NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA

NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 25/2/11 PART 3

Barcode: 586114

Number of pages: 407

Title: France - Political General Algeria

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FILE No. 25/2/11
Part III
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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SUBJECT.
FRANCE Political - General ALGERIA BASEMENT

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Reasons for the decision:

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International relations are dependent upon an appropriate flow of information in confidence between one country and another. If disclosure of information were to lessen the confidence of another country in the Australian Government, that is sufficient ground for a finding that disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage international relations.

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Decision maker :
Designation : APS 5
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: London Times File No. 25/2/11

Published at: London Date: 28-3-59.

THE TIME

ALGIERS CRITICS OF GENERAL DE GAULLE

EXTREMISTS SPEAK OUT

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, MARCH 27

"The gulf is more and more marked between French policy and that of the activists in Algiers," wrote the Socialist paper *Le Populaire* yesterday morning, commenting on General de Gaulle's Press conference of the day before. Reactions in Algiers go far to justify this comment.

The General's refusal "to prejudge the issue," and his emphasis on the way in which the Algerian "personality" will emerge only slowly, as the country is transformed by economic and social change, seems to have been greeted with something between anger and dismay in many European circles in Algiers.

M. Lagaillarde, one of the young extremists who was deeply involved in the uprising of May 13 last year, and was subsequently elected to the French Assembly as a deputy for Algeria, openly declared his disagreement with General de Gaulle, in a statement issued in Algiers last night. He claimed that the success of the referendum in Algeria was a plebiscite in favour of integration, and not—as General de Gaulle had hinted in his Press conference—an expression of a "blind and unconditional confidence" in the person of General de Gaulle.

GEN. ALLARD'S POST

Some of the so-called "patriotic organizations" in Algeria have responded in more or less similar terms, and even the moderate M. Lauriol, a deputy from Algiers, speaking in his own name and that of his fellow deputies elected with him, has made it clear that he cannot agree with all that the General said, particularly where he seemed to make a distinction between Algerians and French.

Yesterday the Council of Ministers in Paris appointed General Allard commander-in-chief of French forces in Germany, in succession to General Jacquot. General Allard has been up to now in command of the tenth military district in Algiers and of all ground forces, and was one of the general officers most closely involved in last year's uprising.

JRC (France)

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: London Times File No: E 25/2/11

Published at: London Date: 31-5-59

In the Shadow of Algeria

The Governments of Morocco and Tunisia have this weekend signed an agreement for "technical, cultural and economic cooperation." Agreements of this sort are often more acts of sympathy than programmes of practical work, and the main inference to be drawn from this gesture is that the two former French Protectorates still feel much more closely linked with each other than with anybody else. Six months ago they took the plunge by joining the Arab League—a decision which has brought them no comfort, since to-day the other League members are more bitterly divided than ever before in their history. The battle of words between Cairo and Baghdad must seem relatively unimportant to Governments which have the shooting war of Algeria on their doorsteps.

Algeria overshadows all the internal affairs of both countries. On the face of it, Tunisia is standing up to the strain better. PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA and his Neo-Destour Party, which recently concluded a "victory congress," are as firmly in the saddle as ever, whereas the dominant Moroccan party, the Istiqlal, has split in two. But Tunisia has 200,000 refugees from Algeria inside her borders, and there have already been clashes between the Tunisian security forces and refugees or Algerian guerrillas on leave. At the back of many people's minds in Tunisia and Morocco is the fear that active war might spread to their countries.

The KING of MOROCCO and PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA, therefore, still devote themselves to the search for a way to end the war. FERHAT ABBAS, the Prime Minister of the provisional Algerian "Government" in exile, has returned to Tunis from Cairo for talks with PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA, and tentative arrangements have been made for a meeting between the KING of MOROCCO and PRESIDENT DE GAULLE. At present these exchanges do little more than to keep the door open. Officially on all sides

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.
Name of Paper: Le Economist - File No. 25/2/11
Published at: London Date: 24-1-59. E

THE WORLD OVERSEAS

The Fight for Algeria—I

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

IF there were only one Algeria, the problem of what to do with it would be soluble, if unpleasant. There are, however, two: the one a scattering of Mediterranean trading towns along the Barbary coast, the other a land mass where the soil, the climate and the population are all equally hostile to any European way of life. France has been caught between its indiscreet attachment to the one Algeria, and its failure to get the measure of the other. It is not altogether surprising that France has, at the same time, been caught between the settler and the military interests. For while to the Europeans in the towns it appears as the simple duty of France to protect a way of life and keep the East at bay, the French army, busy in the valleys and mountains and across the high plateaux of the interior, has committed itself beyond recall to a more complex and ambitious task, the pacification and civilisation of the Arab and Berber peoples against heavy demographic and economic odds. The interests of the European settlers and of the Army are by no means the same, but it is easy to see how both groups found the conventional prefectural administration of the Fourth Republic, which worked tolerably well in the Loiret or the Manche, hopeless in face of a surge of Arab nationalism in an undeveloped country.

Having combined in the *coup* of last May to sweep the prefectural administration away, and having swept away the Fourth Republic in the process, they have been left with very little in common. If the settlers do not yet recognise this fact when they talk to a stranger, the army officers, in general, do. "Integration" was the formula on which the Europeans of Algeria, and the Army, united; but integration means one thing in the half-European towns of the coast, and quite another in the African countryside. To the settlers it offers a refuge from the minority complex, to the Army a mission of social transformation. Of these two groups, the Army and the settlers, it is quite obvious that the Army is the stronger; on the other hand, it is the Army that has taken on the Augean task.

Prefects, sub-prefects, and directors-general are now gradually being infiltrated back into militarised Algeria under the circumspect eye of General de Gaulle's admirable delegate-general in Algiers, M. Delouvrier; but it is perfectly clear that the rough work of administration up-country is going to continue to be done by the Army, if only because of the Army's simple belief in itself as the only body in the French state equipped and ready to do it. The belief is not unfounded. The French Army had generations of experience of this kind of work in the nineteenth century, when the military *bureaux arabes* were the instruments of pacification, just as the military SAS (*sections administratives spécialisées*) are now. Events in Morocco, Indo-China, and elsewhere enabled it to keep its hand in while Algeria was relatively quiet. It saw, in 1955 and 1956, the established structure of civil government in the countryside swept away by the rebellion. Its officers have in their minds a clear conception of the means by which the rebellion can be rooted out, not only on the ground, but in the minds of the Muslim population. As the generals will explain, it is the minds and the hearts that have to be conquered. Their conception involves not only sustained military and police work, not only an ambitious programme of social and economic modernisation, but the transfer and regrouping of vast sections of the population, to produce a country which it is possible not only to police and control, but to render workable in a modern way. In this way, it is supposed, life will be made worth while and the Algerian Arabs given a reason "why they should feel French."

Seen at close quarters, the resettlement of the Muslim population shows, as clearly as anything could, the way in which the tasks of fighting and of governing have become fused. The indigenous communities and tribes have moved, or have been moved, in different ways and for different reasons. Since the early outbreaks in the towns were mastered, the French forces in Algeria have met their main difficulties in the mountain regions which cover a good half of the country, but which house very little of its organised economic life. In some of those regions they needed the population out of the way in order to find the rebels and fight them effectively, as well as to deprive them of food. In others, the Arabs themselves found life insupportable under the harrow of the French forces by day and the rebels by night—the French interrogating them, searching their houses, burning down their trees to deprive the rebels of cover, and fighting over their land, while at night the rebels moved in to take their money, their livestock, and their sons, gave them jobs of sabotage to do, and cut their throats if they did not obey. Some were pulled, others pushed, into leaving the disturbed hill country where they lived and trekking down into the valleys; there the Army assembled them in new settlements designed to provide them with homes, food, protection and discipline.

Probably not less than 600,000 Muslims of Algeria have been moved in this way; many hundreds of completely new villages have been built, or are building, to accommodate them. Experts on rural economy in the civil government will say that these new settlements are intended for the most part as temporary shelter, and that two-thirds of the displaced people will go back to their old grazing-lands when things are quiet again. The soldiers take a different view; to them the new villages—compact, rectilinear, easily policed, rainproof and furnished with electricity and water—represent a great advance on the old Arab way of life as well as a great advance in security, and have therefore come to stay.

To visit a few of these new villages is to be made to feel the audacity of this conception, the depth of the economic misery with which the French soldier-reformers have to contend, and the imperious pressure of population growth which threatens to make nonsense of their efforts. The first product of the migration is a collection of home-made shacks thrown together from petrol tins, loose stone, mud,

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.
Manchester Guardian File No. 25/2/11

NO COMPROMISE FOR ALGERIA

by J. H. Huizinga

[The second of two articles]

In some respects the Algerian leaders find themselves in much the same position as General de Gaulle in 1940. Just as he could face the enemy's overwhelming superiority with confidence because he was beyond the latter's reach and did not stand alone, so the Nationalist leaders in Tunis and Rabat know that they are beyond the reach of France and enjoy the support of the whole of the Arab world plus Communist China and Indonesia. Moreover, they know that in spite of their great losses in the field of battle they occupy a far stronger position than at the outbreak of the war four years ago. Then they were trapped in between a French-controlled Tunisia and French-controlled Morocco. To-day they enjoy every kind of facility on the hospitable territory of their two North African neighbours. At the same time they have greatly broadened their base since the early days when the militant wing of the Nationalist movement decided to take to arms and the more moderate elements, which comprised the majority of the Algerian élite, had not yet made common cause with it.

Thus, one comes away from North Africa inclined to feel that no matter how successful the General may be in "pacifying" Algeria he will not get the sort of peace that will enable France to send its troops back where they belong, as long as he refuses to come to terms with the Nationalist leaders. Those who believe that one can get rid of Algerian nationalism by force seem to make the same mistake as the French and British Governments did when they thought they could get rid of Nasserism by simply dropping a few bombs on Port Said. Admittedly there is one difference between then and now. At the time of Suez the big stick and the big stick alone was supposed to do the trick.

To-day the French employ the carrot as well as the stick. Universal franchise, new housing for a million Algerians, new schools for an additional two million children, new jobs for 400,000 workers; all this adds up to quite a politico-economic carrot. C'est magnifique, one could say of it, mais ce n'est pas la politique. For history offers no precedent of a colonised people turning away from its nationalist movement after four years of bitter war against the colonial ruler in the course of which the record number of 80,000 have already died for the cause.

Thus one reaches the depressing conclusion that no solution of the Algerian problem is in sight. For even the compromise advocated by those who argue that French policy should aim at the creation of a Franco-Maghreb Federation, comprising Morocco and Tunisia as well as Algeria and allowing for Tunis would agree to sacrifice some of their recently acquired sovereignty to the establishment of federal links with their former colonial ruler. And if they are not prepared to do so the Algerian Nationalists who are very conscious of already having shed vastly more blood for their freedom than their two sister peoples have had to expand for its conquest, and who will not, therefore, consider any lesser status than they have achieved, are not likely to prove more accommodating.

It is just possible that the Algerians would accept such a solution by way of a tactical manoeuvre, such as M. Bourguiba executed with conspicuous success when he accepted internal autonomy as a stepping-stone to the full independence which he wrested from the French within nine months of the signature of the autonomy agreement that was supposed to be of indefinite duration. But just because the French will hardly fall into the same trap twice they are not likely to accept such a deceptive compromise solution until and unless they have resigned themselves to the idea of independence. Hence the present deadlock: if France is not to give away everything it must give away nothing and instead continue with the old policy of trying to stamp out as well as emasculate one of the most tenacious and fearless nationalist movements in colonial history.

It seems a hopeless undertaking. But however tempting it may be to criticise the General for persisting in it there are two points that in all fairness should not be overlooked. The first is that public opinion and the Army would not stand for the only policy that offers any hope of peace—recognition of the principle of an independent Algeria. The other point is that the French are struggling with a problem that no other colonial ruler—with one exception—has yet resolved in a constructive manner. The only imperial Power that has dared to transfer power to native Governments in a plural society is, paradoxically enough, France itself. Half a million Frenchmen were handed over to Arab rule in independent Morocco and Tunisia.

But why then does France find it so utterly impossible to follow the same daring policy in Algeria? It is not that the lessons of the Moroccan and Tunisian experiments have been such as to forbid a repeat performance. As regards physical security, the Frenchmen living in independent Morocco and Tunisia have been far better off than their fellow-countrymen who still enjoy the protection of the French flag in Algeria, 1,500 of whom lost their lives in the last four years as against 57 on the other side of the frontier. It is only in the economic field that they are beginning to feel the pinch. Much the same goes for that other category of French protégés the Moslems who collaborated with the French in their day of power. They, too, have suffered far less since the French left than their co-religionaries are now suffering in French-ruled Algeria, where 10,000 of them have been killed by the Algerian Nationalists as compared with the mere handful that fell victim to Nationalist vengeance when the neighbouring States achieved their independence.

It makes one suspect that concern for the fate of her sons and friends cannot be the only reason for France's refusal to recognise that what is sauce for the Moroccan and Tunisian geese must be sauce for the Algerian gander. The desire for raw materials and strategic key-points, which has led to so many colonial wars in the past, plays at least as great a part in the determination to hang on to Algeria. M. Soustelle has made that perfectly clear. In his view the retention of Algeria is imperative "because he who possesses this strategic springboard controls the Western Mediterranean. . . . Because Algeria means the Sahara and the Sahara means oil. . . . That is why France must make sure of retaining free access to the Sahara and prevent it from falling under any other than French sovereignty."

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PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S CONVERSATION WITH A GROUP OF ALGERIAN DEPUTIES AS REPORTED BY M. LAFFONT *

The 30th April, 1959, the Algerian daily "L'Echo d'Oran" published certain statements on Algeria attributed to General de Gaulle.

The Presidency of the Republic has issued the following communiqué on this article :

> " On April 29 General de Gaulle received several Algerian members of Parliament, amon them M. Pierre Laffont, Deputy of Oran. M. Laffont believed that he could in a newspaper give an account of the conversation as he remembered it. General de Gaulle did not grant an interview to M. Laffont. Thus only the substance of what he reported can be considered to correspond to what was said to him."

With this reservation in mind, we publish below a translation of the article that appeared in "L'Echo d'Oran" of April 30, 1959.

"Question : Mr. President, what can you tell me regarding the progress of pacification in the Oran region ?

"Answer: Pacification in the Oran region has been very successful because it has been conducted with appropriate means. I believe that its effects will be lasting, judging from the way the mentality of the population has changed. We are attempting the same task in the Algiers region. It will take longer and be more difficult there, but I do not despair of seeing it reach a happy conclusion within a suitable period of time. Under these circumstances, I do not understand the attitude of certain residents of Algiers who are keeping alive an atmosphere of unrest in the city of Algiers for which there is no justification.

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* M. Laffont is a deputy of Oran and publisher of the newspaper "L'Echo d'Oran."

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"Question : Have you something to say on the recent decrees of pardon ?

"Answer : As the Premier has said, before assuming the Presidency of the Republic, I wanted a new climate to be created. All those condemned to death, some of whose briefs were more than two years old, were pardoned. I also had many prisoners in interment camps set free. Whatever may have been said about it, this measure met with a very favorable reception on the part of the Moslem population, and if today we see more and more of them rallying to our side, this measure has something to do with it. To go back to the recent decrees of pardon, I did not want men who had merely had the bad luck not to have their briefs complete at the time of my election to the Presidency of the Republic to suffer so severe a penalty as the death penalty. I see nothing in that to excite public opinion in a country like ours.

"Question : But why, Mr. President, weren't these comments added to the announcements themselves, thus giving free rein to all sorts of suppositions ?

"Answer : Because, in Paris as in Algiers, there are people who make a point of confusing the issue and who jump at every opportunity to do so.

"Question : Do you believe that the F.L.N. is running into serious difficulties at the present time ?

"Answer : Of course they are : that is the consequence of the military operations. The blockades are effective and it is getting more and more difficult for them to get arms into the interior of Algeria. It has been noted that the enemy has less punch than he used to have.

"Furthermore, the F.L.N. is running into new difficulties on the political level. First they tried to get me to send an emissary to a neutral area to hold talks, hoping in this way to obtain implicit recognition. I did not want this, for I do not have to recognize this organization. The F.L.N. certainly represents a considerable force, but, to my way of thinking, it does not represent Algeria or even the Moslems of Algeria. I have spoken of the peace of the brave. The offer still stands, and it is in Paris that the talks must take place. The organization outside Algeria has likewise tried to obtain official recognition from numerous States and, please note, without the slightest success. I have made it known to all bona fide States that France would immediately recall her ambassadors from any country that recognized this political organization. Of course I am not speaking of the Americans or the British, but I said this both to India and to Soviet Russia.

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"In all that I have just said, there has been nothing but signs of improvement in the past year. Not everything is perfection... not everything is settled, but a tremendous task has been accomplished. There are always people who say, 'yes, but.' Ever since the world began, there have been people like that .... Well, what do these agitators in Algiers want ? The situation now is not what it was a year ago. If May 13 turned out successfully, it was because, behind Algiers, there was all of France and the Army, too.

"Question : Mr. President, you know that the fact that you have never used the word integration has enabled some to draw conclusions that are hostile to your policy.... May I ask you why you have never used this word ?

"Answer : First of all, because people tried to force it on me. But what have I done since I have been in power and even before that ? In 1943, I was the one who gave the Moslems the right to vote. Isn't this already integration ? But those who are screaming 'integration' the loudest today are the very ones who at that time were opposed to this measure .... What they want is for somebody to give them back Papa's Algeria .... But Papa's Algeria is dead, and if they don't understand that, they will die with it.

"And ever since I have been at the head of the State, what have I done, if not to ensure the respect by everyone of equality of rights; to create a single electoral college; to hold elections that enable Moslems to become representatives of their province; to open various public posts to the Moslems, not only in Algeria, but even in Metropolitan France; finally, through the Constantine Plan, to go ahead with what is most important--to keep Algeria from being always down at heel. Isn't that real integration ? As for the political significance of the word, what does it mean ? That Algeria is French ? Is there any point in saying so, since it is a fact ?

"Question : Don't you think, Mr. President, that the word 'integration' was the basis on which the fraternization of the two communities came about, starting with May 13 ?

"Answer : The fraternization of the two communities did not come about on May 13 with M. Lagaillarde. It was during the days that followed that the Moslem population fraternized with the European population in The Forum /a public square in Algiers/. And fraternization came about because people began to shout the name 'de Gaulle'. It was

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around my name that fraternization took place. It is my name which was responsible for it.

"Question : The Algerian deputies complain that they have no contact with you. Do you intend to receive them ?

"Answer : I did not want to see them as long as elections were still in progress. These are now over, and I intend to receive the representatives of both communities on a regular basis.

"Question : Mr. President, do you believe there will be a happy solution to the Algerian tragedy ?

"Answer : I believe that a happy solution is now being worked out, and that is what I am striving to do. As far as we are concerned, it is high time that we succeeded. If this development fails, even if the pacification were final, Algeria would soon be lost to us. For, at the first opportunity, she would rise up again, and this time there would be no solution. I am the only one who can bring about a solution in Algeria.... All those who incite the French of Algeria against me risk delaying a return to peace. Our future can be magnificent if we know how to remain united."

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EUROPEAN

Avec les compliments

de l'Ambassade de France

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"Question : Mr. President, you know that the fact that you have never used the word integration has enabled some to draw conclusions that are hostile to your policy.... May I ask you why you have never used this word ?

"Answer : First of all, because people tried to force it on me. But what have I done since I have been in power and even before that ? In 1943, I was the one who gave the Moslems the right to vote. Isn't this already integration ? But those who are screaming 'integration' the loudest today are the very ones who at that time were opposed to this measure ... What they want is for somebody to give them back Papa's Algeria .... But Papa's Algeria is dead, and if they don't understand that, they will die with it.

"And ever since I have been at the head of the State, what have I done, if not to ensure the respect by everyone of equality of rights; to create a single electoral college; to hold elections that enable Moslems to become representatives of their province; to open various public posts to the Moslems, not only in Algeria, but even in Metropolitan France; finally, through the Constantine Plan, to go ahead with what is most important--to keep Algeria from being always down at heel. Isn't that real integration ? As for the political significance of the word, what does it mean ? That Algeria is French ? Is there any point in saying so, since it is a fact ?

"Question : Don't you think, Mr. President, that the word 'integration' was the basis on which the fraternization of the two communities came about, starting with May 13 ?

"Answer : The fraternization of the two communities did not come about on May 13 with M. Lagaillarde. It was during the days that followed that the Moslem population fraternized with the European population in The Forum /a public square in Algiers/. And fraternization came about because people began to shout the name 'de Gaulle'. It was

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around my name that fraternization took place. It is my name which was responsible for it.

"Question : The Algerian deputies complain that they have no contact with you. Do you intend to receive them ?

"Answer : I did not want to see them as long as elections were still in progress. These are now over, and I intend to receive the representatives of both communities on a regular basis.

"Question : Mr. President, do you believe there will be a happy solution to the Algerian tragedy ?

"Answer : I believe that a happy solution is now being worked out, and that is what I am striving to do. As far as we are concerned, it is high time that we succeeded. If this development fails, even if the pacification were final, Algeria would soon be lost to us. For, at the first opportunity, she would rise up again, and this time there would be no solution. I am the only one who can bring about a solution in Algeria.... All those who incite the French of Algeria against me risk delaying a return to peace. Our future can be magnificent if we know how to remain united."

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.
Name of Paper London Times File No. 25/2/11
Published at London Date 24-4-59 AF

cargo not listed in her papers.

DISILLUSIONED EXTREMISTS IN ALGERIA

M. MARTEL ATTACKS DE GAULLE RÉGIME

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, APRIL 13

The time limit for the registration of lists of candidates for the Algiers municipal elections closes at midnight. Unless there are last-minute developments, it seems that these elections will be notable for the multitude and confusion of lists and rivalry of persons among the Europeans, and an even greater sense of reserve and bewilderment among the Muslims than at the time of the general elections last November.

European extremists, or "ultras," in Algiers are more openly opposing the present régime in Paris and its failure (in their eyes) to fulfil the promises of the rising of May 13 last, by which General de Gaulle was helped back to power. Yesterday some 1,500 people attended a meeting of the "Popular Movement of May 13," at which M. Martel, leader of the movement, made a series of violent charges against the Paris Government, including General de Gaulle.

"A MARXIST TRAP"

He described M. Soustelle as "the instrument of a crypto-Communist régime," and evoked jeers from the audience when he spoke of General de Gaulle as trying to make himself "king of a united Maghreb." In the past year, he said, Africa had obtained "a perfect right to secession," and moral and political decadence was continuing. He stood for total and absolute integration, but this did not mean integration as proposed by M. Soustelle, "which is a Marxist trap." M. Martel used the word "trap" again, promising that "there will be another May 13, but not on that date, because traps are being prepared."

In spite of the rising tone and sentiment of these "ultras" as the anniversary of the Algerian upheavals approaches, most observers on the spot report that a renewal of serious trouble is not very likely. Political visitors from Paris, including some of the Algerian deputies elected last November, have been trying to calm their excitable compatriots, among whom the ex-service men are, as usual, inclined to be most susceptible. The great bulk of the Army in Algeria would probably refuse to be drawn into another insurrectional movement. It might be otherwise if General de Gaulle agreed to political negotiations with the F.L.N. (the Algerian National Liberation Front), but as he shows no sign of that the issue remains academic.

At the parliamentary level, M. Debré's main task is to ensure that the Algerian deputies do not, when the summer session opens on April 28, immediately table draft Bills insisting in so many words on the integration of Algeria with France. It seems for the moment that this danger has been averted, and that the talisman "integration" will be put aside, though the Algerians will certainly not abandon what they interpret as its meaning.

SERVING PRIESTS' LETTER

A letter recently addressed to their bishops in France by some 30 priests serving (as reserve officers, not chaplains) with the armed forces in Algeria has found its way into some left-wing weekly papers in France. It says that, without wishing to take up any political standpoint, the priests must ask their bishops for guidance about what they describe as "methods which our consciences condemn." They say that arbitrary arrests and detentions are frequent, and that interrogations are all too often carried out by methods of torture; and that there are many summary executions of civil and military prisoners, decided on by authorities without competence for such decisions, and covered up under the head of "attempted escape."

The priests add that in some regions of Algeria directives forbidding these practices have been issued by the military authorities, and to their knowledge punishment has been inflicted on some of those responsible for such practices. They emphasize that these practices, though widespread, are not by any means general in Algeria, and contend that part of the difficulty springs from the refusal of the French Army and authorities to recognize that a state of war exists. But, they comment, the practices could have serious effects on the faith and moral values of soldiers serving in Algeria.

The priests' letter also questions the methods of psychological warfare being taught in Algeria. Although Communist methods are openly condemned, "many officers tend to use the enemy's psychological methods, and to justify the means by the end. . . . Here we are faced with a real deformation of conscience."

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: London Times File No. 25/2/11 AF

Published at: London Date: 24-4-59.

AF

TOO SLOW

The great question whether PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S policy for Algeria is too slow and too cautious is raised again this week; M. DEBRÉ'S visit, begun yesterday, is timely. Municipal elections have been held throughout the country except—in about an eighth of the whole—where rebel strength has put them off. Muslims were free to join with Europeans to elect their local representatives. It has been a further cautious move in the attempt to build up the "Algerian personality" so that ultimately the Algerian people themselves — the Muslim majority and the European minority together—may decide their own future through universal suffrage. The results so far leave this future almost as obscure as ever. "The elections," said M. MOLLET yesterday, "have not brought forth true representatives."

This was partly to be expected. In many areas candidates were chosen for personal rather than political reasons. Elsewhere it is encouraging to find that men of moderate political views gained ground against the extremists. But Algiers itself shows once again the strength of GENERAL DE GAULLE'S European opponents, and, on the other side, the Algerian nationalists kept out of the elections altogether. Much more disturbing has been the poor turnout by ordinary Muslims, those whom the French hoped most to bring along. The abstentions may be partly due to rebel threats, partly to lack of interest after the far greater excitement of the referendum last year. The French, however, have to ask whether the movement of hope that was begun with GENERAL DE GAULLE'S return is faltering and whether disillusion is setting in.

The cost of the war in human suffering is still appallingly great. Part of it has just been revealed by M. DELOUVRIER, the French delegate-general. On the basis of a special inquiry he has announced that more than a million Muslims, about one in nine of the Muslim population, are uprooted from their homes and are now in "regroupment centres." Some of them had themselves bolted for safety from their isolated villages. The greater part have been moved by the French Army to keep them away from the rebels or to clear the ground before a military action, and their number has grown rapidly in recent months. Though some are being modernity through schools, industry, and agricultural reform may indeed be too slow. His offer of a cease-fire has been rejected on the ground that it did not include political talks. But he has still to keep hope alive and fortify those Muslims who know that Algeria must, for its own welfare, keep some association with France. With those aims in view, he may have to come out soon with far stricter instructions on the treatment of suspects under interrogation and with a clearer and firmer programme on the future of Algeria.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Economist - File No 25/4/11

Published at London Date 28-3-59

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Answering the Call

M. DEBRÉ'S luck seems to be in at last. He left for Algeria last weekend, intending to repeat General de Gaulle's appeal to the rebels to accept local cease-fires—"the peace of the brave"—in his speech at Constantine on Monday night. The marked lack of enthusiasm for this offer when it was first made last October suggested that repetition might be a politically hazardous enterprise; and M. Debré was painfully conscious of General Massu's disillusioning experience with the Algerian leader, Si Azzedine, earlier this month. But, fortunately for him, a rebel detachment was already on the way from Tunisia to give itself up. This band had apparently been at odds with the rebel leadership in Tunisia; there are suggestions that its leader, Ali Hambli, was among those involved in the plot against the rebel government's war minister, Krim Belkacem. Ali Hambli now says that he had always thought General de Gaulle's proposals had a real interest. While he seems to have taken some time to answer the call, it is an undeniable French success that he should have brought 150 men with him and beaten off determined rebel attempts to stop him. It remains to be seen whether his example will encourage further defections.

Ali Hambli's appearance will have been all the more welcome to M. Debré because both the Algerian command and the settlers' organisations have become increasingly restless over the need for more troops. The new emphasis is likely to be on a strategy of greater manœuvre by local commands, although settler opinion is opposed to any reduction of troops on guard duties in farms and small towns. Meanwhile, an optimistic economic report by the delegate-general in Algiers, M. Delouvrier, has improved the political atmosphere. He expects the iron and steel works at Bône to be built in four years (although financing has yet to be arranged); and the price of natural gas to be made available for Algerian consumption from Hassi R'mel is to be one of the cheapest in the world. Perhaps encouraged by this, 48 new enterprises are being set up in Algeria at present.

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Name of Paper: London Times File No.: 25/2/11

Published at: London Date: 31-3-59.

Imperial and Foreign

BLOW TO REBEL CAUSE IN ALGERIA

AMIROUCHE KILLED IN ACTION

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, MARCH 30

The death at the hands of French troops of Amirouche, by reputation the cruellest, bravest, and most powerful of the Algerian rebel leaders, was hailed in Paris and Algiers to-day as the heaviest blow to the rebellion for several months.

Muslim dignitaries from Kabylia, where Amirouche held sway, were to-day taken by Army helicopter to see his body, so that they might spread the news. M. Delouvrier, the Delegate-General, gave warning in a broadcast from Algiers that Amirouche's fate would sooner or later be shared by all rebels who refused to respond to President de Gaulle's "generous offer" of a cease-fire. He referred to the recent defection of an entire band of 150 armed men to the French side, and hoped that the F.L.N. leaders in Tunis and Cairo would at last realize the futility of the sacrifices they were demanding of the rebel armies. Amirouche's death would at least have served a purpose if it helped to hasten the end of the fighting.

"PARIS GOVERNS"

M. Delouvrier issued an unexpected warning to the European extremists who are criticizing General de Gaulle's policy. Referring to "the complaints of certain people," he said: "You will all realize that it is Paris that governs in Algeria, even in Algiers."

Amirouche's name became legendary in Algeria after he took command of the rebels in Kabylia two summers ago. Born in 1926, he was working as a jeweller in a town near Oran when the rebellion broke out in 1957, and he joined it at once. He quickly showed his leadership in the Aurès sector, and the rebel high command in Tunis then sent him to revive operations in the Kabylia mountains, an area on the point of being "pacified" by the French.

At the head of 5,000 well armed and highly trained men, he sowed terror on every side, and soon made Kabylia the bastion of the rebellion again. Many French operations against him, including a big scheme last winter under General Massu, failed, and the local Kabyles regarded him as miraculously protected by Allah. General Farne, the French local commander, said recently that if Amirouche were slain the revolt in Kabylia would lose four-fifths of its strength.

PRESSURE ON FOLLOWERS

Amirouche is said to have lived close to his troops, making heavy demands on them, on pain of death. To avoid capture, he would sometimes change his refuge several times in a night. He is supposed to have been responsible for the charnel-house of Akgadou, where the French last September found the bodies of 600 Muslims who had been killed for suspected treachery.

On the other hand, he released without ill-treatment the many European civilians, including a Swiss and an American priest, kidnapped by his forces in recent months. Europeans brought before him say that he was a tall, thin man with a black moustache, spoke with authority, and received them with great courtesy. He was killed outside the area of his command, near Bon Saada, in a clash with a large French force, including parachutists and Foreign Legionaries.

Another regional commander, Si Haoues, in charge of the mountain zone south of Algiers, died with Amirouche. There are six F.L.N. regional commands in Algeria.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper London Times File No 25/2/11

Published at London Date 21-4-59 AF

'MODERATES' SUCCESSES IN ALGERIA

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, APRIL 20

The municipal elections which took place yesterday in 120 of the main towns of Algeria have been marked by a low poll, and in several places by victories of moderate and comparatively liberal candidates over right-wing extremists.

In Algiers the poll was 44 per cent., the lowest in living memory; at the general election in November it was more than 60 per cent., and 75 per cent. at the referendum. The drop is explained by general public lassitude at having to vote three times in seven months; by the presence of several different lists of candidates proclaiming the same policy; and perhaps, in the case of some Muslims, by the reluctance to express clear views about the future while General de Gaulle's own policy remains so unclear.

M. Lagaillarde, the well known right-wing deputy from Algiers, commented today on the high abstention rate: "Algiers is the capital of the May 13 revolt. Its silence is the reply to the silence of General de Gaulle." Another observer remarked: "The Muslims are Gaullists. De Gaulle is waiting. The Muslims are waiting."

MAYOR NOT CHOSEN

M. Soustelle's Union for a New Republic, which by the standards of Algerian politics is comparatively liberal, in that it equivocably supports the Government's policy, secured as many seats on the city council (14) as its chief extremist rival, the National Front for Integration and Fraternity, which includes many Poujadists and other elements hostile to the Government and to the whole Parliamentary system.

The French Algeria Movement, slightly less extremist in its views but well to the right of the U.N.R., secured 13 seats, while five went to the supporters of the former left-wing liberal mayor, M. Jacques Chevallier. As several other seats were won by candidates with no clear political colouring it is not yet certain whether the next mayor of Algiers will be an "ultra" or a Gaullist.

In Oran, as in Algiers, the U.N.R. did much better than might have been expected. It won an absolute majority of votes and seats, whereas in November it had narrowly escaped defeat by the "ultras." At Bilde, Philippeville, Tlemcen, and Sidi bel Abbès comparatively liberal lists in favour of the Government's policy won the day over the extremists.

ENCOURAGING RESULTS

These results are generally regarded in Paris as encouraging, and as suggesting that the European population as a whole is far from sharing the hostility to General de Gaulle of certain extremist leaders in Algiers. But the attitude of the Muslims remains baffling as ever. As in November, there were no nationalist candidates, not even moderate ones, and Socialist candidates on the whole did badly. In several predominantly Muslim areas the abstention rate was high—e.g., at Setif the poll was only 37 per cent.

It also appears that terrorists were able to make their presence felt more than in November, and this may have had some effect on the polling. Sixteen civilians have been killed and 63 wounded during the past two days: Algiers saw its worst terrorist attack for nearly two years, and four people were killed when a bomb was thrown near a polling booth at Constantine.

The elections are continuing to-day in smaller towns and rural districts, where they are being spread out over several days for reasons of security. In 150 communes where the rebels are still comparatively strong, the elections are not being held at all for the time being.

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201/5/4
Memorandum 417

25/2/11
Mattile (Paris)
Mr Beckett

21st April 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

Reports published in Paris in recent weeks are constant in their insistence that things are now going better for the French in Algeria. It is hard to judge from this distance and from the seat of the French Government whether these reports are more than psychological warfare but for what it may be worth the substance of the reports is as follows.

2. General Challe, whom General de Gaulle made supreme commander in Algeria, is operating under a new plan. The plan is said to be one under which the Army has split its units into roving bands just like the rebel bands. These do not wait for the rebels to make their presence known by an attack but seek out the rebel bands and engage them. In other words, instead of static defence dispositions and counter-attack in overwhelming strength, the French are fighting guerilla warfare with their own kind of guerilla warfare. To carry out the new plan, intensive command changes were made (no demerit involved).

3. The Challe plan, so far only applied in three regions, is reported to have been very successful. This may explain the relatively high figures of rebel casualties which have been published recently. It may also explain how Amirouche, that very elusive figure, was cornered and killed.

4. It has also been reported that more and more rebels are surrendering to the French. This may be the result of the Challe plan. It may be the result of other reported factors, notably that there is a large amount of dissension among the rebels. The defection of Ali Hambli's band gives some credence to these reports.

5. Still other reports say that at least some of the political leaders of the F.L.N. are discouraged and believe that the rebels' future now lies only in negotiations with the French. M. Ferhat Abbas is said to be of this belief. The most interesting of these reports appeared on 20th April. On that date the head of Reuters in France, Mr King, said that according to reliable information, a majority of the F.L.N. "Government" how wanted to accept General de Gaulle's offer to negotiate in Paris a cease-fire. In a private news circular published today, Mr King's informant is said to be an Egyptian diplomat in Cairo.

6. Also on 20th April the Governor-General's office in Algiers published what it said were notes of the talks between Amirouche and another rebel leader, Si Haoulé, just prior to the engagement in which Amirouche was killed. According to these notes, Si Haoulé expressed to Amirouche complaints about the arms of the rebel bands, a feeling of being abandoned by those outside Algeria and wonderment that General de Gaulle's offer had not been accepted.

7. This latter report can, given its sources, only be treated with great reserve (would two leaders of rebel bands, meeting in the mountains, make notes of their talks?). However, it is all grist to the mill which at present is operating at pretty full capacity.

E. Renouf
(Copy on 167/1/2)

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM. → 25/2/11

JT:HC

I.7440

Dated: 23rd April, 1959.

Rec'd: 29th April, 1959.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

S.AV. 226. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed Canberra, repeated London 47, Washington 36.

French Situation through Tunisian Eyes.

1. I had a long talk yesterday with the Tunisian Ambassador (Bourguiba, son of the President, an old acquaintance from New York since the Security Council's consideration of Tunis' application for membership of the United Nations). He spoke rather bitterly of their continued difficulties with the French, some of whom he said still had nostalgia for the old situation when Tunisia was not independent. In particular he referred to recent frontier incidents and only yesterday he had complained to the French Foreign Ministry regarding French troops who had crossed into Tunisia from Algeria.

2. He also commented on France's irrational irritation when Tunisia had refused to devalue her currency along with the franc (even though the French had given Tunisia no advance notice of their devaluation). Tunisia had been obliged to follow France in her previous devaluation under Mollet, because at that time Tunisia did not yet have her own national Bank. The French were now contesting their own previous figures of the Tunisian currency reserves held by France at the granting of independence. France's latest devaluation was necessary not for technical financial reasons, but to meet domestic political problems which had no bearing on the Tunisian economy. French manufacturers gained an advantage momentarily from devaluation but Tunisia could derive no economic benefit from this devaluation.

3. In discussing the general French situation Bourguiba, like so many other colleagues, raised the question of what would follow if de Gaulle lost popularity. He agreed with the widespread view that there would be a dictatorship of the right ("General de Gaulle has not the mentality of a dictator though perhaps he has that of a King"). But he thought this in turn would produce a revolt by the left. If France went Communist that would be the end of Europe and of North Africa.

4. The tragedy of the present world situation, he said, is that the Nationalist movements in Asia and Africa have experienced only the oppression of the Western colonial powers since Russia had no colonies outside what is today Soviet Union. Consequently the struggle for independence in Asia and Africa is inevitably a struggle against the leading powers

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.7440

of the free world. Unless the free world helps these former colonies to independence they will naturally look to Russia. The Soviet does not need to do anything; it can just sit back and wait for the harvest. This situation is very worrying to Tunisia. As a small country it would have no future in a Communist World. But it could not resist if its North African neighbours were absorbed by the Soviet.

5. Hence the urgency of the Algerian problem. The Algerian rebels cannot be suppressed by force. They will continue to recruit afresh from the Algerian people who have nothing to loose because they possess nothing. Now even if Algeria's industry and cities decay this will not impose any losses on the Algerian people since they have nothing to loose. When they fight at least they feel free.

6. The basic requirement for a solution is for de Gaulle to impose his will on the so called French population of Algeria (who are mostly Italian, Spanish and Maltese "neo Frenchmen") but Bourguiba doubts very much that de Gaulle is strong enough to have his orders carried out there.

7. We discussed a little the history of Tunisian-Moroccan attempts to promote negotiations which led him on to comment on the Moroccan Crown Prince's visit to Cairo "for which the Prince had little enthusiasm". Bourguiba then commented on the progressive disintegration of the Arab League. Although Tunisia was the strongest centre of the U.A.R. in the League, Libya, Soudan, Lebanon and even Iraq had become lukewarm towards the League. Tunisia believed in the brotherhood of Arabs and they should be united by an embrace and not by being trodden under foot.

Walker.

MIN. DLPT. L.A. 30th April, 1959.

SEC A/Ss L. MR. EASTMAN UN ER COMREL P.C&M
EA AM&SP S&SEA S.A. SEA. L.AF&ME E AF ML INF DL
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25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
29 APR 1959
COPY

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS.

RESTRICTED

201/5/4

Memorandum 414

20th April, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Mr Hitchcock
Mr Nystrom
H.R.S.

The Municipal Elections in Algeria

It was Algeria's turn last week-end to hold municipal elections. Voting in the urban areas took place on 19th April, 1959. Voting elsewhere is going on now and will continue for a week.

2. These municipal elections in Algeria have an unusual importance: When elections of this kind were last held in Algeria (before 1956, the first year the rebellion made elections impossible), three-fifths of Algeria was administered by nominees of the Government in Algiers. In the other two-fifths where there were municipal councils, the councils were composed, on the average, of two Europeans for every Algerian. General de Gaulle has changed all this. Elected municipal councils will in future regulate municipal affairs throughout Algeria. Moreover, these councillors will be in a general proportion of two to one but two Algerians to one European.

3. The municipal elections mark therefore an important stage in the General's broad and long-range plan to develop Algeria. A part of the plan is to enhance the political status of the Algerians. Their political status is being enhanced by giving them greater voting rights, both municipally and with regard to Algerian representation in the French National Assembly, and greater representation, again both municipally and in the National Assembly. It is for this reason that the French Goverment has taken great pains to see the current elections are fair and to encourage the people of Algeria to vote.

4. The municipal elections in Algeria are also important for another reason. There results, it was expected, might throw some light upon what the people of Algeria, both white and coloured, think of General de Gaulle's Algerian policy. The white French population is divided upon the policy, some favouring the integration (with France) demand of the 13th May leaders, other backing de Gaulle with his plan of developing Algeria and letting the country's political future form itself. The results of the elections might also reflect the current hold of the F.L.N. upon the native population. In short, it was considered that the elections might serve as a barometer whereby one could gauge the state of play in the Algerian struggle.

5. All this having been said, what do the results of the elections show? The major feature of the results so far received is the high proportion of electors who chose not to vote at all. The rough over-all proportion of those voting is 60%, a decent enough proportion for municipal elections. But the overall proportion does not tell all the story. In the principal commune, the of the capital, Algiers, only 40% of the electors voted (the proportion was even lower in, for example, Setif), and this after extraordinary measures by the Government to coax the public to the polls (a tour by the Governor-General of the voting booths, constant radio exhortations by the civilian and army leaders ("Not to vote is to betray the Army") and cars going around broadcast "Vote, Vote"). The 60% overall vote was only reached by a much higher partic ation in the elections by voters in the communes of less importance.

6. Why did so many electors stay away from the polls in a country wher

Enclair (orig on 167/2/4)

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the people usually revel in elections? It is hard to say exactly. The following reasons all have force:

a) The municipal elections are the third in less than a year and are the least important of the trio. Clearly so many elections must produce some degree of apathy;

b) The multiplicity of candidates. No fewer than 61 lists were offered to the Algiers electors. And the programmes of many of these were vague and difficult to separate from each other;

c) The election boycott of the F.L.N. and ~~its~~ the intimidatory tactics employed to achieve its end;

d) A desire to keep out of trouble, not only trouble with the F.L.N. but also with the ultras.

7. The F.L.N. seems to have made a serious effort to disrupt the elections. It greeted election day with a reversion to urban terrorism. Three serious acts of terrorism, by time-bomb and grenade, were committed, two in Algiers and one in Constantine. They killed six persons and wounded forty-four. This was the first time in two years that the rebels employed a time-bomb in Algiers. The incidents were followed by a flood of F.L.N. leaflets. The F.L.N. were also active outside the urban centres, one Musulman candidate having his head cut off. The purpose of the F.L.N. appears to have been three-fold - to show that the rebellion is still very much alive despite its recent set-backs (such as the death of Amirouche), to persuade Algerians to abstain from voting, and possibly to encourage the white Algerian to support the ultras against General de Gaulle(x)

8. The high proportion of voters who abstained from voting is a set-back for the French Government. It does seem to show that General de Gaulle's ambitious programme for the development of Algeria does not have the mass appeal in Algeria which it was designed to capture, that even such a programme is not enough to make Algerians forget the fratricidal strife of the last four years and co-operate to build for a common future, it is not enough to capture the allegiance of the coloured Algerian and make him forget for a while about independence. The coloured Algerians will, of course, as a result of the elections have more say in the local administrations but quite a lot of them do not ~~apparently~~ appear to attach much importance to this. And it is impossible to say just what kind of coloured Algerian has been elected. Reports say many worthy Algerians would not stand for election, whether through intimidation, through a belief that the elections would not be fair or through an attitude that even if elected they would not have any real powers. There were no nationalist candidates. In brief, the results of the municipal elections, as was the case with the elections in Algeria to the National Assembly last year, cannot be said to have endorsed General de Gaulle's policy. Nor do they hold much hope for the success of that policy in the conditions which now reign in Algeria. The hold of the rebels on the coloured Algerian is, it seems, still strong. At least it is strong enough to make him adopt the attitude of "Wait and see".

9. The white Algerian is divided into two groups - those who want integration with France now, who may be called for convenience the ultras, and those who

(x) "Le Monde" reports that in public discussion in the vicinity of the time-bomb incident just after the event, several Europeans remarked that the incident showed how little General de Gaulle's policy was worth. Colonel Godard, the well-known 13th May figure who controls security in Algiers, was present and exclaimed heatedly and rather ambiguously, "Don't forget there has been no bomb attempt in Algiers since 2nd August, 1957."

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

favour General de Gaulle's policy of development and gradual evolution towards some undefined political state; the latter may be called "Gaullists". The main party of the ultras in the municipal elections is the National Front for Integration and Fraternity; the party of the Gaullists is the U.N.R. (as in metropolitan France). How did the two parties (they campaigned against each other) fare in the elections? As far as one can gather (and there is no means of making a proper reckoning), the U.N.R. has had the better of the struggle. In Algiers each party secured 14 seats out of a total of 77 (the Independents and others secured the most seats, 26). Elsewhere, however, the U.N.R. generally did better than the National Front and other ultra parties and numbers of the 13th May figures were eliminated from the municipal councils.

10. This result is some consolation for the French Government. But it is consolation for the U.N.R. rather than for General de Gaulle, consolation which does not really affect the basic problem of Algeria's future. For whether the U.N.R. as a whole really prefers the General's moderate policy to one of integration is a crucial "showdown" question which has yet to be answered (it may never be answered).

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
27 APR 1959
COPY

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

201/5/4

Memorandum 392

15th April 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

M. Ferhat Abbas, President of the "provisional Government of the Algerian Republic", is in the middle of official visits to India and Pakistan. In an interview given to the "Pakistan Press Association" on 14th April in Karachi, M. Abbas is reported as saying that he was not satisfied with the attitude of the Indian and Pakistani Governments as regards recognition of the "Government" of which he was President. He said further that his "government" had several times tried to get negotiations going with the French Government without any success.

2. M. Abbas also said that he proposed to visit Indonesia in September next as part of his campaign of visits to enlighten public opinion on the Algerian question. He did not, however, propose to visit the U.S.S.R. as part of his campaign.

3. M. Abbas also denied rumours that the "Provisional Government" may move its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. He said that the "Government" would sit alternatively at Tunis, Rabat or Cairo, according to the exigencies of the moment.

4. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to Karachi and Djakarta.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

Mr Spillane
Mr E - return
(sig on 16/4/59)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
27 APR 1959
COPY

201/5/4

Memorandum 403

17th April 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

The Left-wing Paris weekly, "L'Express", has just published an interesting report about General de Gaulle's plans for the future of Algeria. This report is drawn from an article in a magazine published in, of all places, Panama. The magazine is called "Vision", and it is published by the teaching staff of the University of Panama.

2. According to "Vision", General de Gaulle is studying a law which would give Algeria autonomy within the Community and would, at the same time, protect the rights of the colons. The General is said to be motivated by the solution which has been reached in Cyprus, which has shown how the aspirations of two ethnic groups in one territory can be reconciled. The solution which it is said the General is studying is as follows:

a) There would be an Arab President of Algerian and a European Vice-President. The governmental structure would be based upon that of the Vth French Republic;

b) The Algerian Government would have a majority of Arabs, the proportion of Arabs to Europeans not yet having been determined. One proportion being considered is 75/25 or 70/30;

c) Before acting, the General would seek the support of King Mohammed of Morocco. He would also use President Bourguiba to persuade the F.L.N. to go along with his plan;

d) King Mohammed had already made it known that he would support a solution of the Algerian problem along the above lines. As a part of the price for such a settlement, he would be disposed to see that Morocco re-entered the French Community, but as an independent state. It was taken for granted that M. Bourguiba would feel the same way. After the solution has been put through, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco would form a North-West African union within the framework of the Community.

4. It is impossible to see just what basis of fact the above report may have; however the ideas it contains are interesting.

E. Renouf
(Copy on 16/2/12)
AG 1/5.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: Canberra Times File No: 25/2/11

Published at: Canberra. Date: 22-4-59

Algerian Trouble Extends To Paris

By EDWARD ESMERIAN

PARIS (Associated Press).—The backyard of the Algerian rebellion is in Paris—in shanty towns, and cheap hotels where thousands of poorly paid Algerian workers are easy prey to nationalist fund collectors.

Police are well aware of the problem, but French housing conditions are second only to the Algerian insurrection as a national headache. Combined, the two make a tangled mess.

Inside this tangle, fund collectors for the nationalists in Algeria move with relative impunity. It is estimated that they collect two million dollars a month throughout France. This money helps support the rebellion in Algeria, which is now more than four years old.

The expense of the war places that much greater burden on the French Government as it attacks its housing problem at home.

A 20-year-old Algerian wrote the following letter to a welfare organisation:

"Find me a lodging. Even a very small room. I pass my life in misery. When a tree is moved, the leaves wither as they fall. But I am coming to you . . .

"At the cafe I live in a corridor with my three brothers and a cousin. The beds take up all the space . . .

"Impossible to open the window; the owner has sealed it. The old beds are very bad. There are bedbugs. In the summer we cannot sleep. There is only one toilet for the entire hotel . . ."

There are 120,000 Moslems in the Paris area. Officials say 50,000 of these are in urgent need of new housing. Most of the others are also poorly housed.

Of these Moslems, the majority are honest workers, but the living conditions have spawned several thousand professional loiterers, bootleggers, petty criminals, pimps and white slavers.

Prostitution used to be almost exclusively in the hands of the Corsicans. Now the Algerians have horned in. Pigalle and the Champs-Elysees are the prize neighbourhoods, and gangland rivalry erupts into gunplay when there is trespassing.

Bad Lodgings

A vast majority of North Africans in France live in cheap hotels in what is called the "Red Belt," a Communist-dominated zone around Paris. They often share a room with as many as four people, or the bed—three eight-hour shifts.

Moslems say that hotel keepers, North Africans themselves and often fund collectors for nationalist groups, are exploiters. They call them "sleep merchants."

Though most of France's bidonvilles (shanty towns) have been destroyed by the authorities, and their inhabitants more or less rehoused, some 15,000 people still live in them. The Government is not indifferent to their plight. It hopes to have the last bidonville destroyed within 18 months.

The biggest one is just outside Paris, in Nanterre. Five thousand people live there, including 300 families and 1,000 children. There is refuse everywhere, no toilets, and Moslem butchers unhampered by any health service control.

Even in the bidonvilles there are enterprising "sleep merchants." They build sheds, and rent them to newcomers.

Keep Silence

The Algerians willingly talk about their work and housing. However, it is almost impossible for an outsider to discover their political sentiments. The police claim they are terrorised by the nationalist fund collectors and the vast majority would like simply to be left alone. The nationalists, of course, claim otherwise.

Living in such overcrowded conditions, the Algerian can confide in no one. A slip of the tongue and he may get blacklisted by one of the two nationalist organisations. A French gendarme is in no position to protect too many people in these North African ghettos.

Three Algerians were found recently near a bidonville. All three had their throats slit. Later, raiding a North African hotel, police found a back room used for kangaroo courts, a cellar torture chamber, and papers condemning the three victims to death—one for not co-operating, two for being members of the rival organisation. The case was typical.

The Government hopes that by breaking up these shanty towns it will make it more difficult for the nationalists to exercise pressure.

Building Plan

A Government-controlled construction company has been created. It hopes to provide 4,000 decent beds a year for Algerians. However, in its two years of existence, it has built only 700 throughout France.

No matter what is done for the North Africans in France, problems will continue so long as living standards in Algeria are not raised, thus reducing the flow of labour to France.

Algeria is dry and much of its agriculture is stagnant. Industry is still too young to offer enough jobs. Hence the exodus. However, the Algerian who comes to France in order to send money home is often illiterate and ignorant of modern European life. He starts out a poorly paid unskilled workman. Some industries, with the help of students, teachers and other volunteers, offer night courses in France to prepare North Africans for professional training.

In its current budget the French Government has planned the creation of 4,000 additional classrooms in Algeria and the training of 70,000 unskilled workers.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: Canberra Times — File No: 25/2/11

Published at: Canberra — Date: 22.4.59

Eur.

Gaullists Win Seats In Algeria

ALGIERS, Tuesday (A.A.P.-Reuter). — The Gaullist Union for the New Republic—U.N.R.—secured its first political foothold in Algeria yesterday as the results of the first day of polling in the Algerian municipal elections were announced.

The U.N.R. performance fell far short of an election victory, but it secured 14 seats on the 75-member Greater Algiers Municipal Council. This exactly balanced the gains made by the extremist National Front for Integration and Fraternity, which is openly hostile to President De Gaulle.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS.

25/2/11

201/5/4
Memorandum 352

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE COPY
21 APR 1959

8th April 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

There has been a mild recrudescence of terrorism by Algerians in metropolitan France over the past week. This has not yet come anywhere near the level of last year's outbreak when important installations in the metropole, such as power stations, were put under Army guard. A policeman has been killed as well as a young English girl (the latter by accident). Yesterday two police stations in the suburbs of Paris were fired upon by small groups of Algerians but the only casualty was one Algerian wounded. There seems to be less organisation, and less technique employed in these incidents than last year.

2. The French police has retaliated by rounding up several hundreds of Algerians living in Paris. Most of these were subsequently released but over one hundred were detained. The police claim to have captured a lot of important documents.

3. It is hard to say just what has set off the new outburst of terrorism. Perhaps the occasion is the coming municipal elections in Algeria. Another possible and more likely explanation is that the terrorism is in reply to the death of Amirouche and the defection of Ali Hambli (see the Embassy's memoranda 317 of 1st April and 300 of 23rd March 1959, respectively).

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: Syd Morning Herald File No: 25/2/11

Published at: Sydney Date: 21-4-59

Eur

TERROR DISRUPTS ELECTIONS IN ALGERIA

ALGIERS, April 20 (A.A.P.-Reuter).—Rebels disrupted Algeria's first universal suffrage municipal elections yesterday with a terror campaign

French officials said the rebel leaders were trying to reassert their authority over "waverers" tempted by President de Gaulle's "peace of the brave" offer.

Carrying out their death threat to Moslems taking part in the elections, the terrorists.—

- Burnt a Moslem candidate to death in his home in a village near Setif.
- Kidnapped all the candidates in a community nearby, beheaded the leader and beat up the rest.
- Threw a grenade into a crowd near a polling booth in Constantine, killing four people and wounding more than 40.
- Killed 10 people and seriously wounded eight in a raid on the eastern Algerian village of Moulabhen.

Algiers Polling Hours Extended

A woman and a teenage girl injured in bomb attacks in Algiers on Sunday also died.

Extremist European organisations also urged voters to abstain in protest against President de Gaulle's Algerian policy.

By late afternoon there was only a 30 per cent poll in Algiers.

The Prefect of Algiers, Raymond Deugnier, ordered that polling booths should stay open an extra two hours—until 8 p.m.

Lorries toured the streets broadcasting a recorded message from General Jacques Massu, popular hero of the settlers' revolt of May 13, telling Moslem and French alike: "To abstain means nothing less than to betray the Army."

In Constantine and other areas a 60 per cent vote was reported.

Early Figures Inconclusive

Voting figures available last night were inconclusive.

Early returns in Algiers showed that the Gaullist Union for the New Republic (U.N.R.) was being outstripped by the National Front for Integration and Fraternity, which is critical of the President's peace offer to the rebels.

In other towns the U.N.R. made some progress.

Because of Algeria's size and to foil the terrorists, the elections are being spread over a week.

The cities and larger towns and villages voted yesterday.

The French authorities are keeping secret until the last moment details of when other villages will vote.

Loudspeaker announcements at dawn were the first warning villagers had today that it was their turn to go to the polls.

Armed Troops Guard Booths

Elaborate precautions prevented any outrages in Algiers yesterday.

Police and paratroops armed with tommy-guns and rifles guarded polling booths.

Barbed-wire entanglements blocked narrow alleyways in which terrorists might lurk, and roadblocks covered by machine-guns were set up along main roads into the city.

Every car had to stop while soldiers searched it and examined the occupant's identity papers.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times *File No* 25/2/11

Published at London *Date* 11-4-59

Eur.

ROUND UP OF ALGERIAN NATIONALISTS

465 ARRESTS IN FRANCE

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, APRIL 10

Four hundred and sixty-five Algerian nationalists, described by the police as agitators, were arrested last night during police operations in different parts of France.

These arrests follow a week during which there has been a sharp recrudescence of Algerian terrorism in France. Last night two Algerians were killed and 11 other persons injured, one of them a Frenchman, in a shooting affray in a quarter of Paris frequented by Algerians.

In Algeria two Europeans were killed and four others injured, one of them a young boy, when the rebels ambushed two cars entering a village some 30 miles to the west of Algiers. At Laghouat in the south the sudden recrudescence of terrorist attacks has caused the military authorities to impose a curfew from 8 p.m.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

WB:JD. I.6722.

FROM: Sent: 17th April, 1959. 1624.

Australian High Commission, KARACHI. Recd: 18th April, 1959. 0830.

127. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Paris 1, Delhi 10.

Farhat Abbas's visit covered in memorandum no.540 next bag. I have discussed the visit with the Acting Foreign Secretary (Arshad Husain) who informed as follows:-

(1) Farhat Abbas' visit treated as unofficial by the Pakistan Government to whom it was somewhat embarrassing. However, unofficial dinner and meeting with the President arranged.

(11) Abbas requested from President:

(a) Recognition of rebels.

(b) Medical equipment and supplies.

(111) President replied:-

(a) Pakistan supported concept on self-determination for all peoples.

(b) Urged that Abbas and Rebel Government negotiate with the French.

(c) Declined medical supplies on grounds of foreign exchange shortage and restrictions on importation to Pakistan.

(d) Offered textiles to be supplied through appropriate Pakistan charity organizations.

(1V) Abbas disappointed with the results especially failure to change Pakistan's official attitude of non recognition. President's advice of negotiating with the French not welcomed by Abbas.

Cutler.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'S.

19th April, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR.EASTMAN UN ER COMREL PACMAN S SEA SA SEA D.AP&ME E AF INP DL INTELL TA

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CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

201/5/4
Memorandum 329

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
13 APR 1959
25/2/11
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS.

3rd April 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

Reference is made to the Embassy's memorandum no: 317 of 1st April.

2. Confirming the political motivation behind his transfer, General Allard, most improperly it seems, fired a retaliatory shot at General de Gaulle in saying his farewell at Oran on 1st April. He stated that "Quite recently General de Gaulle told me that he never envisaged political negotiations, never envisaged independence for Algeria. The future is what we will make it."

3. This statement may further fuel the present discontent ~~upon~~ among "integrationist" circles in Algeria.

Alan Renouf
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
8 APR 1959
25/2/11
CANBERRA

Memo No317

201/5/4

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS.

1st April, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

The past week has seen three noteworthy developments concerning Algeria - the transfer of General Allard, the killing of Amirouche, and the reactions in Algeria to General de Gaulle's remarks at his press conference on 25th March, 1959. I will treat them in that order.

General Allard

2. General Allard, the Operations Deputy to the C. in C. in Algeria, commander of land forces in Algeria and commander of the tenth Algerian Military Region, has been transferred to command French forces in Germany. This is, in fact, a transfer from an operational to a training command. No replacement for General Allard has been named nor may be named as, it has been announced, unity of command is to be reinforced in the hands of the Commander in Chief, the trusted friend of General de Gaulle, General Challe.

3. There now remains in Algeria only two of the leading military figures of the uprising of 13th May, 1958. These are General Massu, whose loyalty to General de Gaulle is said to be unquestioned, and Colonel Godard. It seems that the cleaning out of the Army in Algeria goes on slowly and cautiously, but surely.

Amirouche

4. Amirouche, reputed as one of the best and most powerful of the Algerian rebel leaders, was killed in a battle with French forces on 29th March. His band of some seventy strong was reported as entirely killed or captured. Amirouche's past was best described in "The Times" of 31st March, and a copy of "The Times" report is attached for easy reference.

5. Amirouche's death is a considerable success for the French, particularly coming on top, as it did, of the defection of Ali Hambli's band (see the Embassy's memorandum no: 300, of 23rd March, 1959). Moreover, the success was not qualified as it was in Ali Hambli's case by the fact that Ali Hambli clearly chose surrender to the French to death at the hands of other rebel bands. But the French claims of the great significance of Amirouche's death have to be taken with a grain of salt. In war good leaders usually have a short life and the F.L.N. must have lots of good replacements available. Besides, the French have said nothing about what casualties they suffered in the battle. They did admit, however, to having brought up heavy reinforcements.

General de Gaulle's Press Conference

6. General de Gaulle's firm reiteration of his policy for Algeria at his press conference on 25th March has caused a ripple of discontent through the

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

various centres of "integrationist" opinion in Algeria (but no reactions within France). Only the Algerian chapter of the U.N.R. expressed satisfaction with the General's remarks. The Mouvement Algérie Française, the Anciens Combattants, the Mouvement Populaire du 13 Mai, the Association Générale des Etudiants d'Algérie, and the Mouvement pour l'Instauration d'un Ordre Corporatif all grumbled publicly in familiar terms. M. Lagaillarde, a leading 13th May figure and now a deputy for Algeria, publicly criticized the General, claiming that the referendum last year was an option for integration. And Ahmed Djebbeur, a Moslem deputy from Algeria, has promised to propose integration to the National Assembly this month and try to force a showdown with the President. The other Algerian deputies in the National Assembly are reported also to be planning steps which might embarrass the Government, for example, a number of written questions about Algeria's future.

7. All these ripples of discontent caused M. Delouvrier, the Governor-General, to remind the people of Algeria that "Paris governs in Algeria, even in Algiers". This was the first time that M. Delouvrier has come out with any statement of this kind.

8. It is hard to work out why on this occasion General de Gaulle's definition of his Algerian policy has aroused so much discontent in Algiers. For it is the same old policy. Perhaps the clue lies in the approaching session of the National Assembly - the ultras and the colons hoping to stir up the Assembly to oppose the General's policy. One cannot see the Assembly doing this - at present. Another explanation may be that the first anniversary of 13th May, 1958, is approaching and the "integrationists" are preparing the ground for an impressive display of their strength.

9. "The Times" of 30th March reports open talk in Algiers of a new uprising. It is not always easy to know just what goes on in Algeria from and through the eyes of Paris, but a new uprising would come as a surprise. The conditions of one year ago and now are quite different. France then had virtually no government worth the name and the Army was rife with rebellion. Now, there is de Gaulle, very much in control, certainly of France, and from what one can gather, of the Army in Algeria. In the circumstances, a new revolt could, it seems, only "fizzle". Actually, an abortive revolt might not be unwelcome to de Gaulle for it might allow him greater freedom of play in Algeria thereafter.

Alan Renouf

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

London "Times" 31-3-59.

BLOW TO REBEL CAUSE IN ALGERIA

LEADER'S DEATH IN ACTION

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, MARCH 30

The death at the hands of French troops of Amirouche, by reputation the cruellest, bravest, and most powerful of the Algerian rebel leaders, was hailed in Paris and Algiers to-day as the heaviest blow to the rebellion for several months.

Muslim dignitaries from Kabylia, where Amirouche held sway, were to-day taken by Army helicopter to see his body, so that they might spread the news. M. Delouvrier, the Delegate-General, gave warning in a broadcast from Algiers that Amirouche's fate would sooner or later be shared by all rebels who refused to respond to President de Gaulle's "generous offer" of a cease-fire. He referred to the recent defection of an entire band of 150 armed men to the French side, and hoped that the F.L.N. leaders in Tunis and Cairo would at last realize the futility of the sacrifices they were demanding of the rebel armies. Amirouche's death would at least have served a purpose if it helped to hasten the end of the fighting.

"PARIS GOVERNS"

M. Delouvrier issued an unexpected warning to the European extremists who are criticizing General de Gaulle's policy. Referring to "the complaints of certain people," he said: "You will all realize that it is Paris that governs in Algeria, even in Algiers."

Amirouche's name became legendary in Algeria after he took command of the rebels in Kabylia two summers ago. Born in 1926, he was working as a jeweller in a town near Oran when the rebellion broke out in 1957, and he joined it at once. He quickly showed his leadership in the Aurès sector, and the rebel high command in Tunis then sent him to revive operations in the Kabylia mountains, an area on the point of being "pacified" by the French.

At the head of 5,000 well armed and highly trained men, he sowed terror on every side, and soon made Kabylia the bastion of the rebellion again. Many French operations against him, including a big scheme last winter under General Massu, failed, and the local Kabyles regarded him as miraculously protected by Allah. General Farne, the French local commander, said recently that if Amirouche were slain the revolt in Kabylia would lose four-fifths of its strength.

PRESSURE ON FOLLOWERS

Amirouche is said to have lived close to his troops, making heavy demands on them, on pain of death. To avoid capture, he would sometimes change his refuge several times in a night. He is supposed to have been responsible for the charnel-house of Akgadou, where the French last September found the bodies of 600 Muslims who had been killed for suspected treachery.

On the other hand, he released without ill-treatment the many European civilians, including a Swiss and an American priest, kidnapped by his forces in recent months. Europeans brought before him say that he was a tall, thin man with a black moustache, spoke with authority, and received them with great courtesy. He was killed outside the area of his command, near Bon Saada, in a clash with a large French force, including parachutists and Foreign Legionaries.

Another regional commander, Si Haoues, in charge of the mountain zone south of Algiers, died with Amirouche. There are six F.L.N. regional commands in Algeria.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

201/5/4
Memorandum 300

8 APR 1959
25/2/11
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

23rd March 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

M. Debré, the French Premier, left Paris on 22nd March, 1959, to visit Algeria. He is scheduled to return to Paris on 24th March. This is M. Debré's second visit to Algeria. His first visit was devoted to Algiers and the neighbouring areas. This visit is to be spent in the eastern part of Algeria, an area in which there is currently a lot of rebel activity. The Premier will, inter alia, inspect the electrified barrier along the border with Tunisia.

2. Arriving at Constantine, M. Debré made a speech which must have warmed the hearts of the ultras in Algeria and in France. He said "The first thing I have to tell you is that France is present in Algeria and will stay there..... France is resolved to preserve what must be preserved..... The separation of France and Algeria cannot be envisaged..."

3. The following day, again at Constantine, M. Debré made another speech in much the same strain. He said there were three fundamental resolves of French policy towards Algeria - to stay in Algeria, to make Algeria a model for economic and social development in Africa and to make Algeria a symbol of French generosity and love of freedom. M. Debré continued that France needed Algeria firstly, for security reasons (France needed a Mediterranean where traffic was safe and free and this could only be assured if France had control on both sides of the Sea), secondly, because France needed security for the development of the Sahara resources and because of the Community. M. Debré finally repeated General de Gaulle's offer of a cease-fire, describing it as the only way out of the Algerian problem.

4. These appear to be the most unequivocal statements yet made by M. Debré's Government that France has no intention of quitting Algeria. It is rather surprising in the circumstances that the local press has treated them as another routine utterance on the Algerian problem. It will be interesting to see whether General de Gaulle echoes M. Debré's remarks in his press conference on 25th March.

5. In making his visit at this time, M. Debré has had something of a windfall. On 21st March a rebel band of 156 men, led by Ali Hambli, appeared near Ouenza just over the Tunisian border and voluntarily surrendered to the French. The band had crossed the frontier during the previous night. This is the first time since the rebellion began that there has been a defection of such a size to the French forces and as such, it is quite a triumph for the French.

6. It seems, however, to be not as great a triumph as the French would have it appear. French Headquarters in Algiers have explained the defection as arising from a conviction by the band that the real future for Algeria lay with General de Gaulle. But the facts do not entirely support this explanation. Apparently the band of Ali Hambli had fallen out with the F.L.N. to such an extent that other F.L.N.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS.

forces were ordered to exterminate the band. Prior to the band's surrender, it had been fighting on the run for three days and had lost one-third of its strength. The band preferred to surrender to the French rather than go on fighting.

7. Irrespective of why the band surrendered, its defection is politically of importance. It establishes dissidence of a size which cannot yet be reckoned among the rebels although Ali Hambli is reported as saying the dissidence was not confined to his band alone. And Ali Hambli has set a precedent which may have an important effect upon the course of the rebellion.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: L'Le Observateur File No: 25/2/11

Published at: London Date: 5/4/59

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Algeria Policy

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Extremists' Threat of New Uprising

From WILLIAM MILLINSHIP

PARIS, April 4

ALGERIAN extremists are preparing a three-pronged attack on President de Gaulle's policy in Algeria: in the municipal elections to be held there between April 19 and 26; in the National Assembly, which begins its new session on April 28; and in Algiers on the first anniversary of the May 13 uprising.

The President, while recognising the influence of the war on the freedom of elections, nevertheless hopes that Muslim nationalists who refused to stand for Parliament last November will seek election to local councils. The European settlers, on the other hand, see the local elections as another opportunity to prove that the Muslims desire nothing but the full integration of Algeria into France.

Pressure on de Gaulle

European extremists, including several members of the National Assembly, have made clear that their price for not launching the threatened *coup* is that de Gaulle must launch an all-out military offensive to smash the rebellion. Most of the 70 Algerian representatives are expected to try to push an integrationist manifesto through the Assembly next month.

The extremists are threatening to organise mass demonstrations on the Algiers "forum" of the kind that helped to bring down the Fourth Republic last May.

'Betraying Revolution'

Opposition in Algiers has hardened rapidly since General de Gaulle's Press conference ten days ago, when he said the future political status of Algeria should be developed democratically over a long period—he thought it might take four generations. The sensitive settlers have also reacted strongly to an anonymous article in *Le Monde* this week suggesting a Cyprus-style solution for Algeria, which would become an autonomous republic within the Franco-African community.

Dr. Lefevre, leader of an Algerian extremist movement, said the plan proved that the regime had begun the process of abandoning Algeria "by betraying the revolution to which it owes its existence." He said that the only terms to offer the F.L.N. were unconditional surrender.

'Band of Cutthroats'

M. Marc Auriol, regarded as one of the more moderate Algerian Deputies, has also criticised General de Gaulle's policy of allowing Algeria to "develop its own personality." He expressed the opinion this week that integration was a "State necessity."

Other Algerian spokesmen have again insisted that the rebels were merely a band of cutthroats who had to be put down by force.

The official French view is that a small minority of rebel extremists are preventing cease-fire talks. *The Week in Algeria*, published by the official Press services in Algiers, claimed recently that the majority of the rebel troops were forcibly recruited. President de Gaulle himself, while praising the rebels' courage, appears convinced the majority of Algerian Muslims do not want independence.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
1 APR 1959
25/2/11
CANBERRA

201/5/4

Memorandum 287

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.
18th March 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

At a meeting of Commonwealth representatives in Paris on 18th March, 1959, Sir Gladwyn Jebb spoke pessimistically of developments in Algeria. He said that M. Delouvrier, the Governor General, had offered his resignation three times since he was appointed some weeks ago but on each occasion had been ordered by General de Gaulle to stay on the job. Explaining his proffered resignations, M. Delouvrier had complained that his task in Algeria was impossible; the Army and the colons would not let him do his work properly. Sir Gladwyn also said that General de Gaulle's Constantine plan for the economic and social development of Algeria was by no means being pushed ahead vigourously. No attempt was being made to implement more than a part of the plan and, in any event, it would be a long time before any benefits of the plan appeared.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb's remarks are significant for they reveal that General de Gaulle may well have overestimated his capacity to govern Algeria from Paris by means of a civil servant. M. Delouvrier has a reputation of being an intelligent and hard-working official but nothing more. His job in Algeria clearly requires much more than this. He must possess in addition the capacity to handle the high ranking army officers and the powerful civilians who had a good taste of power in Algeria from 13th May until the end of last year. Sir Gladwyn's remarks also points to an observation which has been made by this Embassy recently in its reports - that even if the will is there, there is not enough money to carry out the Constantine plan while the Algerian war drags along at its traditional level.

Alan Renouf,
Chargé d'Affaires.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
23 MAR 1959
25/2/11
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
13, RUE LAS CASES.
PARIS (7e)

In reply quote No

File No. 201/5/4

Memo No. 257

11th March, 1959.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ALGERIA.

1. Municipal elections are to be held in Algeria next month. Now that the Government in Paris has taken at least a considerable measure of power out of the hands of the Army in Algeria and is governing Algeria through its own representative, M. Delouvrier, it is trying to see that the municipal elections are properly conducted. It will be recalled that the results of the elections to the National Assembly in November last year did not please General de Gaulle who had hoped to see elected a body of representative Algerian opinion. Instead, there were elected a group of "integrationists" and this was at least partly due to the efforts of the Army and the other "ultras".

2. To try to see that this does not happen again, the Premier, M. Debré, has issued firm written instructions to M. Delouvrier and published them here. The instructions say baldly that the Government wants genuine Algerian representation in the municipal councils and attaches great importance to this. The elections therefore must be free and properly arranged. The Premier has also asked that he be told what steps M. Delouvrier has taken to this end and any difficulties he encounters in carrying out his instructions.

3. It has also been revealed that M. Delouvrier has already passed on these instructions to the responsible civil and military authorities in Algeria.

4. It appears that General de Gaulle is doing all he can to see that on this occasion proper elections are held. Given the

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AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

control he has asserted over Algeria since the elections to the National Assembly last year, there are better prospects now that the new municipal councils will be genuinely representative. The trouble is, of course, that the F.L.N. are bound to order a boycott of the elections and promise reprisals against Algerian Moslems who ignore the boycott. This will undoubtedly obstruct the attainment of General de Gaulle's objective.

Alan Renouf

Alan P. Renouf.

Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

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

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

25/2/11

THE CONSTANTINE PLAN GET UNDER WAY

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Speaking at Constantine on October 3, 1958, during a visit to Algeria, General de Gaulle had expressed his conviction "that all Algeria must have her share in what modern civilization can and must bring to men in terms of well-being and dignity. But the loftiest plans call for practical measures." He then proceeded to outline a number of political, economic and cultural reforms which he considered essential and which would be put into effect within the next five years. Among other things, he called for:

- salaries and wages in Algeria to be raised to a level comparable to that in Metropolitan France;
- 617,500 acres of land to go to Moslem farmers and other measures of agricultural development;
- the oil and gas of the Sahara to be tapped and distributed;
- the creation of great metallurgical and chemical complexes;
- housing for a million people;
- regular employment for 400,000 additional workers; this goal to be attained through a public works program and the employment of Algerian Moslems in the civil service in Metropolitan France and Algeria as well as through industrial expansion;
- enrollment of two thirds of the children of school age (more recent estimates indicate that three quarters of the school-age population, or 2 million children, will be enrolled by the end of the next 5 years).

Premier Michel Debré, on an official visit to Algeria in February 1959, addressed the first meeting of the High Council. "In the years to come," he said, "we are going to witness in this land of Algeria a demographic revolution--already reflected in population statistics---which is marked by a very natural desire for human betterment and emancipation; we shall also witness an economic revolution marked by the extraordinary possibilities offered by the hitherto unexploited wealth of Algeria and the Sahara, which has been recently discovered."

Following the meeting, M. Paul Delouvrier, Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria and an economic expert in his own right, held a press conference in which he outlined the principal conclusions reached by the council.

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1) The plan for Algeria is part of the French Plan. It would be working at cross purposes and uneconomic if it were not placed within the context of the plan for Metropolitan France, which has been adapted to the Common Market;

2) The Constantine Plan is a development plan and not, like that of Metropolitan France, a modernization and equipment plan;

3) There is no question of choosing between setting up great industrial complexes, encouraging small or medium-scale industries, and promoting agricultural development. All three lines of action must be pursued.

4) The realization of the Plan will be the task of all. The local and departmental committees must enlist the cooperation of all groups in the Algerian population.

Inducements to Industry - A Quicker Method

Various inducements are offered to enterprises wishing to establish prospective companies or subsidiaries in Algeria. These advantages (equipment subsidies ranging up to 40%, tax exemptions, reduced interest rate on loans) are granted to all enterprises whether they are Algerian, French or foreign.

Formerly, each enterprise that wanted to become established in Algeria was considered separately. Consequently, it took a long time to reach a decision in each case.

It has been decided from now on to use a quicker method. If the administrative services in Paris agree, the minimum advantages that will be granted will be defined by broad groups of industries. This method will speed up the establishment of new enterprises for, by making clear from the outset the advantages available, it will prompt industrialists to come to a decision.

Heavy expenditures by the administration during the first year will be a proof of the success of this method. Of course, the funds available for this purpose will dwindle month by month; that is why requests from investors should be speeded up at the present time. The very large enterprises with extensive manpower needs will not come under this system but will each be considered on its own merits.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

It was also announced that an administrative order would soon provide for a rebate of social security contributions demanded of industrialists in Algeria. This rebate will amount to 18% of payroll for the industrialists, which will be assumed by the State. It should thus offer special encouragement to enterprises employing many workers.

Attention is also being given to setting the rates for Sahara gas. It is recognized that cheap power is an important factor in attracting industry.

Small Enterprises - To Create New Jobs

One of Algeria's besetting problems is unemployment or "underemployment," as many persons have regular work for only a few days a week. In order to absorb the increased manpower resulting from the rapid population growth and also to raise the net standard of living in Algeria at the hoped-for rate of 5% a year, it is thus necessary greatly to increase the number of jobs available. The attraction of outside capital, and the construction of pipelines, refineries and the complex of steel plants being contemplated for Bône are no doubt of great importance in long-range planning for Algeria, but they are insufficient to provide the 400,000 new jobs that are the goal of the Constantine Plan.

Therefore residents of Algeria who possess a little capital and French private enterprise will be encouraged to set up workshops or small factories in the rural areas. Conversion industries such as the manufacture of construction materials, small parts, textiles, leather and food products would be suitable for this purpose.

Housing projects and the building of schools, as well as other public works such as roads, dams, irrigation canals, etc., will be an essential part of the employment program, which, at the same time, will accelerate the social advancement of the Moslem population as a whole. The present yearly average of 20,000 new housing units will be increased fourfold to furnish housing for a million Moslems during the next five years.

Agriculture - Emphasis on the Moslem Farmer

One of the resolutions adopted by the High Council for the Plan provided an "interim program" for agriculture. This resolution places the emphasis on what it calls "the traditional branch of agriculture" with a view to raising the standard of living of the fellahs and gradually integrating this agriculture in the general economy.

Therefore certain steps must be taken, or existing programs continued, without waiting for the various bodies created under the plan to set the production goals for the principal crops.

Priority must be given to the recruitment--from among the farmers themselves--and training of agricultural advisers whose function is to popularize more modern methods of cultivation. This program, already under way, is to be stepped up.

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Also to be continued are present efforts to protect, reclaim and develop the land by soil conservation and restoration projects, by the construction of irrigation networks and the planting of trees. Whenever possible, local workers will be employed on these projects on days when they do not work for private employers, a measure which will alleviate underemployment on a local basis.

More than 600,000 acres of land will be distributed to Moslem fellahs during the next five years, thus helping to relieve unemployment among those remaining in the agricultural regions, thereby supplementing the industrialization program designed to attract most of the potentially unemployed workers from rural to urban areas.

The High Council for the Plan believes a modernized agriculture to be an essential asset in the national economy. This modernization, it holds, should be carried out within the framework of the economic union with Metropolitan France and in harmony with the prospects opened up by the European Market.

The Organs Responsible for Carrying Out the Plan

The High Council for the Plan adopted a resolution setting up the organs to be responsible for carrying out the Plan. They fall into two groups:

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- Departmental committees;
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Financing - Almost a Billion Dollars a Year for Five Years

Financial experts estimate that approximately 2,000 billion 1958 francs ($4.8 billion) would have to be invested in Algeria during 1959-63 in order to achieve the goals set in General de Gaulle's Constantine speech.

About half this amount is to be furnished by Algeria itself, especially by private investment. Funds will also be derived from the Algerian budget and from the budgets of local communities.

About one third of France's share of the financing will come from private investors, with the remaining two thirds being supplied out of the public moneys. Loans from semi-private corporations will account for 5% of the total.

Metropolitan France, like Algeria, is in all the better position to make such a financial effort, as the setting up of a stable Government has re-established confidence. Thus private capital and savings are ready to supplement public investment, which is primarily responsible for the type of social and economic development that pays off only indirectly.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No 25/2/11

Published at London Date 13-3-59

'PRAISE OF REBELS' IN ALGERIA

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, MARCH 12

All copies of the left-wing weekly newspaper *L'Express* were once again seized by the police in France last night, because, in the Government's words, " by giving prominence to a scandalous interview, it indecently praised the rebel forces against which the nation and the Army are fighting."

The interview in question was with the rebel leader Si Azzedine, who described how the French Army tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a local cease-fire with him last winter. *L'Express* stated to-day that the article contained no praise, decent or indecent, of the rebel forces, but simply details of an attempt at a cease-fire, about which the public had a right to be informed.

Si Azzedine, the leader of a rebel band in Kabylia, was wounded and captured in November, 1958. General Matsu visited him in hospital, it is reported, and apparently persuaded him to return to the rebel ranks and convince his colleagues of the wisdom of a cease-fire. Azzedine was set free, and published a declaration that the return to power of General de Gaulle, and especially the Constantine speech, made nonsense of the Algerian rebellion, and that he would do all he could to end the fighting.

CONFLICTING REPORTS

He returned several times to the rebels to negotiate, but failed to come back from one such trip. The French reported that he had been taken prisoner and perhaps executed, but independent reports suggest that he made his way to Tunis, where several journalists claim to have seen him recently. According to some reports he deliberately tricked the French Army into believing that he was ready for a cease-fire, so as to regain his freedom.

The right-wing paper *Salut Public* was seized in Algiers a month ago for recounting the same facts. In some ways it seems curious that the Army should be so embarrassed, for General Massu was doing no more than carry out General de Gaulle's instructions to make cease-fire contacts where possible with the rebels, and offer them a " peace of the brave." But the Army may feel itself humiliated by Azzedine's apparent double-cross.

It is not the first time that such a thing has happened: last summer the free-lance rebel leader Bellounis broke his truce agreement with the French Army. Some observers wonder whether such cease-fire arrangements are feasible in the present situation, with the F.L.N. itself still opposed to them.

STATISTICAL REVERSE

Nevertheless, the seizure of *l'Express* is regarded as another example of the Government's strange attitude to public relations and Press information. Even pro-Government newspapers have expressed their amazement at another incident: the Minister of the Interior, M. Berthoin, yesterday tried to prove statistically that the municipal elections last Sunday represented a setback rather than a gain for the Communists.

He showed that the average Communist vote throughout the country was 16.3 per cent., against 16.9 per cent. at the last municipal elections in 1953. But he omitted to mention that this was because the Communists had deliberately refrained from putting up candidates this time in many rural areas, and because of the lower abstention rate. The total Communist vote rose by 300,000, and in the main cities, where a comparison is most valid, the percentage rose from 26.1 in 1953 to 27.2 this time.

This afternoon's Press gives wide publicity to the comment of the Socialist newspaper *Le Populaire* that the Government is putting its head into the sand like an ostrich, and is treating the French public as if they were imbeciles.

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25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY. PARIS.

201/5/4
Memorandum 216

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DUPLICATE COPY

27th February, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria - Municipal Elections

It has been announced that the municipal elections will be held in Algeria over a period of two weeks commencing 19th April, 1959. The F.L.N. can be expected to order a boycott of these elections, as it has done for all French-sponsored elections in the past.

The main point of interest about these elections will be whether they succeed in producing any representative body of Algerian Muslim opinion. The elections held last year in Algeria did not do so, despite General de Gaulle's wishes that they do so. Perhaps the subsequent limitation of the Army's power in Algeria will serve to see that this result is not produced again.

Alan Renouf,
Chargé d'Affaires.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

28/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

MG:ABK

I.3902.

Dated: 3rd March, 1959.
2050.

FROM:

Rec'd: 4th March, 1959.
0830.

Australian Embassy,
ROME.

46 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Savingram London 1, Washington 1, Paris 1, Bonn 1, The Hague 1.

I made my first call on Director-General of Political Affairs today. He told me his initial reaction to latest Soviet note to Western Powers was that its agreement to a meeting of Foreign Ministers in April for a limited period should not be regarded as major concession.

2. Sphere of discussions agreed to for Foreign Ministers was limited to Berlin issue. Furthermore in his judgement, the fact that Soviet Note agreed to the Foreign Ministers meeting continuing for two to three months should not be taken as implying deadline of 27th May for handing over their rights in Berlin to the Pankow government had been abandoned by the Russians.

McClure-Smith.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

4th March, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN PAC&AM AM&SP E.AF&ME E INF DL INTELL CR

G.

BERLIN NEW YORK (UN)

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

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

25/2/11

MR. MELHUISH

FRENCH AFFAIRS - No. 80 February 1959
Algeria

A 9/3/59

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CONFIDENTIAL

25/2/11

BW:CM

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

I.3338

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

Dated: 16th February, 1959.

Rec'd: 23rd February, 1959.

FROM:

(Via Commercial Airmail)

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

67. CONFIDENTIAL.

Before leaving Paris today 16th February I send a few thoughts on France.

In June last the United Kingdom Ambassador foretold a "six months honeymoon" for de Gaulle. Jebb has been in London for some weeks and I have not been able to ask him whether he would now agree to an extension. It is hard for anyone to predict with much confidence.

Internally de Gaulle has succeeded during period of Government by decree, which has just ended, in making great changes in the financial and fiscal life of the country as well as in the judicial, medical and educational systems and much else. Few people yet realise how far these changes have gone.

There are some signs of discontent. The Archbishop of Paris told me last week that he had been observing carefully recent rumblings among workers because of lowered incomes (following on the ending of "supplementary hours") and also because of increased gas and light and other bills. None the less he felt the workers were ready to accept sacrifices "always providing something good is achieved and soon".

Externally de Gaulle has already asserted the role of France in world Councils and will undoubtedly try to increase it even before the country is sufficiently restored to justify it. He has considerably strengthened already existing rapprochement with Germany. He has shown no disposition to listen to the U.S.S.R. (which was urged against him before his return). Although he has had a trial of strength with England over F.T.A. the strain on relations can be repaired.

As regards Algeria it is impossible to judge from this distance but I do not think he has slipped back much if at all. He will however need to act quickly in his campaign to make Algeria prosperous and contented.

In his present position the President approximates to President of the United States or perhaps more to King William III.

Prime Minister Debre is his faithful spokesman and seems to have little personal ambition

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

I.3338

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

or public personality. Deputy Prime Minister Soustelle has both and although he is certainly enigmatic and possibly sinister in his ruthless single track methods, he also has something of greatness, or the potentality of greatness, about him.

Success of the Fifth Republic, (jibed at as "Third Empire" and "monarchy of Charles the Eleventh") depends almost entirely on de Gaulle continued health. There is no doubt his earlier touch of greatness has been developed very markedly by his long years of reflection and his nine months of sovereign power. At the same time he has become simpler in manner and wins people more readily. Strain of mysticism is always there. This cuts both ways but on the whole I believe it is good as an antedote to materialism of French political life in recent years.

I think therefore we should hope for a continuance of de Gaulle's health and energy for another five years, within which France would have a good chance to get back much of her old role in Europe, thus strengthening instead of hampering Western alliance and in consequence benefiting Australia.

Sterling.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S

23rd February, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP
S&SEA E.AF&ME E INF DL INTELL
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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

201/5/AM 160
Memo

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

10th February, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
18 FEB 1959
COPY

Algeria

Reference is made to the Embassy's memorandum no: 131 of 3rd February, 1959.

2. M. Debré is now in Algeria in the process of his three days' visit.

3. On 9th February, the Premier laid a wreath at the Cenotaph in Algiers. It was at just such a ceremony in the same place that M. Mollet received such a hostile reception three years and three days before. M. Debré's wreath-laying did not go off very well although there is no comparison at all with the hostility displayed towards M. Mollet.

4. Some 2,000 people had assembled at the Cenotaph and reading between the lines of the French press whose freedom to speak the truth (particularly the truth coming from Algeria) is doubtful, they gave M. Debré a lively time. Apparently his wreath-laying was punctuated by cries such as, "Sold out", "Hurrah for Massu", "Algeria is French", "a wreath as for Mollet", and so on. M. Debré is then said to have had difficulty in getting back to his car.

5. Later in the same morning, M. Debré made a broadcast which should have calmed down the passions of the colons a little. I am attaching a report of the broadcast from "Le Figaro".

6. It may be significant that the broadcast consisted of two parts, a message from the Government and "a few personal words". The message from the Government has nothing new in it, the key sentence being: "The appeal made by General de Gaulle is the only way to salvation..." But the "few personal words" contained the following: "The truth is that Algeria is a land under French sovereignty." The implication which will be read into this in Algeria is that Algeria will remain under French sovereignty. M. Debré went on to denounce those who said there were differences over Algeria between General de Gaulle and himself, saying no one could doubt the General when he said that there would be no political negotiations.

7. Instead of reassuring people that General de Gaulle and he are of one mind over Algeria, it is quite possible that M. Debré's "few personal words" at the end of a Government message will have the opposite effect. And if the General does have any idea of ever negotiating with the F.L.N., the "few personal words" of M. Debré may have made his task in the future just a little more difficult.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

(Copy on 167/2/2)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS.

201/5/4
Memorandum 146

9th February, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

One of the interesting things about M. Debré's Government is that it includes a Muslim woman as a Secretary of State. This is Mlle Sid Cara. It is now being reported that Mlle Sid Cara is preparing a draft law to improve the status of the Muslim woman in Algeria and that this law will be submitted to the next session of the National Assembly in April, after consultation with Muslim religious authorities.

The main points of the new law are reported to be the following:

1. The establishment of a right of inheritance for Muslim women;

2. The obligation for French Muslims to be married before the Mayor rather than the Cadi;

3. The application to French Muslims of the laws upon divorce and the withdrawal from them of the right to get out of a marriage simply by declaring that it is finished.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor

E. Ahern
(orig on 167/2/2

25/2/4

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 2/12/11E.

Published at New York. Date 15-2-59

A THREE-PRONGED PROGRAM

By ROBERT C. DOTY

PARIS, Feb. 14—President Charles de Gaulle and Premier Michel Debré have implicitly asked Frenchmen to brace themselves for a long-haul military, economic and social effort in Algeria.

The belief that, somehow, President de Gaulle, would be able to pull a quick solution and an end to the 52-month-old war or rebellion out of his two-starred *kepi* has been largely dissipated over the past few months. This had always been based more on a flattering but almost irrational estimate of President de Gaulle's prestige and ability than on any promises by him or an objective view of the difficulties of the situation. After nearly nine months of Gaullist rule the only really new element in the situation—an important one—was the establishment in France of a Government with prospects of continuity of existence, hence of policy.

President de Gaulle has defined as its long-term goal an Algeria "pacified and transformed, developing herself her own personality and closely associated with France."

Premier Debré has modified—in the left-wing view, distorted—this idea with the proviso that pacification and construction of the future can be realized only on the basis of "French sovereignty which is exercised and will continue to be exercised here [in Algeria] as in Metropolitan France."

Both have ruled out the possibility of political negotiations with the Moslem rebel provisional government set up by the National Liberation Front (F. L. N.).

And this year, as in every year since 1954, the rebel leaders continue to insist that the war will go on—by frontal shock or covert terrorism and ambush—until France recognizes Algeria's right to independence and agrees to negotiate on that basis.

Obviously, if there is to be peace in the fifth year of the rebellion, something has to give.

President de Gaulle and his Government appear to base their policy on the idea that ultimately it is rebel intransigence that will have to give.

According to the President's closest collaborators, he does not currently envisage any spectacular new initiative to bring peace. He has reminded the F. L. N. that his Oct. 23 offer of an honorable cease-fire, without political conditions, still stands. The F. L. N. has twice rejected these terms. The President is not likely to go further, say members of his staff.

In the absence of a cease-fire, Gaullist policy boils down to an attempt to undermine the F. L. N. by a combination of military pressure and social and economic action to wean the Moslem population away from the rebels.

Living Standards

The principle instrument of this policy is the program announced last week to invest up to 300 billion francs ($600,000,000)—a third of it from the French budget, the rest from private sources—this year in improvements of the Moslem standard of living.

The objectives, first pro-

the rebels. It will conduct huge, sweeping operations to rout the F. L. N. bands out of their mountain strongholds.

Finally, under the watchful eye of the army, the Algerian populace will go to the polls sometime this spring to elect mayors and municipal councils.

This three-pronged military, economic-social and political program is counted upon to:

(1) Discourage the rebel fighters, if not their political leaders.

(2) Reinforce Moslem confidence in French will and ability to protect them and improve their living standards.

(3) Begin the political development of the "Algerian personality" of which President de Gaulle speaks as the basis for her future political status.

Definition Difficult

It is doubtful that President de Gaulle—the great empiricist—has any clearly defined idea of how, out of this combination, peace will finally be restored or what modifications of Algeria's political status finally will result.

But there are two forces capable, perhaps, of upsetting his hopes for gradual, evolutionary change.

The rebels, even if driven to the wall in a purely military sense, could, as even French military spokesmen admit, carry on for years a campaign of isolated terrorist attack and ambush that could prevent or retard a political settlement. Thus far the rebels have given no sign of lassitude or diminishing combativeness.

It appears doubtful that President de Gaulle's political, social and economic programs could be fully implemented in the atmosphere of insecurity the rebels seem capable of maintaining.

The other predictable stumbling block to progress toward a peaceful solution is the renaissant extreme Right-Wing in Algeria and France.

Its members have already begun to treat as traitors and "sell-outs" the very men and movements—their former allies—that made the Gaullist insurrection in Algiers last May 13 and who are now in the Gaullist Government or Parliament.

To these Fascist extremists and ultra-conservatives no solution short of complete crushing of the Moslem revolt by force and complete integration of Algeria with France is tolerable. And this integration, they seek

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

war or rebellion out of his two-starred *kepi* has been largely dissipated over the past few months. This had always been based more on a flattering but almost irrational estimate of President de Gaulle's prestige and ability than on any promises by him or an objective view of the difficulties of the situation. After nearly nine months of Gaullist rule the only really new element in the situation—an important one—was the establishment in France of a Government with prospects of continuity of existence, hence of policy.

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Living Standards

The principle instrument of this policy is the program announced last week to invest up to 300 billion francs ($600,000,000)—a third of it from the French budget, the rest from private sources—this year in improvements of the Moslem lot in Algeria.

The objectives, first proclaimed in General de Gaulle's Constantine speech last October, were a 5 per cent annual increase in standards of living; creation of 400,000 new jobs and a million new dwelling units in five years; provision of school opportunities for all young Algerians in eight years and distribution of 625,000 acres of land in small holdings to Moslem farmers.

The question was whether Premier de Gaulle's program would bog down in war and resistance by the Algerian Europeans.

Simultaneously the French army will increase pressure on the rebels. It will conduct huge, sweeping operations to rout the F. L. N. bands out of their mountain strongholds.

Finally, under the watchful eye of the army, the Algerian populace will go to the polls sometime this spring to elect mayors and municipal councils.

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Its members have already begun to treat as traitors and "sell-outs" the very men and movements—their former allies—that made the Gaullist insurrection in Algiers last May 13 and who are now in the Gaullist Government or Parliament.

To these Fascist extremists and ultra-conservatives no solution short of complete crushing of the Moslem revolt by force and complete integration of Algeria with France is tolerable. And this integration, they seek through self-interest, the army seeks with nuances of difference, through pride and sense of mission.

Both elements—ultras and army—have powerful supporters in the Right-Wing majority of the new Parliament. Although the Parliament's power is less than under the Fourth Republic, its assent will be necessary, and difficult to obtain, for any settlement short of full integration.

Thus, for President de Gaulle, as for his predecessors, the way to the future is a narrow one between two intransigencies with no end currently in sight.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Economist — File No. 25/2/11 E

Published at: London — Date: 14-2-58.

ALGERIA

In M. Mollet's Footsteps

THREE years after M. Mollet, another prime minister, the gaullist M. Debré, was hooted by the crowd at the Algiers war memorial on Monday. M. Debré answered back on the spot. His more formal speeches did, however, steady the nerves of the European population which had been sadly frayed for some weeks by distrust of President de Gaulle's clemency measures, a perceptible rise in rebel attacks, and rumours of an impending rundown in army strength. Encouraged by local firebrands and by metropolitan deputies like M. Biaggi—in Algiers to address the new *Mouvement Algérie française*—the settlers were again impatient to hear the word "integration" on official lips. Eight months of gaullist rule had not given it them, and M. Debré was not the man to break a good habit. His vocabulary, including the affirmation that Algeria was a "land of French sovereignty" and that France would remain there, was popularly held to be more integrationist than the President's. But he made it clear that the President's policy was sacred; for a prime minister, it seems, only phrasemaking is moderately free.

M. Debré's chief task was to launch the Constantine plan to provide 400,000 new jobs through industrial and agricultural development in the next five years. At the opening meeting of the planning council M. Delouvrier, the delegate-general in Algiers, emphasised that one asset the government was relying on was French industry's new willingness to invest in Algeria's future. The extent of this willingness, and of the prospect of attracting German capital, has still to be discovered. A governmental decision on the proposed iron and steel works at Bone is hoped for next month; but first the French steel industry has to have its say.

The settlers' fears that the French army effectives will be reduced this year have been partly allayed by official reassurances. Because of the drop in the birthrate during the last war the conscript classes available for service will be appreciably smaller and Algeria's claims may be hard to meet. The idea is disconcerting to a population that has seen how it is beyond the strength even of the present huge army to stifle the rebellion.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

D 5/2/1

CM:FPG

I.2689

Dated: 12th February, 1959
1205

Rec'd: 13th February, 1959
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

58 CONFIDENTIAL.

1. My Canadian collegue who saw the Prime Minister shortly before his departure for Algeria said that Debre had told him that it would be 18 months or even two years before he could show "results" in Algeria. Dupuy said he had urged Prime Minister to say this publicly now and also to get going as soon as possible some visible signs, however small, of Constantine plan.

Dupuy was not much impressed by Debre. He thought him mediocre and contrasted him with Pflimlin Mollet and Mendes France. Also with Deputy Prime Minister Soustelle "who was biding his time".

2. I went to see Soustelle yesterday evening he said he hoped to visit French territories in Pacific before end of year. De Gaulle in a recent conversation had spoken of wish to strengthen French positions there and said that a ministrial visit was desirable. He would fit in the visit to New Caledonia and Tahiti between his frequent visits to Sahara which was his chief preoccupation. Sahara was developing fast in fact almost too fast because of unsettling impact of oil developments on age old way of life of inhabitants. His next visit would be Djibouti.

Stirling.

MIN & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S.

13th February, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SEA E.AF&ME
E INF DL MT INTELL MR EASTMAN

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Manchester Guardian Weekly File No. 25/2/11 E

Published at Manchester Date 12 - 2 - 59

EXTREMIST FURY IN ALGIERS

by our own Correspondent

PARIS, FEBRUARY 9.

M. Debré, the French Prime Minister, has been visiting Algiers, and he has more reason to be pleased than sorry that rain has been falling during his visit, for the French extremists have been determined to show to what extremes of folly they can attain.

At present, though, there is no indication that they can or perhaps wish to mobilise such a mob as threw tomatoes at M. Guy Mollet on February 6, 1956 (though there were cries from the crowd of "give him the same wreath as Mollet got") or took part in the coup d'état of May 13 last year.

The crowd was small but on the whole noisily hostile when M. Debré laid the customary wreath on the war memorial this morning. They began with comparatively mild cries such as "Algeria is French," but went on to "the army is with us"—and "long live Massu"—a reminder that this general accepted to associate himself with the demonstrators at a fairly early stage of the May coup d'état. "Shoot Ben Bella" was a direct protest against the President's acts of clemency.

During the night the old antipathy to the present President of the Republic, which was probably stronger in Algeria than in any other French territory, was expressed in leaflets which described him as a more dangerous traitor to the national cause than M. Mendès-France or M. Mollet. Even the Algerian deputies are now being denounced as having allowed themselves to be cuckolded by the Parisian politicians. When M. Lagaillarde, the newly elected deputy of Algiers belonging to the extreme Right and the leader of the mob last May, tried to calm the crowd from his car to-day the police had to intervene to enable him to drive away, while angry young men shouted. "You've been bought, you've been bought."

These cries were only a feeble version of what had been heard on Saturday night at a meeting addressed by men such as Maître Biaggi, founder of the "Patriotic Revolutionary Movement." He was interrupted by shouts of "De Gaulle's an assassin," "De Gaulle to the gallows," and "Long live the Marshal" (i.e. Pétain). It was in this atmosphere that M. Debré had to give his assurances that the policy represented by President and Government was not one of betrayal. Like the President, he had to use carefully chosen words, though these were already several shades nearer to the integrationists than the declarations of the President.

The fury of the extremists in Algeria beats for the moment, at least, in the void. There is no longer any possibility of a long interregnum in Paris, such as was the situation last May. The extremists are at least showing how totally unreasonable they are, and probably driving the more moderate elements towards the General. They are also demonstrating to the Moslems that even if the position adopted by President de Gaulle is still insufficient from their point of view, it is one which it has not been easy to take.

come to look like a lifebuoy to the Southern Congressmen who, having damned the more radical bill offered by Senator Paul Douglas and the Northern liberals, have sworn to suffer no civil rights legislation at all. The other moderate alternative is President Eisenhower's bill which, however, provides Federal funds to "assist" integration, which in the end means to enforce it through the letter of the law.

Senator Johnson's bill with its sweet determination to enforce nothing and to provide, in the Senator's words "assistance at the local level and on an informal basis" may come to be the last precious shred of dignity the segregationists can rescue.

But whether the South is declining into a new period of what is being called "passive resistance" may depend on the energy of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, which has dictated the pace of test cases and is anathema to the segregationists. Yesterday its chief legal counsel, Mr Thurgood Marshall, said that integration had begun in 25.6 per cent of the school districts of the South and allowed that the South is making progress. The only question, he added, is "whether the progress is fast enough." It is a question whose answer rests, more than Senator Johnson or the Virginians care to admit, on Mr Marshall himself.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS.

201/5/4
Memorandum 131

3rd February, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
12 FEB 1959
COPY

Algeria

The Premier, M. Debré, will visit Algeria on the 9th, 10th and 11th February, 1959.

The speeches which M. Debré will make when he is in Algeria will be closely studied. As has been reported in memorandum 129 of 2nd February, in his statements on Algeria, M. Debré is showing tendencies to go further towards "integration" than General de Gaulle. The same tendency appeared in the speech which M. Debré made in Touraine last weekend. M. Debré said that the purpose of his coming visit to Algeria would be to persuade Europeans and Muslims that France does not intend to "abdicate".

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

25/2/11

E - return
(orig on 167/2/1)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times — File No. 25/2/11 E

Published at: London — Date: 10-2-59

M. DEBRÉ BOOED IN ALGIERS

EXTREMISTS TURN ON THEIR LEADERS

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, FEB. 9

M. Debré had a hostile reception from young European extremists when he went to lay a wreath on the war memorial in Algiers to-day. The demonstration did not reach the proportions of that which greeted M. Mollet three years ago, but it was a strange experience for the Prime Minister, who in Paris has always been regarded as an upholder of French interests in North Africa.

He was greeted with boos and whistling and shouts of "Algérie francaise!" and "Shoot ben Bella!" M. Debré is disliked in Algeria for the measures of clemency accorded to ben Bella and other nationalists. Pamphlets were distributed in Algiers last night describing him as "worse than Mendès and Guy Mollet, a man who is offering a cease-fire to the F.L.N., *i.e.*, political and electoral victory to the liberated rebels."

NO MAGIC FORMULA

M. Debré later read a statement emphasizing the French role in Algeria and reiterating that the Army would be allowed to fulfil its task. General de Gaulle's appeal to the rebels was "the only way of salvation" and no one should count on the French growing weary of their struggle in Algeria. "There is no key word, no magic formula to settle the Algerian problem. The truth is that Algeria is a land of French sovereignty."

The indignation of a vocal section of Algerian extremists has also turned against some of their staunchest leaders, men such as M. Lagaillarde and Maître Biaggi, who are regarded by liberals as dangerous extremists.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No: 25/2/11 E
Published at: London Date: 9-2-59

ALGERIA VISIT BY M. DEBRÉ

EFFORT TO REMOVE DOUBTS

IMPATIENT SETTLERS

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, FEB. 8

M. Michel Debré, the Prime Minister, left Paris to-day by air for Algiers, where he arrived in the early evening. This, his first visit since he became Prime Minister, is to be devoted largely to official contacts and meetings in Algiers, including the opening session of the new committee charged with applying the Constantine plan for economic and social progress. M. Debré is also to make a broadcast speech while in Algeria.

The Europeans in Algeria are said to be waiting with interest and even impatience, to hear what the Prime Minister has to say. In spite of protestations to the contrary from French Ministers, it is obvious to anyone able to hear and read that General de Gaulle's thoughts on Algeria are not the same as those of many members of the U.N.R. (the neo-Gaullist Union for a New Republic) and of the Algerian deputies elected to Parliament last November. There are also signs that some of the younger Army officers are feeling something less than enchantment at the General's refusal to make "integration" his watchword, and at what they think to be the imprecision of his spoken thoughts on Algeria.

"HEAVY SILENCE"

Something of the peculiar temperature now existing in Algiers may be gathered from accounts of a meeting held there last night by an organization called "Algérie Française." The chairman of the movement referred, in his speech, to the "heavier and heavier silence which is now weighing down on Algeria" and to the need to "rekindle confidence in the masses."

After these implicit criticisms of General de Gaulle and the Government in Paris, some of the other speakers, including U.N.R. deputies from Paris, found it impossible to get a hearing, so vociferous were the criticisms in the hall of Paris policies and personalities. Among the recognizable shouts were "Debré to the gallows."

A Paris military court yesterday passed death sentences on two of the Algerians involved in the attempted assassination of M. Soustelle in Paris last September. Another of the men got hard labour for life, and three were sentenced to one year's imprisonment. During the trial counsel for the defence tried to prove, unsuccessfully, that the accused should be considered as combatants in a war and accorded suitable treatment.

Three of the accused said that they had been tortured by the French police. In his summing up the representative of the Judge Advocate-General said the would-be assassins had "probably acted for money," but one of the defence counsel, an Algerian, replied in a way that seemed to leave the court impressed. He argued that the accused had done what they believed to be their duty, as part of their struggle for an Algerian nation. "Ask for their heads," counsel [illegible] but do not say leave them their [illegible] Party," [illegible] has

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Times, London
Published at:
File No. 25/2/11 E
Date 9-2-59

CHANGE IN ALGERIA MARRIAGE RULES

FRENCH DECREE ON RIGHTS OF MUSLIM WOMEN

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, FEB. 11

Muslim marriage rules in Algeria are changed by a French Government ordinance made last week and published to-day. In future a Muslim woman must not be married without her own consent, and two witnesses must be present. The right of a Muslim to renounce his wife unilaterally is abolished, and a divorce system closer to the European model is substituted. Marriages may be dissolved in court, but the husband is liable to pay alimony. The minimum marriage age is set at 15 for a woman and 18 for a man.

Previously there was no minimum age, and girls were sometimes promised in marriage as infants. Polygamy remains legally possible, but is now practised in Algeria by less than 2 per cent. of the male population.

This ordinance marks an important step towards the emancipation of Muslim women in Algeria. It was prepared largely by Mlle. Sid Cara, Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs, the only Muslim member of the Government. It places the Muslim woman more nearly on a footing of equality with her husband, and provides her with some legal redress if her husband should abandon her. The reform has been contested, however, by the Islamic authorities in Algeria, on the ground that the Muslim marriage laws are no business of the French Government.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

201/5/4
Memorandum No: 70

17th January, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

Reference is made to the Embassy's memorandum no: 46 of 12th January, 1959.

2. General de Gaulle's grant of grace to six leading Algerian rebels, headed by M. Ben Bella, and to many other minor rebel figures and suspects has produced a lot of discussion in France and as might have been expected, a spate of speculative reports about a new French initiative and "contacts" between the French and the F.L.N. It is impossible to say definitely whether there have been or are such "contacts" but it does seem clear that no basic change in French policy is envisaged.

3. What General de Gaulle seems to be doing is to encourage the F.L.N. to ask for a cease fire. Apart from this, his policy remains constant - as before, his policy is to see peace established in Algeria and to see Algerians of both colours work hand-in-hand to develop the country; in due course, Algeria's political future will then emerge inevitably. The General expects that it will be as a member of the French Community.

4. Hence, the declaration by M. Delouvrier at Oran on 15th January that "there cannot be political negotiations on the political status of Algeria"; General de Gaulle has repeated that the destiny of Algeria must be decided in Algeria. But M. Delouvrier added that "any negotiation on the military plane for a cease-fire is to be desired". Hence also the fact that General de Gaulle's act of clemency and some earlier acts meet some of the F.L.N.'s minor demands - that rebels captured fighting should be interned, that rebels condemned to death should be shot, not guillotined, that rebel political leaders should not be executed and that M. Ben Bella should be released. The first demand has been met over the last three months, the second over the last month. The third demand has now been met, the fourth met partially.

5. But in his message to the National Assembly on 15th January, General de Gaulle made it clear that his policy towards Algeria was not changed. In the message the General defined his policy as "pacification and transformation of Algeria, which are clearly the indispensable conditions of a political solution, a solution which could not emerge except through universal suffrage." (A copy of General de Gaulle's message is forwarded with memorandum no: 68).

6. Outlining his Government's programme to the National Assembly on the same day, the Premier, M. Debré, was more specific. M. Debré spoke of what France had done for Algeria, of the fact that France in Algeria was guaranteeing the security of the Western Mediterranean (the West had lost a lot in recent years; "new abdications" could not be contemplated), of what France was going to do for Algeria in the way of economic and social development. He went on that Algeria would shape its own way, with its own traits, "in the breast of French sovereignty", and concluded by repeating General de Gaulle's offer of 23rd October of a cease-fire and a safe-conduct for rebel leaders to Paris to negotiate the same. M. Debré said that rumours that something other than this was "in the wind" were stupid - "nothing else had ever been envisaged, nothing else can be envisaged." (A copy of M. Debré's speech is forwarded with memorandum no:68)

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(Copy on 162/4/4)

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS.

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Memorandum 70 (Contd)

7. For its part, the F.L.N. has given no indication, at least up to the present, that General de Gaulle's act of clemency will cause it to waver. On 15th January, M. Yazid, the "Minister" for Information in the "provisional Government", told the press in Cairo that the act could only be fruitful if it were based on a positive desire by France to enter into direct negotiations with the F.L.N. looking to a peaceful solution of Algerian problems; these negotiations, according to the F.L.N., must be based upon independence for Algeria and take place on neutral ground. M. Yazid also said all the rumours about contacts or negotiations between France and the F.L.N. direct or indirect were false. Nor had M. Fanfani mediated while he was in Cairo.

8. General de Gaulle's act of clemency does not appear therefore to have brought a solution of the Algerian problem or even a cease-fire any closer. It may have helped France's case a little with her friends but that is all, at least so far. As for the colons in Algeria, their apprehensions over the act have probably been assuaged by General de Gaulle's message to the National Assembly and more so by M. Debré's speech before it.

9. Looking further ahead, there are some signs that the F.L.N. has lost some ground recently. The signs are:

a) On the military plane, the rebels are still lively but their activities lately seem to be concentrated more on localized efforts, such as murders and cutting railroad lines, rather than more military-like operations. This reflects perhaps logistic problems;

b) On the psychological plane, one cannot help thinking that General de Gaulle's programme of Algerian development must be having some effect even if yet small on the Algerian people. When first announced, there must have been some scepticism but the General has since shown every sign that the programme is real. And its effect will grow as its practical benefits appear. The act of clemency probably gave it a little boost;

c) On the diplomatic plane, France won at the U.N. General Assembly, but by one vote only. This was a triumph for the F.L.N. But recognition of the "Provisional Government" has come from only 15 countries (the Lebanon is the latest) and this is an unsatisfactory result.

10. It is still too early to say but these indications suggest the tide may be starting to swing against the F.L.N. Whether the swing in the tide will be enough to induce the F.L.N. to talk to the French on anything like General de Gaulle's terms remains to be seen.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
File No: 25/2/11 E.
Published at: London
Date: 29-1-59

NO PEACE OF THE BRAVE

There is to be no cease-fire in Algeria. The blunt announcement by a rebel spokesman kills many hopes that had sprung up in France and even in parts of Algeria since GENERAL DE GAULLE made his offer of a "peace of the brave." The rebels repeat that they would stop the war only if France were ready to talk of Algerian independence, "with or without links with France." As France refuses any political negotiations with the rebels, everyone is back at the old question. Can any end be seen to the ruinous strife? The only honest answer is that it is likely to go on for years. Militarily, the French forces, about 400,000 strong, have made great gains during the past eighteen months. They have pushed the active rebel groups back into three separated hill areas—first and foremost Great Kabylia, which is the home of the tough and proud Berber highlanders, the Pathans of Algeria; then the Ouarsenis of the south-west; and the coastal range between Algiers and Oran. As war weariness grows, the Muslims are more ready to let the French forces know where the rebels are and then comes a well-directed and deadly blow. But the process is almost as hard as taking up the sea in a sieve. In spite of their losses, the National Liberation Front keep about 30,000 men in the active groups, with perhaps another 20,000 ready to take the field, and they call upon or kidnap or terrorize into obedience other villagers whenever they can.

The large cities, the smaller towns, and many fertile areas are secure. But the burden falls on the villagers, especially in or near the hills. About 600,000 have fled their homes or have been moved, for security reasons, by the French. The first result is seen in the pastures and fields that are left derelict. The second effect appears in the neat new villages which the people build under French direction and in the tents and rough huts where many of them live while waiting for their new stone or concrete cottages. Yet even those who have not moved are caught between two pressures. There is the heavy French military guard by day, and at night there comes the weekly or monthly visit by an F.L.N. agent, collecting dues like another Alan Breck, with the difference that a refusal to pay or a pro-French act means risking a slit throat or a burnt village.

The astonishing thing is that life and production go on in most of the country. But even in the most settled areas there are the uncertainties, and among the nine million Muslims there is the aching desire for peace. French officers and probably most of the million European civilians recognize that they are engaged essentially in a struggle for the minds of the Muslim. Quite genuinely they are convinced that backward Algeria's only chance of being brought forward into modern life lies in some association with France and, especially since GENERAL DE GAULLE'S coming to power, they are seeking to build up a new partnership with the Muslims. The firstfruits are seen in the new schools being built among the villages and the regroupment centres, in the new roads and irrigation schemes, [illegible] to bring more Muslims into

mean having an autonomous régime or a wider North African confederation. So far, however, the only certainty is that the war goes on.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

first result is seen in the ... fields that are left derelict. The second effect appears in the neat new villages which the people build under French direction and in the tents and rough huts where many of them live while waiting for their new stone or concrete cottages. Yet even those who have not moved are caught between two pressures. There is the heavy French military guard by day, and at night there comes the weekly or monthly visit by an F.L.N. agent, collecting dues like another Alan Breck, with the difference that a refusal to pay or a pro-French act means risking a slit throat or a burnt village.

The astonishing thing is that life and production go on in most of the country. But even in the most settled areas there are the uncertainties, and among the nine million Muslims there is the aching desire for peace. French officers and probably most of the million European civilians recognize that they are engaged essentially in a struggle for the minds of the Muslim. Quite genuinely they are convinced that backward Algeria's only chance of being brought forward into modern life lies in some association with France and, especially since GENERAL DE GAULLE'S coming to power, they are seeking to build up a new partnership with the Muslims. The firstfruits are seen in the new schools being built among the villages and the regroupment centres, in the new roads and irrigation schemes, in the drive to bring more Muslims into the administration. Above all, there is the promise that profits from the oil wells in the Sahara will be set off to Algeria's benefit, and there is the wider promise of industrial development over the next ten years, to which France is pledging enormous sums.

Nevertheless, even if all develops as planned, there can be no certain answer. The formidable and daunting fact about Algeria is that it is a heavily over-populated country. It has ten million people depending on soil and resources that could comfortably sustain three or four million, and the population is rising fast. Even if the ten-year plan provided work for 800,000 people, and arranged for a further 200,000 to work in France, the population would have risen by three or four million in the same period. Beyond that is the nagging fear that as the people become more educated, and as more of them are given a better start in life, they will become more demanding and more nationally conscious. Yet France cannot do less than make the effort. She cannot let the poor become poorer. There are villages and areas to-day which could not live without the money sent home by the 300,000 or more Algerian workers in France. Certainly an Algeria cut off from French (or other western) help would either starve or be driven to accept help from the Communist camp.

Sooner or later a settlement has to be reached. GENERAL DE GAULLE has said that the Algerians themselves, Muslims and Europeans together, must decide their future on the basis of universal suffrage. It is a long-term policy. It seems to set aside the hopes, held especially by many educated Muslims, of the early dramatic move or statute which they expected when first he came to power. They may become weary and suspicious again. That is the danger of delay. But, if he keeps to his plan, the first test may come in about four years' time when general elections are due. The great question then would be whether the Muslim majority—having seen what France had done by then—were convinced that some link with France had to be kept. That would

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

25/2/11

SDP

I:1715

Dated:28th January, 1959.

Rec'd:29th January, 1959.

(Via Leased Channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

SAVINGRAM 64. CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy to London.

North Africa.

The following from Stokes (North West African Affairs) on 28th January.

MOROCCO:

2. The Government claimed that Riff uprising was now over. The Moroccan Army was now turning its attention from the Riff Area to the middle Atlas Region where there was also the threat of a possible uprising.

3. 'Istiqlal' had split and Left Wing Radical element under leadership of Ben Barka and Ben Seddiq had broken away from the arty. (Ben Barka was a prominent Left Wing Trade Union leader and Ben Seddiq was former Editor of 'Istiqlal' newspaper and influential in student affairs.) Main centres of radical strength were in urban centres among trade unions and students.

4. It was not clear yet how this development would affect the position of Cabinet and Stokes commented that the Prime Minister (Ibrahim) and the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs (Bouabid) were closely associated with the radical group. Stokes thought it was possible that with Ibrahim as Prime Minister the Radicals might have decided that this was the opportunity they had been waiting for to break with the Conservatives. The latters' domination of 'Istiqlal' Executive and their control of the Police and Army had been sources of dissatisfaction among the Radicals for a long time. However, previous attempts to form separate Radical political organizations had failed as Conservative-dominated 'Istiqlal' Governments had refused to issue licences for new political parties and had arrested leaders when they tried to form organizations without licences. With Ibrahim as Prime Minister, the radicals might hope that licence would be issued.

5. Stokes commented that it was difficult at this early stage to assess significance of the Break between the Conservatives and Radicals but he believed that it might well strengthen the King's position. Up to now, the King had had to deal with 'Istiqlal' as monolithic organization. Stokes noted that Morocco did not yet have a Constitution or any representative institutions and the King was final arbiter on all matters of Government policy.

ALGERIA:

6. F.L.N. Provisional Government appeared to be moving back to Tunis from Cairo. There were number of indications which suggested that their relations with the U.A.R. had cooled,

CONFIDENTIAL

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although the United States did not yet know the reasons for this. Stokes speculated, however, that as Iraq and Saudi Arabia were important sources of funds for the F.L.N., the latter may have decidedit was politic in the present circumstances not to appear too close to Nasser. Further, with sharp exchanges which had taken place between Nasser and Bourguiba, the latter might well have applied pressure on the F.L.N. and threatened to cut off their access to Algeria across the Tunisian border unless they moved out of Cairo.

7. In Algeria itself, the F.L.N. had given up attempt to carry on the war with large bands and was reverting to its earlier guerrilla type operations. From the French point of view the containment of guerrilla war required a larger number of troops and heavier expenditures.

8. French release of Algerian prisoners was no more than a gesture but was nevertheless to be welcomed. The United States understood that F.L.N. leaders would now be willing to go to Paris for talks with the French Government. Also, that they might be willing to drop their demand that independence for Algeria should be a topic for discussion, and merely insist that 'political questions' should be included in agenda. They apparently felt, however, that they could not go to Paris for what would in fact amount to little more than discussion of 'surrender terms'.

9. Stokes commented that the French could not implement their reconstruction programme for Algeria while the fighting lasted. It did not appear that there could be any hope for a military solution of Algerian rebellion and presumably Paris was realistic enough to appreciate this by now.

TUNISIA:

10. Bourguiba's refusal to depreciate Tunisian Dinar parallel with depreciation of Franc was likely to lead Tunisia into all kirds of financial difficulty. The United States frankly did not understand why Bourguiba had taken this stand but was hopeful that French patience, and co-operation from other members of the Common Market, would lead to a solution of the problem. Stokes commented that it was the United States view that Western Europeans could easily carry Tunisia without too much difficulty.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE

30th January, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&M AM&SP S&SEA
SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL INTELL MR.EASTMAN

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TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper Manchester Guardian Weekly File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at Manchester Date 22-1-59

Cease-fire ?

Almost since General de Gaulle came to office last year there have been rumours of negotiation between the French Government and the Algerian rebels. These rumours have now been strengthened by the measures of clemency announced last week. Not only did these measures commute all death sentences on Algerians and set free 7,000 internees but they were taken by Ministers a number of whom would have denounced them fiercely if one of the Governments of the Fourth Republic had proposed them. General de Gaulle has by his authority got a large part of French opinion to admit (however grudgingly) that the thing to do with responsible rebel leaders is to move them from prison to a forced residence rather than to shoot them. This is a step forward, and the next step might be to acknowledge that a political settlement could best be brought about by negotiating with these same responsible leaders. The question is: what could France and the rebel leaders negotiate about? And would the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) agree to negotiate? The new Prime Minister, M. Debré, said last week that the only possible French offer was that which General de Gaulle made last year and which the F.L.N. then rejected. The proposal then was that the rebel leaders should come to France—as brave men entering into a voluntary truce—and negotiate a cease-fire. A general election would then give Moslem nationalists a chance to take part in the shaping of Algeria's future. Since then the election has come and gone and has sent to Paris Algerian deputies mostly committed to integration. On the face of it the offer is less attractive than it was last year. If the F.L.N. leaders should change their minds it would presumably be for one of two reasons: either they are losing ground in the field and in their countrymen's minds, or else the French Government has, after all, some prospect to hold out beyond a mere cease-fire.

The rebels have suffered heavy losses. Yet this can be taken as a sign that they are able to call upon fresh recruits. From the start the Algerian war has looked like one of those conflicts that cannot, on military grounds, be either won or lost. This still seems true. General de Gaulle acknowledged as much last Thursday when he spoke of "pacification" as a means to a political settlement rather than as an end in itself. The difficulty is to know how a political settlement can even be approached, let alone carried through. In Morocco and Tunisia French Governments half moved, half let themselves be dragged by events towards a settlement in the teeth of opposition from the Europeans and their friends. They gradually released Nationalist leaders and then got them to take part in talks with the upholders of the old order. The pressure of events did the rest, though not without many desperate moments. In dealing with Algeria the new French Government is better able than were its predecessors to avoid hurtling from one improvisation to the next. On the other hand, the problem itself is far more tangled. The Europeans dominate the counsels of those Algerian deputies whom the General has invited to take part in "doing the rest"—that is, in settling the territory's relations with France. Can these deputies be induced to sit down with representatives of the Moslem Nationalists, who must inevitably include the F.L.N.? Can the Europeans be weaned from their demand for integration and the F.L.N. from its demand for independence? It is conceivable that General de Gaulle and the new Government might by a series of bold moves bring about a new climate of opinion on either side. But at present it is difficult to see how.

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25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY.
PARIS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
19 JAN 1959
COPY

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201/5/4
Memorandum 46

12th January, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

Immediately upon becoming President of the French Republic, General de Gaulle has aroused something of a hornet's nest over Algeria. Two separate matters are involved - firstly, the reference the General made in his inauguration address to the future of Algeria and secondly, rumours that the customary exercise of the President's power to grant grace may concern Algerian nationalist leaders under detention.

The Inauguration Address

2. In this address on 8th January, General de Gaulle spoke glowingly of the new French Community and then said, "In the whole thus formed, a choice place is destined to Algeria of tomorrow, pacified and transformed, developing its personality itself in close association with France."

3. This, on the face of it, sensible and not surprising statement drew immediate criticism from the great majority of the 71 deputies from Algeria and the Sahara in the National Assembly. In a communiqué the deputies replied there was no place for Algeria in the Community - "integral fusion with the metropole" was the only future for Algeria. The powerful Algerian Ex-Servicemen's Association also criticized General de Gaulle's statement saying that it would have a "catastrophic effect within Algeria."

Clemency to Algerian Rebels

4. The local press has been full of reports over the last few days that to improve the climate for an Algerian settlement, General de Gaulle will shortly relax the conditions under which some top Algerian rebels are detained. The General's intention, it is reported, is to release Mohammed Ben Bella, once military leader of the F.L.N., and the four other leading F.L.N. members who were seized with him on 22nd October, 1956 (during an air flight from Morocco to Tunis) from prison in Paris and to put them in "controlled residence" (or house arrest) on Belle Ile, an island off the coast of Brittany. It is also reported that the General intends to lift the death sentences imposed on some other Algerian rebels and to release some suspects from detention.

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(orig. on 167/2/4)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN ... PARIS

5. The four F.L.N. leaders concerned, apart from M. Ben Bella, are MM. Mohammed Khider, Aît Ahmed Hecine, Mohammed Boudiaf and Mostafa Lacheraf. Ben Bella and the others, with the exception of Mostafa Lacheraf, are Ministers in the F.L.N. "Provisional Government" established recently in Cairo. Ben Bella, Aît Ahmed and Mohammed Khider are serving sentences of life imprisonment for terrorist acts.

6. It has also been reported that General de Gaulle intends to move M. Messali Hadj, the leader of the M.N.A., from "controlled residence" on Belle Ile to compulsory residence in Paris (Messali Hadj, in a recent radio interview, described General de Gaulle's Constantine speech as "a step forward").

7. The reports of General de Gaulle's intention to accord clemency to these top Algerian rebel figures has aroused anxiety among the colons in Algeria, possibly more anxiety than any of the steps General de Gaulle has taken in Algeria since he came to power. The Ex-Servicemen's Association has said that clemency would show weakness on the part of the French and encourage the rebels; it would start France on the same fateful path as she took with Tunisia, Morocco and Indo-China.

8. These Algerian developments coming just before the short session of the National Assembly at which M. Debré will present his programme for approval may lead to some discussion of the Algerian problem in the Assembly on Thursday next. Perhaps to forestall this, General de Gaulle may withhold clemency, until after the Assembly has broken up.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Observer — File No. 25/2/11 E

Published at: London — Date: 18 - 1 - 59

● *AFRICA*

How Much, How Fast?

DE GAULLE was brought to power because the Fourth Republic could not solve the Algerian problem; the success of his regime depends on his ability to provide a solution.

Last week as one of his first Presidential acts he introduced an amnesty by which:—

1.—Two hundred convicted Muslim terrorists were to have their death sentences commuted to forced labour for life.

2.—All other terrorists imprisoned in Algeria were to have their sentences reduced by one-tenth.

3.—Seven thousand suspects—about half of the total—were to be released from internment camp in Algeria.

4. Algerian leaders held in France were to have their prison conditions ameliorated.

These acts of clemency were, of course, at once attacked by the ultra-Rightists in Algiers and in the Assembly, where the new Prime Minister, M. DEBRE, supported the General's policy. He added a plea for Nato support for French policy in Algeria: "We cannot be united in Europe and disunited against the same threat in the Mediterranean."

Unfortunately this plea for regarding Algeria as an integral part of Europe exactly reversed the recent plea of Algerians at the Accra conference — that they should be regarded as part of Africa—the Africa struggling for freedom from colonialism.

Congo Moves

Africa's rapid moves towards an anti-colonial unity found expression in general African support for the uprising in the Belgian Congo, to which Brussels reacted by proposing:—

Political: Independence was promised "without delay but also without inconsiderate haste." The first moves in this direction were to be the election of urban and rural district councillors at the end of this year, with provincial councils next year. This put the Congo roughly in a position equivalent to the bottom of the British colonial ladder—far below her neighbours, Uganda or French Equatorial Africa.

Personal: Race discrimination to be ended and the Congolese to enter the higher Civil Service posts.

Penal: Three of the burgomasters elected under last year's very limited political reforms were to be imprisoned. The nationalist Abako Party to be suppressed.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times — New York Weekly Review
Published at:
File No: 25/2/11 E.
Date: 18-1-59

Still Algeria

Under the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France, the National Assembly's powers are drastically curtailed. Its consent is no longer required in order for the government to take office; the President names the Premier, and the Premier names his Cabinet. The Assembly can no longer throw out governments at will. And it can be dissolved by the President if he feels there is an emergency.

Last week the first Assembly of the Fifth Republic—its political complexion strongly right-wing—convened for its first working session. Crowds packed the Chamber's galleries, and the proceedings were televised. The Assembly heard the new Premier, Michel Debré, outline his Government's policy. While in theory M. Debré is responsible for this policy, in fact President Charles de Gaulle is running the show. As M. Debré put it to the Assembly, the first condition for political action is "the presence and authority of General de Gaulle."

The dominant question facing de Gaulle and the Assembly was Algeria. It was the issue of Algeria that brought de Gaulle to power eight months ago. For a time thereafter he had hoped that the Fifth Republic's first parliamentary elections would bring to Paris an Algerian delegation that reflected nationalist opinion and could negotiate a settlement with him, but a nationalist boycott of the elections had thwarted that hope. He had then seemed to place reliance on the possibility of conciliation and the evolution of some settlement acceptable to both the rebels and French public opinion.

Declares Amnesty

Last Tuesday, in anticipation of the Assembly session, President de Gaulle in a conciliatory gesture decreed wide amnesty measures freeing thousands of Algerian Moslem prisoners. The rebel leaders responded by reiterating their demand for political negotiations toward independence. French rightists reacted resentfully to the amnesty.

In this bleak situation de Gaulle on Thursday stated his views on the Algerian problem in broad terms. He said France's major goal was "the pacification and transformation of Algeria, which are, of course, the indispensable conditions of a political solution which can only proceed from universal suffrage." That seemed to mean that while the general was not now offering the rebels any concessions, he was prepared eventually to accept the wishes of the Algerian Moslem population, expressed in a free vote. In other words, de Gaulle seemed to be saying that he was not in favor of the political fusion—"integration"—of Algeria into France proper, which the conservative French parties and the French settlers in Algeria demand.

But after de Gaulle's message was read, Premier Debré delivered what was, in effect, a state-of-the-union speech. M. Debré said his Government's policy was to keep Algeria under French sovereignty. The Premier promised that Algeria would be "welded to France." He said "there will not be, there cannot be political negotiations" between France and "barbarians of the rebellion." And he said peace could come only if the rebels accepted de Gaulle's call for a negotiated cease-fire.

Premier Debré's Algerian statements sounded tougher than those made by de Gaulle. And the Premier's statements were received enthusiastically by the Assembly. The deputies showed their uncompromising opposition to Algerian nationalism and their will to continue the war by voting 453 to 56 in favor of the Debré program.

Despite the Assembly's broad support for the program, there were complaints from right and left over the austerity measures de Gaulle put into effect two weeks ago in order to meet the economic burden of the Algerian conflict. Many observers believe that these complaints will mount, and that eventually the combination of de Gaulle's evident desire to let the Algerians decide their own fate and the Assembly's weariness with the austerity program might point the way to an Algerian settlement.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No: 25/1/4 E.

Published at: London Date: 17-1-59

PRIME MINISTER'S ALGERIA POLICY

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, JAN. 16

No vote of confidence in a new Government is necessary under the new constitution, but at the end of the debate on the programme of M. Debré's Government this afternoon the National Assembly gave it an overwhelming vote —453 to 56.

The neo-Gaullist Union for a New Republic, voted for M. Debré, and nearly all the orthodox right wing, all the M.R.P., and nearly all the Radicals. Those who voted against were the Socialists, the Communists, and a few others.

The Assembly remains in session into next week, but its business is limited to domestic matters such as standing orders. The next parliamentary session begins at the end of April, and both Houses will then sit until the summer recess. In the interval local government elections, both in France and Algeria, will provide another test of public opinion.

KEY PHRASE

The debate has shown that Parliament, and by inference public opinion, is preoccupied above all by two questions, of which the first and greatest is Algeria. In spite of the flood of words, no new element has been introduced into the situation. The key phrase in regard to the matter in M. Debré's long and somewhat diffuse speech yesterday was that "Algeria will mould herself with her own characteristics, within French sovereignty."

The impression that M. Debré's ideas on Algeria, at any rate as he expressed them, are not as liberal as those of General de Gaulle is reinforced by the favourable reaction of the U.N.R. and Algerian groups in the Chamber, as well as the Europeans in Algiers, who a week ago were decidedly restive at the remarks made by General de Gaulle on becoming President of the Republic, and at the decision to reprieve Algerians condemned to death.

TWO PHRASES

M. Debré, replying to the debate this morning, once again used the curiously misty kind of phraseology that seems inseparable from this intractable problem. "Algeria falls within the scope of French sovereignty," he said. He added another curious phrase about continuing the present policy in Algeria in such a way that "at the end of the mandate" they would leave Algeria (the word used was *laisser*, which does not mean "to quit") "finer, more content, that is to say better fused with France."

Several speeches showed that the Algerian deputies, and some of the right wing deplore General de Gaulle's recent acts of clemency. M. Lauriol, who is by no means an extremist, expressed "the emotion of the Algerian people" at these measures, and went on to reject "any beginning of autonomy, even in the financial field."

Muslims should attain political equality and social dignity, but territorial autonomy was an obstacle to this, for "it incites Muslims to consider themselves as more and more Algerian, and exasperates the French people."

APPARENT OMISSION

If there were an Algerian "per-[illegible]" M. Lauriol concluded, "it is the French personality, and that

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If there were an Algerian "personality," M. Lauriol concluded, "it is the French personality, and that alone"—a remark which shows the gulf that separates these people from General de Gaulle. *Le Figaro* remarked this morning that the one vital error in M. Lauriol's logical and well argued speech was the apparent failure to take the rebellion into account.

The other great question with which Parliament and public opinion are concerned is that of the economic and financial measures enacted by the de Gaulle Government in the last days of its life. Many deputies, not only the Socialists, were critical of these, and the decision to stop the pensions of able-bodied ex-service men was freely and unfavourably commented on. A U.N.R. spokesman expressed mistrust of what he called "rationing by the purse," and hoped that there would be adjustments of the financial programme.

This speaker, M. Terrenoire, was before his election to Parliament head of the information services of the Radio-diffusion-Télévision-Française, a post to which as a faithful Gaullist he was appointed in June.

He argued yesterday that, as the present Government was likely to survive for the whole life of this Parliament, it must maintain "a constant dialogue with the people"

EUROPEAN UNITY

Finally, M. Debré's speech yesterday clearly demonstrated the new approach of his Government—and therefore also of General de Gaulle—to European unification.

There is no question of France's going back on any of her international obligations, but M. Debré made it plain that his Government regarded the proper way forward in European unity as that of consultation between heads of Governments, representing nations, and not through supra-national organizations.

European solidarity could not "be founded on the negation of the national idea, for Europe is made up of nations"; and the future consisted in making public opinion see that "national causes are a part of the great cause of Europe."

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No 25/2/4E.

Published at London Date 16-1-59

SAFE CONDUCT TO PARIS TO DISCUSS CEASE-FIRE

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, JAN. 15

The deputies of the Fifth Republic attended the National Assembly in force this afternoon to hear M. Debré, the new Prime Minister (whose forty-seventh birthday it was) announce his Government's policy, which he did with perhaps an excess of rhetoric.

On Algeria he said that General de Gaulle's offer last October of safe-conduct to the Algerian rebel leaders if they came to Paris to discuss a cease-fire was still open. This offer, he said, "opened the only possible prospect of a cessation of hostilities." Among other reasons to justify the French "presence" in Algeria he quoted the strategic issues involved for France, Europe, and the west.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

A Socialist critic later remarked that the spirit of General de Gaulle's liberally minded statements on Algeria was conspicuously lacking from M. Debré's speech, and concluded that he had sacrificed it to his majority, which found it not to its liking. As might have been expected, the Socialist spokesman announced that his party would vote against the Government at the end of the debate.

The session opened with the reading by the president of the Chamber, M. Chaban-Delmas, of a message from President de Gaulle.

In this he said that if the national recovery that had begun was to continue and prosper, French affairs must be put in order in all fields. Here came a passing reference to Algeria in which the President spoke of "the pacification and transformation, which are clearly the indispensable conditions of a political solution which can come only as the result of universal suffrage."

This passage afterwards caused some discussion in the lobbies. Most people interpreted it as another expression of the General's idea that in Algeria there is a continuing process of elections, first to the National Assembly, and then to the municipal bodies and to the Senate.

TEST FOR PARLIAMENT

General de Gaulle's message ended with a reference to the efforts required by different categories of French people if the various national tasks were to be accomplished. This would be the decisive test for Parliament.

If it yielded to "sectional pressures," instead of associating itself with "the common and national interest," the crisis of institutions "would become threatening." If, on the other hand, as he believed it would, Parliament did not allow itself to be blinded by personal and private interests to "the forest of French unity," a great future was assured to the Republic and to the nation.

M. Debré was perhaps most interesting on Atlantic and European policies; he went a long way towards confirming the new régime's trend to insistence on the French role, and what is due to it, in the Atlantic alliance, and to view European unity as the concern of Governments and nations rather than of supra-national Organizations. He said that there could be no real solidarity

The Prime Minister said that the Atlantic alliance must show itself ready for co-existence, which was a "necessity, and will be more so to-morrow than to-day." The true value of the alliance would be determined by the extent to which its members were "united and strong enough to permit a *de jure* state of balance between the western and Soviet worlds to replace a *de facto* balance."

In a reference to the free trade area project M. Debré recalled that France had gone into the Common Market and accepted the principle of competition, in spite of her generous social legislation and oversea efforts. But success depended on a "firm attitude" towards other liberal experiments which would not have the same indispensable guarantees for the French economy.

FIRST OF NECESSITIES

The Government would not, in the future any more than in the past, reject the idea of a free trade area, but could not give up the guarantees accepted by the other members of the Common Market: common tariffs, levelling up of wage rates, sharing of oversea investments, and common agricultural policy.

M. Debré began his speech with a reference to last year's "profound upsurge," which in no way had been an "outburst of nationalism." This led him to the thought that General de Gaulle "is to-day the first of our national necessities." He went on to appeal for a more satisfactory working of parliamentary institutions, and for the taking of vital questions out of politics.

Then came the passage on Algeria, with its statement that "only France can assure for Algeria the possibility of equal rights for all." M. Debré repeated General de Gaulle's cease-fire offer, and spoke of a "soldiers' peace" (the General's phrase had been "the peace of brave men"). The observation that no other road to peace had been or could be envisaged brought loud applause, with the notable exception of some of the Socialist benches.

MR. GAITSKELL AT THE ÉLYSÉE

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, JAN. 15

Mr. Gaitskell, accompanied by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British Ambassador, was received by President de Gaulle this afternoon and remained with him for 75 minutes. He was the General's first foreign visitor since he became President last week. Mr. Gaitskell said afterwards that he was very happy to have met the President; their "very interesting conversations" had borne on N.A.T.O., nuclear defence, relations with Russia, and Algeria. Economic problems had not been discussed.

ANGLO-FRENCH ECONOMIC CONVERSATIONS

FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in charge

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AN ATOMIC POWER

People could not be united in Europe, where one threat existed, and not united in the Mediterranean, where there was the same threat. The French Government's view of its duties towards the Atlantic alliance was that France should become a military atomic Power, and should secure recognition of the "unparalleled strategic importance of French positions in the Mediterranean."

It was these duties which had inspired the de Gaulle Government to an effort of "revision and correction, which will be continued" (evidently a reference to French ideas for changes in N.A.T.O.).

The Prime Minister said that the [illegible] of balance between the western and Soviet worlds to replace a *de facto* balance."

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ANGLO-FRENCH ECONOMIC CONVERSATIONS

FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in charge of economic questions, is flying to Paris to-day for exploratory conversations with M. Wormser, head of the economic section of the Quai d'Orsay. A problem which they will discuss is the provision under the Common Market agreement by which the six Powers extend to each other, but not to other members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, import quotas equal to at least 3 per cent. of national production of each product.

It has been agreed that British and French representatives should work out an interim arrangement. The recent French liberalization decision excepted a number of imports of special interest to Britain. The positions of France and Britain are therefore at present wide apart.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS.

25/2/11

201/5/4
Memorandum 55

14th January, 1959

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria.

Reference is made to the Embassy's memorandum 46 of 12th January.

After the first meeting of the new French Cabinet on 13th January, General de Gaulle went ahead and granted clemency to M. Ben Bella and the four other F.L.N. leaders who were arrested with him in 1956, to Messali Hadj and to 7,000 suspected Algerian rebels in administrative detention in Algeria. As expected, Ben Bella and his four compatriots are to be transferred from prison to a "fortified area", while Messali Hadj will be brought from Belle Ile to Paris and allowed to move freely within France, provided that he does not go to Algeria.

As a further act of clemency, General de Gaulle also decreed that all prisoners under sentence of death who had exhausted their rights to appeal would ~~be spared to~~ hard labour for life. This measure applies, apparently, to French criminals as well as to the Algerian rebels. Acting with his customary courage General de Gaulle has thus defied the well-publicized opinion of the colons in Algeria and of the Algerian bloc in the National Assembly that grace should not be granted to leading Algerian rebel figures. What is more, General de Gaulle went ahead with his intentions, in defiance of this opinion, on the eve of the meeting of the National Assembly at which M. Debré is to ask approval of his Government's programme.

At the same time the Government made clear that there would be no change by the new Government in the Algerian policy of its predecessor. Speaking after the Cabinet meeting, Mr Frey, the new Minister for Information, said that the Algerian policy of the Government was inspired by the policy of the old Government, notably, a rejection by France of any foreign intervention and equally a rejection of any kind of negotiations upon the political status of Algeria.

Mr - urbain.
(orig on 167/2/2)

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

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EUROPEAN

25/2/4

Mr B Dexter
AUS
To see 4/-

FULL TEXT OF THE POLICY STATEMENT ON ALGERIA

BY PREMIER MICHEL DEBRE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

ON JANUARY 15, 1959

Algeria has absolute priority among the nation's concerns.

Men and women live there, whose fathers built Algeria, and who continue to build to it each day. There France has gathered, around her flag, and through her high political concepts, Europeans and Africans, all of them citizens like ourselves. Our Moslem fellow citizens, like the descendants of those who crossed the Mediterranean, are men and women in whose faces we see a common hope. There are some people who value debit and credit, profit and loss above all else. Let us say right out to the honour of our people and particularly to the honour of our officers and soldiers, that we place above all things this surge of feeling that unites millions of Algerians, from city and country, in the spontaneous affection that creates - above and beyond the differences of origin, race and religion - the Community of hope.

Must we convince those calculating minds? Let us show them the Sahara, the desert where the French cock has warmed his spurs so well that henceforth foreign powers will gladly come to scratch in the burning sand. Let us agree to associate them with us in an immense task that can open up a new era for Algeria and for Africa - for France and for Europe.

Let us recommend to those who are not satisfied by the vision of the great economic and human potentialities that are open to us, thanks to Algeria, let us recommend that they reflect on the problem of our security. France is in Algiers because of a basic necessity which our ancestors faced. It is through our incontrovertible presence and our undisputed authority that we guarantee the security of the Western Mediterranean, and thereby, our own security. In the light of the disturbances in the Middle East, and their most unfortunate consequences, we can measure the value of the calm that is maintained in this nearer part of a sea, the strategic importance of which it would be a serious

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mistake to forget. What a tragedy it would be for us, for Europe, for the Western World, if the entire Mediterranean once more should become a frontier between two hostile worlds. The West has lost enough in the course of the past years. Let the least imaginative henceforth imagine where new abdications would lead.

Finally, let us have the courage to say, beyond our deepest sentiments, beyond economic interests and military requirements, that our country once again puts the spotlight on the true hierarchy of political values. States, their aspirations, their ambitions and their methods cannot be evaluated merely from the point of view of the results obtained. Successes achieved through lies, treachery, and contempt for the dignity of man or woman, are no doubt effective: they lead from one tragedy to another. France's legitimate presence in Algeria - beyond the fact that Algeria is a creation of various elements which, however, have been forged and welded through the action of France, and beyond that other fact that there can be no enrichment and social betterment tomorrow except through the effort of France - France's legitimate presence, I say, is fundamentally established in relation to eternal values, because it is the only one inspired by a desire for human brotherhood. General de Gaulle has said it to the Europeans of Algiers, to the Moslems of the bled, he has said it to the officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men over there, who are once again the soldiers of brotherhood and freedom; he has said it in Constantine, directing his remarks at foreigners who try in vain to hide the truth. France alone can bring Algeria the possibility of equal rights for all. She alone can make a humane social and political ideal prevail. Anywhere else Algeria can find only misery, only hatred, only racism. It is France that offers the various communities - the Moslems, the Christians and the Jews, the Europeans and the Africans, the Kabyles and the Arabs - the chance for unity and the hope of brotherhood.

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Our duties are on the same high plane as the reasons for our legitimate presence.

There are the duties of security and administration. There would be no security if the Army were not there - the Army of the Republic, the Army of France, which remains faithful to its highest traditions, not only in combat, but also in ensuring the protection of cities and villages, the construction of roads, the education of children; likewise, there would be no administration if our civil servants and our magistrates were not standing by the side of the Army. This security and administration must be present and active in the towns as well as in the bled.

There is the duty of ensuring economic development for the common good; Algeria, between the Sahara and the Mediterranean, must develop her agriculture and her industry; her ports must know the bustle of countries in the process of expansion that receive a great deal, but that sell just as much, and not only raw materials, but also products that have required a considerable amount of labour.

There is the duty of leading the march of social evolution; Algeria is changing before our eyes; different as she is now from what she was twenty years ago, in ten years she will become - from the point of view of family customs, traditions, relationships between individuals - an Algeria that is not only young but also new. We must head this evolution through the education of children, the emancipation of women and the training of men for better positions.

There is the duty of giving Algeria technical and political leaders. An immense educational effort has been made in the last fifty years. This must be increased and stepped up in proportion to the demands of the new Algeria. In addition, by the laws of democracy, political leaders are coming to share our responsibilities - today, the elected representatives to the National Assembly, tomorrow, the elected representatives to the new Municipal Assemblies and to the Senate. Men and women of Algeria, whatever their origin, commingled in a single electoral college, are coming to the fore. Thanks to them Algeria will take shape with her own traits within French sovereignty.

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Finally, there is the duty of foreseeing the return to peace. An armed organization - the leaders of which have taken refuge abroad, and who receive from abroad, along with gold and weapons, orders to kill without lettup - has fought against us for four years. Who gains by this struggle? Let us say it aloud so that all can hear: it is to the advantage of all the subsersive forces of terrorism and of racism, at the expense of law and order, of peace, of brotherhood. Does the September Referendum mean nothing? Does this great mass of people reaching out to General de Gaulle mean nothing? Algeria has spoken from the bottom of her heart, and she has not spoken for those who have chosen the side of the rebellion, that is to say the side of hatred. Last October, the head of the Government, by suggesting for some the peace of the brave, and for others a safe conduct to France, opened the only possible prospects for the cessation of hostilities. Yesterday's head of the Government is today's President of the Republic and President of the Community. In other words, his offer still stands, and, thinking of the false rumours so foolishly but so complacently repeated, I say that there is no other prospect that has ever been considered or ever could be considered. To reject it is to work as much against Algeria as against France. To accept it is to hasten the hour of a brotherhood regained, or a brotherhood awaited - an hour that can never strike except with France and through France.

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AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION
972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

25/2/11

SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES
No. 124

January 15, 1959

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There is the duty of giving Algeria technical and political leaders. An immense educational effort has been made in the last fifty years. This must be increased and stepped up in proportion to the demands of the new Algeria. In addition, by the laws of democracy, political leaders are coming to share our responsibilities--today, the elected representatives to the National Assembly, tomorrow, the elected representatives to the new Municipal Assemblies and to the Senate. Men and women of Algeria, whatever their origin, commingled in a single electoral college, are coming to the fore. Thanks to them Algeria will take shape with her own traits within French sovereignty.

Finally, there is the duty of foreseeing the return to peace. An armed organization—the leaders of which have taken refuge abroad, and who receive from abroad, along with gold and weapons, orders to kill without letup--has fought against us for four years. Who gains by this struggle? Let us say it aloud so that all can hear: it is to the advantage of all the subversive forces of terrorism and of racism, at the expense of law and order, of peace, of brotherhood. Does the September Referendum mean nothing? Does this great mass of people reaching out to General de Gaulle mean nothing? Algeria has spoken from the bottom of her heart, and she has not spoken for those who have chosen the side of the rebellion, that is to say the side of hatred. Last October, the head of the Government, by suggesting for some the peace of the brave, and for others a safe conduct to France, opened the only possible prospects for the cessation of hostilities. Yesterday's head of the Government is today's President of the Republic and President of the Community. In other words, his offer still stands, and, thinking of the false rumors so foolishly but so complacently repeated, I say that there is no other prospect that has ever been considered or ever could be considered. To reject it is to work as much against Algeria as against France. To accept it is to hasten the hour of a brotherhood regained, of a brotherhood awaited--an hour that can never strike except with France and through France.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Canberra Times File No: 22/2/11 E

Published at: Canberra Date: 15-1-59

PARIS, Wednesday (A.A.P.).—The French Government last night announced clemency measures for Algerian rebel prisoners held in France and Algeria.

The measures were announced after the first full meeting of the Cabinet under the chairmanship of President De Gaulle, according to British United Press.

They include the transfer of Mohamed Ben Bella, the Algerian rebel leader credited with starting the war against France in 1954, from Sante prison in Paris to a form of "surveillance" on Belle Island, off the Brittany coast.

The leader of the Algerian national movement, Messali Hadj, will be released from house arrest on Belle Island and will be allowed to reside in Metropolitan France, but may not go to Algeria.

Seven thousand other Algerian rebels detained in France and Algeria will also be released.

Reuter reported that President De Gaulle also commuted all French and Algerian death sentences to forced labour for life.

Department of Justice sources said last night about 25 people in France had been awaiting the guillotine, but no execution had been imminent.

Capital punishment, although provided for in law, is rarely carried out. There are about seven to 10 executions a year in France.

The sources said the comparatively high number of people awaiting execution was the direct result of North African terrorism in France.

A second communique gave details of amnesty measures decided by President De Gaulle to mark the entry into force of the new Constitution.

These were:

- Approval of an amnesty for those who had belonged for three months or more to combat units in Algeria or had been wounded while serving.
- A decree under which the sentence of all insurgents convicted by Algerian courts would be cut by one-tenth. This measure would be completed by an individual study of every case so that further clemency might be granted.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Times File No.: 25/2/11 E

Published at: London Date: 14-1-59

BEN BELLA TO GO TO FORTRESS

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, JAN. 13

The Fifth Republic has begun its career with sweeping gestures of clemency towards captive Algerian nationalists. These were announced after the first Council of Ministers of the new régime, held this afternoon under the presidency of General de Gaulle.

M. Frey, Minister of Information, stated that the President, using his right of clemency, had commuted to forced labour for life all the sentences of death for which judicial recourse had been exhausted. This amounts to a reprieve for an estimated 200 convicted Muslim terrorists. The President, said M. Frey, had also signed a decree reducing by one-tenth the sentences of all other rebels imprisoned in Algeria.

These measures are the personal prerogative of the President. An amnesty is a traditional feature of the beginning of any new term of presidency of the republic, but rarely does it have such political significance. In addition, the Government to-day decided to release 7,000 Muslim suspects from internment camps in Algeria—more than half of what is believed to be the total population of these camps.

FREEDOM OF TRAVEL

It was decided that Messali Hadj, the leader of the Algerian National Movement, should be released from Belle-Ile, where he has spent the past three years in restricted residence, and should be allowed to travel freely in France, but not to return to Algeria. Ben Bella and the four other leaders of the National Liberation Front, who were captured in October, 1956, are to be transferred from La Santé prison to an unspecified "fortified stronghold" where they will enjoy somewhat greater freedom and privileges. This could be the Ile de Ré, where Marshal Pétain was imprisoned, or the fortress in Corsica that housed the Madagascan nationalists.

Severe reactions can be expected from European circles in Algiers, where even the reports of the transfer of ben Bella were enough to set off disquiet on Saturday. The 71 Algerian Deputies, now in Paris, have, however, been adopting a more cautious attitude than their friends in Algiers. Meeting yesterday, they stated they were not against acts of clemency, and refrained from explicitly condemning the reported measures in favour of ben Bella.

RIGHT-WING REACTION

In fact, the transfer of ben Bella and his friends to a rather more dignified form of imprisonment is not as important as the reprieve of convicted F.L.N. assassins. This will be condemned in right-wing circles as an encouragement to the F.L.N. to continue the fight. But some observers believe that much F.L.N terrorism, as in Cyprus, is in retribution for executions, and that a general reprieve will reduce the level of violence. This view would seem over-optimistic, in the light of what is known of the F.L.N.'s aims and methods.

M. Debré, the Prime Minister, told the council, according to M. Frey, that his Government's Algeria policy would be the same as that of the preceding one. There would be no foreign intervention, and no negotiations with anyone on the political status of Algeria. The Government would keep one step ahead of the necessary social evolution, rather than

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M. Debré would demand a vote of confidence on his overall policy at Thursday's special session of Parliament, and President de Gaulle would address a message to the Deputies the same day. The executive council of the new French Community would hold its first meeting next month, when the heads of the different African Governments would be able to contact the various French Ministers.

ECONOMIC MEASURES

The Government also decided to-day to modify some of the recent economic and financial measures.

The Council of Ministers confirmed the appointment of M. Pierre de Leusse, a former Ambassador in Warsaw, to succeed M. de Courcel as French permanent representative on the N.A.T.O. Council. It appointed M. Etienne Hirsch to take the place of M. Louis Armand as French member of the Euratom commission. M. Hirsch was formerly in charge of the development and reconstruction project known as the Monnet plan.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No 248/2/UE

Published at London Date 12-1-59

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, JAN. 11

President de Gaulle is expected shortly to release ben Bella and several other Algerian political leaders from prison and to place them under house arrest. The news has set off another of those waves of panic and bitterness in Algiers that have followed most of the Gaullist liberal gestures of recent months.

This time agitation is not confined to the extremists of the public safety committees. The Ex-Servicemen's Federation, probably the most powerful European movement in the city, has openly criticized the President's Algerian policy for the first time since the revolt of May 13. It accused the President yesterday of having failed consistently to define his policy and claimed that his remarks on Thursday about Algeria "developing her personality herself, in close association with France" has had a catastrophic effect on the population of the country.

As for "special measures in favour of killers" (a reference to the reports about ben Bella), the federation said that magnanimity would be considered by the Muslims as a sign of weakness and an encouragement to continue the rebellion. M. Arnould, leader of the federation, said he could not understand the news, as for three years everyone had been expecting ben Bella to be executed.

MEETING OF DEPUTIES

The 71 Algerian deputies, most of them dedicated to integration, are meeting in Paris to-morrow to consider the situation. The attitude they adopt may be of the highest importance, in view of the influence they could exert at Thursday's session of Parliament. According to unconfirmed reports, the official announcement of the measures of clemency has already been postponed until after Thursday in view of the reactions from Algiers.

Measures of grace in favour of prisoners are a tradition at the beginning of any new Presidency of the Republic, but they do not usually have such a political significance. General de Gaulle is believed on this occasion to have consulted M. Debré and his Government. According to a now well established practice, reliable-sounding reports about the proposed measures began leaking into the Press on Friday and Saturday.

According to these reports, ben Bella, Mohamed Khider, Mohamed Boudiaf, Ait Ahmed Hocine, and Mostefa Lacheraf, all captured by the French in an aircraft flying from Morocco to Tunisia on October 22, 1956, and all save Lacheraf members of the National Liberation Front's so-called "government," are to be transferred from La Santé prison in Paris to house arrest on Belle-Ile, off the west coast of France. Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, and Khider have been sentenced to forced labour for life for terrorist acts, but none of the five is under sentence of death. Ben Bella, told yesterday of the proposed measures, is said to have replied, "That's the fourth time since June I have been told that."

It is also reliably reported that Messali Hadj, leader of the National Liberation Front's rival, the Algerian National Movement, is to be transferred from house arrest on Belle-Ile to Paris, where he will enjoy even greater freedom. Some terrorists under sentence of death are expected to be reprieved and some internees to be freed.

BRITISH MESSAGE

M. Debré, the new Prime Minister, yesterday installed himself in the Hotel Matignon and then presented his Government to the President at a brief ceremony in the Elysée Palace. One of his

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BRITISH MESSAGE

M. Debré, the new Prime Minister, yesterday installed himself in the Hotel Matignon and then presented his Government to the President at a brief ceremony in the Elysée Palace. One of his first callers at the Matignon was Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British Ambassador, who brought the congratulations of Mr. Macmillan. M. Soustelle, the new Minister-Delegate with the virtual rank of deputy Prime Minister, installed himself in the building in the Rue Oudinot hitherto occupied by the now defunct Ministry for Oversea Territories.

At the new Government's first Cabinet meeting, held yesterday afternoon, it was decided that M. Debré would ask Parliament to vote its approval of his programme on Thursday, even though under the constitution he is not bound to do so. He is sure of a majority. It was also decided that he would not ask for an extension of the present emergency powers beyond February 5, the date on which they are due to expire. This leaves him with less than four weeks in which to complete the series of decrees that are reorganizing the whole structure of French life.

M. Debré's party, the U.N.R., yesterday suffered a minor parliamentary setback when the presidents of the other parties turned down its suggestion that in the new Chamber there should be a clear dividing line between Government and Opposition, as in the House of Commons. On one or two other matters of administration and procedure the U.N.R. found itself outvoted.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Observer File No 25/1/4 E

Published at London Date 11-1-59

From WILLIAM MILLINSHIP

PARIS, January 10

RUMOURS that clemency will be shown to captured Algerian rebels may cause the new French Premier, M. Michel Debré, his first Parliamentary difficulties when he announces his Government's general policy to the National Assembly on Thursday.

According to these rumours, General de Gaulle intends to use his wide Presidential powers to order the transfer from a Paris prison to more agreeable surroundings of Mohammed Ben Bella, the rebel chief captured in 1956.

Thousands of other political prisoners may be released from Algerian internment camps.

Advance notice of these measures is believed to have been instrumental in persuading the hesitant Catholic M.R.P. to allow party members to enter the Debré Government.

The M.R.P. was also swayed by President de Gaulle's promise that the "pacified and transformed Algeria of to-morrow" would have "a choice place" in the French community. The President said Algeria should develop its personality "itself" in close association with France.

Knows His Place

This is a very different prospect from the integration of Algeria into France advocated by M. Debré and his second-in-command, M. Jacques Soustelle.

The statement has brought a renewed demand for integration from the 70 Algerian Deputies in the National Assembly, but General de Gaulle is unlikely to meet with serious opposition from the new Government. It closely resembles his own Cabinet —17 of the 21 Ministers served under him—and the new Prime Minister has announced there will be no radical change in policy.

Equipped with immense powers, President de Gaulle will remain the real leader. The Premier will look after routine matters and face Parliamentary music when necessary.

M. Debré, who drafted the new Constitution, knows his place in it. His unshakable loyalty to General de Gaulle makes him doubly fit for the job of right-hand man. It is highly improbable that he would desert his chief even over Algeria, and he is also expected to accept France's entry into the European Common Market, which he has always opposed.

Critics of Austerity

His programme will probably also include a radical overhaul of the country's administrative machine, the reorganisation of the chaotic and costly system of distribution, a general reform of education, and a new status for the French radio and television services.

The National Assembly does not have to approve his policy, as was the case under the Fourth Republic, but the Prime Minister may request a vote of confidence. This he should obtain easily, despite Parliamentary uneasiness about Algeria and concern, even within the Government majority, at the consequences of the austerity programme.

Deputies of all political colours are embarrassed by angry letters from their constituencies criticising them for budgetary measures which were introduced without reference to Parliament.

De Gaulle's Warning

Because of the small Left-wing representation in Parliament, the main pressure will probably be

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De Gaulle's Warning

Because of the small Left-wing representation in Parliament, the main pressure will probably be exerted on the predominantly Right-wing Government by the trade unions.

Wage claims have already been made — railwaymen are demanding an 11 per cent. increase—to compensate for the higher cost of living caused by heavier taxation and the abolition of subsidies on food and services. There is also strong hostility to the Budget in rural areas.

The Catholic C.F.T.C. Union today sharply criticised the Government's economic policy and commented that financial equilibrium could not be attained "while the State continues, mainly because of the Algerian war, to devote a quarter of its resources to unproductive expenditure."

The economic reforms and austerity programme are essential to the plan to put France back among the great Powers. M. Debré may agree to minor changes, but he is likely to stand firm on the main lines of his policy. President de Gaulle has also given warning that he is ready to "impose" the measures required by "public safety" and the national interest. A clash between the Government and organised labour, if it came, could be violent.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Economist File No. 25/2/11 E

Published at London Date 3-1-59

Industry for Algeria

FROM A CORRESPONDENT

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S five-year plan for Algeria, which he outlined in his speech at Constantine on October 3rd, aims at raising the social standards of the largest and poorest part of the Algerian population. The planned increase in industrial and agricultural wealth has to be obtained in a way which serves this primarily social purpose. These promises, moreover, must be fulfilled while a huge programme of elementary education is being carried out. The general said at Constantine that by 1963 two-thirds of Algeria's children would be at school. At present 12 per cent from all communities is the official and probably exaggerated figure; as Mlle. Germaine Tillon pointed out in her book on Algeria, in many parts of the country barely one child in 70 goes to school. The priority given to education is essential politically. But, because of the age structure of the Algerian population, it will not be until 1975 at the earliest that education could begin to pay real economic dividends. Today, half Algeria's 10 million Moslems are under 20.

By far the most direct way to increase the economic wealth of Algeria would be to concentrate development in the three established industrial zones—Algiers, Oran and Bône—where railway and port facilities are available. But this would not help the country districts where work is most needed and would still further accentuate the dangers of concentration in Algiers itself. In 1957 half the registered profits of industry and commerce were earned in Algiers and a quarter in Oran; almost half the building permits in the same year were issued in Algiers. The areas where industrial employment is most needed are totally non-urban but do not necessarily have a low population density. For example, the mountainous department of Tizi Ouzou in eastern Algeria has no large town but has a population density of 150 per square kilometre, which is rather higher than that of the Seine Maritime department in France which contains Rouen and Le Havre.

Another serious difficulty is that many industries which have to be developed in Algeria as a basis for reconstruction—such as chemicals, gas and electricity—give comparatively little employment. Nor will the exploitation of Saharan oil and natural gas need much man-power. It is clearly desirable that, together with public works (which has the highest employment coefficient of all), the industries to be encouraged should include leather and shoes, soap, pharmaceutical products and all those based on the skill of the artisan. These industries could be placed in the countryside and, supplying the home market, should eventually become well established.

BUT here, as M. Jean-Louis Fyot has pointed out in the *Revue de l'Action Populaire*, there is one great obstacle. French industry has always regarded Algeria as its private preserve and at a moment when sacrifices are being asked from consumers and producers in metropolitan France, there will be a strong feeling in favour of preserving the present form of economic "integration." There will certainly be opposition to any tariff-barriers that would save, for example, an Algerian boot and shoe industry from being swamped by French competition. The problem is greater because Algerian development cannot be carried out without financial and technical aid from French industry. It will need great resolution by the general's government to follow an economic policy for Algeria that is the reverse of "integration," but Algerian industry will have to be protected from competitors from metropolitan France.

General de Gaulle's figure of 400,000 new jobs for Algeria in five years was based on *Perspectives Décennales*, a report drawn up by a committee of civil servants and economists and published last year which spoke of 875,000 non-agricultural jobs in 10 years. It will be more difficult to achieve half the target in five years, since it should be in the last three or four years of the ten-year period that increased prosperity will have the most marked effect on employment. *Perspectives Décennales* also allowed ten years for providing 351,000 hectares of land for Muslim farmers, whereas the Constantine speech promises 250,000 in five years. It is hard to see how General de Gaulle's figure can be obtained without the expropriation of large estates and buying land from the poorer European farmers. Interference beyond a limited extent with Algerian agriculture would upset a whole nexus of trade relations that contribute to the national revenue, and would create as many problems as it would solve. However, failure to reach the target of 250,000 hectares will be less serious if there is a sufficient increase in employment in the over-populated rural areas. M. Jean Vibert, Director of the Plan for Algeria, believes that it should be possible to increase the number of Algerian workers in France by 20,000 per year, thus bringing the number of new jobs per year to 100,000.

Perspectives Décennales put the investment effort for the strictly economic aspects of the plan at 350 milliard francs per year from metropolitan France, over half coming from public sources. This excludes the cost of developing Saharan oil resources. On the other hand, the prospects of revenue from oil (and it is now clear that, for once, official figures for oil output in 1960-62 have erred on the prudent side) imply that France will not have shouldered an endlessly growing financial burden. There are plans for exporting natural gas to Italy, Spain and even Germany. It seems plain that even after 10 years' industrialisation, Algeria itself could only account for a fraction of the natural gas which will have to flow through the pipe lines to make the Saharan exploitation economically possible. Of course there will be no satisfactory oil or gas revenue from the Sahara unless there is peace in Algeria. The future is at the mercy of political uncertainty.

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Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

ALGERIA
January 18, 1959
Section 1

ALGERIA: CONVERSATION WITH M. DELOUVRIER

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 18*)

(No. 2. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *January 10, 1959.*

I paid my first official call on M. Delouvrier, Delegate-General of the French Government in Algeria, on the 7th of January and dined with him on the occasion of the visit of a party of London journalists on the following day. On both occasions M. Delouvrier showed the greatest friendliness and spoke with complete frankness, revealing a most refreshing freedom from prejudice and preconceived ideas on the Algerian question. He has clearly approached the subject with realism and with determination to get at the facts independently of official sources of information. In this he has been greatly helped by his visit of three weeks on a study mission for General de Gaulle when, as he himself says, his appointment to his present function was unknown even to himself.

2. In the course of these two consecutive conversations M. Delouvrier ranged over a wide field and gave a good idea not only of his present thinking but of that of General de Gaulle himself.

3. When I paid my official call on him, M. Delouvrier opened the conversation by asking me to tell him candidly whether I thought the situation had improved during my time here. I said that there had been changes of course but fundamentally I felt bound to say that I could see but little improvement in the basic situation in Algeria. The army won all the battles but seemed to be making very little progress towards the principal object of bringing the war to an end. For this reason I found the projects of economic development encouraging as possibly offering opportunities of some new development.

4. M. Delouvrier then and on the following evening set out his ideas on the following lines. He had no political plan in his pocket and indeed since the 13th of May passions here had been so aroused that all political advance was blocked. It was his determination therefore, and the intention of General de Gaulle, to lower the political temperature and for this the economic programme, though of course of the utmost importance in itself, would be very valuable. He had, however, no illusions that the economic programme held the key to the ultimate solution of the Algerian problem. Economic programmes had their effect in the long term but only a political solution could bring a rapid solution.

5. He made no secret of the fact that he had been most reluctant to come here but, as General de Gaulle had insisted, he had considered it a duty to come down. He was, however, determined that his role here should be that of an executant of the political decisions taken in Paris. He was not prepared to allow himself to be turned into the spokesman for the Algerian Europeans as so many of the previous occupants of his chair had been. He made it clear to people here that he was an official and that it was no good the Algiers Deputies trying to influence his policies since he would carry out the policies decided on in Paris.

6. In reply to a question whether he felt that he knew the real thinking of the Moslem population, he replied with a sad laugh that he fully realised that he was now the official to whom the most lies were told. He had, however, had the opportunity of making illuminating contacts in the course of his journey of three weeks and there were one of two Moslems, whom he happened to have known for many years, whom he was still able to induce to speak openly to him.

7. To illustrate the state of mind of thoughtful Moslems he told of a meeting he had had with the head of a nurses teaching school in one of the departmental

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centres of Algeria who had only recently been released after interrogation by the police on suspicion of Nationalist activity. He had found an extremely smart young woman and had been quite unable in the course of conversation while going round the school to discover whether she was in fact French or Moslem. She was in fact a Moslem but had been given the full French education, culminating in a university degree. There were six other young women like her in the town and they met regularly to discuss the situation. M. Delouvrier asked her to say frankly what she and her friends felt about the situation, adding that if she preferred to say nothing he would of course forget all about it. She had spoken freely of her arrest saying that her interrogation by the French police had lasted 15 days and had been an extremely hard experience. She had not been tortured but preferred to forget that she had been so treated by the French. Coming to the Front de Libération Nationale (F.L.N.) she had said that it must be realised that for her and for her friends the F.L.N. in the mountains were after all her brothers. She was not, however, an active supporter or she would not have been released by the police. M. Delouvrier then had asked her whether she and her friends had in any way changed their attitude after the 13th of May and how they felt about General de Gaulle. She had replied that some of her girls had been to Algiers at the time of the 13th of May and had returned saying that the Moslem participation and particularly the unveiling was engineered by the French and that therefore they must all continue to wear the veil. She herself had opposed this attitude pointing out to them that it was not the sensible way to consider it and that unveiling was a modern trend and that what the French said about it was immaterial. On the question of General de Gaulle she was most emphatic that she and all her friends had unbounded confidence in him and so completely did they trust him that they had "agreed to stop thinking" since he had come to power and confine themselves to day-to-day problems.

8. Possibly in the light of this experience, M. Delouvrier said to one of my colleagues that it must not be supposed that because Moslems did not support the F.L.N. they were opposed to it. He told me, however, that from other Moslem contacts he perceived what might yet prove a ray of light. At the height of the Lacoste repression of 1957 it had been noticeable that Moslems who stood apart from the fight felt a sense of inferiority towards the militant members of the F.L.N. whom they felt were fighting their battles for them. The growing establishment of the F.L.N. leaders abroad had altered this and the feeling was growing in Moslem circles in Algeria that the F.L.N. leaders were now having a soft life and that it was the people in Algeria who were bearing the greater burden. They no longer felt ashamed of being out of the fight. There was in fact developing the characteristic split between the *émigrés* and the interior. It might one day be possible therefore to reach agreement with the Moslems of Algeria if this split could be used to induce those Moslem leaders still living in Algeria, who at the moment were standing apart, to work out with him some political solution. One of the difficulties of the political problem in Algeria was the diversity of the country and its development. The areas of intense European colonisation on the coastal plain such as Algiers, Oran and Bône and their immediate hinterland could be very easily integrated with France, and in these areas the problem of the Moslem sub-proletariat was no more difficult than that of the sub-proletariat of an industrial suburb of Paris. But beyond the coastal Atlas lay a different world with a very sparse European population and a very primitive Moslem one where authoritarian rule was the only form at present possible or understood by the inhabitants. The sudden support of integration after the 13th of May by the *colons* who had so long opposed it, was due not to any new judgment of the needs of Algeria but to their sudden realisation that the Assembly in Paris had imposed on them elections under a single college which would entail a swamping of the European interest in any Algerian legislative body. They had, therefore, attached themselves to the abolition of all Algerian institutions so that the Moslem vote would in its turn be swamped in Paris. The contradictions of these various factors all contributed to make any immediate political advance very difficult.

9. I asked M. Delouvrier if he thought that France could bear the enormous financial burdens being placed upon her by Algeria from which there seemed no immediate prospect of release. He said he had not really made up his mind on the

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long-term situation but it must be borne in mind that in any programme of economic development very large expenditure was physically impossible in the opening stages. So long as the investment programme was of the order of 100 milliard to 125 milliard per annum he thought there should be no difficulty; but he would not yet like to commit himself on the situation when it had to go higher. Asked whether he thought that the Bône iron and steel complex could be an economic proposition, he said that he had called for a very detailed study to be submitted to him because he was not prepared to recommend it unless it was economically sound. It should be borne in mind that the development of the French steel industry had lagged behind that of both Germany and the United Kingdom and that a new complex of the type suggested for Bône was necessary somewhere. Dunkirk, for instance, had been suggested. It might well be therefore that it could be suitably and reasonably sited at Bône. He did not, however, consider that such a project, which might produce perhaps 5,000 jobs for Moslems, was a really important factor in raising the standard of living in the country. There was a tremendous amount of work to be done on the agricultural front. In the past development had been far too much concentrated on the areas of European colonisation and the high plateaux neglected. He had therefore had a stiff fight with the Ministry of the Interior in Paris to bring about an administrative modification in Algeria divorcing the regional Super Prefect (or I.G.A.W.E.) from the Prefecture. Hitherto it has been the practice in Algeria, as in Metropolitan France, for the Super Prefect of a region to combine his duties with that of Prefect of the Department in which he has his seat. This had in the past led to the Super Prefects of Algiers, Oran and Constantine having the affairs of the coastal plain far too much in the forefront of their minds. There would in future be Prefects in these three towns as in other departmental capitals and a regional secretary-general free from all departmental responsibilities whose task would be the fuller development of the hitherto neglected high plateaux. The appointments for Algiers and its region were in fact announced on the 7th of January. This unquestionably is a very valuable development. There have for instance been serious cases of deforestation within living memory in the area of Boghari which can only be attributed to maladministration and a lack of any control of tribal woodcutting and goat raising.

10. Both M. Delouvrier and his staff give the encouraging feeling that they are able, unbiased and, as far as the Consular Corps is concerned, anxious for a far closer co-operation than has been the case with the administrators of Algeria since I have been here. M. Lacoste, according to my United States colleague, issued instructions that Consuls-General were to be helped only in their strictly consular work and that any political aspect of their functions was to be ignored. He seems, moreover, intent on a policy which while probably the only one possible in present circumstances has both in its economic and administrative aspects the double virtue of diverting attention for a time from the political problem and of helping Algeria forward to be better able to manage her own affairs when it inevitably comes about that she must do so. General de Gaulle, I understand, recently said to a foreign journalist that he anticipated that Algeria would be independent in 20 years and that his present plans were designed to make her ready for it. It must, I hope, be assumed that in his own mind the deadline is more nearly the five-year term of the Constantine speech. In spite of M. Delouvrier's caution, he himself seems to have few illusions as to the urgency of achieving peace by political means long before the economic programme can bear fruit. He is, however, acutely aware of military susceptibilities and of the excitability of public opinion and is resigned to political inaction for the moment.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Tunis and Rabat.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: Manchester Guardian Weekly File No. 25/2/11E

Published at: Manchester Date: 11-12-59

Algerian leader

The real tragedies of an age do not always find adequate expression. Indeed, the historian usually has to construct his story with documents which are striking by the very flatness of their contrast with the drama of the events they narrate. For that reason it is all the more noteworthy when we meet a piece of writing which is both humanly moving and also expresses the full complication of contemporary history. Mme Germaine Tillion's testimony, given at the trial of the Algerian F.L.N. leader, Yacef Saadi, and now translated in the current number of "Encounter," is such a one. Mme Tillion, a distinguished ethnologist, had two meetings with the terrorist leader in Algiers, and tried—apparently with success—to persuade him to abandon a policy of indiscriminate terror while, on the other hand, she endeavoured to convince French Government circles that executions and reprisals only made matters worse. The testimony is composed of an account of the meetings, and of general reflections on the Algerian situation. The latter are not encouraging, but have their lesson for any country placed in a similar position to that of France in Algeria. "The two sides have resigned themselves to a policy of unlimited reprisals, and the situation has gone from bad to worse"—might it not be Cyprus? And Yacef Saadi's cry at Mme Tillion's exposé of the difficulties in the way of an independent Algeria —"In that case, I shall never be a free man"—expresses the despair of the modern patriot wrestling with economic and political forces which have become too strong for the individual. Yet, if there is despair, there is also hope: hope in the generosity displayed by the Algerian leader, hope in the deep concern and humanity apparent in every word written by Mme Tillion. This tragic, but also beautiful narrative, bears witness not only for Yacef Saadi, but for the spirit of man with its strange aspirations and fundamental greatness.

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JR 1015/215

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ALGERIA
November 20, 1958
Section 1

SURVEY OF THE GENERAL ALGERIAN SCENE

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 20)

(No. 44. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *November 17, 1958.*

As the Algerian war enters its fifth year it is perhaps opportune to take a fresh look at the general Algerian scene. In doing so the observer is struck by the atmosphere of increased hope and confidence springing from the sole presence at the head of affairs of General de Gaulle. This amplifies and extends the effect of the already very large investment programme in spite of the absence of any very fundamental improvement in the security situation.

2. The present state of affairs is paradoxical. In Algiers and to some extent in the other large towns boom conditions prevail. Its source is threefold. First, it is here that the large public investment programme is most felt. An intense house-building programme is under way led by Algiers, which under its last elected Mayor, M. Jacques Chevallier, earned the title of the "largest building site in France." At the same time the French Government in pursuit of M. Lacoste's policy of "building through the storm" is pursuing an ambitious, and some think extravagant, programme of road construction and improvement, of developing airfields and communications and generally expanding the economic infrastructure of the country. This and the large school building programme are the first steps in the ten-year economic development programme, which is to call for investment by the French State of 1,300 milliard francs and by the French private investor of 1,700 milliard francs. It is to raise the standard of living of the "European" economic sector (which includes many Moslems) by 4 per cent. per annum, a rate said to be comparable to that obtaining in Metropolitan France; and to improve the standard of the "native" sector by 5·5 per cent. per annum to bring it gradually into line with the European sector.

3. Secondly, and additional to the public investment programme of Algeria, has come the enormous expansion in the activities of the companies engaged in seeking and exploiting Saharan oil since the first strike in 1956. A thousand vehicles a day, many of them of awe-inspiring size, stream down the main trunk route through Medea to Laghouat and to Hassi Messaoud. Investment in research and exploitation is rising steeply. According to the latest published figures investment by the oil companies alone which totalled 80 milliard francs between 1951 and 1957, is to reach a like figure in the current year and rise to 120 milliard in 1959, 145 milliard in 1960 and 150 milliard in 1961. Meanwhile the Governmental Saharan organisation is to spend 43 milliard by the end of 1960 on communications, artesian wells and buildings. The prize, according to the latest of the constantly changing forecasts of production is to be, from the Sahara as a whole, 1·7 million tons of crude oil in 1959; 3·7 million in 1960 when the 24-inch Hassi Messaoud–Hougie pipeline is to open; 16 million in 1961 with the pipeline from Edjélé to the coast in Tunisia, and 20 million tons in 1963.

4. In addition to the stimulus of this present and promised investment there is the flow of purchasing power derived from the military operations. With nearly half a million men in Algeria the distributive trades and the hotel industry are working to capacity, and they and the transport industry are enjoying great prosperity.

5. The section of the economy affected by this boom is unfortunately a narrow one. It is the "European" economy which already enjoyed a satisfactory standard of living. The fortunate technicians and artisans needed for the investment programme can now command famine prices. Those lucky enough to be established in the distributive trades are profiting if on a less astonishing scale. In general, however, apart from the oilfields far away in the

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desert, the boom is confined to the towns. Neither the prosperity nor the superficial calm extend far beyond the municipal limits. In the countryside the unemployment, under-employment and crushing poverty which have so long cursed Algeria remain undiminished. And if in the town the midnight curfew has become something of a habit, beyond the municipal limits the curfew is from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. and in some sectors 5 p.m. to 7 a.m., and in the hill areas the army shoots at sight during this period and without warning. For Europeans the countryside is in fact denied for much longer. For it is an accepted fact that the army cannot succeed against a rebel band unless they make contact in the morning; by afternoon the action is sure to fail under cover of darkness. Even the crack 2nd Parachutists under Colonel Bigeard lost touch with a band which they had surrounded on a four kilometre perimeter. The F.L.N. therefore raid at dusk and it is a rash man who drives near the foothills and on the lonelier side roads in the late afternoon and evening. By dark the countryside is open to anyone who fears neither the rebels nor the army, and in general it seems agreed that the army, or at least that large part of it engaged in the garrison-like operation of the " quadrillage " remain after nightfall within the perimeter of the farms and villages they guard.

6. A year ago, subject to these provisos the main roads were safe in the daytime and attacks in the towns had grown very rare. The F.L.N. policy seemed to be rather to attack the army. This tactic culminated in the suicidal frontal attacks on the French defences facing the Tunisian frontier in the first four months of this year. The improved French technique in using the Morice Line which made these attacks so costly is said now to have reduced frontier crossings to a minimum, and certainly no large engagements are reported. The F.L.N., for their part, seem to have switched their tactics to the truer guerrilla technique—of ambushes, attacks on isolated cars, and the throwing of grenades in the towns. A tight censorship keeps the details out of the Press of all the smaller incidents, but the reports of local business men, and even members of the gendarmerie themselves, coupled with the attacks which reach the Press, give a picture of widespread insecurity in the countryside even in those areas such as the Mitidja plain behind Algiers which had seemed wholly pacified.

7. The army public relations officers and the Press continue to talk of the growing difficulties of the F.L.N., their shortage of supplies, and their difficulties of recruitment. They no doubt have these difficulties but so far they have overcome them. And even so, the occasional description of the heroic death of some unfortunate man fighting on the French side, and these include Moslems, describe the deadly fire power of the F.L.N. bands " outnumbering the patrol by ten to one." Moreover, provided the F.L.N. avoid mass engagements and keep to the guerrilla tactics, it seems certain that a mere handful of determined men can keep employed a very large French army, by maintaining the most widespread sense of insecurity, and this almost indefinitely.

8. A hopeful aspect of the situation is that difficult though life may be in the interior, the economic life of the country in general has not so far been seriously impeded. The harvests have been gathered, and the construction programme carried out. Oil from the Sahara, though still only a trickle, has been safely protected from attack. If the French Government can carry through the ambitious programme outlined in General de Gaulle's Constantine speech of the 3rd of October, even if in practice it is little more than the 10-year development programme previously elaborated, it is conceivable that they will buy peace with prosperity. The burden of such a programme, carried out under military guard, and with the Algerian war continuing, seems a crushing one; and at the time of writing there appears little prospect of peace in the absence of some political miracle. This General de Gaulle seemed for a while about to produce. The hope is now fading, or at least postponed until his second chance offered by the senatorial elections. In its absence the French people are faced with the long and exceedingly expensive haul of an investment programme of rising magnitude coupled with a military burden which cannot be substantially reduced. On their ability and willingness to endure the effort and expense depends the validity of many business calculations in Algiers.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Tunis and Rabat.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times
Published at London
File No 25/2/11 E
Date 20 - 12 - 58.

GEN. SALAN LEAVES ALGIERS

DEMONSTRATORS SHOW THEIR DISAPPROVAL

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, DEC. 19

It has been said that the Algerians—or at least the European inhabitants of the city of Algiers—habitually greet their governors from Paris with insults and then, at the end of their tour of office, hang affectionately on to their coat tails to prevent them from leaving.

Something of this tradition, though less than on previous occasions, was maintained to-day when General Salan left for Paris, to be replaced by M. Delouvrier, the civilian official who is henceforth to be the direct representative of the Government in Algeria.

After General Salan had laid a wreath on the war memorial in Algiers, groups of spectators in the Forum, the centre of the uprising of May 13, began to shout and throw pamphlets about demanding that the General should not leave and protesting that Algeria was once more being betrayed. When the General's car left for the airport, demonstrators tried to hold it up, and there were some minor scuffles.

SOME APPLAUSE

A few hours later, M. Delouvrier landed at Algiers airport from Paris. In spite of instructions to the contrary from some of the extremist organizations, most of the flags which householders had hung out to salute General Salan were still in position, and as M. Delouvrier's car and escort drove through the city there was some applause from spectators on the pavement. A handful of agitators, mostly young fellows, uttered hostile cries as M. Delouvrier approached the war memorial to lay a wreath; they were quickly silenced by M. Lagaillarde, the young extremist who played a leading part in storming the seat of the Government on May 13.

In Paris, where a meeting of the Council of Ministers was held to-day, the Government has approved the plans for financing the five-year development programme for Algeria already outlined by General de Gaulle. For the next five years, the State contribution to this plan will be divided into two sections: (*i*) a minimum portion of 100,000m. francs a year (£80m.); (*ii*) a conditional portion the size of which will be decided annually by the Finance Bill. The Government has also decided to set up a fund for social and family relief among Algerian workers in metropolitan France.

A reminder that the war in Algeria is still active comes in the news that 14 French soldiers were killed in an ambush near Blida, less than 30 miles from Algiers. Twenty-four more were injured, some of them seriously; seven of the Algerian attacking force were killed.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Economist, London — File No: 25/4/11E.

Published at: London — Date: 27.12.58.

ALGERIA

Salan at Sunset

GENERAL SALAN was never dearer to French hearts in Algiers than in the hour of his departure on December 19th. Although settlerdom, aware of his record in Indo-China, had long suspected him of weakness and vacillation—and barely concealed its disappointment at his escape from the bazooka plot in January, 1957—it put on the motley suitable for a governor-general's exit. The hate-love relationship of the Algiers settlers and their rulers is obsessional. Algiers fears anyone new, any sign of change, from France; it even feared M. Soustelle when he first arrived. But when the converts—M. Soustelle, M. Lacoste and now General Salan himself—go back to defend *l'Algérie Française* in Paris, settlerdom prostrates itself in emotion and devotion.

The sun has thus set on an uneasy spell of power that began in the insurrectionary days of May. It was to General Salan, then commander-in-chief in Algeria, that M. Pflimlin made the empty gesture of entrusting the powers of the tottering republican regime. The general was the first to cry, from the celebrated balcony above the forum: *Vive de Gaulle!* He was retained by General de Gaulle, and addressed by him in complimentary terms. But his execution of General de Gaulle's orders, particularly before the November elections, came perilously close to insubordination. He behaved for seven months as a weak man in a tight corner would behave.

General de Gaulle's anxiety to restore a measure of civilian rule in Algeria, through the new delegate-general, M. Delouvrier, is understandable. The social and economic plans announced at Constantine on October 3rd will now be pursued. But France's diplomatic position has taken a bad knock since the latest United Nations debate on Algeria. The Afro-Asian powers failed, by one vote, on December 13th to secure a two-thirds majority recognising Algeria's "right to independence." It has not escaped General de Gaulle's attention that Guinea, so recently emancipated from colonial rule, voted against France, or that the United States pointedly abstained.

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ALGERIA
August 15, 1958
Section 1

ALGERIA: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF "INTEGRATION"

Sir George Young to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 15)

(No. 165 E. Confidential) *Paris,*
Sir, *August 14, 1958.*

In his despatch No. 105 of the 17th of June and again in paragraphs 4 to 6 of his despatch No. 129 of the 18th of July, the Ambassador referred to the economic problems raised by the idea of "integrating" Algeria with France. Since economic development clearly plays an important part in General de Gaulle's thinking on Algeria, I will try, in this despatch, to set out in greater detail some of the elements of the problem, on the basis of the information available. In the absence of published statistics this remains unsatisfactorily incomplete; the views expressed and the figures quoted in this despatch must therefore be considered as provisional.

2. There appear to be three rather different propositions in the field. In the first place, there are the limited plans announced by General de Gaulle in Algiers on the 3rd of July (Algiers telegram No. 14 Saving of the 6th of July). Secondly, there is the comprehensive programme of economic development contained in the unpublished "Ten-Year Plan for Algeria" which was completed in March of this year and was based on the earlier "Maspetiol Report" produced in 1955. Finally, and quite distinct, are the economic implications of the basically political idea of "integration" which presumably would involve the equation of social conditions in Algeria and the Metropole. In the succeeding paragraphs each of these propositions is examined in turn.

3. In his Algiers speech of the 3rd of July, General de Gaulle stated that:—

(*a*) an extra 15 milliard francs had been allocated for new works projects this year. (The original programme for the year had amounted to 62 milliard francs.);

(*b*) the number of new houses in Algeria this year would be doubled. (This would imply an increased investment by the State of not less than 3 milliards on the optimistic assumption that private enterprise would also double its output in this sector.);

(*c*) in ten years' time all Algerians would go to school. (According to calculations described in paragraphs 18 to 22 of Annex A(1) of this despatch, this might involve capital expenditure spread over the next ten years of not less than 126 milliard francs (compared with this year's estimate under the same head of 7·1 milliard francs), and recurrent expenditure rising from the present level of 22·8 milliard francs to about 110 milliards a year by 1966; an average expenditure on capital and current account of, say, 83 milliards per annum over the ten-year period);

(*d*) in addition, he referred to the modernisation of agriculture and to plans for industrialisation to be announced later in the year. (It is impossible to say exactly what he had in mind, but if the current agricultural and industrialisation programmes (excluding oil) were to be increased by, say, 50 per cent. this would involve additional expenditure of 25 and 7·5 milliard francs respectively.)

4. The striking feature that emerges from the General's speech is the emphasis on education; the other items announced were so vague that it is hard to say whether it is justifiable to read into them more than a solemn undertaking to accelerate economic development in Algeria. If it were legitimate to deduce from the speech the lines of a plan for Algeria, its cost would depend on

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whether the figures for new works and housing could be taken as recurrent or not, and above all on the scope of the agricultural and industrial programmes to be announced later. On the rather dubious basis of the figures in the preceding paragraph, the extra expenditure to which the speech appears to commit the Government might not be great, say in the region of 100–120 milliard francs a year. Such an additional commitment would, no doubt, not be crippling but, on the other hand, it would barely scratch the surface of the problem.

5. " The Ten-Year Plan for Algeria " is a comprehensive document. Though it has not yet been either published or adopted by the Government, Mr. Robinson, of the Commercial Department of this Embassy, was able to obtain access to a copy for a few hours and the notes he was able to take, though necessarily incomplete, throw valuable light on its contents. A summary of those parts of the Plan known to this Embassy, together with comments on them, is attached to this despatch as Annex A.(1) Briefly its objective is the development of Algeria on all fronts including industry, agriculture and forestry, oil production, mining, communications, housing, education and public health, by means of a total investment in the neighbourhood of 4,700 milliard francs spread over a ten-year period. It is calculated that investment on this scale would provide an annual increase of 5 per cent. in total real private incomes in Algeria, or of over 60 per cent. in the ten-year period. To illustrate the effect on the ground of investment on this scale, I might mention that the Plan envisages that in addition to a great increase in the output of mining and metallurgy, and in the leather and textile industries, food production would be doubled, building and building material production would be increased five times, and oil production would reach 20 million tons a year by 1966, of which 4 million tons would be refined in Algeria. During the ten-year period the number of places for children at school would be increased from 500,000 to 1,800,000; somewhere in the region of 1,000,000 dwellings would be built; and employment in Algeria would be found for an additional 875,000 persons.

6. The sums involved in the Plan are of course huge. The information available to us about the authors' allocation of the Bill is uncertain and to some extent contradictory. But it is clear that the authors envisage that of the total ten-year Bill of 4,800–4,700 milliards at least half, and perhaps as much as two-thirds, should come from private capital with much of the balance provided from public and semi-public institutions such as the Fonds d'Equipement d'Algérie; Collectivités locales; Caisses de Dépots; Crédit Foncier de France, &c., with only a comparatively small residue of a few hundred milliards falling as a direct charge on the Metropolitan budget. The authors envisage the revenue from oil royalties reaching 40 milliards per annum by 1966.

7. On the basis of such incomplete information, no detailed appreciation of the investment programme is possible, but the facts available do suggest some major lines of criticism. In the first place it must be remembered that as a field for investment Algeria has to compete with the vast requirements of Metropolitan France itself, now embarking on its third Four-Year Plan for re-equipment and development. For Algeria to attract investment on the scale required from either private or semi-public institutions, highly attractive conditions must be offered. But as these conditions are not at present foreseeable in Algeria except in the case of investment in oil, they can only be created by the provision of guarantees, subsidies, tax relief and other inducements on a vast scale, as is indeed admitted in the report, all of which would represent a massive commitment on the part of the Metropolitan budget (see paragraphs 24 to 26 of Annex A to this despatch). Secondly, most of the average annual expenditure of about 470 milliards under the programme would represent direct calls on the Metropolitan economy in one form or another, amounting to little less than the current average annual increase in the gross national production of the Metropole. If the Metropolitan economy were not to collapse under the strain of this additional call upon it, domestic demand would have to be reduced accordingly; that is to say, Frenchmen would have to forgo the annual increase in the standard of living to which they have been accustomed for the sake of the rapid development of Algeria. On past form it seems incredible that they would submit to it. An additional consideration is that the effect on the external balance of payments

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of such a vast diversion of productive capacity into the Franc Zone would be extremely serious, at any rate in the short term. Finally, all this supposes that Algeria possesses the necessary infrastructure to absorb such a huge influx of investment, and could do so without disastrous inflation. To sum up, the Plan would appear to spell economic disaster unless either the French economy were lightened by the elimination of some other major commitment, or Frenchmen were to accept a dose of economic self-discipline unprecedented in peacetime, or they were to receive foreign aid on a massive scale.

8. Staggering as the completion of such a programme would be for a country in the economic condition of France, it would nevertheless still leave grave shortcomings in the Algerian economy. For instance the housing programme in the Plan might provide an extra million dwellings over the ten-year period, whereas in 1955 it was estimated that over 3 million Moslems were living in tents or primitive huts. At the end of the ten-year period there would still be over half a million unemployed in Algeria. Over 300,000 children would still be without any form of primary education. If the standard of living in France continued to progress at its present rate, the Plan would make little difference in the overall disparity between conditions in Algeria and the Metropole.

9. These shortcomings are not emphasised to belittle the scope of the Plan, whose benefits (assuming that Algeria would be able to absorb them), since they would inevitably be spread unevenly through the Algerian population, might transform the economic position of important sections of the Moslem community. But they emphasise the vastness of the economic problems involved, and the limitations in the results to be expected even from expenditure apparently beyond the capacity of France in present circumstances. It is therefore scarcely surprising that when one considers the economic implications of full-scale "integration," one departs entirely from the realm of practical possibility.

10. By "integration" is presumably meant the raising to Metropolitan standards of Algerian levels of pay, social security, family allowances, educational facilities, housing, &c. Such a project is specifically considered in the "Ten-Year Plan for Algeria" only to be rejected " . . . . thus, because they (the Algerians) exist and will continue to exist in a different economic environment, wages social security and family allowances cannot be as high in Algeria as in the Metropole . . . ." The following figures provide rough indications of the sums that would be involved in such a policy: —

(*a*) *Social Security and Family Allowances.*—The additional cost per annum would be in the region of 750 milliard francs in 1958, rising to 1,000 milliards a year by the end of the ten-year period.

(*b*) *Wages.*—Industrial wages in Algeria are between 25 and 50 per cent., and agricultural wages 25 to 40 per cent., below equivalent wages in the Metropole.

(*c*) *Primary Education.*—The cost of universal primary education has already been referred to in paragraph 3 (*c*) above.

Such increases in social security and wages would not perhaps be a direct charge on Metropolitan France, but because they would immeasurably increase the handicap on nascent industry in Algeria, they would have to be offset by further subsidies and grants if investment were not to be repelled and the industrial programme collapse.

11. Of course, as M. Soustelle has said (the Ambassador's despatch No. 129 of the 18th of July, paragraphs 4 and 5) it is all a question of what is meant by "integration," and by equating conditions in Algeria with those in France, as conditions vary enormously in France itself. For instance the revenue *per capita* in the Department of the Seine is 5·4 times greater than that in Corsica, just as the average standard of living in Metropolitan France is 5 or 6 times higher than the average (including Europeans) in Algeria. These differences in conditions in the Metropole are reflected, albeit palely, in differences in the standard minimum wages applied in different departments, the margin between the highest and the lowest amounting to 8 per cent.; the same legislation provides for a margin of up to 50 per cent. between the lowest standard minimum wage in Algeria and the highest in France. The principle of a differential, therefore, already exists so far as wages are concerned, and it could be argued that it would need little modification in the case of "integration." This rather equivocal line of argument might also be applied in

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

the case of social security and family allowances, so as to soften the otherwise shattering effect on the Algerian economy that "integration" would have. This is indeed suggested in the following passage on this subject in "The Ten-Year Plan for Algeria":—

> "The necessary differences could result in most cases from simple administrative differentials in the amount or the rate; the overall legislative provision being otherwise identical."

Perhaps this is the key to the economic nonsense that "integration" would otherwise be. The figures show that a real equation of social conditions in Algeria and France is out of the question. However, French ingenuity might be equal to trying to meet a political requirement for "integration" and at the same time avoiding its disastrous practical consequences by the use of some differential that would take account of economic realities. Whether this could be made acceptable to the Moslem community is another question.

12. To sum up:—

(*a*) A limited scheme for economic and social development for Algeria, such as might be within French means, would make no appreciable difference to the general standard of living in Algeria.

(*b*) A comprehensive scheme of economic development on the scale of the Ten-Year Plan which would make an appreciable difference to the Algerian standard of living, even though it could not be hoped to approximate it to the standard of the most backward part of Metropolitan France, seems likely to be both beyond the economic capacity and will of France to support.

(*c*) "Integration," if by that is meant the equation of social benefits and minimum wage levels in Algeria to those in Metropolitan France would be out of the question, though perhaps ways and means might be found of establishing the form without the substance.

Of these three conclusions, it is (*b*) that I find the most depressing. The Ten-Year Plan is a serious document drawn up by professional economists and officials, but unfortunately its authors worked under the influence of the optimism that characterised M. Lacoste's administration and were obliged to assume ideal economic, political and military conditions for its implementation, whose absence now appears to nullify much of the work. Further appreciation of the prospects of economic development in Algeria in the military and economic circumstances now existing, and of the part it has to play in the maintenance of the French position, must await the announcement in detail of the Government's plans. In this despatch I have confined myself to setting out the relevant facts known to this Embassy likely to be useful as a basis for future judgment. Meanwhile I should be most grateful for any comment and supplementary information that Her Majesty's Consul-General, Algiers, has to offer.

13. In addition to Her Majesty's Consul-General, Algiers, I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Tunis, Rabat, and to Mr. P. E. Watts of Her Majesty's Treasury.

I have, &c.

GEORGE YOUNG

(*Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires*).

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S PERSONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO
M. DELOUVRIER, DELEGATE GENERAL IN ALGERIA

25/2/11

Following is the text of a letter sent on December 21, 1958 by Premier Charles de Gaulle to M. Paul Delouvrier, recently appointed Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria.

"As you are about to take up your functions in Algeria, I want to make clear to you the Government's intention in entrusting you with them. You are France in Algeria. This means that you are France's authority, her means of action. The problem of Algeria arises between Algeria as she really is and France in her entirety, and by no means between France and this or that Algerian group which might claim the right to dictate to Metropolitan France either abandonment of Algeria or arbitrary action. What the Government wants is for Algeria, through her trials and in spite of all delays, little by little to reveal, thanks to the action of all France, her essential self. In your capacity as Delegate General, you must pacify and administer, but at the same time transform.

"The transformation that must be brought about in Algeria at the present time is, all in all, a human transformation. In the psychological sphere, it is contacts between men, the sense of a real equality of rights, the conviction that a great effort is under way to improve the condition of each woman and each man that must be increased. In the material sphere, it is the economic development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants that must be carried out successfully. In the political, social and administrative spheres, the emphasis must be placed upon seeking the country's elites and training them. This human advancement obviously implies universal education.

"Algeria's development is, of course, permanently compromised by insecurity. Nothing is possible without military protection or offensive action, to which you will not fail to attach the greatest importance, and for which you must work in close and constant cooperation with the General in command. In this domain, you will delegate part of your powers to him without your higher responsibility being in any way affected by this.

European

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

"The Government attaches a great deal of importance to seeing that all police operations and all preventive or repressive measures, to which such operations give rise, be carried out strictly in accordance with regulations. In this regard, the chiefs who are in command must have full responsibility in the area in which they operate. No specialized agency, still less any individual may act in an area except under their authority. In addition, you will give the Commission to Safeguard Human Rights and Liberties, set up by the Government, all the necessary means to carry out its mission and you will use its investigations and its experience to good advantage."

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25/2-/11

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

In reply quote No. 221/8/2
Memorandum No. 1474

16th December, 1958.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

INDIA AND ALGERIA

Yesterday afternoon Mr. Nehru expressed warm appreciation in Parliament for the United States abstaining in the voting on Algeria in the U.N.

(W.R. Crocker)
High Commissioner.

1. U.N.
2. S. Asia Adl
3. E. 24/12.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY.
PARIS

20/2/11

File No. 201/2/5/1 17th December, 1958.

Memo No. 971

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ALGERIA.

I enclose a table drawn up by "Le Monde" showing the new set-up in Algeria.

AMBASSADOR.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY,
PARIS

"Le Monde"



Les fonctions indiquées dans le schéma ci-dessus ont été marquées d'un point blanc lorsqu'elles sont civiles, d'un point noir lorsqu'elles sont militaires. Celles de M. Delouvrier, délégué général du gouvernement, sont doubles.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 958

16th December, 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

Reference is made to previous memoranda from the Embassy about the transfer from Algeria of General Salan and the appointment of M. Delouvrier in his place.

General Salan's transfer from Algeria and M. Delouvrier's appointment there were announced on 12th December, 1958. In future, Algeria will be governed in the following fashion:

1) By a Delegate-General directly responsible to the Premier. This is M. Delouvrier. The Delegate-General is the only representative of the French Government in Algeria.

2) As regards defence, the Delegate-General is assisted by a Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Algeria, to whom the Delegate-General is to delegate the necessary powers. The Commander-in-Chief is General Challe, of the French Airforce. Assisting the Commander-in-Chief, is a General in Charge of Operations, General Allard.

3) At the regional level, the functions of Inspector General of the Administration and of Army Commander are exercised at Algiers by General Massu, at Oran by General Rethoré and at Constantine by General Olié. Alongside each of them is a Regional Civil Secretary General who leads and co-ordinates the Administration and directs the preparation and execution of the economic and social programme.

Attached hereto is a chart published by Le Monde, which gives the make-up of the Algerian administration.

The decisions taken on 12th December mean that the extraordinary situation which has existed in Algeria since the revolt of 13th May, which saw the Army possessing both civilian and military powers, has been substantially ended. The Army has not lost all its civilian powers, in fact many of its civilian services in Algeria continue to be essential. However, the important fact is that the Army has been put under the control of a civilian, M. Delouvrier,

../...

E. 24/12.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

responsible solely to the Premier of the French Government.

General Salan has been made Inspector General of National Defence. This is a new post. There is already an Inspector General of the Army (General Ely), a Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and a Chief of Staff of National Defence (Admiral Cabanier). How the new post of the Inspector General of National Defence will work in with these previously-existing posts remains to be seen.

General Salan's transfer from Algeria has long been expected, indeed, his transfer seems to have been a condition precedent to the re-establishment of the French Government's control over Algeria. It is said that General de Gaulle has been trying to transfer him from Algeria for some time, but General Salan refused to leave Algeria and General de Gaulle did not feel strong enough up to the present time to enforce his wishes. The other most foremost Algerian figure in the 13th May up-rising, namely, General Massu, remains in Algeria, in fact, his position has been enhanced by the decisions of 12th December. However, General Massu is now responsible to the civilian Delegate-General, M. Delouvrier. It also remains to be seen just how long General Massu will remain in Algiers; perhaps, the transfer at the same time of both General Salan and General Massu would have proved too much for those in Algeria who backed the up-rising of 13th May.

General de Gaulle has sent a letter to General Salan expressing to him General de Gaulle's own and the Government's tribute for the way in which General Salan carried out the important and difficult task which was entrusted to him. The letter says also that General Salan had to carry out this task in a period where insurrection and dangers upon the frontiers demanded a really exceptional capacity for commanding. In the midst of all this, the letter says, General Salan carried out his task with honour.

The Embassy has already sent the Department a biography of M. Delouvrier. Enclosed herewith is one of General Challe. It is interesting to note that the command of the forces in Algeria has now been entrusted to an airman who refused to participate in the up-rising of 13th May.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 951

12th December, 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE COPY
22 DEC 1958
CANBERRA A.C.T.

Algeria

Reference is made to the Embassy's memorandum 897 of 1st December, 1958.

On 11th December, General Salan issued a new General Political Directive to the French Army in Algeria. The last General Political Directive by the General was issued about the time of the May crisis.

In his new Directive, General Salan said that a vast amount remained to be done to fuse the people of Algeria. Since 13th May discouragements had come to light to cloud the great spirit it had then revealed. In view of these, the General thought it appropriate to recall the role of the Army in Algeria. Above all, the General said, the Army had to pursue the destruction of the rebel bands. The Army had also to increase the assistance that it was giving to the public services. The new élites which were emerging from the most modest social strata had to be ceaselessly encouraged, supported and protected. These élites were one of the essential factors in the building up of Algeria, "province française".

The General also said that all members of the Civil Administration in Algeria had to strive to carry out the programme laid down by General de Gaulle in his Constantine speech.

The harmonious development of Algeria demanded that all French people of Algeria should work together to find a solution to the problems posed by the development of Algeria and definitive accession to the rank of a completely French province.

Coming on top of the recent spate of rumours that General Salan is shortly to be transferred from Algeria, this statement by the General may turn out to be something of a political testament. It is interesting to see that General Salan, on what is commonly thought to be the eve of his departure from Algeria, has emphasised the great effort that the Army has still to make against the rebels and, moreover, speaks so clearly of Algeria as a "French province".

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→ E

24/12.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

Memorandum 951 (Contd)

- 2 -

Attached hereto is a biographical note upon M. Delouvrier who, if the rumours are to be believed, is about to take over the Civil Administration in Algeria.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 952

12th December, 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

F.L.N.

A delegation from the F.L.N. "Government" is now in Peking. According to a statement made by M. Ferhat Abbas in Cairo on 11th December, 1958, the delegation has gone to Peking on the invitation of the Chinese Communist Government. Its aim is to "consolidate the friendly relations which already unite the people of China and the Algerian people."

M. Abbas also said that "it is not excluded that we may formulate a request for material aid."

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

1. E.
2. E. Asia
3. E. R.

24/12.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

POL. 52/1.

J. C. G. Kevin Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA...A.C.T.

With the Compliments

of the

Official Secretary

Enc: 2 copies circular telegram W No. 565 Saving dated 16th December 1958.

Ref: Algeria.

23rd December 1958.

Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Canberra, A.C.T.

nmonwealth Relations Office

25/2/11

.C.)
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r, 1958)

ED

ncil of Ministers approved the
elegate-General of the Government,
tly Director of Finance in the
l and Steel Community at Luxembourg.
he direct authority of General
ourse of the next Prime Minister) will exercise
and military power in Algeria. As regards defence, security and the maintenance of public order, however, he will be assisted by a Commander-in-Chief to whom he will delegate the necessary powers. This post is to be held by Air Force General Maurice Challe, at present General Salan's operational deputy.

2. The fact that the Army are by far the largest service in Algeria is recognised by the appointment as General Challe's operational deputy of Army General Allard, the present Super-Prefect of Algiers. He is also to become commander of all land forces in Algeria and of the 10th Military Region, appointments which were hitherto held by General Salan in addition to his other responsibilities. Thus, although the post of Commander-in-Chief goes to an airman, operational command over the Army will be exercised by an Army General.

3. General Massu, the parachutist commander succeeds General Allard as Super-Prefect of Algiers, and, temporarily, Commander of the Army Corps in the Algiers Region.

4. French press comment has drawn the following conclusions:-

(a) the Government have thus re-established the principle of the supremacy of civil authority over the armed forces;

(b) the appointment of an economic expert to succeed General

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

25/2/11

TO: OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
PRETORIA (ACTING H.C.)
DELHI (ACTING H.C.)
KARACHI
COLOMBO
ACCRA
KUALA LUMPUR
SALISBURY

(Dated 16th December, 1958)

W. No. 565 SAVING UNCLASSIFIED

My W. No. 470 Saving.

A L G E R I A

On the 12th December, Council of Ministers approved the replacement of General Salan, as Delegate-General of the Government, by M. Paul Delouvrier, until recently Director of Finance in the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community at Luxembourg. M. Delouvrier, who will be under the direct authority of General de Gaulle (and in due course of the next Prime Minister) will exercise all civil and military power in Algeria. As regards defence, security and the maintenance of public order, however, he will be assisted by a Commander-in-Chief to whom he will delegate the necessary powers. This post is to be held by Air Force General Maurice Challe, at present General Salan's operational deputy.

2. The fact that the Army are by far the largest service in Algeria is recognised by the appointment as General Challe's operational deputy of Army General Allard, the present Super-Prefect of Algiers. He is also to become commander of all land forces in Algeria and of the 10th Military Region, appointments which were hitherto held by General Salan in addition to his other responsibilities. Thus, although the post of Commander-in-Chief goes to an airman, operational command over the army will be exercised by an Army General.

3. General Massu, the parachutist commander succeeds General Allard as Super-Prefect of Algiers, and, temporarily, Commander of the Army Corps in the Algiers Region.

4. French press comment has drawn the following conclusions:-

(a) the Government have thus re-established the principle of the supremacy of civil authority over the armed forces;

(b) the appointment of an economic expert to succeed General Salan, and his direct subordination to the Prime Minister, show the importance attached by the Government to the rapid execution of the Constantine Plan;

/(c) General

Copy passed to Africa
Dec 23/12

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

(c) General Massu's appointment as prefect of Algiers indicates that the Government do not consider the time has yet come for the wholesale restoration of Algerian local administration to civilian prefects. The new Delegate-General, however, has power to modify the administration as he sees fit.

5. You may inform Commonwealth authorities.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

E. Tous 25/2/11 Embs.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECEIVED
15 DEC 1958
COPY

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 931

8th December, 1958.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

ALGERIA

Reference is made to the Embassy's memorandum No. 897 of 1st November, 1958.

On 7th December, General de Gaulle returned from his latest visit to Algeria. The visit was unusually uneventful if one can judge from the press reports. It was significant for what was not said or done by the General rather than for what was said or done.

There were two main negative aspects of the visit. Firstly, the widely-expected and well-reported transfer of General Salan and the appointment of M. Delouvrier were not announced. Perhaps this was because General de Gaulle after taking an on-the-spot look at Algerian affairs decided the time was not ripe; perhaps the reason is merely that these moves will be made after the General has had a chance to confer with his Cabinet now that he is home from Algeria. Time will give the answer.

Secondly, General de Gaulle did not elaborate his Algerian policy any more than he did in his Constantine speech of October. In his statement upon this subject broadcast over Radio Algiers just after he had left Algeria, (copy of which is attached), the General said that the problem of Algeria's future was a human one. Each Algerian had to attain his liberty, good-fortune and dignity. As this was done, there would rise up the living personality of Algeria and the manner of the ties between Algeria and France. It was then that the practical and reasonabl solution of the so-called "political" problem would appear.

It will be appreciated from this statement that once again General de Gaulle has declined to make the categorical choice of integration or independence. He does not appear to see the Algerian problem in these terms but rather as one at this time of developing Algeria politically, economically and socially in the course of this development, he expects the solution of the problem to emerge.

General de Gaulle paid his first visit on the occasion of this tour of Algeria to the oil regions of the Sahara Desert. The visit indicates the importance which France attaches to oil and natural-gas exploitation in the region. In brief, the position reached with the exploitation is as follows:-

a) At Hassi Messaoud and Edjélé (east Sahara) there are deposits of at least 600 million tons of available petroleum, at Hassi R'Mel 100 million tons of petroleum and 500 billion cubic metres of natural gas;

b) A six-inch pipeline now connects Hassi Messaoud to Touggourt. The oil goes from Touggourt to Bougie port by rail (400,000 tons have so far been moved);

c) A 24-inch pipeline is being built to connect Hassi Messaoud with Bougie. It should be finished in 1959 and the flow to Boggie by 1961 should

1. ER to [illegible] Mr Holding
2 E - [illegible]
Mr (orig on 16/2/11)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

Memorandum 931

8th December, 1958.

reach 14 million tons;

d) It is planned to commence another pipeline from Hassi Messaoud to Bougie in 1959 to be finished in 2 years;

e) The French overall plan is that by 1962 France's petroleum needs should be completely met from the Sahara and from production in Gabon and at home.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3



National Archives of Australia, A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES December 1958
No. 121

RADIO ADDRESS BY GENERAL DE GAULLE

BROADCAST FROM ALGIERS ON DECEMBER 7, 1958

This evening, speaking from Algiers, I declare that our problem is first of all a human problem. What is important is for each man and each woman to have his freedom, his happiness and his dignity here. Insofar as this is brought about, we shall see better revealed, on the one hand the living personality of Algeria, and on the other hand the nature of the things that unite her with France. It is then that the political solution, properly speaking, will take shape, in a practical and reasonable way.

Now France, in order to bring to a successful conclusion her task, in Algeria and with Algeria, France has the means necessary for this. When we see the derricks of Hassi-Messaoud and Edjeleh going up in the heart of the Sahara, or the jets of gas at Hassi R'Mel flaming on the sand, we are sure that some of the energy that we shall extract from the earth will go to give Algeria an industrial development that will be her revolution.

When we witness the spiritual awakening and the rapprochement of hearts that is made possible by the economic, social and cultural transformation of the country, we see very clearly the moral stimulus that lies behind a magnificent undertaking.

When we see these signs appearing in Algeria at the very time when the surge of renovation uplifts the whole of France and at the time when, between the North Sea and the Indian Ocean, the free French-African Community is being established, then we feel that a whole is being formed and that a great human task is being accomplished.

I call on everyone to share in this common and brotherly task--on all those women and men who live in Metropolitan France, in the Overseas Departments and Territories, in Algeria, in the Sahara, in the young States of the Community. Here is a task that everywhere supercedes all the old partisan quarrels, the outdated race prejudices, the fanatic outrages; here is light for a whole generation.

Long live Algeria, the Community and France together!

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SDP

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

Dated: 8th December, 1958.
1950

Rec'd: 9th December, 1958.
2050

FROM: (Via Leased Channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

NY.1592. UNCLASSIFIED.

First committee opened debate on Algeria. Tunisia (Slim) was the only speaker today. France was absent.

2. In a lengthy historical survey he pointed out that barely a month after the end of the debate at the twelfth session of the General Assembly violent battles between French troops and the F.L.N. Army were resumed. In his view the cause of this was the determination of France to ignore Algerian realities. The war in Algeria which threatened to engulf the whole of North Africa was continuing and it was inconceivable to maintain in these circumstances that the Algerian War was an internal affair within the exclusive jurisdiction of France.

3. After reviewing the history of the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian People he said that in his opinion there could be no doubt that that Government represented the people of Algeria and effectively exercised power in Algeria. Furthermore, he said, this Government, ever since its formation, had demonstrated its sincere desire to enter into negotiations without prior conditions which, however, did not mean a renunciation of Algerian aspirations to regain complete Sovereignty. The question thus arose: why were negotiations with this Government refused, since France had said that what was needed was a negotiating partner with the ability to engage the Algerian people in negotiations in which the prior condition of independence would not be posed? These conditions had been met by the Provisional Government of Algeria, Mr. Slim contended. France he charged, was using the referendum in Algeria as a new excuse for refusing the most logical, peaceful means provided by the Charter for the settlement of conflicts.

4. Discussing the elections in Algeria he said that the French insistence on holding them in spite of everything meant that the voters confronted with a single list had no choice. The result of this combined with Army supervision was the election of people who had no right to speak for the Algerian people.

5. The United Nations, he continued, should not content itself with a general and imprecise recommendation open to various interpretations including the possibility of continuing the so called "war of pacification". In his delegation's opinion, the organization should urge negotiations as the most effective means for putting an end to the conflict, and should indicate the bases of a resolution in conformity with the natural right of people to freedom and independence.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 10th December, 1958.
P.M's.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E INF
DL MR. EASTMAN AF&ME
Q

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

25/2/11

:ABK

I.21052.

Dated: 24th November, 1958.

FROM:

Rec'd: 2nd December, 1958.

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAVINGRAM EX893 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Austemba Paris EX288, Washington EX929.

Algeria

1. Following is report dated 17th November from United Kingdom Consul General, Algiers:

"Within twenty-four hours of the new deadline for registration of candidates cancellations and disqualifications have reduced the number of lists in Algeria from 53 to 47. The situation in Algiers and Greater Algiers is improved by a reduction from six to only four lists each.

The lists continue to offer little hope for progress towards a solution of the Algerian problem. Their interest is rather therefore in their possible influence on the balance of the National Assembly.

Only two lists, one of four at Oran and one of five at Bone, are led by known socialists. At Constantine one of four and at Medea one of two are believed to be left wing. Another five lists are thought to be left of centre.

Of the last M. Salade has sole list at Tiaret in the Oran province. He is Arabic-speaking Mayor of Trezel and is thought to have considerable Moslem support.

The Moslem candidates seem to be an unknown quantity in their attitude to French politics since their French supporters here are interested only in their attitude to Algeria. This they intend shall be solidly integrationist.

General apathy to the elections among general public both Moslem and European is expected."

2. We have also seen further report from United Kingdom Embassy Paris expressing gloomy views about the "almost farcical nature" of the Algerian election lists, which are a far cry from de Gaulle's desire that lists should "represent every tendency" (his letter to Salan of October). Embassy quotes a M. Savary, who spent ten days in Algeria to try to see if it would be worth presenting a "protest list", as saying that he thought result of elections in Algeria would make it more and not less difficult for de Gaulle to achieve any constructive solution there. The General's own entourage were being rather embarrassed in their comments, but said that his approach was unchanged and that the situation must be "allowed to evolve gradually". De Gaulle himself was rather gloomy in his talk with Sir Winston Churchill on 6th November.

3. It seemed probable that the bulk of the new Algerian deputies would be strongly Right-wing and integrationist. All the same, it was at least conceivable that some of them might prove less conformist than the Right might hope.

CONFIDENTIAL

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
~~3. I.21052~~.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

4. Assistant Head African Department commented to us last week that the Algerian outlook seemed gloomy: It was obvious that the elections were going to be a farce and that the hopes which had been pinned on their producing "interlocuteurs valables" for de Gaulle were doomed to disappointment.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE. 2nd December, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL

G.

TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SDP

(1:22*11/12/13/14)

Dated: 16th December, 1958.
2035

Rec'd: 17th December, 1958.
1536

FROM:

(Via Leased Channel)

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

2440. SECRET.

Repeated to Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York, and Ottawa. Information copy to London.

De Gaulle's Proposals and Policies.

Your memorandum 856 (File 78/2/3).

Jandrey (Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Bureau) responded favourably to the views of the Australian Government on de Gaulle's proposals when we presented them today. (We did not refer to the consultations on the subject between Australian and United Kingdom Governments, but said we were aware of nature of proposals and had followed closely coverage given by the American press. We referred also to State Department Press Release 731 which said that tripartite exploratory talks were being held in Washington, and thatother interested Governments would be kept informed. We indicated that we would like to be regarded as an "interested Government" and this was readily accepted. We did not leave an aide memoire, but presented our our views orally.)

2. Jandrey said that 2 meetings had been held in Washington so far and that no more would be held until New Year. These had been exploratory only. The United States had taken position that proposals should not be rejected out of hand, in view of de Gaulle's personality and his attempts to raise the international status of France, and at Washington talks objective had been to raise a number of questions which would clarify proposals. Questions had been directed to French Ambassador on way in which French proposals would work in practice; their effect on other members of N.A.T.O., especially in the light of the improvements made recently in political consultation between N.A.T.O. partners; and reaction of countries outside the N.A.T.O. area to suggestions that their regions might be subject to some kind of overlordship. Jandrey said frankly that satisfactory answers to these questions had not so far been received and he assumed that Dulles would discuss the whole question with de Gaulle in Paris during the N.A.T.O. meetings.

3. Jandrey said that the United States did not favour creation of any new institution of three powers, such as de Gaulle seemed to envisage, but would welcome increased bilateral consultation if the French felt that present consultation between the Three Powers was inadequate. He agreed that French interests would be better served by an improvement in the functioning of N.A.T.O., and he accepted the view that French efforts might best be concentrated on Europe and North Africa. He affirmed that in European defence strategy France continued to occupy a key position.

SECRET

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

4. As far as Asia was concerned, Jandrey agreed that France had neither the capacity nor reputation to justify a demand for a greater role in that area and he added that similar considerations would apply to the Middle East. Thus, French participation in recent United States intervention in Lebanon, had this been suggested, could not have been entertained.

5. We made the point that while we strongly supported the concept of regional defence organisations, we hoped that a greater degree of co-ordination could be developed between the organisations, based on a fuller understanding of the global nature of the Communist threat. We said that from our point of view the Chinese Communist threat was most important and we would be concerned if de Gaulle's proposals had the effect of expanding N.A.T.O.'s. role in global defence to the detriment of other regional organisations. Jandrey said that we need have no fear that the United States would over-emphasise European problems to the detriment of others, pointing to United States actions on the Off-Shore Islands. He added that the United States tried to keep N.A.T.O. informed when crises like Quemoy and Lebanon arose, but was not committed to consult that Organisation before taking action. The same would apply in connection with de Gaulle's proposals.

French Policies.

5. Speaking of de Gaulle's personality, Jandrey recalled that after the events of May this year there were reports that de Gaulle seemed to have mellowed, but his subsequent attitude had shown that his exclusion from Yalta, etc, still rankled and that the problem of handling him would continue to be difficult. The de Gaulle Mystique had been a substantial factor in his success at the elections, but there were other reasons for this success, notably dissatisfaction with political instability and low state of French prestige in world affairs. The large rightest majority in the Assembly would probably limit his freedom of action particularly in regard to Algeria. If he attempted to implement a radical or even a moderate Algerian policy he would run into united opposition in the Assembly and notwithstanding his great prestige he might not be able to over-ride this.

6. Jandrey mentioned that the State Department was particularly concerned about the Algerian problem. There was serious danger that the F.L.N. would turn to the Soviet Union for arms, and would also seek support among emergent African nations such as Guinea and Ghana. Damage which the F.L.N. could do in such countries gave added impetus to the need for a solution of the Algerian question.

7. On Berlin, Jandrey said that de Gaulle apparently agreed with the United States United Kingdom and West Germany on the basic policy to be adopted. In matters of detailed implementation differences among the Four might, however, arise.

8. We enquired about the progress of negotiations on Missile Bases in France. Jandrey said that the United States wanted to have such bases, especially while United States Forces were stationed in France and because of France's key position in Europe. However, de Gaulle had made clear both his opposition to the proposed arrangements and his determination that France should become a nuclear power. He did not seem to appreciate the huge expense involved in producing nuclear armaments, especially in the present state of the French economy and in view of the need to maintain large armies in Algeria.

SECRET

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

- 3 - 1:22011/12/13/14

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

17th December, 1958.

SECRET

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
8 DEC 1958
COPY

File No. 201/2/5/1 9th December, 1958.

Memo No. 943

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ALGERIA.

I enclose an article by Brigadier Bernard Fergusson on the Algerian elections which appeared in the "Sunday Times" of 7th December. His summing up of Algeria at the moment is:

"There is without doubt a surge of exhilaration all round, a sense of fresh confidence in the future of France and Algeria alike."

E - retain
M (orig on 167/2/2)

AMBASSADOR.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

2/2/11

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 936

9th December, 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
8 DEC 1958
COPY

Algeria

At a meeting in Paris on 9th December, 1958, the day before the opening of the new French National Assembly, 60 of the 67 deputies from Algeria signed a declaration favouring integration for Algeria. This is the position that it was generally expected the Algerian deputies would take. But the promptitude and formality with which they have come out with their attitude has been something of a surprise.

The bloc of Algerian deputies also decided at the meeting referred to above not to join for the time being any political group in the National Assembly.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

E - return.
N (Orig (16/3/12) passed to M-Rennie).
AHS. 9/12.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 897

1st December, 1958.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Algeria

General de Gaulle has decided to pay another visit to Algeria, one which will be somewhat longer than those which he has previously paid. He will leave Paris on 3rd December and return late on the 7th or early on 8th December. The General counts, in the course of this visit, in going to see the petroleum extraction works in the Sahara.

The local press reported last week that the purpose of this visit by General de Gaulle would be to encourage the civilian administration in Algeria to play a larger role in the running of the country. Reports this week say, however, that the visit will be more significant although with a significance of the same type. These reports, which have been widely featured, are to the effect that General Salan is to be transferred from Algeria to become Inspector-General of the Army and is to be replaced by General Challe, who is at present his deputy in the military field, as Commander of the Army in Algeria. As regards General Salan's duties in the field of civil administration, these, the reports run, are to be taken out of the Army's hands and given to a young economist, M. Delouvrier. M. Delouvrier is at present Finance Director at the European Coal and Steel Authority.

The newspaper reports indicate that General Salan is to be transferred from Algeria because he has failed to obey completely General de Gaulle's orders in Algeria, in particular Army interference with the elections to the National Assembly has prevented Algeria from electing a truly representative group of deputies. Although there may be something in this theory, the removal of General Salan from Algeria appears as the latest development in the long-standing policy of General de Gaulle to return matters to normalcy in the territory. Now that the elections to the National Assembly are over, the time seems ripe to make a decisive move to re-assert Paris' control over Algeria and hence to separate the Army and civilian administration there; the transfer of General Salan is the convenient way to do this.

The appointment of M. Delouvrier, an economist, if true, indicates the importance that General de Gaulle attaches to the economic and social reforms he announced in his Constantine speech. It also represents an assurance to the Moslem people of Algeria that the General intends to carry out the reforms.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

E - ref
(orig on 167/1/2)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
201/2

Memorandum 896

27th November 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Election of Algerian Deputies
to the French National Assembly

The election of Algerian deputies to the National Assembly is to take place in Algeria in the coming week-end. Despite General de Gaulle's effort to see that these elections should result in the return of a body of deputies truly representative of opinion in Algeria, it now seems that the only result which the elections can produce will be a solid block of deputies all of a Rightest complexion and nearly all of whom will be strongly in favour of the integration of Algeria with France.

This question is well covered by the editorial in the London "Times" of the 27th November, a copy of which is attached for easy reference.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL 25/2/11 EATTE to file

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

1. Mr G Hunter 21/11
2. Mr Holland
3. F 167/2/1

TO: COLOMBO
ACCRA
KUALA LUMPUR

RPTD: OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
PRETORIA (ACTING H.C.)
DELHI (ACTING H.C.)
KARACHI
SALISBURY (ACTING H.C.)

(Dated 20th November, 1958)

W. No. 520 SAVING CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Pretoria, Delhi, Karachi and Salisbury.

My W. No. 503 Saving.

WEEKLY SUMMARY No. 42

/ I enclose this week's summary.

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS No. 42

ARGENTINA

In a somewhat confused political situation Vice-President Gomez recommended to the President that it was necessary to form a National Coalition Government to deal with the situation. The President refused to take this advice, and stood his ground with the support of the Armed Forces. The Vice-President has since tendered his resignation. The strike in the oil fields which led to President Frondizi's pronouncement of a "state of siege" has now ended. In addition, the non-Peronist unions have decided to call off the strike threatened for next week.

ALGERIAN ELECTIONS (See Summary No. 41)

A further analysis of the electoral lists, most of which were submitted shortly before midnight on November 9th, shows that 53 lists, each with the requisite proportion of Muslims, were submitted for the 18 Algerian constituencies. These 53 lists, however, were later reduced to 47 as a result of cancellations and disqualifications and they offer little hope for progress towards a solution of the Algerian problem; nearly all lists are committed to "integration" in one form or another. Two lists are known to be led by Socialists and 7 are thought to be left of centre. One list is led by the Arabic-speaking Mayor of Trezel, who is believed to have considerable Muslim support. Muslim candidates seem to be an unknown quantity in their attitude to French politics.

2. "Le Croix", the liberal Catholic Paris daily newspaper sums up the attitude of responsible opinion as follows: "One must face the facts. France has just received a setback in Algeria".

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

ABK:HP

I.20309

Dated: 19th November, 1958.
0015
Rec'd: 21st November, 1958.
1130
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

2271. CONFIDENTIAL.

Copies to London, New York and Paris.

Algeria.

Following from Allen (Tunisia Desk) on 19th November.

2. The State Department was most discouraged about developments in Algeria. Few Moslem candidates had come forward to stand for election and those that had were unknown figures lacking in standing in the Moslem community. Allen presumed that Moslems were reluctant to stand for election because of the fear of assassination by F.L.N.

3. It was most unfortunate that de Gaulle's offer to negotiate had been refused by F.L.N. The State Department assumed that prior to making the offer the French had had discussions with F.L.N. leaders and had believed it would be acceptable. Whatever understanding had been reached between them had apparently been interpreted differently by each side, and both now appeared to feel that the other had betrayed understanding.

Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

21st November, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL MR.EASTMAN
G

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Manchester Guardian Weekly File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: Manchester Date: 13.11.58.

HOW TO AVOID INTERFERENCE

by our own Correspondent

PARIS, NOVEMBER 11.

How difficult it is for a French military commander in Algeria to accept in their full sense General de Gaulle's instructions to General Salan for the Army to abstain from all interference in the elections in Algeria is shown by a circular to his subordinates from Colonel Marzloff, commanding at Médéa, printed in this evening's "Le Monde."

The circular is confidential and only to be mentioned with great discretion to civilian officials. It says:

"While remaining impartial and keeping out of struggles between persons or parties the Army should more than ever play its national part in Algeria. This consists in promoting the fusion of the two communities, and more particularly counselling and guiding the Moslem population. By indicating the prospects open to the Algerians within the French framework (the Constantine speech) and with respect for our Western values, the Army will enable the population to exercise its choice between the lists of candidates with full knowledge and to vote for those lists that will best serve the cause of French Algeria and reject those that include separatist candidates or persons morally disqualified.

"To play the part of counsellor and guide the Army should reinforce and multiply its contact with the population. While remaining strictly non-political, it will maintain close contact with the Committees of Public Safety. The Army is not to intervene in the choice of candidates but it is not impossible that the rebellion will seek to transfer the battle to the electoral plane and therefore instigate the presentation of crypto-F.L.N. lists and introduce candidates of its own choice into certain lists. The recipients of this order will follow very closely the candidatures that are put forward, keeping me informed without delay."

It is perhaps easier to be shocked at the naiveté of this conception of impartiality than to draft instructions to an officer on the spot who is in fact lord high everything and responsible for security in his district.

M. Savary, the dissident Socialist, who has returned from Algeria after deciding not to stand, has stated that arrests were still numerous among Moslems, and that there is, therefore, a widespread sense of insecurity.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Manchester Guardian File No. 28/2/11 E

Published at: Manchester Date: 13-11-58.

Obstacle race

General de Gaulle has met with a serious obstacle in the course he has set himself—that of bringing forward an Algerian "political élite" and working out with them Algeria's future relations with France. The General had looked for genuinely free and representative elections in Algeria at the end of the month. In the event, few of the lists of candidates that have been entered include anyone at all sympathetic with Moslem Algerian nationalism, and three of the eighteen constituencies show the very thing General de Gaulle wished to guard against—a single unopposed list of candidates pledged to "integration." Still, General de Gaulle could argue that, maimed though it will be as a test of public feeling, the election will for the first time lead Moslems and Europeans to vote on a common roll. As fears die away, more representative elections may be possible, and even some of the tame Moslems who will now be returned may show greater initiative. The trouble with the argument is that such a gradual transformation needs time. None knows better than the General the need to catch the tide in men's minds: he cannot be sure that in a year's time he will command such wide allegiance. One possible way round the obstacle would be to bring together Algeria's elected representatives (such as they will be) and delegates appointed by the Nationalists. A somewhat similar device helped three years ago to break the deadlock in Morocco. The F.L.N., it is true, still rejects General de Gaulle's conditions for a cease-fire and talks: but it looks like abating some of its own. Though it still wants to deal with France as Government to Government, M. Ferhat Abbas seems now to be hinting that a cease-fire need not wait on negotiations. There may still be a chance of establishing what the French call a "dialogue" between the warring sides.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 E

Published at: New York Date 12. 11. 58.

The Algerian Election

Premier de Gaulle has received a severe setback in his ardent efforts to find a gradual solution for the Algerian problem. The lists of candidates presented for the elections of Nov. 30 all champions of "integration," which is to say a continued link to metropolitan France. Those Moslems who have advanced their candidacies are part of the small group that sees eye-to-eye with the Committee of Public Safety and the French military in Algeria.

When the lists closed on Sunday night there were no representatives of the Moslem nationalists and none that could have been, as hoped, secretly sanctioned by the Algerian National Liberation Front (the F. L. N.). The election, therefore, is not going to do much to bring about a badly needed settlement of France's Number One problem.

The fault is much more with the Algerian nationalists than with Premier de Gaulle. He had shown his goodwill, his moderation and his willingnes to make concessions. He had offered to negotiate a cease-fire and he would have been glad to see some Algerian nationalists get elected to the National Assembly in Paris. The F. L. N. had a splendid —perhaps a unique—opportunity to win ground for themselves and put an end to the cruel conflict that has now lasted four years. They threw the chance away.

General de Gaulle has therefore lost a battle; he has not lost the war to win Moslem support for a peaceful evolution toward Algerian autonomy and perhaps independence. The wisdom and resourcefulness that Premier de Gaulle has shown in regard to Algeria will not desert him now. The elections will be better than none, and a new start can be made afterward.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No.: 25/2/4E.

Published at: New York. Date: 12-11-58

DE GAULLE LOSES ALGERIAN GROUND

Moslem Chiefs' Refusal to Enter Poll Is a Severe Setback to Premier

By ROBERT C. DOTY
Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Nov. 10—The failure of Moslems of stature and nationalist views to present themselves for election to Parliament from Algeria constitutes a severe setback for Premier Charles de Gaulle.

The deadline for filing for the election to the first National Assembly of the Fifth Republic passed at midnight Sunday with fifty-two lists of European and Moslem candidates. The election will be held Nov. 28-30.

All but a handful of the ninety-seven European candidates for twenty-one seats are men deeply committed to the policy of tight integration of Algeria with France and rejection of any flowering of the separate "Algerian personality" in "close association" with France as projected by Premier de Gaulle.

The 126 Moslems seeking the forty-six seats assigned to them are either local notables already deeply committed to undiluted French sovereignty in Algeria or persons whose names are virtually unknown. In most cases the political complexion of the list can be determined by the European candidates and these are all, or nearly all, representative of differing shades of "integration" opinion.

In Government circles it was held that some of these Moslem candidates would be capable of evolving into legitimate, representative spokesmen under the influence of the political "forcing ground" of French parliamentary life. But there was no attempt to hide the disappointment over the failure of Moslems representing a wide range of opinion to present themselves.

This was a severe setback for Premier de Gaulle because his hopes for ending the four-year-old Moslem nationalist rebellion depended on the election of at least a few Moslem Deputies truly representative of Moslem opinion. With these he had hoped ultimately to discuss a future political statute for Algeria that would be liberal, progressive and realistic.

Such a solution, sanctioned by valid representatives of the Moslem majority in Algeria, would, he had hoped, enlist the support of the Algerian masses and undercut the pretensions to independence advanced by the rebel National Liberation Front's provisional government.

The validity of the election in Algeria was undermined not only by the refusal of independent Moslems of stature to present themselves but also by renunciation of candidacy by three liberal Europeans who had considered the possibility of running in Algeria. These were Jacques Chevallier, respected and progressive former Mayor of Algiers; Algerian-born Alain Savary, a former Socialist and minister, and Jacques Fonlupt-Esperaber, a former Deputy of the Roman Catholic Popular Republican party.

The three men let it be known that they had decided not to run because they had been unable to find responsible Moslems to share a ticket with them and because they doubted that the election could be truly free and representatives under current wartime conditions in Algeria. M. Chevallier, at least, had urged Premier de Gaulle to postpone the election until a more propitious time.

This Premier de Gaulle refused to consider. Such an action would have been interpreted as a victory for the rebel Government, based in Cairo, which has declared that elections held without its sanction and participation can have no representative value.

Despite this background, General de Gaulle has refused to espouse the integrationist cause. He has said that Algeria's political future can be fixed only by the Algerians themselves through freely elected representatives.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No. 25/2/11 E.
Date 15-11-58.

ALGERIA ELECTION LISTS SHRINK

CONTROL COMMISSION INTERVENE

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, Nov. 14

The number of electoral lists in Algeria, each of some three or four deputies, has shrunk from 53 to 42. At Algiers and Bone three lists have been withdrawn voluntarily to avoid vote-splitting among integrationist candidates, while eight other lists in various parts of the country have been declared irregular, for various reasons, by the electoral control commission.

In Algiers it is the two most liberal lists that have been ruled out of order because in each case one of their Muslim members has been found to have a criminal record. One of these lists has the backing of the Roman Catholic progressives and the other, led by M. Lacoste, former president of the Algeria Assembly, was definitely opposing the views of the public safety committee. These lists still have a few days, however, to find replacements. Liberal observers agree that it would be a great pity if they were obliged to withdraw and so leave the field to the remaining three lists, at least two of which are led by extremists.

DECLARED IRREGULAR

A list at Mascara, calling itself the Gaullist union for the maintenance of French Algeria, and comprising a French retired policeman and three Muslim women, has been declared irregular on the grounds that one of the women, an assistant welfare officer, is under age and another, a nurse, was never even asked whether she wanted to be a candidate.

Two further liberal measures were announced by the Government to-day. In the Constantine district, 660 Muslim internees are to be released, and in Paris certain nationalists serving sentences for terrorism are to be accorded privileges nearly equal to those of political prisoners. As a result of this concession, Ben Bella and other political prisoners have decided to call off their hunger strike, now in its seventeenth day.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Manchester Guardian Weekly File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: Manchester Date: 25-9-58

Blow to France

The setting up of an Algerian Government in exile represents a victory for extremism. Coming at a moment when the French political climate had already been worsened by the F.L.N. campaign of murder and sabotage in metropolitan France, such an announcement plays into the hands of the French Right just as much as it does into those of intransigents on the Algerian side. Its immediate effect will probably be to undo the one liberal part of General de Gaulle's North African policy, which has been carried into effect: his conciliation of Tunisia and Morocco. The Governments of those countries, which have displayed a good deal of moderation up till now, will have to recognise the new Government, and this is bound to give a handle to those elements in France itself who do not want any kind of settlement in North Africa. Even the Socialist paper "Populaire" has not hesitated to use the attempted assassination of M. Soustelle to smear the name of M. Mendès-France in a manner which recalls the more imaginative inventions of Dr. Goebbels. In Algeria itself General Salan has spoken to members of the committees of public safety in terms which suggest that the old fires of May 13 are not yet quenched. In short, a few days before the referendum the political climate in France and in Algeria has deteriorated sharply, and more and more power is coming into the hands of the extremists in both camps. The atmosphere is one in which even General de Gaulle will find it difficult to carry out his appointed task as the preserver of the Republic and of French unity, and in which any end to the Algerian war seems out of the question.

In these circumstances the constitution of M. Ferhat Abbas's Government will also pose a problem for France's friends and allies. They must necessarily view with distress and alarm this growing tendency to extremism, and in particular could not be indifferent to any deterioration in the relations between France and Tunisia and Morocco. Both Britain and the United States have an interest in seeing that these two Moslem countries are not pushed violently towards the Soviet Union by French policy, and, if there are circles in France who contemplate some rash reprisal for the support given by other North African countries to the F.L.N., they should be warned against it now. If extremists in France are bent on going for a death ride in North Africa, they must not think that they can take the Western alliance with them. As for the Algerian nationalists, their extension of a terrorist campaign to France itself will cause immense suffering to their countrymen both there and in Algeria. Meanwhile, the world is treated to the spectacle of two adversaries locked in a death grapple which may well destroy them both, and which certainly will put democratic institutions in France in extreme danger if it continues.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

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Q

ALGERIA
July 23, 1958
Section 1

M. SOUSTELLE'S VIEWS ON ALGERIA

Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received July 23*)

(No. 129. Confidential) *Paris, July 18, 1958.*

Sir,

In my despatch No. 123 of July 15 about General de Gaulle's Algerian policy, I referred to the possible political and psychological disadvantages of the General's recent appointment as his Minister of Information of M. Jacques Soustelle. Since, as I said in that despatch, M. Soustelle has recently been fairly cautious in his public utterances about Algeria and, since his new post, whatever his personal influence with the General may be, undoubtedly confers upon him considerable propaganda and other means of influencing French public opinion, I thought it worth attempting to confirm our impression of M. Soustelle's views on Algeria. Accordingly I invited him to lunch on July 15 and did my best to draw him out on the subject.

2. M. Soustelle is convinced that there are only two conceivable long-term policies for Algeria. One is integration (which of course he favours) and the other is independence. Federation, autonomy and what you will are—according to him—merely variations of independence. Once there is a separate Algerian Parliament it must be obvious what will follow. There are few shades in M. Soustelle's thinking. Either a thing is black or it is white. As regards independence, he argues that it is possible to be in favour of it and if things go badly it may well happen. But there will never be independence for Algeria as a whole, for, if the principle is once admitted, then Algeria will begin to break up. The Moroccans will seize some of the south-western districts and notably Tlemcen: M. Bourguiba may try—though probably without much success—to extend his own frontier westward; the Kabyles will undoubtedly succeed in organising some kind of Kabyle State of their own; a good deal of the mountainous interior will remain in a permanent state of anarchy; and, most certainly, the Europeans will defend themselves in the coastal districts, perhaps unified, but more likely in enclaves around Oran, Algiers and Bône. These enclaves will demand and get some kind of Commonwealth status and retain a direct relationship with France. As M. Soustelle sees it, such a development as this is quite inevitable if an attempt is made to create an autonomous Algerian State on the basis of free elections. The F.L.N. will never have the ability or the means to organise even Moslem Algeria as a separate entity, while the "colons," unless they are completely overwhelmed by military means, will never agree to being ruled by the Moslems. If such an anarchic situation is to be avoided, therefore, the only hope, in spite of all the admitted difficulties, is to cultivate the *mystique* of integration. Already with the 300,000 Algerians living in France and with the co-operation which has gone on for a century in Algeria itself, there is a kind of symbiosis in existence and the task of the future is to encourage this by all possible means. In fact the alternatives are, either that Algeria will become increasingly French or that there will be anarchy, perhaps under the general suzerainty of the United Arab Republic.

3. I said that unfortunately it did not seem clear to foreigners that General de Gaulle himself had accepted this statement of the position. In particular he had never, so far as I knew, himself used the word "integration" to describe the future, while he had often in the past given hints that he was in favour of some "federal" solution which, after all, would connote, if not independence, a large degree of autonomy. M. Soustelle said that he could not deny that the General did not seem as yet to have made up his mind completely, but he thought he had already taken two steps which would inevitably point to integration in due course.

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In the first place, he admitted complete "equality of rights" and in the second place he had committed himself to a substantial raising of the standard of living. As he proceeded to apply these principles he would, M. Soustelle thought, inevitably be pushed in the direction of complete acceptance of the integration thesis. (This, I should add, is also the view of an increasing number of rather disheartened French "liberals".)

4. I said that this might conceivably be so, but in any case what did integration mean? How could M. Soustelle possibly pretend that even within ten years from now there would be anything like complete integration in the sense of a homologation of the essential services, wages, education and industrial development between Algeria and the metropolis? M. Soustelle replied that it all depended on what was meant. It was quite true that such an approximation was impossible, even in the long run, between Algeria and the bulk of the French departments north of the Loire. On the other hand, if I visited what used to be called the "désert de la France" in such departments as the Lozère or Corrèze, or even the upper regions of the Gard (where he himself originated), I would see that the standard of living at this moment was really incredibly low compared with the northern districts. In these departments people simply scratched the earth and whole villages were up for sale for £200 or £300. Yet there was no sense of revolt. People continued in their old ways and the bright young men after all got away and often managed to make a career. It was a question therefore of seeing whether the general standard of living in Algeria could during the next ten years be approximated to the standard of living in Corrèze, the Ardèche, or, indeed, in Corsica.

5. I said that this was very interesting, but so far as I knew it was a fact that all the children in the "désert de la France" did at least go to school, and it was for this very reason that the bright young men such as himself were able to emigrate and make their living. In Algeria, on the other hand, as I understood it, only something like 20 per cent. of the children went to school or got any education at all. Even for educational purposes, therefore, it would need an immense sum to bring Algeria up to the level of Corrèze. M. Soustelle said that this was so. He would not deny that, if his policy was to work, very large sums would have to be voted by the metropolis for the purpose of educating the Algerians and also for the purpose of installing local industries. The enormous sums which had been mentioned by some people as essential for the development of Algeria or even the 4,000 milliard francs odd over a period of ten years recently recommended by an expert committee were out of the question—no country could afford anything of the kind. But he himself thought that something like 200–250 milliards per annum would in fact have to be devoted by France to the development of Algeria during the next ten years. It might even have to be rather more. This would, of course, necessitate considerable sacrifices on the part of the French people, and if such sacrifices were to be demanded it was essential that they should be made all round. In particular, the possessing classes must provide the bulk of what was necessary, and if he had his way he would see to it that they were made to do this. Of course if there was a real return of confidence—the beginnings of which seemed to be evident in the success of the Pinay loan—there need not be enormous sacrifices by anybody. The country, in his opinion, could afford the sort of sums which he had mentioned and it was his hope that General de Gaulle would succeed in installing a régime which would result in increased prosperity and therefore in the sacrifices needed being freely agreed to.

6. This led us on to a short exchange of views on Africa generally. Our conversation had begun, not surprisingly in view of the date, by some discussion of the situation in the Middle East, in the light of the news which had just been received of the American landing in Beirut. M. Soustelle, of course, is not exactly pro-American. He maintains that the Americans, who torpedoed the Suez operation, have now decided, too late, on a policy of force and may well be in danger of making a failure of it. If only to restore the situation in the Lebanon, it seems to him that they will need many more troops than they now contemplate using and, if they eventually withdraw without the situation being solidly established, everything will redound to the ultimate benefit of Nasser. Indeed, within the general African context, M. Soustelle is enormously impressed by the damage being done to the French, and, he also thinks, to the British, possessions in Africa by Nasser's propaganda and intrigues. Playing on the obvious fact that among the poorer natives of Africa it

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was far easier and cheaper to gain some respect by putting on a turban and a cloak than a European suit and also on the fact that the Moslem religion by its very simplicity made it easier for the backward natives to emerge from fetishism and voodoo, the propaganda of the United Arab Republic was having a most corrupting effect on the whole continent. In order to counter this the West would have to offer some kind of counter-*mystique*. On this M. Soustelle claimed to have certain ideas of his own. He did not reveal them to me but said that he proposed to discuss them with his colleague, the Minister for Overseas France.

7. This covers the main points of substance discussed in our conversation but, in conclusion, I might add that, if it is true, as his opponents allege, that M. Mollet has fallen for General de Gaulle, it is equally clear that M. Soustelle has fallen for General Massu. In his opinion, not only has General Massu great qualities as a military leader and great integrity and single-mindedness, but he is also by no means lacking in political sense. During recent meetings of the Algiers Public Safety Committee, General Massu—according to M. Soustelle—has been most adroit at playing off one group against the other and generally in getting agreement on some more or less reasonable political line.

8. I have reported these views on M. Soustelle at some length both because, as I said at the beginning of this despatch, it seemed desirable to clarify his exact position and also because he is probably one of the most active and, if only because of his ministerial position, influential members of the present Government. As a general judgment, I should describe him as an exceptionally clever man though lacking in charm and no doubt also in real political conviction. It may well be, however, that, as regards Algeria, he has persuaded himself that " integration " is the only possible line for France to take. On other political issues I suspect that he will follow a line which best suits his own interests and there is little doubt that he himself by one means or another intends to get to the top.

9. In my despatch under reference I classified the appointment of M. Soustelle as Minister for Information as perhaps the greatest of the liabilities in the balance sheet of General de Gaulle's Algerian policy. As regards the Algerian problem itself, I am sure this is true. From the more general political viewpoint, however, it can be argued that General de Gaulle was, on the whole, perhaps well advised to take M. Soustelle into the Government. He could have been a serious thorn in the flesh of the present Administration at the present time. After the Referendum, no doubt, the situation may be different. But it is obvious that the General will want to avoid any serious polemics before then. In short, de Gaulle presumably hopes to inoculate his Government against M. Soustelle (and what he stands for politically) by injecting him into the Governmental system. There is, however, an obvious danger that the inoculation may be too powerful and the Government itself become infected.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Rabat, Tunis, Washington and the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO and to Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Algiers.

I have, &c.
GLADWYN JEBB.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York. Date 25-10-58

EUROPEANS VOICE FEAR IN ALGERIA

Man in the Street Receives de Gaulle's Bid in Disbelief —Others Welcome It

By HENRY TANNER

Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS, Oct. 25—Europeans in the streets of Algiers expressed surprise, disbelief and even fear today when they heard the news of Premier Charles de Gaulle's offer to negotiate a cease fire with the Algerian rebels.

There were no signs of unrest. Leaders of the reorganized movement of public safety committees predicted that there would be no public demonstrations and no organized opposition to the Premier's policy.

The first reaction of several citizens was, "I don't believe it, it can't be true."

"Now I am beginning to be afraid," said a young office worker. Faces were solemn. Consternation was written on many, bitterness on some.

The populace heard excerpts of the Premier's statement over the radio. The city's only afternoon paper was already on the street and the published text will not be available till tomorrow.

Many of the first reactions were made in the belief that the Premier had offered political as well as military negotiations.

Algerian Europeans on the whole have nothing against military negotiations, especially since they feel that the French Army now has the upper hand and that a cease-fire would in effect be a surrender by the rebels.

"The great danger is that de Gaulle may be faced with progressive political demands by the rebels," said one representative of conservative European opinion. "The closer peace appears to be," he added, "the more difficult it will be to resist rebel demands for autonomy and finally independence."

His fear clearly was that the Premier's statement might mark the beginning of a political all-out. Local political leaders knew since early morning what the gist of the Premier's statement was going to be. Unlike the man in the street, they showed no surprise.

Some of them expressed strong doubt that the rebels would be able to accept the Premier's offer. Others said that even if Ferhat Abbas, Premier of the provisional rebel regime, agreed to a cease-fire he could not impose his will on the rebel fighting forces and the war would go on.

René Denis, secretary general of the Organization of Public Safety Committees, called General de Gaulle's statements "good news."

Move Hailed at U. N.

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 25—Premier de Gaulle's offer to hold cease-fire talks [illegible] Algerian rebels [illegible]

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times
Published at: New York

File No. 25/2/11 E.
Date: 25-10-58

Text of Remarks at de Gaulle News Conference

PARIS, Oct. 23 (Reuters)—Following, in unofficial translation, is the text of Premier Charles de Gaulle's statement at a news conference here today and of questions and answers at the conference:

De Gaulle's Statement

The last time I had the pleasure of seeing you, it was in the month of May last. The atmosphere was then heavy. The least one can say is that it has completely changed.

Confidence has replaced anguish. National unity has prevented division and the referendum of Sept. 28 has proclaimed the renewal of France, because it is indeed the wish of the French people to unite for the struggle and greatness which was revealed on that day.

This was revealed by all the "yesses," and there were many. Among those who voted "no," now many did so against their inner will?

Moreover, the massive participation of Algerians in the voting established a psychological basis which never before existed for the political, economic, social and cultural evolution of their country, and on this basis, it is now possible for Algerians and Metropolitan Frenchmen to build the future together.

Furthermore, 25,000,000 men of black Africa, of Madagascar, Djibouti, the Comoro archipelago, showed spontaneously their wish to establish with France a free community and at the same time 35,000,000 citizens of Metropolitan France, Algeria, Reunion Island, the West Indies, Guiana, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, the French settlements in Oceania, made the same decision as far as they were concerned. There is there a mutual undertaking between the people concerned, which nowhere and at no time had such precedent.

Proof of Vigor Seen

One sees that the sign, the proof of vigor and reason given by our country, has produced in the world a decisive effect. Yesterday, very few bet frankly on us. Now, everybody wishes to back France. We have utilized this great popular movement to renovate our institutions. The new public powers will be very different from the old ones. Arbitration by the head of state, separation of the executive and the legislative, continuity of government, this is what is foreseen, this is what the people have wanted.

Legislative elections will be held next month to implement the new Constitution.

Everybody understands—I allow myself to speak a word on my own account—everybody understands that I do not wish, nor can I, involve myself in a direct manner in this contest.

The mission that the country has assigned is such that it excludes an attitude on my part that would consist of taking sides. I will not do so in favor of anybody. Even if [illegible] showed me a friendly devotion [illegible] function in equilibrium, stability and efficiency and the nation will be interested in the free debates of its representatives.

In one word, it was by a profound reform that we have safeguarded the representative regime. May Parliament not destroy this chance.

In any case France has showed that she is to live, rise and shine.

Questions and Answers

Q.—Following the directives that you have given General [Raoul] Salan regarding the forthcoming elections and after the order you have given officers to withdraw from all political organizations, could you say what role you assign to the army in Algeria?

A.—I understand very well that circumstances being what they are, the attention and professional curiosity of the press be centered essentially on Algeria.

It is a matter of knowing what has happened, what is happening for the French Army in Algeria. Well, to my mind, the French Army has accomplished in Algeria what France expects of it. Its first task naturally is to prevent Algeria being lost through military action in the field. In this respect, I believe, most of the task is now done, though nothing is completely finished.

The army has also the task of protecting all categories of the population in Algeria, and in particular the Moslem population. Indeed, one should know that though in the past four years in Algeria about 1,500 French civilians have been killed, more than 10,000 Moslems, men, women and children have been massacred by the rebels, and nearly always by throat-cutting.

In Metropolitan France, for seventy-five Frenchmen killed in outrages, 1,717 Moslems fell under the bullets and knives of killers.

How many lives, how many homes, how many crops the army is effectively protecting. In Algeria. What a hecatomb that country would know if we were stupid enough or cowardly enough to abandon it. This is the reason, the merit, the result of so many military actions, costly in men and pains, of so many reconnaissances, patrols and clashes.

To date in Algeria, 7,200 French officers and soldiers have died, and alas and alas, 77,000 rebels killed in action.

The third task of the army, which indeed it carries out in a brilliant and moving manner, lies in the fact that it is everywhere in the field, and the fact that as it is the army, that is to say a devoted disciplined and disinterested body, it wished and could establish human contact with this Moslem community that too often and for very long had found itself relegated in the mechtas and in the douars [illegible]

Attitude on Peace Bid Asked

The New York Times

INVITED TO FRANCE: Ferhat Abbas, Premier of Algerian Government-in-Exile. He is now in Cairo.

struggle. I say: wherever they are, their chiefs in the field need only make contact with the local French command.

The old warrior's procedure long used when one wanted to silence the guns is to use a white flag for parleys. And I say that in this case the combatants would be received and treated honorably.

As for the external organization of which we were speaking a moment ago, and which from outside strives to direct the fight, I repeat openly what I have made known: If delegates were designated to come and settle with the authority the end of hostilities, they would have only to address themselves to the French Embassy at Tunis or that at Rabat.

Either one will insure their transportation to Metropolitan France. Their full security will be assured and I guarantee them the freedom to leave again.

New Elections Cited

This peace, I repeat, may it come as soon as possible. Now certain people say: But what are the political conditions on which the French Government would accept a discussion?

I answer that the political future of Algeria is in Algeria itself. It is not because one has made the guns sound that one can dispose of it. When the democratic way is open, when the citizens have the opportunity of expressing their will, well then, there are no methods that are valid. And that way is open in Algeria.

The referendum has taken place. Legislative elections are going to take place soon. In March, there will be elections for municipal councils. In April, the senatorial elections. What will follow? Myself I say this is a matter of evolution. In all ways an [illegible] linked together in the world today. The universe is small. There are two world groups. That of the Anglo-Saxons, and that of the Soviets who for some years have been producing atomic weapons, and at the present hour, one of the other of these two groups is in a position to unleash in an instant on the universe a gigantic cataclysm.

I do not say, and in addition I do not think, that the responsibilities are equal on one side or the other in the fact that until the present moment, these two groups have not been able to come to an agreement on disarmament and control.

I am for my part convinced that the West would disarm at once if Russia did the same. But as things are, death continues to hang suspended over the universe.

Before this world danger, France has always wanted to play the role of apostle and champion of disarmament. We have not ceased and we do not cease to press the Russians, Americans and British to give up production, even to liquidate their stocks of atomic bombs, and to agree to an effective international control. And these positions that we have taken up we believe we ought to hold, all the more so because it is the only objective which can be positive. If it were reached, the famous question of tests would disappear immediately.

Allied Stand Cited

If on the contrary this goal is not reached, then, for those who continue to accumulate bombs, what can the suppression of tests matter. Their power would be absolutely unchanged and the world peril would not be diminished. On the contrary, this will be like giving small change to a poor world if the three states concerned were to take such an attitude.

And then this would give each one an alibi not to disarm. Besides, this is what Britain, the United States and France recognized in common last May. At that date, the three nations formally declared that the goal to reach was the limitation and the control of armaments, in particular of atomic armaments, and that it would add yet another risk to many others, and that it would turn the debate on to a fallacious siding by making the suspension of tests a goal.

It so happens, and I think this is a pity, that our allies have thought at New York their duty recently to modify their positions, but France has no reason to change her opinion, and that is what our delegate in New York has declared very clearly.

Independently of general considerations, which she has for holding to what has been agreed amongst the West, she has also a reason all her own, it is true. Everybody knows that we now have the means to provide ourselves with [illegible] armed, France will not accept a gigantic chronic inferiority. Besides, when we become an atomic power, a day which is not far off, we will have all the greater means of making action felt in the spheres that are dear to us and that are also dear to all men, that is to say, world security and also disarmament.

When one asks then General de Gaulle to define the broad lines of a foreign policy adapted to the size of the community that is being created, the head of the government recalls that the policy is before everything the interpretation of realities and there to attain certain objectives. For France, these objects are neither more nor less than security and fraternity in the world. As to the means, he adds the Government employs them according to circumstances. That is what he is trying to do. You would be so good as to agree that perhaps he achieves not without difficulty some results.

Q.—Does the Government envisage now defining in a precise manner its position as regards Frenchmen in Guinea.

A.—We have not made the least obstacle to the event that has happened in Guinea. The present Premier of Guinea took the attitude that everyone knows about at the referendum.

That was his right, at least as far as we were concerned, and it is on the basis that for the moment he acts and he speaks. For us, Guinea has yet to become. We notice what she is going to be from the point of view of foreign relations, we notice the tendencies and above all the possibility of acting as a state if she does establish herself definitely.

We will establish our relations with this new Guinea with what we shall see in the various fields. We will act without bitterness and with the greatest loyalty. But we cannot have complete certainty that the position today will remain the same tomorrow.

End of Assistance Cited

As to the Frenchmen who are still in Guinea and about whom up to this moment we know that very happily their lives and property are not at stake, we do not see any reason for them to stop living in a country where they have established their business. Naturally, I do not refer to the civil servants and technicians whom the French state provided to Guinea under the system of the framework law, or which she would have provided under the system of the community and which she is unable to provide under the system of so-called independence.

It is the same thing as regards financial assistance that the French state was [illegible] Guinea and that for the development of

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

great popular movement to renovate our institutions. The new public powers will be very different from the old

held next month to implement the new Constitution.

Everybody understands — I allow myself to speak a word on my own account — everybody understands that I do not wish, nor can I, involve myself in a direct manner in this contest.

The mission that the country has assigned is such that it excludes an attitude on my part that would consist of taking sides. I will not do so in favor of anybody, even of those who have always showed me a friendly devotion through all vicissitudes. Of course, I would not be able to disapprove of groups or candidates of all shades of opinion of making public their support of the action of Charles de Gaulle. And besides, others will not fail to be in the opposition, using that liberty that they accuse me of wishing to destroy.

Use of Name Barred

This impartiality obliges me to insist that by and large my name, even in the form of an adjective, should not be used in the declarations of any group or any candidate. But this impartiality does not prevent me, of course, from wishing that the forthcoming electoral campaign should take place in objectivity and in dignity, at least as far as possible, and that in particular people should abstain from those personality conflicts that are always ungracious and saddening and that jeopardize everything and serve no purpose.

The elections will be held, and at first sight it may seem that they will be on the same nature as hitherto.

And yet, the Assembly that will result from these elections will not find the same conditions as those that preceded it.

After some months of suspension, parliamentary agitation will reappear, it is true, but it will no longer be omnipotent.

The lesson of the facts, the course of events, the judgment of the people and also the civic sense of the whole of the French political body, have led the Constitution makers of 1958, that is to say the members of the Government, assisted by the work of the Constitutional Council, by the advice of the Council of State, and I must say by the enlightened advice of the President of the Republic, to place on future assemblies strict limits and powerful brakes. It is indeed because the world situation and the necessity for national recovery absolutely prohibit a return to the confusion of the past.

Objective Action Urged

If by any misfortune the Parliament of tomorrow does not adapt itself to the role that is assigned to it, there is no doubt that the republic would be faced with a new crisis, the outcome of which nobody can predict, except that the parliamentary system would be swept away for a long time.

On the contrary, if the future assemblies fulfilled in an objective manner their legislative functions, if they should abstain from these excesses, from these pretentions, from these permanent agitations of which often the example had been set, then the powers of the state will

The third task of the army, which indeed it carries out in a brilliant and moving manner, lies in the fact that it is everywhere in the field, and the fact that as it is the army, that is to say a devoted disciplined and disinterested body, it wished and could establish human contact with this Moslem community that [illegible] long had found itself relegated in the mechtas and in the douars [remote villages].

Attitude on Peace Bid Asked

Officers and men of the army, with their hearts and generosity, did not limit themselves to protecting the population, but to help it by all means. One should see on the spot what they are doing in the field of housing, health supplies, schools, and measure the value of human contacts established day after day. Besides, if the referendum is what it has been in Algeria, in particular if one saw this moving eagerness of Moslems, it is simply proof of this trustful and reciprocal fraternity dawning on this unfortunate soil. Whatever the results achieved, the army continues its task. It must pursue the pacification. It must contribute actively toward the development of Algeria and it must work among all sectors of the population for reconciliation that preconditions the future.

With the forthcoming elections, the army had to keep out far and high. It has done so on my orders. France is proud of the services her army, commanders in chief, staff officers and officers and men, have rendered and are rendering in Algeria, and I from high above can very firmly bear testimony.

Q.—What is your Government's attitude toward recent overtures of peace made by the Algerian National Liberation Front?

A.—The outside organization you refer to has of its own started the fight. It has pursued it for four years. I leave the future to determine what this struggle will have served, but in any case now it serves nothing. Surely it can if it wants to continue the outrages, carry out ambushes on the roads, throw grenades on market places, sneak into villages at night to kill some poor people. It can seek shelter in mountain lairs, it can go in small groups from djebel to djebel, hiding arms and then use them. But the outcome is not there. The outcome is not in the political dreams and eloquent propaganda of refugees who wander abroad.

In truth and in all consciousness, the issue is now drawn out. It is drawn by the fact that the security forces slowly, slowly control the field, but more particularly it is drawn by the demonstration of civic sense on Sept. 28.

Yet I say without embarrassment that for most of them the men of the insurrection have fought courageously. Let the brave man's peace come, and I am sure that the hatreds will go. I speak of the brave man's peace. What does this mean. Simply this: that those who opened fire cease fire and return without humiliation to their work and their families. I am told: What can they do to end the

it come as soon as possible. Now certain people say: But what are the political conditions on which the French

the democratic way is open, when the citizens have the opportunity of expressing their will, well then, there are no methods that are valid. And that way is open in Algeria.

The referendum has taken place. Legislative elections are going to take place soon. In March, there will be elections. In April, the [illegible] elections. What will follow? Myself I say this is a matter of evolution. In all ways an immense transformation has started in Algeria.

Surely France, because that is her duty, because she alone has the power to do it, France brings about this transformation. As and when developments occur, political solutions will appear. Myself I think, I have already said, the future solution will have as a basis, because that is the nature of things, the courageous personality of Algeria and her close association with Metropolitan France. This association completed by the [illegible]hara, will, I think sooner or later, link itself for its common interest with the two states of Morocco and Tunisia.

You see each day its labor, but when I am asked whether I finally win, I answer, I am convinced, that in the last-resort, fraternal civilization will win.

Free Elections Sought

Q.—The Government wishes a multiplicity of lists in the electoral contest in Algeria. What measures does the Government intend to take to insure candidates all liberty?

A.—The Government will insure in Algeria, as in Metropolitan France, the possibility for candidate to express their faith, use posters and naturally distribute bulletins, and even if need be, their pictures. There is no doubt about this. Orders that have been given are very clear. I cannot hide from myself nor from you either that in the rather special circumstances in which Algeria, alas, finds herself, there may be some difficulties of interpretation here or there.

I am perfectly aware of this. The Government is setting up on the spot an extremely thorough control commission with all the powers wished for to remedy the situation when difficulties occur.

Whatever we have been able to do, we have done. And as regards our intention to see emerge, in particular as to the Moslem element in the French Parliament of tomorrow, qualified and valid men —of course there can be no question of criminals—whatever their opinions on the future of Algeria and that of France or any other subject, we ardently hope that this should happen, and it is besides, literally one of the bases of our policy that Algeria should awaken politically. This will, I think, take a long time. It will happen gradually, but the way is open, it must be followed, and there are no other ways.

Q.—At New York the French delegation at the United Nations has adopted a negative attitude to the project of nuclear suspension tests. Would you be able to indicate the reasons?

A.—It is a serious debate, a little outside our other preoccupations, but everything is

cluded that the goal to reach was the limitation and the control of armaments, in particular of atomic armaments.

have thought at New York their duty recently to modify their positions, but France has no reason to change her opinion, and that is what our delegate in New York has declared very clearly.

Independently of general considerations, which she has for holding to what has been agreed amongst the West, she has also reason all her own. It is true. Everybody knows that we now have the means to provide ourselves with nuclear weapons, and the day is nearing when we shall in turn take part in tests.

Perhaps this circumstance counted when Moscow, Washington and London simultaneously thought that really the suspension of tests was suddenly of capital importance.

While the three other states remain for their part over-

As to the Frenchmen who are still in Guinea and about whom up to this moment we know that very happily their [illegible]s and property are not at [illegible]ke, we do not see any reason for them to stop living a country where they [illegible]e established their business. Naturally, I do not refer [illegible]he civil servants and technicians whom the French state provided to Guinea under the system of the framework law, or which she would have provided under the system of the community and which she is unable to provide under the system of so-called independence.

It is the same thing as regards financial assistance that the French state was going to supply for the development of Guinea and that for the moment everyone understands must cease.

It is not in doubt that at the present moment the concern of all Frenchmen wherever they may be is to concentrate on the future of their own country that will to a certain extent be settled in the November elections and also on the end that all the world hopes for the Algerian drama.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: New York Date: 25-10-58.

De Gaulle Asks Algerian Rebels To Negotiate 'Brave Man's Peace'

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

ing a moment ago [he did not once use the term National Liberation Front], and which from outside strives to direct the fight, I repeat openly what I have made known: If delegates were designated to come and settle with the authority the end of hostilities, they would have only to address themselves to the French Embassy at Tunis or that at Rabat.

"Either one will assure their transportation to continental France," he said, adding:

"Their full security will be assured and I guarantee them the freedom to leave again."

It might be asked, he said, what political conditions the Government would be willing to debate.

"I answer that the political destiny of Algeria is in Algeria itself," he asserted. "It is not because one has made the guns sound that one can dispose of it [Algeria]. When the democratic way is open, when the citizens have the possibility of expressing their will, well then, there are no other methods that are valid. And that way is open in Algeria."

In his first appearance at a news conference since his drama-charged conference May 19, with France under the threat of civil war, Premier de Gaulle seemed relaxed, unhurried and unworried. He spoke slowly but fluently without notes, his voice ranging from a deep rumbling baritone up to the high register employed for emphasis. The orderly presentation of his thoughts and his mastery of language and syntax were flawless, as usual.

The substance of his remarks strikingly underlined the profound revolution of sentiment and political atmosphere General de Gaulle has created since his return to power June 1. A mere suspicion that former Premier Pierre Pflimlin might undertake negotiations with the Algerian rebels was sufficient to move the army and European civilians in Algeria to threaten civil war last May 13. Their wrath toppled the Fourth Republic and brought General de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic onto the scene.

Today, five months later, Premier de Gaulle, in an almost negligent, off-handed manner, proposed the reception in France of the rebel leaders for the purpose of discussing peace.

A series of free elections that began with the constitutional referendum at the end of September and will continue with legislative, municipal and senatorial elections, Premier de Gaulle said, will outline the political future of Algeria.

These will be held under his precise orders for complete freedom of expression of all tendencies of political opinion, he said. But he acknowledged that in the "special circumstances" pertaining in Algeria there might be, here and there, "some difficulties of interpretation."

General de Gaulle mournfully tolled off the tragic cost of nearly four years of guerrilla warfare in Algeria. Fifteen hundred Europeans and more than 10,000 Moslems have been massacred by the rebels in Algeria, he said. Seventy-five Europeans and 1,717 Moslems have fallen to killers in France, he went on, and in armed combat 7,200 French officers and soldiers and 77,000 rebel-fighters have died.

In his remarks on the coming elections in France, Premier de Gaulle made it clear that no party could claim his patronage or use his name "even in the form of an adjective"—Gaullist.

All, however, are free to proclaim their fidelity to the "action of Charles de Gaulle," the Premier said, just as opponents will use the same freedom to attack him.

This ended speculation that a powerful loose coalition of Right-wing leaders and old-line Gaullists would be permitted to campaign with the tacit sponsorship of General de Gaulle.

Among the leaders currently negotiating such an alliance are Information Minister Jacques Soustelle, Justice Minister Michel Debré and Léon Delbecque, a central figure in the May dissidence in Algeria. All are Gaullists and members of the newly formed Union for the New Republic. Also supporting the move are André Morice, a dissident Radical; Roger Duchet, an Independent, and former Premier Georges Bidault, a Popular Republican.

The mission given him by the country, Premier de Gaulle said, precludes his taking sides.

Algerian Rebels Confer

CAIRO, Oct. 23 (Reuters)—The leaders of the Free Algerian Government-in-exile formed by the National Liberation Front conferred here today on General de Gaulle's offer of a cease-fire in Algeria.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Economist File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London Date: 8. 11. 58.

FRENCH ELECTIONS

Moslems Hang Back

THE French parties, let alone the electorate, will need the campaigning days before the first ballot on November 23rd to discover where all the 2,997 candidates for 465 seats in metropolitan France really stand. The *scrutin uninominal à deux tours*, last used in the Third Republic, sets a pretty puzzle for a new generation of voters, managers and experts. But there was disconcerting news for General de Gaulle personally from Algeria (where the electoral lists were to remain open until November 9th) when it was evident by midweek that Moslem candidates were being conspicuously backward in coming forward.

Part of the trouble could be attributed to the row between the settler politicians in Algiers who are friendly with MM. Soustelle, Bidault and Duchet, and the *ultras* from the committees of public safety. When such a stalwart as M. de Sérigny found himself rebuffed by his old *ultra* companions it was clearly no time for Moslems like Dr Sid Cara to do other than reserve their services until the issue was settled. But the reluctance of moderate nationalists to appear on any list looked bad. It was optimistic to conclude that local deals with the rebels were still in progress. The rejection of General de Gaulle's truce terms would prevent the militants from standing. But the essence of General de Gaulle's instructions to General Salan had been that all opinions, including those of European liberals like M. Jacques Chevallier, the former mayor of Algiers, and of Moslem moderates, should be heard. Had the army—the sole instrument of French rule—ideas of its own about these orders? The new Gaullist policy in Algeria seemed to be in trouble.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: New York. Date: 20-10-59.

De Gaulle in Command

The Army to Power!" was the [illegible] in the revolt in Algeria last May against the wobbly Fourth French Republic. The Army was backed by right-wing civilian extremists. Together they proclaimed Committees of Public Safety to run Algeria in defiance of Paris. Their defiance raised fears of insurrection in France itself and set the stage for Gen. Charles de Gaulle's dramatic return to power in June.

In the ensuing months the General temporized with the dissidents in Algeria. The belief in Paris, however, was that for a man of de Gaulle's disciplined character the shadow of illegality cast over his Government must be distasteful. Then three weeks ago de Gaulle won a sweeping popular mandate in a referendum on his new constitution. Last week, de Gaulle moved and in effect broke the back of the dissident movement.

Order to Army

On Monday Paris made public a stiff letter from Premier de Gaulle to Gen. Raoul Salan, the Army commander in Algeria who has headed the military junta there. De Gaulle wrote:

> The time has come for the military to stop taking part in any organization which has a political character * * *. I order [the Army] to withdraw without delay.

The next day the Army bowed. Maj. Gen. Jacques Massu, the President of the All-Algeria Committee of Public Safety, and eleven other French officers withdrew. It was clear that the Army was in no mood to defy the man who led France during World War II and who rescued France from the brink of civil war last spring. Right-wing civilian extremists on the Committee were enraged. They immediately announced plans for demonstrations against de Gaulle. But other members of the Right-wing were reluctant to act against their "hero," de Gaulle. The protest strike was canceled.

At the week-end it was obvious that the collapse of the Right in Algeria had greatly enhanced de Gaulle's prestige and authority in France. The consensus was that de Gaulle's victory strengthened the non-Communist Left and Centrist parties. Thus the belief in Paris is that the Center and moderate Left will sweep the new republic's first parliamentary elections Nov. 23 and Nov. 30 as handily as de Gaulle himself when he personally stands for election Dec. 14 as the Republic's first President.

Moreover, the defeat of the Right in Algeria last week had returned Algeria policy-making to Paris for the first time in years. The Algerian National Liberation Front, which has been waging a war of independence for four years and recently proclaimed itself a "government," has been making increasingly conciliatory gestures toward de Gaulle since his constitution won 97 per cent of the Algerian vote. Thus it was felt that de Gaulle's thrust at the Right in Algeria last week had strengthened chances for a cease-fire with the rebels.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Economist
Published at: London
File No. 25/2/11E
Date 18. 10. 58.

ALGERIA

The General shows his Teeth

GENERAL DE GAULLE has at last begun to make plain what he has in mind for Algeria. His orders to General Salan, published on Monday, are unequivocal: the flunked. By insisting that the Algerians should be free to choose the representatives they want—even if these are nationalists campaigning on a platform of independence—he has laid the basis for a negotiated end to four years of cruel and unprofitable fighting.

The National Liberation Front (FLN) has begun to modify its attitude, too. M. Ferhat Abbas has declared himself willing to negotiate with Paris without preconditions. The Algerian leader is in a weaker position than before the referendum. His troops are scattered into small groups; the overwhelming number of Moslems voting *oui* cannot be wholly explained by the French army's manipulations; and now the quarrel between Cairo and Tunis leaves him unhappily with a foot in either camp. His shadow government provides poor warmth against the chill of these facts.

The doors are open for negotiation, but the path is cluttered with traps. Although General de Gaulle has smashed the idea of a charade election with single lists of vetted candidates, he has left a loophole by debarring "anyone engaged in terrorist activity." The five weeks before November 23rd are not long for a war-soiled country to organise political parties and campaigns. The army officers have had their heyday as politicians, but General Salan is still in charge, and General Massu's influence was not bounded by his former position as president of the now disintegrating Algeria-Sahara committee of public safety. While the war of "pacification" continues, the army is in command. There is still no civil authority in Algeria.

The best hope would lie in a quick cease-fire. The exchanges between General de Gaulle and M. Ferhat Abbas are oblique—at any rate to the public eye—but they seem to be falling plumb on target. As our Paris correspondent suggests on page 241, their accuracy hints at direct talks carried on privately. A cease-fire before the elections appears to be General de Gaulle's objective, but any terms that might persuade M. Ferhat Abbas to call off the fighting would probably be too tough for the general to swallow.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

25/2/11

:ABK

I.20289.

Dated: 14th November, 1958.

FROM:

Rec'd: 20th November, 1958.

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAVINGRAM EX869 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington EX905, Paris EX282.

Algerian Elections.

Following is report dated 10th November from United Kingdom Consul General, Algiers:-

"The lists came in with a rush in the last few hours before the time limit on Sunday night. There are now at least two lists for each constituency except Tiaret and in the Sahara, but their composition offers little hope of that "expression of all opinions" called for by General de Gaulle.

"The liberals and Moslem Nationalists are boycotting the elections and a preliminary analysis of the lists published today suggests that only four are Socialist and two M.R.P., the remainder which contain few known names stand in various forms: "for the ideals of May 13", "integration" and "national renewal". The registration of six such lists in Algiers Town and five at Bone and in the Algiers suburbs supports local accusations of place-seeking without a policy and is likely to return candidates on a small minority vote. The only variety comes from Setif with a list "for the crushing of the rebellion" and Bone with a list for "democratic union to preserve peace, the currency and nuclear energy".

"Moslem candidates are new names, mostly in Government employ or members of municipal bodies but some may reveal nationalist views after election. Only one was a member of the former Algerian Assembly and few are known to command any following.

"Five Moslem women are standing, and in Philippeville the wife of the Commanding Officer of the Foreign Legion parachutists.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 21st November, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME IN DL MR. EASTMAN

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM. 25/2/11 Au

..JD. I.20153.

FROM: Sent: 11th November, 1958.

External Affairs Office, LONDON. Recd: 19th November, 1958.

S.V.EX857. CONFIDENTIAL.
Repeated Paris EX279, Washington EX691, Ottawa EX231.

Algeria.

We shall try to discuss outlook in Algeria with Foreign Office this week. Meanwhile, however, following report from United Kingdom Embassy, Paris may be of interest:-

"With three days to go before the closing of the registers of electoral lists for the forthcoming general election in Algeria, not a single list has so far apparently been registered. Reports from Algiers speak of almost indescribable confus ion amongst the European, where politicians of varying shades of extremism are indulging in a typically Mediterranean battle of personalities.

What is causing far greater concern in Paris, however, is the total absence of any Moslem candidatures. In part, this may be due to the chaos in European ranks. Certain Moslems have apparently been asked to appear, with European candidates, on as many as six different electoral lists. In the main, however, the conclusion drawn here is that the failure of de Gaulle's peace offer to the F.L.N. has discouraged Moslem "moderates" from standing. They are now both frightened of F.L.N. reprisals if they come forward and also probably apprehensive lest, if they do become members of the French Parliament, their representative quality will be disputed by the F.L.N., the war will drag on, and the French will ultimately be forced to discard them and negotiate direct with the F.L.N.

This has produced a characteristic swing of the pendulum in France, where pessimism is now the order of the day throughout the press, apart from the extreme left-wing, whose turn it is to say "I told you so". There has been a spate of editorial hints to de Gaulle to take some unspecified but spectacular initiative disigned to "unfreeze" the Moslems and a flock of rumours about the possibility of de Gaulle again visiting Algeria, making a further statement or postponing the elections; or even that negotiations are once again in train and F.L.N. representatives already secretly on their way to Paris.

All this has been firmly dismissed by de Gaulle's office, who deny that the General intends to pay any further visit to Algeria before the elections or to make any new public statement. Nor, they say, are any fresh negotiations in process. The General has said his last word to the F.L.N. and has proclaimed the date of the elections and the conditions in which they are to be held. It now only remains for this process to go forward.

This lordly attitude only thinly conceals the serious concern and anxiety in de Gaulle's entourage and amongst French officials. De Gaulle's Secretary General for Algerian Affairs has been despatched post-haste to Algeria with the thankless task of knocking European heads together and persuading reluctant

CONFIDENTIAL 2

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

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Moslems to come forward. In fact, he will probably be able to restore the situation sufficiently to enable at least a semblance of competing lists, including the necessary proportion of Moslems, to be registered before midnight on November 9th. After all, in Metropolitan France itself many candidates were still registering within a few minute of midnight last Sunday. The Fact remains that this combination of European irresponsibility and Moslem reticence has produced a situation from which only the F.L.N. can obtain propaganda and political advantage. De Gaulle's press conference was an audacious move which regained some initiative for France. The F.L.N. can now, however, claim (even if their influence may itself be only partly responsible) to have demonstrated their continuing hold over the Algerian Moslems. De Gaulle may have further cards up his sleeve; indeed perhaps his most useful trup is the genuine longing of the Moslem population for peace. On present form, however, the prospect of the Algerian elections resulting in a genuine expression of popular will or in the election of men with whom de Gaulle can usefully discuss "the rest", seems distantly remoted.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 19th November, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR P.C&M AM SF S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF DL NT I.R EASTMAN

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No: 25/1/11 E.

Published at: New York. Date: 26.10.58

IRISH SAID TO SPUR ALGERIA TRUCE BID

Secret Talks Are Reported Under Way on de Gaulle Cease-Fire Move

By MICHAEL JAMES
Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 24—Efforts by Irish officials in the United Nations were reported today to have paved the way for truce talks that Premier Charles de Gaulle of France proposed to the Algerian rebels.

All parties to the problem here agree that negotiations are secretly under way between the French and the Algerians and that they have been going on for several weeks.

The French and Algerians here hint that developments can be expected momentarily, perhaps during the week-end, when the Algerians are expected to respond officially to General de Gaulle's proposal that they go to France for discussions.

It is understood that Frank Aiken, Foreign Minister of Ire-

Continued on Page 3, Column 2

Irish Aide at U. N. Said to Spur Paris Truce Bid to Algerians

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

land, sat down here more than a month ago with Moroccans, Tunisians and representatives of the Algerian insurgents. He told them that the French Premier appeared to be willing to negotiate with the rebels concerning at least the fighting in Algeria.

He indicated that the Algerians might do well to learn a lesson from the history of Ireland's negotiated agreement with Britain in 1921.

The Irish have also been urging the Algerians to take the advantages provided by elections, as long as those elections are honest. They point out that when they decided to participate in the 1918 parliamentary elections they swept Ireland. This gave them the opportunity to set up their own Assembly, which, though unofficial in British eyes, allowed them to claim justly that the revolutionary government had in fact been elected by the people.

North African circles feel that the agreement between the French and Algerians is being reached during conversations going on at the present, and that a Paris meeting would be little more than window dressing. The insurgents would probably be agreeable to go to Paris to keep General de Gaulle happy, it is understood, as long as an agreement on principle had already been reached.

Rebel Acceptance Forecast

Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS Oct. 24—Moderate Moslems with nationalist tendencies who could be reached here today expressed the hope that the Algerian nationalist leaders would take up Premier de Gaulle's offer.

Most of them were inclined to think that the Premier's bid had a fairly good chance of being accepted.

Bourguiba Praises Offer

Special to The New York Times.

TUNIS, Oct. 24—President Habib Bourguiba welcomed today the offer of General de Gaulle to negotiate with the chiefs of the Algerian nationalists. He declared the proposal constituted "a new element" in the Algerian problem.

"His [Premier de Gaulle's] words are different from those pronounced by any other French statesman since the Algerian war began in 1954," Mr. Bourguiba said.

The Tunisian President made these comments in reply to questions from newspaper men after he had recorded a speech marking United Nations Day. In the speech he said that the Algerian rebel Government in Cairo was still counting on the United Nations to help settle the conflict with France.

Offer Is Hailed in France

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Oct. 24—Premier Charles de Gaulle waited today for the Algerian rebels to act on his offer of truce talks while totally contradictory French political forces praised his courage and boldness.

Rarely in recent French history, and never on the Algerian question, has the country seen the kind of unanimous backing that was shown today in the press and public statements for one of the most important moves the Government has yet made to end the four-year-old Algerian fighting.

Premier de Gaulle proposed safe-conduct for a rebel delegation to come to France to discuss the ending of hostilities. He made it clear he would not discuss Algeria's political future with the rebels. He reserved such discussions for democratically elected representatives of the Algerian people.

The only support for the proposed truce talks now lacking is that from the rebels themselves. The Premier's office said tonight it had no indication of any response.

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25/2/11

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de l'Ambassadeur de France

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AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

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French Affairs – No. 71 October 1958

BIRTH OF A NEW COMMUNITY OF FREE PEOPLES

"Do you approve the Constitution proposed by the Government of the Republic?" This was the question put last month to the 47,249,142 registered voters of Metropolitan France, Algeria, the Overseas Departments, the Overseas Territories and also the French nationals abroad. The entire French community from Polynesia to the North Atlantic archipelago of Saint Pierre and Miquelon was invited to take part in the largest referendum ever organized by a French Government.

The participation exceeded the most optimistic expectations. A total of 38,097,854 citizens of France and of the French Union flocked to the polls and cast their votes. In other words, among the registered voters, 79.8 per cent had exercised their right to vote.

The Constitution was overwhelmingly endorsed everywhere except in the West African Territory of Guinea, where it was rejected. The over-all results were:

Yes:	31,123,483 (65.8 per cent of the registered electorate; 82.5 per cent of the vote)
No:	6,556,073 (14 per cent of the registered electorate; 17.5 per cent of the vote)
Blank ballots:	418,298

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However, since by its 95.4 per cent vote against the Constitution Guinea had declined to become part of the French Community provided for under Title XII of the Constitution, the results of the referendum, as officially proclaimed on October 4, 1958, did not include those of that Territory.

Official Results

Metropolitan France

Registered voters:		26,603,464
Participants:		22,596,850
(Percentage of participation: 84.9)		
Valid votes cast:		22,293,301
Yes:		17,668,790
(Percentage of electorate: 66.4;	of vote: 79.2)	
No:		4,624,511
(Percentage of electorate: 17.3;	of vote: 20.8)	

Algeria and the Sahara

Registered voters:		4,694,270
Participants:		3,751,522
(Percentage of participation: 79.9)		
Valid votes cast:		3,711,796
Yes:		3,589,876
(Percentage of electorate: 76.4;	of vote: 96.7)	
No:		121,920
(Percentage of electorate: 2.6;	of vote: 3.3)	

Overseas Departments

Registered voters:		373,135
Participants:		246,988
(Percentage of participation: 66.2)		
Valid votes cast:		243,120
Yes:		218,187
(Percentage of electorate: 58.4;	of vote: 89.7)	
No:		24,933
(Percentage of electorate: 6.6;	of vote: 10.3)	

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Overseas Territories (Guinea excluded)

Registered voters:		14,151,288
Participants:		9,911,327
(Percentage of participation: 70)		
Valid votes cast:		9,854,191
Yes:		9,221,585
(Percentage of electorate: 65.1;	of vote: 93.5)	
No:		632,606
(Percentage of electorate: 4.5;	of vote: 6.5)	

French nationals abroad

Participants:	387,291
Valid votes cast:	383,409
Yes:	368,064
(Percentage of vote: 95.9)	
No:	15,779
(Percentage of vote: 4.1)	

Over-all (Guinea excluded)

Registered voters:		45,840,642
Participants:		36,893,979
(Percentage of participation: 80.4)		
Valid votes cast:		36,486,251
Yes:		31,066,502
(Percentage of electorate: 67.7;	of vote: 85.1)	
No:		5,419,749
(Percentage of electorate: 11.8;	of vote: 14.9)	

On the afternoon of October 4, the five members of the National Census Commission, headed by Nicholas Battestini, First President of the Court of Cassation, submitted the official tabulation of the results of the referendum to the Minister of the Interior. The new Constitution was promulgated by the President of the Republic on October 4. That afternoon, the Constitution, bearing the Seal of the State, was placed under glass at the Ministry of Justice alongside the Constitutions under which France had formerly been governed. It was published in the *Journal Officiel* of the French Republic on October 5, 1958.

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REFERENDUM OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1958

FRANCE



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THE RESPONSE OF METROPOLITAN FRANCE

The striking significance of these results becomes apparent when they are compared with those of the referendum of October 13, 1946, when the Constitution of the Fourth Republic was approved. At that time, a third of the electorate in Metropolitan France and half of the electorate in the Overseas Territories stayed away from the polls. A total of only 17,792,000 persons voted, including those who cast blank ballots. The results were 9,039,000 (52.3 per cent) to 7,830,000 (47.7 per cent) in favor of the Constitution in Metropolitan France, and 335,000 (56.5 per cent) to 258,000 (43.5 per cent) against the Constitution in the Overseas Territories.

France, frequently seen as a divided nation, gave a demonstration of unity on September 28, 1958 – the day of the referendum. This unity had crystallized around Premier de Gaulle as the symbol and promise of national renovation above partisan politics.

Not a single Department had a majority of "no" votes, and there were only five Departments in the center of France (Allier, Corrèze, Creuse, Gard and Haute-Vienne) in which only 60 to 70 per cent voted "yes." In all other Departments the percentage of "yes" votes was higher than 70 per cent: 24 of them returned more than 85 per cent of "yes" votes. Manche led with 93 per cent, followed by Bas-Rhin with 92.7 per cent and Haut-Rhin with 91.7 per cent.

The political leaders (non-Communist) of the national parties who had campaigned for a "no" vote were all defeated, not only in their Departments, but even in the communes of which they were mayors.

The referendum was marked not only by a high degree of unanimity but also by a huge outpouring of voters. The large proportion of abstentions noted in the referendum of 1946 was nowhere repeated. Whereas, in 1946, 31 per cent of the voters had abstained and another 31 per cent had voted "no," in 1958 the turnout amounted to almost 85 per cent. More than 66 per cent of the entire registered electorate – an absolute majority by a comfortable margin – voted "yes."

A third striking feature of the referendum was the collapse in Communist voting strength. The Communists had campaigned vigorously against the Constitution; but at the polls at least one in five and possibly one in four of their usual voters, deserting the Communist standard, voted "yes". In the 1956 legislative election, the Communist candidates had polled 5,600,000 votes – 25.5 per cent of the votes cast. The total "no" vote in the Constitutional referendum was less than 4,625,000 and the number included unknown thousands of votes mustered by influential non-Communist members of the opposition.

The losses in Communist voting strength were particularly spectacular in Paris's suburban "Red Ring," where Communist candidates had polled up to 37 per cent of the vote in 1956.

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Ivry, for instance, had given Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, 14,586 votes in 1956. The total "no" vote there in 1958 was 12,171. At Montreuil, where Jacques Duclos, chairman of the Communist parliamentary group, had won 21,640 votes in 1956, the "no" vote was 17,473.

Similarly, at the port city of Le Havre, where the mayor and the majority of the council are Communists, the vote was 60,969 to 25,162 in favor of the Constitution. At Marseille, the 1956 Communist vote had been in excess of 122,000; the "no" vote there was 88,799. At Lyon, too, the Communist vote fell by a fifth or more.

In all of France, one town only – Bagnolet in the "Red Ring" – voted against the Constitution. It turned in a "no" vote of 8,586 to a "yes" vote of 6,636. Even Maurice Thorez, in his closing address at the Central Committee meeting of October 4, 1958, admitted the failure sustained by the Communist Party and the supporters of the "no."

THE RESPONSE OF ALGERIA

In Algeria, the verdict of the referendum was a resounding "yes" to France and "no" to the four-year-old rebellion. The men who direct the rebellion had sent out word to the effect that participation in the referendum was tantamount to treason and that offenders would be punished by death. Despite the fact that the rebels, who claimed to control three quarters of Algeria, attempted to impose their boycott with every form of physical and moral intimidation, over 80 per cent of the Moslems of voting age registered to vote and, of these, over 70 per cent cast their ballots. Premier Charles de Gaulle noted in a speech at Constantine on October 3 that Algeria, by its vote of confidence, had pledged itself to France for a better future.

The results of the referendum in Algeria could be interpreted only as a vote of confidence in France, in General de Gaulle and in his drive to make every Algerian a "full-share citizen." The Premier had promised the Moslems "a new deal," and they believed him. He had urged the Europeans and the Moslems alike to join in the building of a new, better Algeria in close association with France, and both communities proved at the polls that he could count on wide support.

But the referendum had even more significance for Algeria. For the first time in the history of that country, the Moslem women took part in a demonstration of the popular will. They did so in great numbers and with notable enthusiasm. The Moslem women evidently looked upon the exercise of their newly granted right to vote as an initial long stride in the direction of social emancipation.

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It is noteworthy that in many places the first voters to appear were the women. Thus, at El Oued, on the edge of the Sahara, where a local Moslem dignitary had urged the women to awake from their torpor, 17,000 women registered to vote. Of this number, 98 per cent went to the polls on September 26, preceding the men.

In the distant M'Zab, an oasis community in the Sahara inhabited by members of the puritanical Abadite sect of Islam, it was thought that no amount of persuasion could induce the women to leave the sanctuary of their homes and to cast their votes. But there again a religious leader preached the word of progress, and the women flocked to the polls.

In this respect, it is also known that many religious leaders, previously assumed to be the jealous guardians of tradition, adopted a progressive position. This was true even in the Constantine Department, a nationalist stronghold.

Neutralization of the Rebel Threats – When plans for the referendum were announced in June 1958, Premier de Gaulle had appealed to those who had taken up arms against France to accept a peaceful contest at the polls. The rebel leaders responded to this offer by instigating renewed violence. They dedicated their whole effort to the total disruption of the referendum. They threw their armed bands into action to prevent the registration of Moslem voters and, failing that, to keep them away from the polls.

Yet in defiance of the rebel boycott four fifths of the Moslems of voting age registered with the census bureaus of voters. Of the registered electorate, three fourths took part in the referendum, voting "yes" in more than nine cases out of ten. In fact, when the results were in, it was seen that an absolute majority of the Moslem population of voting age had voted "yes." Of course it was not to be supposed that many Moslem voters would defy the rebel boycott, accept the risk of rebel reprisals and often travel long distances just in order to vote "no" once inside the booth. In fact, only about 118,000 voted "no." However, those who did cast "no" votes, did so in the secrecy of the polling booth and in total security.

For example, in the mountains of Kabylia, east of Algiers, where a number of rebel bands were entrenched, the turnout was rather less than in most of the other parts of Algeria. Nevertheless, it exceeded 60 per cent everywhere, reaching 85 per cent at Maillot and Tassaft. In many of the remoter parts of Algeria, itinerant voting stations moved from village to village under armed guard to enable the inhabitants to vote.

Civil Supervision – The physical protection provided by the Army was only part of the over-all system devised to insure the freedom and validity of the voting in Algeria. Measures of civil supervision were enforced.

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A civil Control Commission composed of sixteen members headed by Ambassador Henri Hoppenot, a career diplomat, had general supervision over preparations for the referendum and over voting procedures. A Departmental Commission headed by a member of the central commission was established in each of Algeria's twelve departments. The members of these commissions, Europeans and Moslems alike, were drawn exclusively from the judiciary and other nonadministrative branches of the Government.

After keeping a close eye on practical arrangements and taking steps to insure freedom of expression and assembly, the commissioners – with the help of 8,000 delegates, all civilians, scattered among the various voting stations – had the further task of preventing irregularities. At the close of voting, the ballot boxes were sealed in the presence of a commissioner or delegate and taken to a counting center under military guard accompanied by a civilian representative of the Control Commission. The results of the referendum were tabulated under the scrutiny of the central commission at Algiers before being transmitted to the National Commission in Paris.

THE RESPONSE OF THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

During his swing through the French African Territories in August 1958, Premier de Gaulle made it quite clear that the choice facing each Territory on September 28 lay between membership, temporary or permanent, in a French Community of self-governing peoples or full immediate independence. This option was designed to place France's relations with her former Overseas Territories squarely on the principle of their consent to association with Metropolitan France in a new Community whose members will have equal rights and duties, France herself relinquishing part of her sovereignty to the Community.

At the same time, Premier de Gaulle made it clear in a speech at Abidjan, capital of the Ivory Coast in French West Africa, that these privilages were not to be regarded as a one-way street. Calling attention to the tremendous financial and other burdens and responsibilities carried by France in Africa and elsewhere, he declared that she, too, would retain the right of self-determination.

By voting "yes," the Territories could become members of the Community provided for under Title XII of the proposed Constitution. Title XII stipulated that the member States should be self-governing in all matters except foreign policy, defense, currency, common economic and financial policy and the disposition of strategic raw materials. These powers would be reserved to the Community. In addition, except by special agreement, the Community would retain control of higher education, the courts and inter-State and foreign communications. By "Community" was meant, not the French Government, but the governmental institutions – an Executive Council, a Senate and a Court of Arbitration – common to all the member States including France. A further provision of Title XII stipulated that a member State could change its status within the Community or sever its ties completely at any time. However, a governmental decision to such an effect would have to be ratified by the people of the State concerned in a referendum supervised by the appropriate agencies of the Community.

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Therefore, in campaigning for or against the proposed Constitution, the political leaders in the Overseas Territories knew exactly what the alternative was. Most of them urged their followers to vote "yes."

The results in the eight territories of French West Africa, the four territories of French Equatorial Africa, French Somaliland, Madagascar and French Polynesia were:

Registered voters:	15,559,788
Participants:	11,115,202
(Participation: 71.4 per cent)	
Valid votes cast:	11,047,496
Yes:	9,278,566
(Percentage of electorate: 59.6; of vote: 84)	
No:	1,768,930
(Percentage of electorate: 11.3; of vote: 16)	

A glance at these figures reveals that in the Overseas Territories, as in Metropolitan France and in Algeria, an absolute majority of the electorate voted "yes." Again, the turnout was well above the 1946 figure, with the percentage of abstentions falling from 51.6 to 28.6. Excluding Guinea, which voted against the Constitution, the total vote was 93.5 per cent in favor of the Constitution, a degree of unanimity almost equal to that of Algeria.

It was evident, too, that certain political leaders held great sway over their followers. Indeed, in each of the Territories that voted "yes," the majority obtained was more than 70 per cent, which indicates that in most cases there was a relatively homogenous current of public opinion, which was determined even more by the personality of the leader than by the ideologies of the two main rival parties of French Black Africa: the African Democratic Rally (R.D.A.), which had triumphed during the territorial elections of 1957, and the opposition party, the African Regroupment Party (P.R.A.).

Thus, in the Ivory Coast, where Félix Houphouet-Boigny, president of the African Democratic Rally (R.D.A.) and Minister of State in the present French Government, championed the cause of the Community, the "yes" vote was 99 per cent of the total. Similarly, in Guinea, where Premier Sékou Touré, M. Houphouet-Boigny's rival in the R.D.A., campaigned against the Community, the "no" vote was 95 per cent of the total.

In the Niger Territory of French West Africa, where two prominent politicians campaigned against each other, the "yes" vote was 78 per cent of the total. This represented a defeat for Premier Djibo Bakary, a leader of the African Regroupment Party (P.R.A.), and a victory for Hamani Diori, a Vice President of the French National Assembly and leader of the R.D.A. opposition in his Territory.

In Senegal, a citadel of the P.R.A., the local politicians were harried on their left by the young activists who had dominated the party congress at Cotonou in Dahomey in July 1958. Nevertheless, they stood their ground in favor of the Community, and their position was endorsed by 97 per cent of the voters.

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The same phenomenon could be observed in three territories of French Equatorial Africa. Abbé Fulbert Youlou, the mayor of Brazzaville, brought out a 99 per cent "yes" vote in Middle Congo, while, in Ubangi-Shari, the followers of Barthélemy Boganda returned a 98 per cent "yes" vote. Gabriel Lisette was not far behind with a 97 per cent "yes" vote to his credit in the Chad.

In Madagascar, where public opinion was more divided than in most of the other territories, the advocates of the Community rallied a good majority of the voters. The results in that important Territory were:

Registered voters:	2,154,934
Participants:	1,764,460
(Participation: 81.8 per cent)	
Valid votes cast:	1,755,610
Yes:	1,363,059
(Percentage of electorate: 63.2; of vote: 77.6)	
No:	392,551
(Percentage of electorate: 18.2; of vote: 22.4)	

These returns represented a clear-cut success for the Malagasy moderates, who, in the 1957 election, had won only 60 per cent of the seats in the Territorial Assembly.

REFERENDUM OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1958
OVERSEAS TERRITORIES



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* The following publications are available for distribution at the Press and Information Division of the French Embassy, 972 Fifth Avenue, New York.

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RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

::HP

I.19746

Dated: 31st October, 1958.

FROM:

Rec'd: 12th November, 1958.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

25/2/11

Saving 56. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated to Paris Savingram No.3.

F.L.N. Algerian "Government".

Your Savingram AP.57.

On 25th October, I mentioned the matter of the F.L.N. Committee to Mr. M.J. Desai, Commonwealth Secretary, outlining our views.

2. Mr. Desai said that the attitude of India was completely stated at the Prime Minister's Press Conference on 12th October. He recalled that Mr. Nehru had said India would not accord recognition to the "provisional government" but the matter would be kept in view by the Government all the time. He had noted that the question of immediate recognition raised certain difficulties including that of "a government which may be called a government existing outside the territory which it is supposed to govern". The Prime Minister had also added that the French Government had often observed that it did not know with whom to deal in Algeria on the issue of Algerian independence. Mr. Nehru thought the so-called provisional government represented "all the elements of Algerian nationalism both moderate and extremist" and therefore the French Government might find it suitable to deal with them.

3. Mr. Nehru in answer to a question had said he thought the referendum results in Algeria were misleading (partly because of the large proportion of French soldiers in the voters).

4. Mr. Desai reiterated some of these points in rather different language. He said that the Algerian situation required a fully agreed solution and that although the new "government" did not satisfy the tests for recognition, it might in time provide suitable opportunities for General de Gaulle to reach a solution which could be accepted. India thought Algerian independence was inevitable but recognised the complexities of the present situation and was anxious to avoid adding to them.

...Heydon.

Min. & Dept. External Affairs(167/2/2)

12th November, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT MR.EASTMAN
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RANGOON KARACHI KUALA LUMPUR COLOMBO

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P.I.B. No 21 of 11th December 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

file 25/2/11

ALGERIA AND THE FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM

There must necessarily be a wealth of supposition in any interpretation of Algeria's vote in the French Constitutional referendum of 28th September, 1958. The result of the vote in Algeria was that approximately 3,475,000 voted, representing 80 per cent of the registered electorate (the basis for registration being universal adult suffrage). Ninety-six and a half per cent of the votes (representing 78 per cent of the registered electorate) were in favour of the new Constitution - which, incidentally, made no specific provision for Algeria.

The composition of the poll and the attitude of the voters is estimated to have been as follows :

(a) French settlers - 500,000, who believed that their affirmative vote represented a vote for integration with France;

(b) Moslems - 2,975,000 comprising

(i) 1,475,000 women, whose affirmative vote no doubt resulted from appreciation at their emancipation and a desire for peace;

(ii) 350,000 ex-servicemen, who do doubt voted "yes" in admiration of de Gaulle and through a feeling of affinity with France;

(iii) 1,150,000 males, the great majority of whom voted "yes" through a desire to end the strife and, to a limited extent, through psychological constraint (fear of the French Army).

The "yes" vote therefore represented support for a variety of things ranging from integration to independence. The most constant element in the vote seems to have been a feeling that a "yes" vote would help de Gaulle end the strife; and to this extent the vote did represent a huge vote of confidence in de Gaulle.

Even more striking, however, is the fact that three million odd Moslems voted out of the 3,900,000 who had registered as electors. There is no accurate estimate of the number of Moslems eligible to vote, but there seems general agreement that, in a total population (including French settlers) of about nine or ten millions, the number, under the conditions of universal adult franchise which obtained, would have amounted to about 4,900,000. Therefore no less than approximately 60 per cent of the eligible Moslems voted. These votes were cast despite the F.L.N.'s ban on participation and establishment, ten days before the referendum, of the Algerian "Government" in Cairo. Consequently one may doubt the claim of the F.L.N. to represent the wishes of Moslem Algerians; in fact, the size of the Moslem vote would seem to indicate that a majority of Moslems have had enough of the violence and political, economic and social dislocation caused by the F.L.N.

At the same time, the fact that 40 per cent of eligible Moslems (totalling 1,900,000) did not vote indicates some support for the F.L.N. Almost half of those who did not vote had registered as electors. The causes for their failure to vote were varied. It may not be true therefore to say that all the 40 per cent which abstained favoured the F.L.N. Nevertheless as a rough estimate it can probably be said that the F.L.N. may speak for up to 40 per cent of Moslem Algerians (representing about 36 per cent of the Algerian population).

The lines of de Gaulle's immediate policy are now emerging. In the economic and social spheres, he announced on 5th October an ambitious five-year plan. This aims at -

/(a) raising wage

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(a) raising wages and salaries to a level "comparable" with that of France;

(b) providing schooling for two-thirds of all Algerian children (the remaining one-third to be provided for during the ensuing three years);

(c) ensuring that ten per cent of recruits to the French administration, magistrature, armed forces, teaching professions and public services should be non-European Algerians;

(d) distributing 250,000 hectares of new land to Moslem farmers; and

(e) completing the "first phase" of a plan for agricultural and industrial development involving the -

(i) distribution of Algerian oil and gas;

(ii) construction of metallurgical and chemical industries;

(iii) construction of housing for one million people;

(iv) development of hospitals, roads, ports and communications; and

(v) provision of employment for 400,000 new workers.

The plan is so extensive that it is clear that it could only be executed in all aspects through considerable austerity at home in France.

In the military sphere, de Gaulle, while offering to "treat with honour" rebels who surrendered, is reported to have ordered the extension of Army operations into mountainous rebel areas formerly considered to be unassailable.

In the political sphere he has boldly broken the power of the Committees of Public Safety and confined the Army to its own proper functions. In instructions sent to General Salan, French Delegate-General and Commander-in-Chief in Algeria, on 9th October and published on 14th October, he ordered the General to see that members of the armed forces withdraw forthwith from "any organization of a political nature". Most members of the Army welcomed these clear-cut instructions and the opportunity they provided to disengage themselves from their uneasy association with the French settlers. They withdrew from the Committees immediately.

In protest against de Gaulle's instructions and proposed electoral arrangements, the French civilian members of the Committee of Public Safety in Algiers called for a general strike on 16th October. General Salan banned the strike, and it did not eventuate. The power of the Committees and of the French settlers composing them collapsed.

In the same instruction to General Salan, de Gaulle told the General to ensure that complete freedom of nomination and speech (even concerning the future status of Algeria) was maintained in Algeria for the elections to the French Chamber of Deputies on 28th, 29th and 30th November. He stated that only military personnel, civil servants and criminals were to be denied the right of nomination as candidates. Out of the 66 Deputies to be elected from Algeria, 45 will be Moslems. De Gaulle declared that the objective was that a "new Algerian elite" should freely emerge in the elections. The success of this, of course, will depend on the extent to which the Army carries out his instructions in spirit as well as in letter.

/De Gaulle has

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De Gaulle has let it be known that he hopes that among this elite will be a number who enjoy at least the tacit support of the F.L.N. He no doubt hopes that with this group he will be able to negotiate a settlement or at least a modus vivendi. Even he probably does not yet know the outlines of such a settlement. It is clear, however, that he will not aim at integration as demanded by the French settlers, but will nevertheless seek some form of continued close association.

By the very fact of establishing a "Government" in Cairo, and of rejecting on 25th October de Gaulle's offer of cease-fire talks in Paris, the F.L.N. "Government" leaders have probably placed themselves out of court in so far as negotiating an Algerian settlement is concerned. Their future prospects do not look bright, provided de Gaulle can maintain some momentum.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London

File No. 25/2/11 E.
Date 10. 11. 58.

ALGERIA ELECTION TANGLE

MUSLIM ÉLITE STILL HOLDING BACK

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, Nov. 9

This evening, within a few hours of the time limit for election nominations in Algeria, there was still no real sign that a representative selection of the Muslim *élite*, such as General de Gaulle has publicly declared he wishes to see returned to Parliament, is offering to stand.

So far about 18 lists have been registered, most of them containing Muslims, and some including Muslim women; but nearly all seem to be either members of official French services or retired Civil servants. No openly "liberal" list has yet appeared, and most if not all the known lists have been put forward at the instigation of the committees of public safety and under the sign of "integration."

Judging from Algiers dispatches, it is no easier there than here to disentangle the situation. General de Gaulle's secretary-general for Algerian affairs, who is returning from Algeria to-night, has evidently been trying to encourage and facilitate the emergence of electoral lists with objectives that would not be entirely synonymous with the Europeans' interests. M. de Serigny, of the *Echo d'Alger*, refers in disparaging terms in that paper to "the entourage of General de Gaulle," which, he claims, is "aiming at breaking Algerian unity."

CANDIDATES' COMPLAINTS

Something of the temperature may be judged from the explanation given by the mayor of Philippeville for withdrawing his candidature: "The traditional moneyed powers continue to impose their law," he says, making it difficult for the Muslim élite to take part in the election as General de Gaulle desires.

M. Fonlupt-Esperaber, a liberal-minded European who was going to stand in the Sahara constituency, also has abandoned the attempt, explaining in a telegram to General de Gaulle that "sincere and free elections" are impossible at the moment and that neither Muslims nor liberal Europeans will stand in conditions which "are as lacking in freedom as before June, 1958" (the date of the General's return to power). The left-wing Gaullist movement, to which M. Fonlupt-Esperaber belongs, has asked General de Gaulle to postpone the election.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No: 25/2/1E
Date: 8.11.58.

ALGERIA CANDIDATES EDGE FORWARD

LAST-MINUTE EFFORTS

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, Nov. 7

Election candidates have at last begun to register in Algeria, two days before nominations close. Two lists were registered last night, at Oran and Blida, and two others to-day, at Orleansville and in the Oran country constituency. These four lists are all in favour of integration and *Algérie Française* and comprise in all nine Muslim and five European candidates.

Under the electoral system for Algeria each constituency has three or four seats, of which two-thirds, on average, are reserved for Muslims. Each list in each constituency must therefore comprise both Muslim and European names.

The list in Oran city is headed by the mayor, M. Fouques-Duparc, and backed by M. Soustelle's party, the Union for the New Republic. The Oran country list is headed by Dr. Sid Cara, the best known Muslim integrationist, and president of the Algeria-Sahara public safety committee. Other nominations are expected.

NO NATIONALISTS

There is still no sign of middle-of-the-road Muslim candidates, let alone nationalists. European liberals who were hoping to find Muslims to form lists with them against the integrationists are now reported to have abandoned the attempt. This is certainly true of M. Chevallier, the former mayor of Algiers, and M. Savary, an extreme Socialist, who says he does not think it is possible to hold free elections without a cease-fire. Rumours persist, however, that M. Chevallier and M. Abderrahmane Farès, a moderate nationalist, are planning to announce a list at the last moment in the Blida district.

Officials in Paris still refuse to regard the battle for a genuine election campaign as lost. They say that the reports made to General de Gaulle from Algiers by M. Brouillet, the Secretary of State, are not entirely pessimistic. Efforts to persuade Muslims to come forward are continuing, and General Salan has announced over Algiers radio that the Army will ensure liberty of expression for candidates of all tendencies. This weekend will clearly mark one of the most crucial periods in Algerian history.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

25/2/11

File No. 201/2/5/1 4th November, 1958.

Memo No. 839

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
13 NOV 1958
COPY

ALGERIA.

I enclose a useful summary of the Algerian war by B.J. Cutler, Paris correspondent of the "New York Herald Tribune". Although he has only recently arrived in Paris from Moscow, Mr. Cutler is rapidly getting a grip on the French political situation.

AMBASSADOR.

E-retain
(orig on 167/1/pt)

What is possibly worse, the war has divided Frenchmen. One part

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"Herald Tribune" 3/11/58

AUSTRALIAN ... PARIS

Algeria War Four Years Old

By B. J. Cutler

On Nov. 1, 1954, before dawn on All-Saints Day, bands of Moslem nationalists slipped down from the rugged Aures Mountains of eastern Algeria to murder European settlers and pillage their farms.

It was an event France and the world took little notice of. The normal colonial measures were taken. Troops were moved in, repressions followed. No one then thought that Nov. 1, 1954, marked the start of perhaps France's greatest disaster since World War II.

Loans and Inflation

By the following August, when 70 Europeans were massacred near Philippeville, France began to realize it was involved not in a police action but in a war for independence. It became a cancerous war; when the rebels were checked by military surgery in one place they grew the death cells of guerrilla warfare in others.

The cost of fighting the rebel National Liberation Front (FLN) has been incalculable. In money it has amounted to well over $4,000,000,000, more than the cost of the Indochina war, which lasted twice as long.

It has turned France, fundamentally a rich and capable nation, into an international pauper soliciting loans in Washington, delaying repayments, postponing settlement with its trade partners and checking industrial modernization and social improvements.

Moreover, no French government has dared to meet the cost of the war in its budget. Deficits were met by printing money. The resulting inflation hit hardest at the working class and postponed the day when the Communist party would lose its hold on one-fourth of the nation.

Algeria brought even more comfort to the Soviet Union. France's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization see a capable army of 500,000 tied down in North Africa, thus weakening the common defense of Western Europe.

Loss of Life

In men, the war has cost both sides heavily. France has lost 7,200 soldiers while killing 77,000 rebel troops. The FLN has murdered 1,500 European civilians and massacred 10,000 Moslems who failed to give it support.

Like all guerrilla actions, it has been a dirty war. No one denies there have been unspeakable atrocities on both sides. France is basically a democratic and liberal state. Not so long ago it suffered the Nazi occupation, and now it has a bad conscience over what its forces have had to do in Algeria.

What is possibly worse, the war has divided Frenchmen. One part of France's politicians hates another. Those who have suggested negotiations with the rebels have been reviled as traitors and betrayers of "French Algeria," as those who would sell out a brave army to cutthroats and assassins.

Fall of 4th Republic

This feeling has both poisoned and paralyzed political life. The governments of Guy Mollet, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Félix Gaillard, Pierre Pflimlin—the post-war Fourth Republic itself—crumbled on suspicion of "softness" toward the rebels.

Each time a government fell, causing chaos, economic stagnation and disgust with Parliamentary democracy, the risk grew of a military coup and of a Right-wing authoritarian regime alien to French tradition.

Despite the grim march of events, France is sustained on the fourth anniversary of the Algerian war by what was lacking on previous anniversaries: hope for the future.

This hope is focused on the towering figure of France's symbol of war-time resistance. Premier Charles de Gaulle is older and wiser than when he tried to govern France more than a decade ago. He is far more politically adroit and no less determined to restore France's unity and greatness.

Brought to power by the May 13 insurrection in Algeria of Rightist settlers and the army, both fearing a Paris sell-out to the rebels, Gen. de Gaulle in effect has been elected not Premier but temporary king of France with full power to remake the state and settle the Algerian war.

His performance in office has given the lie to Communist charges that he was a Fascist and dictator. With astute timing, he restored a key prerequisite of a democratic state: civilian control over the army.

With a liberalism which first confounded and then won over his democratic opponents, he ordered the army out of Algerian politics, thus crippling the extremist settlers who would block any settlement. He decreed free and honest elections, the first in the territory's history. Banning only Communists and terrorists, he opened the road of election to France's Parliament of even those Algerians who stand for independence.

Finally, he dramatically invited the FLN on Oct. 23 to send its leaders to Paris under his pledge of safe conduct to negotiate a "peace of the brave," an end to the four years of bloodletting.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York. Date 2-11-58

ALGERIAN REBELS MAKE 'LAST' PLEA

Bid Paris Negotiate or Face War in Which Aid Would Be Sought Anywhere

By MICHAEL JAMES

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 31—The Algerian provisional government issued today what was called a "last" appeal to France: Begin negotiations for peace or face a war in which the insurgents will try to get help from any outside source.

The demand came in a statement issued here by M'hammed Yazid, Minister of Information of the rebel provisional government. The statement marked the start of the fifth year of the Algerian revolt against the French.

The statement made an "ultimate appeal" to the people of France and their Government to accept "direct negotiations with the provisional government of the Algerian Republic, negotiations in a neutral country, for a settlement of the Algerian problem in its entirety."

Invitation by de Gaulle

Premier Charles de Gaulle had invited the rebels to go to Paris to discuss a cease-fire. He had told them to present themselves "under the white flag."

The insurgents, who do not feel that they should surrender, turned down General de Gaulle's tenor of offer curtly. They have repeatedly offered, however, to hold talks on neutral ground, but only if those talks cover the whole Algerian problem, not just a cease-fire.

Mr. Yazid's statement said that the French people "must recognize that they face the total impossibility of bringing a military solution to the conflict."

"One cannot defeat an army such as the Army of National Liberation, because this army is

Continued on Page 2, Column 2

to the French National Assembly. The move was interpreted as another part of his effort to promote an atmosphere of reconciliation and political freedom.

Since his return to power on June 1, General de Gaulle has liberated 15,000 of those held in camps in various parts of Algeria on suspicion of complicity with the rebel National Liberation Front.

The number still in camps has been placed as high as 100,000 by rebel sources. French officials decline to discuss the number detained but imply that the rebel estimate is exaggerated.

In orders to the army and electoral control commission, General de Gaulle has specified that all tendencies of opinion in

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One Liberal Defies Trend

Only one liberal European thus far has decided to buck this trend. This is Alain Savary, who recently quit the Socialist party to join a dissident Socialist movement that does favor concessions in Algeria.

Long known as an anti-colonialist, M. Savary, who was born in Algiers forty years ago, resigned as Secretary of State for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs in the Government of Guy Mollet in October, 1956, after four rebel leaders were arrested when their plane, flying from Rabat to Tunis, was forced down in Algiers.

M. Savary asked this week in L'Express whether he would be able to form a list with Moslems who have been imprisoned merely because they were suspected of being nationalists and who like himself rejected both

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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Name of ... Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published ... Date 2-11-58

PAYMENT DELAYED ON U.N. SUEZ LOAN

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5

...in a 'Last' Plea; Threaten to Seek Help Anywhere

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

the people," he said.

"The Algerians never surrendered in the face of the enemy when they fought in defense of France and democracy. General de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French, knows this better than anyone, and this makes his offer of unconditional surrender an even greater insult."

The French have about 500,000 troops in Algeria. From time to time they announce that they are winning over the rebels, but the war goes on.

The Algerian Army, however, is severely limited in its capabilities by a lack of artillery and anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. The rebel army does not have any Communist weapons, and until the present has not asked for any for fear of political consequences.

Today, however, the Algerians warned against a prolongation of the war. It would, Mr. Yazid's statement said, "have direct repercussions beyond our frontiers."

"The principal concern of the provisional government will then be to provide the Algerian people and their army with all the material means necessary for the pursuit of the war," the statement read.

"Such material means the Algerian Government will then take wherever they are to be found, without geographical or ideological limitations."

Mr. Yazid later stoutly insisted that the threat was not blackmail but simply a hard and unpleasant military reality: the Algerians would have to shift their war program from one of attrition against the French Army to one of open war against it and would need new arms and skills.

The Algerian spokesman insisted, however, that the main tenor of his government's stand was one of a search for what he called "peace with dignity—dignity excludes hatred but demands respect."

More Algerians Freed

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Oct. 31 — Premier Charles de Gaulle ordered today the release of 1,000 Algerians held in administrative detention in camps in Algeria.

General de Gaulle acted on the eve of the opening of the campaign for the election of sixty-seven Algerian Deputies to the French National Assembly. The move was interpreted as another part of his effort to promote an atmosphere of reconciliation and political freedom.

Since his return to power on June 1, General de Gaulle has liberated 15,000 of those held in camps in various parts of Algeria on suspicion of complicity with the rebel National Liberation Front.

The number still in camps has been placed as high as 100,000 by rebel sources. French officials decline to discuss the number detained but imply that the rebel estimate is exaggerated.

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lotted to the twelve Algerian departments. Four seats will be filled in the two Sahara departments of Oasis and Saoura.

Of the sixty-seven Algerian seats twenty-one are to be filled by Europeans and forty-six by Moslems, a drastic change from the past when the heavily outnumbered Europeans had the same number of seats as the Moslems.

Most of the political interest will center on what Moslems come forth as candidates since the degree to which they represent the Algerian people will determine to a large extent the success or failure of any political plan that is put into effect in Algeria.

Whereas there are many takers for the twenty-one European seats, reports reaching here indicate little haste among Moslems to declare themselves in the race.

The problem for the French Government is not to find enough Moslems to fill the forty-six seats but to find Moslems who command a following and respect among the Algerian masses and who consequently could discuss a statute in Paris and get it accepted at home.

Little Choice Is Seen

Although there is some competition among Europeans, the voters in Algeria will find little to choose among the basic programs presented.

The political complexion of the European candidates is one-sidedly Rightist and their program for Algeria is one that bars concessions to the Moslem nationalists, proclaims Algeria to be 100 per cent French and demands its full integration with France.

The biggest fight among the Europeans is the rejection by some persons of the old-line political parties and their desire to get "new" men into the race.

In constituting the lists, the conservative Committees of Public Safety, which assumed great power in Algeria after the uprising of May 13, are playing an important role. Despite the rebuffs to them by Premier Charles de Gaulle and the withdrawal of army officers on the Premier's orders, the committees are making their weight felt.

Thus the ultra-conservative editor of the Echo d'Alger, Alain de Serigny, who declared his candidacy in Algiers, told the over-all Algeria committee that he would withdraw if it wished to present someone else.

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Continued

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The number still in camps has been placed as high as 100,000 by rebel sources. French officials decline to discuss the number detained but imply that the rebel estimate is exaggerated.

In orders to the army and electoral control commission, General de Gaulle has specified that all tendencies of opinion in Algeria must have freedom to campaign. The liberated men will be free to seek election or campaign for others.

Even nationalists detained in the camps could be elected to Parliament if no formal charges were outstanding against them.

Algerian Lists Open

Algeria has just begun a revival of political life that is expected to have a strong influence on that area's political future.

The lists opened today and will close a week from tomorrow for candidates for the sixty-seven Assembly seats allotted in the two Sahara departments of Oasis and Saoura.

Of the sixty-seven Algerian seats twenty-one are to be filled by Europeans and forty-six by Moslems, a drastic change from the past when the heavily outnumbered Europeans had the same number of seats as the Moslems.

Most of the political interest will center on what Moslems come forth as candidates since the degree to which they represent the Algerian people will determine to a large extent the success or failure of any political plan that is put into effect in Algeria.

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M. Savary asked this week in L'Express whether he would be able to form a list with Moslems who have been imprisoned merely because they were suspected of being nationalists and who like himself rejected both integration and independence.

Despite reports of pressure on him to desist, M. Savary said he was a candidate because he wished to help end the Algerian conflict through free elections. He indicated doubts that the elections would be free and said it would have been preferable to delay them.

Another well-known liberal, Jacques Chevallier, former Mayor of Algiers, has given up his effort to be a candidate, unable to form a list. A few Socialist lists have been formed, but they are said to be weak and without a following.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper New York Times weekly Review File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York. Date 2. 11. 58

ALGERIAN REBELS DEAL BLOW TO PEACE HOPES

But de Gaulle Is Still Optimistic That Settlement Can Be Reached

By ROBERT C. DOTY

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Nov. 1—Chances for a quickly negotiated end to the four-year-old war in Algeria vanished with the rebel refusal last week of cease-fire talks. But Premier Charles de Gaulle is reported to be less pessimistic than most of his countrymen over the long-range prospects.

De Gaulle's hopes for an end to the long Algerian ordeal appear now to be rooted in the cumulative effects of a series of national, local and regional elections that will take place over the next six months. He counts on these to reawaken political life and to give an outline to the Algerian "personality" he has evoked, with which France can deal for a rational solution.

He is undeviating in his belief that such a solution can only be one reconciling the irreversible mid-twentieth century urge of colonial peoples to escape from humiliating foreign tutelage with the obvious practical need for close association between France and Algeria, based on economic and strategic facts.

No new gesture is to be expected from France. De Gaulle, according to close associates, feels that the ball is on the rebel side of the net. He will not meet them on neutral ground to discuss political settlements with them—the only counter-proposal received from the rebel provisional government at Cairo in reply to his offer of talks in Paris for a ceasefire alone.

These same associates deny that new discreet contacts between the Government and the popular choice can be smuggled into the new National Assembly past the watchful and suspicious eyes of the right-wing ultra-colonialist settlers. With these, it is hoped, a start can be made toward definition of the future political status of Algeria.

A second consequence of the rebel refusal is that it risks taking the issue of war and peace in Algeria out of de Gaulle's hands and throwing it back into the French political arena.

Parliamentary Rein

De Gaulle's present extensive powers will be sharply curtailed when the new Parliament convenes early in December. Even though the Constitution of the Fifth Republic extends his decree powers into early 1959, once there is a Parliament in existence he must begin to take account of its views.

Once de Gaulle has been installed in the Presidency of the Republic, probably early in January, he will have to work almost exclusively through his Premier and Cabinet. They, in turn, must conciliate the parliamentary majority.

The rebel leaders must be no less aware than de Gaulle that the time for a quick, honorable peace, uncomplicated by all the political conflicts that have snarled the problem for the last four years, is running out. They must also be aware that their propaganda position has taken a sharp turn for the worse. The sympathies they once enjoyed, avowed or tacit, in liberal Western circles are now being transferred to de Gaulle and France as the proponents of peace on reasonable terms.

Admittedly their choice is a difficult one. They can continue indefinitely, but clearly cannot win, the campaign of guerrilla attack and furtive terror. But the possibility of a French capitulation through governmental impotence or exhaustion disappeared with the return of de Gaulle to power. Capitulations are not in his style.

On the other hand, acceptance of a ceasefire would commit the F. L. N. irrevocably to an unknown future course for Algeria to be plotted by the elections. It would involve renunciation of the one asset of the rebellion—a force in being. Cut off from normal intercourse with the population for nearly four years, the rebel leaders have no ready-made political and social program to present in a bid for support at the polls. Once the military momentum of the rebellion had been arrested by a cease-fire it would be all but impossible to get rolling

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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These same associates deny that new discreet contacts between the Government and the rebels are under way. This is not probative. They entered similar denials at a time when Abderrahman Fares, moderate Moslem leader, and Jean Amrouche, respected Moslem writer, were acting as intermediaries between the Government and the rebels to pave the way for de Gaulle's offer of peace talks. M. Fares is reported again to be in touch with the rebels.

But for those with less patience and confidence than de Gaulle it appears that a uniquely propitious moment for ending the war on the best terms for all concerned has passed.

The forty-six Moslem deputies to be elected in Algeria on Nov. 28, 29 and 30 will play a major role in any future discussions of political settlements there. It is important in de Gaulle's calculations that some of them, at least, should be truly representative of all shades of Moslem opinion. Obviously a peaceful election would have favored this objective.

Now, because of the rejection of his ceasefire offer and barring a last minute miracle, those elections will be held under wartime conditions.

Bullets and Ballots

This means that fewer truly representative Moslems will consent to run. It means that those Moslems of real stature who do present themselves will see their right to campaign frankly and freely for any measure of Algerian autonomy gravely compromised by the fact that the rebels still are supporting similar arguments with bullets and bombs.

Finally even if such Moslems should run and campaign in defiance of these difficulties, their hopes for election will be slim indeed. Under wartime conditions the Moslem voter, terrorized by conflicting pressures, may be pardoned for voting the way he thinks the French Army and Europeans of Algeria would want him to vote.

Despite these prospects, de Gaulle and his entourage continue to express confidence that at least a handful—perhaps only two or three—Moslem deputies representing the real

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Local Leaders

The decisive voice against peace is reported to have been that of leaders of the Army of National Liberation. They reported that the men fighting in the hills would regard a ceasefire without a political settlement as a betrayal.

De Gaulle put no time limit on his offer. Conceivably the combination of increased pressure from world opinion and a new demonstration of the appeal of de Gaulle's name to Moslem voters in the November elections might lead the rebel leaders to reconsider their refusal to talk. In such an event, it is unlikely that de Gaulle would deny them whatever face-saving gestures they might seek within the limits he has set.

Otherwise, the future seems to offer only a gradual erosion of the rebel will to resist under stepped up French military action and an equally gradual evolution of the political situation as the Algerians acquire again the habit of elections under the muzzles of the guns of both sides.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 2511 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No: 25/2/4E

Published at: London Date: 1. 11. 58.

1,000 ALGERIANS TO BE RELEASED

ELECTION GESTURE

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, OCT. 31

A statement from the Hotel Matignon this evening announces that General de Gaulle has decided to release 1,000 people from the internment camps in Algeria. The number in these camps, in which Muslim suspects are interned, has never been revealed, though some people believe it to be about 6,000, or more.

For a long time liberals in France have been urging the release of some of these internees, who are not judged terrorists, and who may well contain some of the elements of that Muslim "third force" which will perhaps provide the key to true Muslim representation. The General's decision this evening may be regarded as part of his effort to ensure that Muslim representation in the new Parliament will not be confined to known pro-French candidates. It is certainly another example of his liberal approach to the Algerian dilemma.

NO "WHITE FLAG"

Ferhat Abbas, Prime Minister of the "Algerian provisional Government," said in a speech reported by Cairo radio last night that his Government was still prepared to negotiate to stop the bloodshed in Algeria, but negotiation was not a surrender or a plea for mercy. The Algerian Ministers will not go to Paris with ropes round their necks. No illusion should be entertained on this score. Our army is not prepared to hoist the white flag and accept defeat."—*Reuter.*

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Economist File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 1 - 11 - 58.

A Muffed Chance

The atmosphere in Algeria has changed since the dark days of May

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S olive branch has been rejected. It was a prickly one, but not prickly enough to explain or excuse the Algerian rebels' refusal. They seem to have blundered. At his press conference on October 23rd the general offered them immediate talks on a cease-fire and, beyond that, a political future based on French recognition of Algerian identity and Algeria's close ties both with France and with Morocco and Tunisia, its North African neighbours. The French terms were not new, but the offer to talk was ; and after the general's plebiscite the terms could at last be honoured. Underlying them was his own expectation, frequently expressed, of a new atmosphere in Algeria and, with it, the beginning of the political change that, in his words at Constantine early in October, must "little by little make itself evident."

This peaceful evolution of Algeria was the substance of General de Gaulle's offer. The leaders of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Cairo seem to have been unable to grasp it. Their blank reply—there has been as yet no public attempt to bridge the gap—concentrated dully on the form. This, it is true, was not overly encouraging. The general summoned the FLN representatives to attendance in Paris ; he did not

Gaulle and the rebels—the attitude of M. Ferhat Abbas and certain of his colleagues appears to have been more conciliatory. Although it cannot be excluded that General de Gaulle may have framed his actual offer in a way to force the rebels' hand, the surprise and disappointment in Paris when it was learned that the FLN delegates were not coming seem to have been entirely genuine. It looks very like a muffed chance.

SHOULD the general share the blame ? It remains to be seen whether his offer was his last word in practical politics, or whether, in essence, it was an attempt to push the FLN to the wall. He would certainly not be unaware of the offer's diplomatic effect, particularly at the United Nations ; nor of its political repercussions at home. He has already won a sizable political success without the rebels' acceptance. President Bourguiba of Tunisia came close to approving the offer in public before the rejection was announced from Cairo ; he is probably already committed in Moslem eyes. M. Mendès-France and other opposition liberals commended the offer ; criticism of the general's present Algerian policy in the electoral campaign may now be confined to the communists. And this has been done while *ultras* like MM. Morice and Duchet in France and M. de Sérigny in Algiers itself have contentedly reflected that, if the rebels have to show the white flag, it is total surrender that is really being asked of them.

Nevertheless, the general's purpose seems clear. He has said all along, and he repeated it last week, that he intends to discuss Algeria's future with the true representatives of the Algerian people. These are not the settlers' friends, like Dr Sid Cara ; but neither, as the referendum showed, are they the FLN and no one else. The least invalid way of determining Algerian opinion is by the elections that are to be held on November

out France and popular expectation in Algeria itself. If there is to be a settlement in the foreseeable future, it will have to be with him. The general has firmly dismissed both integration as the settlers conceived it, and independence as the rebels have demanded it, as answers to Algeria's troubles. The FLN cannot hope to gain an outright victory either militarily or psychologically. But neither can the French army hope to stamp out the armed rebellion that has persisted since 1954. The Moslem population has now been promised a new status and a growing responsibility for running its own affairs. At the same time, the *ultras* among the colonists have been brought to heel ; the army has been made to feel a new discipline from Paris ; the dissatisfied colonels in search of a victory secured one when they brought General de Gaulle to power and another when they organised the successful referendum in September. The hopeful evolution of Algeria is already under way.

But fresh setbacks cannot be anything but dangerous. The breakdown in the slow progress towards a truce has already discouraged liberal expectations in France. It may revive latent army ambitions. Its effect on the general's own policy could be serious. For M. Bourguiba the prospect of the war continuing across his borders, and of FLN troops under Cairo's influence within them, is precarious in the extreme. Is it too late to pick up the threads again ? Some of them seem sufficiently obvious. One of General de Gaulle's proposals was that the rebels should knock on the doors of the French embassies in Rabat and Tunis. Would it be too undignified for either side to have the main talks there ? And would it be a pointless mission if Rabat and Tunis were to knock on the general's own door in Paris ? The hopes that rest in General de Gaulle require of him that this shall not be his last word for peace in Algeria.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.
Name of Paper The Economist File No 25/2/11 E.
Published at London Date 1-11-58.

envisage political discussions ; and he insisted on the rebels in the field showing the white flag and laying down their arms. The FLN, through M. Yazid, its representative in New York, had previously spoken of a meeting on neutral territory ; it wanted the talks to be political as well as military ; and its soldiers could not easily contemplate the stigma of surrender. Even so, the rejection was clumsy. Only if it presages some subtle oriental bargaining can it be reasonably understood: but is General de Gaulle the man for such tactics ?

The cardinal point that the rebels stood to gain by acceptance was the prospect of negotiation itself. Once talks had begun on the general's agenda, the division between military and political affairs must have become as indeterminate as it has always been. Did the FLN not recall how Moroccan independence came from the Aix-les-Bains conference in 1955 ? They cannot have expected as much ; but do they need to ask as much just now ? In the unofficial discussions in Cairo—in which M. Farès, the former president of the Algerian Assembly, was the intermediary between General de Gaulle and the rebels—the attitude of M. Ferhat Abbas and certain of his colleagues appears to have been more conciliatory. Although it cannot be excluded that General de Gaulle may have framed his actual offer in a way to force the rebels' hand, the surprise and disappointment in Paris when it was learned that the FLN delegates were not coming seem to have been entirely genuine. It looks very like a muffed chance.

SHOULD the general share the blame ? It remains to be seen whether his offer was his last word in practical politics, or whether, in essence, it was an attempt to push the FLN to the wall. He would certainly not be unaware of the offer's diplomatic effect, particularly at the United Nations ; nor of its political repercussions at home. He has already won a sizable political success without the rebels' acceptance. President Bourguiba of Tunisia came close to approving the offer in public before the rejection was announced from Cairo ; he is probably already committed in Moslem eyes. M. Mendès-France and other opposition liberals commended the offer ; criticism of the general's present Algerian policy in the electoral campaign may now be confined to the communists. And this has been done while *ultras* like MM. Morice and Duchet in France and M. de Sérigny in Algiers itself have contentedly reflected that, if the rebels have to show the white flag, it is total surrender that is really being asked of them.

Nevertheless, the general's purpose seems clear. He has said all along, and he repeated it last week, that he intends to discuss Algeria's future with the true representatives of the Algerian people. These are not the settlers' friends, like Dr Sid Cara ; but neither, as the referendum showed, are they the FLN and no one else. The least invalid way of determining Algerian opinion is by the elections that are to be held on November 30th. General de Gaulle has already acted to reduce army influence and interference in the vote. But, even so, the representatives likely to be produced cannot have the same authority and respect—in France or Algeria—as those delegated by an election in which the FLN had joined. The general's plans could probably go ahead, in some form, if the FLN remains utterly opposed to recognising what it calls French elections in Algeria. But if some candidates could have had the open, or even the tacit, approval of the rebels, years might well have been saved in working out a final political solution. This prospect now looks like being snatched away.

YET the circumstances that first produced the buzz of activity and hope remain unaffected, so far. The FLN may have blundered temporarily through its own political inexperience or through bad advice from its mentors in Cairo. Yet it must ultimately come to recognise that the situation has changed since the ominous days of May and June. General de Gaulle is firmly in office with massive popular support throughout France and popular expectation in Algeria itself. If there is to be a settlement in the foreseeable future, it will have to be with him. The general has firmly dismissed both integration as the settlers conceived it, and independence as the rebels have demanded it, as answers to Algeria's troubles. The FLN cannot hope to gain an outright victory either militarily or psychologically. But neither can the French army hope to stamp out the armed rebellion that has persisted since 1954. The Moslem population has now been promised a new status and a growing responsibility for running its own affairs. At the same time, the *ultras* among the colonists have been brought to heel ; the army has been made to feel a new discipline from Paris ; the dissatisfied colonels in search of a victory secured one when they brought General de Gaulle to power and another when they organised the successful referendum in September. The hopeful evolution of Algeria is already under way.

But fresh setbacks cannot be anything but dangerous. The breakdown in the slow progress towards a truce has already discouraged liberal expectations in France. It may revive latent army ambitions. Its effect on the general's own policy could be serious. For M. Bourguiba the prospect of the war continuing across his borders, and of FLN troops under Cairo's influence within them, is precarious in the extreme. Is it too late to pick up the threads again ? Some of them seem sufficiently obvious. One of General de Gaulle's proposals was that the rebels should knock on the doors of the French embassies in Rabat and Tunis. Would it be too undignified for either side to have the main talks there ? And would it be a pointless mission if Rabat and Tunis were to knock on the general's own door in Paris ? The hopes that rest in General de Gaulle require of him that this shall not be his last word for peace in Algeria.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper Foreign Report File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 30. 10. 58

Confidential

Published by The Economist Newspaper Limited,
22, Ryder Street,
St. James's, London, S.W.1.

October 30th, 1958.

Foreign Report

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The General's Miscalculation

Something has evidently gone wrong with General de Gaulle's plan for a cease-fire in Algeria before the general elections there and in France towards the end of November. Although the full facts are not known, it is possible to present a reasonably full picture of what has happened. All the information reaching us this week confirms that General de Gaulle's plan was approximately that outlined by M. François Mitterrand (see last week's FOREIGN REPORT):

1. Cease-fire talks in Paris.
2. Elections enabling the return of Algerian Moslem nationalist deputies *with the rebels' approval.*
3. Political negotiations about the future of Algeria, using the nationalist deputies as intermediaries between the French and the rebels (FLN).

The plan apparently broke down as a result of the following sequence of events:

(i) The General wrote two letters to Mr. Ferhat Abbas, the rebel leader and "prime minister of the provisional government of the Algerian republic." The contents of these letters are not known, but the first probably outlined the plan mentioned above. The latter is believed to have been taken to Cairo by M. Farès, former president of the Algerian assembly. M. Farès turned down a post in General de Gaulle's first cabinet; his paradoxical advantage as a go-between is that he is suspect both to the FLN as pro-French and to the French as pro-FLN.

(ii) Mr. Abbas replied to the first letter, probably accepting but laying down certain political conditions. We have reason to believe that the FLN leader named

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the delegates his " government " would be sending to the talks: Ferhat Abbas h... Mr. Krim Belkacem (defence minister) and Dr. Amine Debaghine (foreign minist... At that stage already the main political condition laid down by the FLN was probably that the talks should be on a government-to-government basis, and on neutral soil.

(iii) The General's second letter was a reply to Mr. Abbas's own answer to his first letter. There has been no further reply from Mr. Abbas.

(iv) While the FLN still seemed to be pondering their reply the General called his press conference on October 23rd. His public invitation to the FLN to come to Paris, and his offer of safe conduct, were probably designed to force the rebels' hand (in much the same way as his announcement last May that he had started the " regular process " of forming a government was designed to force M. Pflimlin to resign).

(v) At this stage, one of two things happened. Either: (*a*) the FLN panicked, fearing that they would be outwitted by de Gaulle; or (*b*) the Cairo wing—principally Debaghine and Yazid—got the upper hand with its argument that no negotiations with the French were worth while unless they concerned Algeria's political future. Whatever the reason, the FLN then made public the conditions mentioned in (ii) above.

There is busy speculation in Paris about the meaning of these events and their effect on the Algerian situation. Thus:

1. *The liberal Gaullists* are gloomy. They feel that: (*a*) the General cannot possibly treat with the Algerian " government " as such; and (*b*) therefore the advocates of a war to the finish will be strengthened. One remark heard in the past few days in the General's *entourage* was that " de Gaulle will be hurt to have been treated like any Bourgès-Maunoury "—and, by implication, would drop the idea of a political solution.
2. *Right-wing Gaullists* are overjoyed, for the same reasons.
3. " *Europeans* " are gloomy. They are convinced that General de Gaulle intended to spend less on Algeria the more independent it became, leaving France better able to play its part in the common market.

CHANCE TO BE " BOURGUIBIST "

It seems clear that General de Gaulle, though he wanted the talks to be unconditional at the outset, in fact wished to give the FLN a chance to be " political " in the Bourguibist sense: that is, to learn the advantages of gaining points through negotiations rather than by throwing bombs. This indeed is the course President Bourguiba of Tunisia has been trying to persuade the FLN to adopt for the past couple of years. But the FLN has remained deeply apprehensive of being outwitted at the conference table. In addition, having made the cardinal error of proclaiming a government (the same error as made by the Indonesian rebels), the Algerian rebels feel in logic bound to negotiate *as* a government.

It seems unlikely that General de Gaulle, despite the apprehensions of his liberal supporters, will lightly abandon his attempt to end the war by negotiation. On the other hand:

1. From the standpoint of his original plan, the timing was clearly important: a cease-fire before the elections would: (*a*) make it

difficult for the ar... Moslem nationalis... FLN reprisals. If t... as candidates.

2. The FLN's terms ... impartial stand be... game is hard to play ... to them.

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CONFIDENTIAL

EPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Foreign Report
London

File No. 25/2/11 E.
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difficult for the army and the ultras to prevent the election of Algerian Moslem nationalists; and (*b*) relieve potential candidates of the fear of FLN reprisals. If there is no cease-fire, only yes-men may come forward as candidates.

2. The FLN's terms make it difficult for the General to maintain his impartial stand between the extremists of both sides; the political game is hard to play, if the FLN will not take the ball when it is passed to them.

Against this, it is probable that General de Gaulle while aiming at negotiations, had a reserve plan in mind: to weaken and divide the FLN. It would be weakened by the election of nationalists who could steal their thunder; and divided if these tactics persuaded the FLN moderates to quit. General de Gaulle clearly does not want yes-men to be elected; and in Algeria the referendum, if it showed nothing else, did demonstrate that it is possible for Moslems to vote without fear of reprisals (though nationalist *candidates* would be far more exposed to dangers—both from the FLN and from the French extremists in Algeria).

It now looks as though the prospect of a cease-fire will have been retarded by some months by the FLN's attitude.

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Manchester Guardian Weekly File No. 21/2/11 E.

Published at Manchester Date 23 - 10 - 58

ALGIERS CLIMB-DOWN

by our own Correspondent

PARIS.

The resistance in Algiers to General de Gaulle's orders that the Algerian elections were to be true elections and that the Army should withdraw from the Public Safety Committees collapsed at noon last Thursday when the All-Algerian Committee called off its threatened general strike and demonstration at the Algiers Forum.

Before the end the committee had been reduced to a rump of Poujadists, fascists, and student delegates. The Gaullists, led by M Delbeque, the ex-Pétainist like M de Serigny (the editor of the "Echo d'Alger"), and the Moslem members such as Dr Sid Cara, the co-president, and the two men who had been sent to Paris to plead with General de Gaulle had all resigned.

The president of the Algiers students' organisation, M. Lagaillarde (no longer a student, but a young lawyer), and M Maurice Denis, a leading member of the ex-servicemen's organisation, clung to the end to the part they had cast for themselves as nationalist revolutionaries, and called off the strike order only after General Salan had given a plain warning to a delegation from the committee that he would not tolerate the strike or demonstration.

It had already become evident that no crowd would rush up the hill again this time to the Forum, as they had done in May. Riot police and parachutists were on duty there in strength and would not have shown the passivity which allowed a crowd of schoolboys and students to occupy the Government-General five months ago.

The implicit right that the Algiers Command had exercised for the last [illegible] months at least to contest the orders it received has now finally gone by default. There will no doubt be difficulties about the enforcement of this or that order, but General de Gaulle has enforced an order which was certainly distasteful to those most directly concerned.

The irresponsible madness of the Algiers Committee has done the rest. When General Massu withdrew from it his parting words seemed to have invited the committee to carry on without him, but it soon became evident that if it is to have any surviving functions they must be without even the vestige of public responsibility.

The General's victory may well have as important effect in Metropolitan France as in Algeria. The "Figaro", commented next day: "Everything is happening as if the instructions of General de Gaulle had suddenly come to upset a carefully-prepared political plan, aimed not so much at giving Algeria a new status as at securing the election of deputies belonging to a sort of monopoly party."

The proposed 70 nominated deputies from Algeria would indeed have involved both a political tie-up for the Army, and the domination of the first Parliament of the Fifth Republic by an overwhelming nationalist majority.

Hitherto, the General's careful and often ambiguous course has left more reason for satisfaction to the Right than to the Left, since, by avoiding choices, he necessarily left things to continue on existing lines. Since his instructions to General Salan however, it is the Right-wing leaders who have had to ask their followers to be patient and await the results, while both the Left-wing Gaullists and many of those who voted "No" at the referendum have been rejoicing.

23. 10. 58.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times Weekly Review File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York Date 26. 10. 58.

de Gaulle to F. L. N.

*"To pacify Algeria, to act in such a way that it is forever body and soul with France * * * that, Frenchwomen and Frenchmen, is what we must do first of all."*

That was the goal to which Charles de Gaulle pledged himself when he returned to power last June. Since then, Premier de Gaulle has been trying to induce the Algerians to end their bloody, four-year struggle for independence from France.

Up to last week his efforts were concentrated on two fronts. Militarily the French Army stepped up its "pacification" campaign to the point where now, says de Gaulle, "the security forces slowly, slowly, control the field." On the political front de Gaulle has tried to win over the bulk of the Algerian Moslem population (Algeria has 9,000,000 Moslems, 1,000,000 Europeans). While refusing the Moslem demand for independence, de Gaulle has offered them a representative, democratic regime. In the constitutional referendum last month, de Gaulle won a victory. The rebel Front de Liberation Nationale (F. L. N.), which has set up a "government-in-exile" in Cairo, tried to induce the Moslems to boycott the referendum. The French Army put pressure on them to participate. About 80 per cent of the registered voters went to the polls and 95 per cent of these voted for the Constitution—a reflection of both Army pressure and the hope that de Gaulle could bring peace.

Last week de Gaulle made a peace offer. He invited F. L. N. leaders to come to Paris under safe conduct to discuss what he called a "brave man's peace." At a news conference Thursday the Premier said:

> If delegates were designated [by the F. L. N.] to come and settle with the authority the end of hostilities, they would have only to address themselves to the French Embassy at Tunis or that at Rabat. Either one will insure their transportation to metropolitan France. * * * [They] would be received and treated honorably. * * * Their full security will be assured and I guarantee them the freedom to leave again. This peace, I repeat, may it come as soon as possible.

This was the first time France had offered publicly to negotiate directly and unconditionally with the F. L. N.

Rebels Say No

Yesterday Ferhat Abbas, head of the Algerian government in exile, rejected de Gaulle's offer but said the F. L. N. was ready to negotiate peace with the French. He proposed that the negotiations be held in a neutral country, however, instead of France.

His reply was not a surprise. French circles had predicted that the F. L. N. would not accept de Gaulle's offer unconditionally for fear of losing face, but that it would make some kind of affirmative counter-offer. Accordingly the expectation is that there will be peace talks.

What kind of settlement the talks can produce is uncertain. The F. L. N. leaders are firmly committed to full independence for Algeria. De Gaulle has made it plain that full independence is out of the question—at least for the present. But last week he left the door wide open for a political compromise. At his press conference he said:

> The political future of Algeria is in Algeria itself * * * when the citizens have the opportunity of expressing their will * * *. Legislative elections are going to take place soon. In March there will be elections for municipal councils. In April the Senatorial elections. What will follow? Myself, I say this is a matter of evolution. * * * The future solution will have as a basis * * * the courageous personality of Algeria and her close association with metropolitan France. This ensemble completed by the Sahara, will, I think sooner or later, link itself for its common interest with the free states of Morocco and Tunisia.

In Algeria, the European colonists reacted with surprise and some bitterness to de Gaulle's offer. But in France all groups from the extreme Right to the extreme Left praised the Premier. Seldom before had France accorded any leader the strength of support de Gaulle received—especially on an issue as thorny as the Algerian question.

De Gaulle's Leadership

The reaction in France was evidence of the profound change de Gaulle has wrought during the past five months. Last spring the Rightists in France and Algeria, working with the French Army,

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De Gaulle's Leadership

The reaction in France was evidence of the profound change de Gaulle has wrought during the past five months. Last spring the Rightists in France and Algeria, working with the French Army, organized an uprising against de Gaulle's predecessor, Premier Pflimlin, because of suspicion that he might negotiate with the Algerian rebels. Ironically, it was this uprising that led to de Gaulle's accession.

Since then de Gaulle has moved to assert his leadership firmly. He has forced the army out of politics, with the result that the Rightists in Algeria are virtually powerless. He demonstrated his popular support by winning 80 per cent of the French vote in the constitutional referendum. Today, as he said at his press conference, "Confidence has replaced anguish [in France]. National unity has prevented division."

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Observer London File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at Date 26.10.58.

Algerians Decline Paris Conference

French Reject Counter-Plan

From NORA BELOFF

PARIS, October 25

AFTER 48 hours of suspense, the French learnt with dismay this evening that the Algerian émigré Government in Cairo has refused General de Gaulle's invitation to come to Paris to negotiate a cease-fire.

The General immediately let it be known that he would not accept the Algerian counter-proposal for a meeting on neutral territory to examine the future of Algeria on a Government-to-Government basis.

Although M. Ferhat Abbas, Prime Minister of the émigré Government, was reliably reported to have let the French authorities know through private intermediaries that he would have welcomed direct talks with General de Gaulle, the weight of F.L.N. (the rebel organisation) opinion was against accepting what might appear to Muslim opinion as a call to surrender.

Despite the fact that the French Prime Minister had been at pains to emphasise respect for the guerilla fighters and to avoid humiliating their chiefs, his attempts have been neutralised during the past two days by the French radio and television under the direction of his Minister of Information, M. Jacques Soustelle.

These adopted a stern tone and repeatedly affirmed that the General would stand for nothing less than unconditional surrender and jeered at the "lunatic dreams" of the nationalist leaders.

Different Languages

But despite the genuine desire by the General and the F.L.N. leaders to get back on speaking terms, the two parties were at no point really talking the same language. General de Gaulle had, in fact, reasserted long-standing French policy that the future of Algeria could be worked out only between the French and the elected representatives of the Algerian people in elections to be held under French management.

He would be ready, his advisers said, to let the rebels participate in future elections on a nationalist ticket if they would lay down their arms.

This necessarily meant treating the F.L.N. not as qualified representatives of the Algerian nation—which is what the émigré Government claims to be—but as erring citizens of France who would be received back into the body politic by the good graces of the French Government.

The breakdown of this tentative offer to negotiate means that the four-year-old war will go on and the French Army is expected to intensify its drive against the rebel mountain strongholds in an effort to get as much of the country as possible back under control before the elections still planned for the end of November.

Amnesty Offer

The offer of an amnesty to rebel troops in the field which the Prime Minister coupled with his invitation to their leaders to come to Paris still holds, but there has so far been no indication of any general collapse of the nationalist will to resist.

Although the immediate result is likely to be renewed hostilities, the General's initiative still marks an important advance in French thinking on the whole Algerian question. It

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Although the immediate result is likely to be renewed hostilities, the General's initiative still marks an important advance in French thinking on the whole Algerian question. It was the first effort of a French Government to educate French opinion into admitting that Algeria could no longer be treated as a province of France, that the rebels were not a band of cutthroats and criminals, and that it was not high treason to be willing to receive and talk to them.

General de Gaulle's initiative in issuing the invitation to the F.L.N. and his repeated declaration that as a last resort it would be the Algerians in Algeria who would decide their country's future represents a major advance over the public stand taken by leaders of the Fourth Republic.

A long period of sobering French opinion may be necessary before peace talks are possible, but there was an impressive degree of unanimity and enthusiasm for his first peace offer inside France.

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

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AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION
972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES
No. 119

October 1958

PRESS CONFERENCE OF GENERAL DE GAULLE

HELD IN PARIS ON OCTOBER 23, 1958

"I am very happy to see you.

"The last time I had this pleasure was last May. How oppressive was the atmosphere at that time! The least one can say now is that it has completely changed. Confidence has replaced anguish. National unity has prevented disruption; the referendum of September 28 has proclaimed the renewal of France.

"For it was indeed the determination of the French people to unite in a common effort and in a search for greatness that was revealed on that day. All the "Yes" votes--and they were many--were given joyfully; and, among those who voted "No," how many did so reluctantly?

"Moreover, the massive participation of the Algerians in the voting laid a psychological foundation, which had never existed before, for the political, economic, social and cultural evolution of their country; and on this foundation, it is now possible for the Algerians and the French of Metropolitan France to build the future together.

"Furthermore, 25 million men of Black Africa, of Madagascar, Djibouti, the Comoro Islands spontaneously showed their determination to establish with France a free Community and, at the same time, 55 million citizens of Metropolitan France, of Algeria, of Réunion, of the West Indies, of Guiana, of New Caledonia, of the New Hebrides, of French Oceania, for their part, made the same decision. In this we can see a mutual pledge between the peoples concerned that is without precedent in any place, at any time.

"Finally, the proof of vigor and of reason given by our country has had a decisive effect in the world. Yesterday, very few frankly put their money on us; now everybody wants to bet on France.

"We have made use of this great popular movement to renovate our institutions. New governmental authorities will come into being, profoundly different from those of yesterday. Arbitration by the chief of State, separation of the executive and the legislative, continuity of government--that is what is provided for, that is what the people wanted. Legislative elections will be held next month to put the new Constitution into effect.

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"Everybody understands--I allow myself a personal word or two--everybody understands that I do not wish, that I cannot take, any direct part in this contest. The mission with which the country has entrusted me prevents me from taking sides. Thus I shall not do so on behalf of any one, even of those who always have shown a friendly loyalty to me through all vicissitudes. Of course, I shall not disapprove if groups or candidates of all shades of opinion make known their support of the action of Charles de Gaulle. Besides, others will not fail to make known their opposition, utilizing that freedom that they accuse me of wanting to destroy. This impartiality compells me to make it very clear that my name, even in the form of an adjective, must not be used in the title of any group or in the slogan of any candidate.

"But this same impartiality does not prevent me of course from hoping very strongly that the forthcoming election campaign will take place, as far as possible, in objectivity and dignity, and in particular that people will abstain from that dealing in personalities which is always saddening, compromises everything and serves no purpose.

"Elections, thus, are to be held. At first sight, it might appear that they will be much the same as hitherto. The Assembly, however, that will result from these elections will not find itself in the same situation as the ones that preceded it.

"After being suspended for a few months, the parliamentary institution will reappear, but no longer omnipotent. The lesson learned from the facts, the course of events, the judgment of public opinion, and also the civic sense of the whole of the French body politic led the people who drafted the Constitution of 1958--that is to say, the members of the Government, assisted by the work of the Constitutional Council, by the advice of the Council of State and, I should add, by the enlightened advice of the President of the Republic: all this led the drafters of the Constitution to place strict limitations and powerful brakes on future Assemblies. The Nation has ratified their work. Indeed the situation of the world, the needs of national renovation absolutely prohibit a return to the confusion of times past.

"If, unfortunately, the Parliament of tomorrow should refuse to accept the role incumbent on it, there is no doubt that the Republic would be thrown into a new crisis, the outcome of which no one can predict, except that in any case, the parliamentary institution would be swept away for a long time to come. On the contrary, if the future assemblies rebuild their legislative functions in an objective manner, if they abstain from these rival bids, from these claims, from these partisan agitations--of which we have seen all too many examples--then, the powers of the State will function with proper balance, stability, and effectiveness of the Nation will take an interest in the free debates of its representatives.

"In short, it is by reforming the representative system thoroughly that we have safeguarded its chance. May it not destroy this chance.

"In any case, France has shown that she is made to live, to rise and to radiate."

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Question - After the instructions you sent General Salan concerning the elections, and the order you gave the officers to withdraw from all political organizations, would you define the role you are assigning to the Army in Algeria?

"I understand very well that circumstances being what they are, it is essentially Algeria that awakens the professional curiosity of the members of the press.

"The question is to know what is happening and what will happen as far as the French Army in Algeria is concerned. Well, the French Army in Algeria is doing what France expects it to do. Its first duty, of course, is to prevent Algeria from being lost through military action and in the field. In this respect, I believe that the hardest is done, although nothing is over as yet.

"The Army is also entrusted with the security of all categories of the population, and particularly of course, of the Moslem population.

"It must indeed be known that during the last four years in Algeria, while approximately 1,500 civilians of French origin have been killed, more than 10,000 Moslems, men, women and children, have been massacred by the rebels, almost always by throat-cutting.

"In Metropolitan France, for 75 Frenchmen attacked and killed, 1,717 Moslems have been shot or knifed by the killers.

"How many lives, how many homes, how many crops have been protected by the French Army in Algeria! And to what slaughter would we condemn this country if we were stupid enough and cowardly enough to abandon it!

"That is the reason, the value, the result of so many military actions, costly in men and weariness, of so many nights and days of guard duty, of so many reconnaisances, of so many patrols and clashes. Alas, 7,200 officers and men are dead. Alas, 77,000 rebels have been killed in combat.

"Another aspect of the Army's mission, which it fulfills in a brilliant and moving way, can be seen in the fact that it is found throughout the country, and also that it is the Army, that is to say a devoted, disciplined and disinterested corps. That is why it wished and it was able to establish human contact with this Moslem community which, too often and for too long, has found itself relegated in its mechtas, its douars and its misery.

"Officers and soldiers--with their hands, their hearts, their ingenuity--do not restrict themselves to protecting the population, but they help it in every way. One should see, on the spot, what they are able to do with regard to supplies, health, housing and schools. The value of the human relationships that are established day after day must be measured. Moreover, if the referendum was what it was in Algeria, if the moving eagerness of Moslems to participate in it could be seen, this was simply the proof that a confident and reciprocal brotherhood is dawning in that unhappy land.

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"Whatever the results achieved, the Army is continuing its mission. It must pursue its work of pacification. It must give its active support to the task that has been undertaken to develop Algeria. It must work for the rapprochement of minds that is the prerequisite of the future.

"Because of the forthcoming electoral and political competitions, the Army had to keep its distance and retain its dignity. This it did, on my orders.

"France is proud of the services its Army--commander in chief, staff officers, officers, and men--has rendered, is rendering and will render in Algeria. And, loudly and firmly, I testify to this."

Question - The F.L.N. is making overtures concerning the possibilities of peace in Algeria. What attitude does the Government plan to take toward this?

"The organization of which you are speaking started the fight on its own initiative. It has continued it for four years. I leave it to the future to determine what purpose this struggle may have served. But, in any case, it no longer really serves any purpose. Of course, they can, if they wish, continue the outrages, lie in ambush on the roads, hurl grenades in market places, and sneak into villages at night to kill a few unfortunate people. They can hide in mountain caves, go in groups from djebel to djebel, and hide weapons in rock crevices to be used when the opportunity arises. But the issue does not lie there. Nor is it in the political dreams and the propaganda oratory of refugees abroad. In truth and in all conscience, the issue is now clear. It is made clear by the fact that the forces of law and order are little by little gaining control of the terrain. But above all, it is made clear by the decisive demonstration that took place on September 28. However, I say unequivocally that, as for most of them, the men of the insurrection have fought courageously. Let the peace of the brave come, and I am sure that all hatred will fade away and disappear.

"I have spoken of the peace of the brave. What does this mean? Simply this: let those who opened fire cease fire, and let them return without humiliation to their families and their work.

"People say to me: but what can they do to end the struggle? My answer is: wherever they are organized for combat, their leaders need only enter into contact with the French command. The old warrior's procedure, long used when one wanted to silence the guns, was to wave the white flag of truce. And I answer that, in that case, the combatants would be received and treated honorably.

"As for the external organization of which we were just speaking, which, from the outside, strives to direct the struggle, I repeat openly what I have already made known. If delegates were designated to come and negotiate with the authorities the end of hostilities, they would have only to address themselves to the French Embassy at Tunis or at Rabat. Either one would ensure their transportation to Metropolitan France. There, they would be assured of complete safety, and I guarantee them the freedom to depart.

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"Some say: but what would be the political conditions that the French Government would be willing to discuss? I reply: the political destiny of Algeria is Algeria itself. Opening fire does not give a man the right to determine that destiny. When the democratic way is open, when the citizens have an opportunity to express their will, then there is no other way that is acceptable. Now, this way is open in Algeria. The referendum has taken place. In November the legislative elections will be held; in March, the elections to the municipal councils; in April, the election of Senators. What will be the outcome? That is a matter of evolution. In any case, a vast physical and spiritual transformation is under way in Algeria. France, because it is her duty and because she alone is capable of doing it--France is bringing about this transformation. As and when developments occur, political solutions will take shape. I believe, as I have already said, that future solutions will be based--because that is the nature of things--upon the courageous personality of Algeria and upon its close association with Metropolitan France. I believe also that this ensemble, completed by the Sahara, will link itself, for the common progress, with the free States of Morocco and Tunisia. Sufficient unto the day is the burdensome evil thereof. But who will win out in the end? You will see that it will be the fraternal civilization that wins."

Question - In New York, the French Delegation has just taken a negative stand toward the halting of nuclear tests. Would you please indicate the reasons for this attitude?

"That is a serious problem, which may seem not to have any bearing on what we have just been discussing. But everything is related. I am therefore going to talk about it. Two world groups, the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, have for many years been making and stockpiling atomic weapons. At this very moment, one or the other of these two groups is in a position to unleash on the world, in an instant, a gigantic cataclysm. So far, these two groups have not been able to reach an agreement on disarmament and control. Certainly I do not say that the responsibility for this disharmony is equal on both sides. For my part, I am convinced that the West would disarm at once if the East wished to. But as things are, I see that, at every moment, death hangs over the world.

"You know that, before this world danger, France has always wanted to play the role of the apostle, of the champion of disarmament. We have not ceased, we are not ceasing to press Russians, Americans and British to give up production, to liquidate their stockpiles of bombs and to agree to the establishment of effective international controls. If this goal should be attained, the big question of tests would disappear immediately. If this goal could be attained, of what importance then would be the halting of tests to those who continue to accumulate bombs? Their power would not be changed by it, and world danger would not be lessened. On the contrary, these three States would only be deceiving the poor world, in making it believe that by stopping tests security would be advanced. It would even be tantamount to giving themselves an alibi not to disarm.

"Besides, this is what the United States, Great Britain and France had jointly recognized in August 1957.

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"You undoubtedly know that,at that time, they issued a formal statement in which they declared that the goal to be reached was the limitation and the control of all armaments, particularly of atomic weapons, and that it would add yet another risk to many others, if the debate were to be shunted to the fallacious sidetrack of the suspension of tests.

"It so happens that our allies have recently thought fit, in New York, to modify their position, but France sees no reason to change her opinion and this is what the French Delegate in New York made very clear.

"Independently of the reasons she has for holding to what has been agreed upon between the countries of the West, France also has--it is true--a reason of her own. Everybody knows that we now have the means of providing ourselves with nuclear weapons and the day is approaching when we, in our turn, will carry out tests.

"Perhaps this circumstance was taken into consideration when Moscow, Washington and London simultaneously decided that the suspension of tests was suddenly advisable. I will not attempt to decide this question, but I do say that while the other three States remain over-armed, France will not accept a position of chronic and overwhelming inferiority.

"Besides, when we become an atomic power, and that day is not far off, we will have all the greater means at our disposal for making our action felt in fields that are precious and useful to all mankind: those of world security and disarmament."

Question - General, does the Government intend to define exactly, at this time, its position with regard to Frenchmen living in Guinea?

"I do not in the least mind stating again the present attitude of the Government of the French Republic with regard to the event which occurred in Guinea; an event, moreover, which was expected and which, in accordance with our promise, we have not obstructed in any way.

"We all know the attitude adopted by the present head of the Government Council of Guinea toward the referendum. He was within his rights, at least as far as we were concerned. At this time, I believe this attitude is the basis of his words and actions. Therefore, for us, Guinea is in a state of flux and we do not know where it is headed. We shall see how it develops and what it will do under its present Government, both with regard to its leanings and its foreign associations and from the point of view of its ability to form a State, if it succeeds in establishing one.

"We shall establish our relations with Guinea on the basis of what happens in these different fields. We shall do so without bitterness, but without any certainty--I must admit--that what is today can remain tomorrow.

"As for Frenchmen in Guinea--whose lives and property are happily not in jeopardy--we see no reason for them to leave the country.

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"Of course, this does not refer to civil servants and experts sent to Guinea by the French Government under the 'Loi-Cadre,' or to those France might have furnished under the Community system, but whom she cannot furnish in the so-called independence system.

"As to the financial assistance given by the French State for the development of Guinea, the whole world understands why such assistance has had to cease. Furthermore, may I say that this question does not seem to me to warrant the long columns given to it in the newspapers.

Question - General, forgive me for coming back to Algeria. I would like to know if the Government will take practical measures for guaranteeing that the various candidates can make their platforms known, and if measures will be taken to ensure that candidates will have printing and publishing facilities at their disposal.

"The Government will see that in Algeria, as in Metropolitan France, candidates will be enabled to make known their platforms.

"There is no doubt whatever on that question, and very definite orders have been issued to this effect. I will not pretend, however, nor you either, that in certain cases, and these alas still include Algeria, there may be, here and there, difficulties in interpretation. The Government has sent an extremely serious and capable Control Commission there, possessing all the necessary authority, to solve these difficulties insofar as possible. Everything that can be done in this respect, we shall do.

"As regards the appearance, in the forthcoming Parliament, of qualified and worthy Algerians, particularly Moslems--whatever their opinions on the destiny of Algeria, on that of France or on any other subject--we ardently hope that this will come to pass.

"It is, literally, one of the principal aims of our action that Algeria should find itself politically. This will be done, of course, only step by step. But as I said a few moments ago, the way is open. It must be followed. There is no other."

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Economist File No. 25/2/4 E

Published at: London Date: 27-9-58

The Exiles

THE Algerian rebels' formation of a "government-in-exile" in Cairo came as less than a shock to the watching world. The decision had been agreed on by the Maghreb partners at Tangiers in April, and although General de Gaulle's advent and the advice of the cautious Tunisians and Moroccans stayed the hand of the National Liberation Front through the summer, the card was clearly going to be played when needed. It seems to be badly needed now. The FLN has had to find a counter to General de Gaulle's referendum in Algeria, for which the French army has secured millions of Moslem registrations. Now the guerrillas have a "government" of their own to point to in demanding the allegiance of the *bled*. But M. Ferhat Abbas and his colleagues are plainly leading from weakness, not strength.

Reactions, even within the Maghreb, were not particularly reassuring for the men in Cairo. Both Moroccans and Tunisians were at pains to protect their relations with the French. Although the Tunisians had cause to be gratified by the appearance of a moderate like M. Abbas at the head of the "government," they were careful to emphasise to everyone that they regarded the step as a contribution to peace and not a sign of an intensifying war. The other Arab countries (except, so far, Lebanon) fell into line at once, and communist China began what looked like becoming a series of recognitions by communist states. But the Soviet Union has been noticeably slow off the mark; Mr Khrushchev may have sensed the pitfalls which lie in wait for anyone who encourages the creation of "emigré" regimes without an inch of territory in their possession.

In Afro-Asian countries like India, Ghana and Ceylon, the problem of reconciling anti-colonialist sympathy with the facts of normal diplomatic life may set off a struggle in more than one prime ministerial conscience. The FLN have not given up hope of a nod from them yet; they would be delighted by even a wink from western dissidents like Greece and Iceland. Yet what should count is not merely the physical precariousness of the FLN position, but the avowed policy of its new "ministers" in the murderous campaign in France itself. M. Ferhat Abbas has got off on the wrong foot. Only if France itself breaks off relations with countries that recognise the Cairo exiles will the FLN gesture attain real diplomatic importance. So far there are no signs of General de Gaulle making such a mistake.

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25/2/11

FOR P.I.B.
167/2/2

ALGERIA

There have been many attempts to write down the Algerian vote in the French constitutional referendum of 28th September. There have been charges that the results were faked and that Algerians were bludgeoned into voting. There is no substantial evidence to support these charges.

2. Certainly, the Army organized polling, provided protection for and transport to polling centres, and actively campaigned to secure a large vote. There, however, its responsibilities and activities ended. While it may be true to say that some Moslem Algerians voted through fear of offending the Army, the Army was in no position to force them to vote "yes". Further, it seems true to say that many Moslem Algerians voted although they felt themselves to be under no restraint by the Army.

3. Approximately 3,475,000 voted, representing 80% of the registered electorate (the basis for registration being universal adult suffrage). 96.5% of the votes (representing 78% of the registered electorate) were in favour of the new Constitution (which incidentally made no specific provision for Algeria).

4. The composition of the poll and the attitude of the voters were probably as follows:

(a) French Settlers - 500,000, who believed that their affirmative vote represented a vote for integration with France;

(b) Moslems - 2,975,000 comprising

(i) 1,475,000 women, whose affirmative vote no doubt resulted from appreciation at their emancipation and a desire for peace;

(ii) 350,000 ex-servicemen, who no doubt voted "yes" in admiration of de Gaulle and through a feeling of affinity with France;

(iii) 1,150,000 males, the great majority of whom voted "yes" through a desire to end the strife and, to a limited extent through psychological constraint (fear of the French

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5. The "yes" vote therefore represented support for a variety of things ranging from integration to independence. The most constant element in the vote seems to have been a feeling that a yes vote would help de Gaulle end the strife; and to this extent the vote did represent a huge vote of confidence in de Gaulle.

6. Even more striking, however, is the fact that 3 million odd Moslems voted out of the 3,900,000 who had registered as electors. There is no accurate estimate of the number of Moslems eligible to vote, but there seems general agreement that, in a total population (including French settlers) of about 9 or 10 millions, the number (under the conditions of universal adult franchise which obtained) would have amounted to about 4,900,000. Therefore no less than approximately 60% of the eligible Moslems voted. These votes were cast despite the F.L.N.'s ban on participation and establishment ten days before the referendum of the "Government" in Cairo. Consequently one may doubt the claim of the F.L.N. to represent the wishes of Moslem Algerians: in fact, the size of the Moslem vote would seem to indicate that a majority of Moslems have had enough of the violence and political, economic and social dislocation caused by the F.L.N.

7. At the same time the fact that 40% of eligible Moslems (totalling 1,900,000) did not vote indicates some support for the F.L.N. Almost half of those who did not vote had registered as electors. The causes for their failure to vote were varied. It may not be true therefore to say that all the 40% which abstained favoured the F.L.N. Nevertheless as a rough estimate it can probably be said that the F.L.N. may speak for up to 40% of Moslem Algerians (representing about 36% of the Algerian population).

8. The lines of de Gaulle's immediate policy are now emerging. In the economic and social spheres he announced on 5th October a pretentious five year plan. This aims at -

(a) raising wages and salaries to a level "comparable" with that of France;

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(b) providing schooling for two thirds of all Algerian children (the remaining one-third to be provided for during the ensuing three years);

(c) ensuring that 10 per cent of recruits to the French administration, magistrature, armed forces, teaching professions and public services should be non-European Algerians;

(d) distributing 250,000 hectaires of new land to Moslem farmers; and

(e) completing the "first phase" of a plan for agricultural and industrial development involving the

(i) distribution of Algerian oil and gas;

(ii) construction of metallurgical and chemical industries;

(iii) construction of housing for one million people;

(iv) development of hospitals, roads, ports and communications, and

(v) provision of employment for 400,000 new workers.

The plan is so extensive that it is clear that it could only be executed in all aspects through considerable austerity at home in France.

9. In the military sphere, de Gaulle, while offering to "treat with honour" rebels who surrendered, is reported to have ordered the extension of Army operations into mountainous rebel areas formerly considered to be unassailable.

10. In the political sphere he has boldly broken the power of the Committees of Public Safety and confined the Army to its own proper functions. In instructions sent to General Salan, French Delegate-General and Commander-in-Chief in Algeria, on 9th October and published on 14th October, he ordered the General to see that members of the armed forces withdrew forthwith from "any organization of a political nature". Most members of the Army welcomed these clear-cut instructions and the opportunity they provided to disengage themselves from their uneasy association with the colons. They withdrew from the Committees immediately.

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11. In protest against de Gaulle's instructions and proposed electoral arrangements (described in paragraph 12 below) the French civilian members of the Committee of Public Safety in Algiers called for a general strike on 16th October. General Salan banned the strike, and it did not eventuate. The power of the Committees and of the colons composing them collapsed.

12. In the same instruction to General Salan, de Gaulle told the General to ensure that complete freedom of nomination and speech (even concerning the future status of Algeria) was maintained in Algeria for the elections to the French Chamber of Deputies on 23rd November. He stated that only military personnel, civil servants and criminals were to be denied the right of nomination as candidates. These arrangements should ensure that out of the 66 Deputies to be elected from Algeria, 45 will be Moslems. De Gaulle declared that the objective was that a "new Algerian elite" should freely emerge in the elections. This, of course, will depend on the extent to which the Army carries out his instructions in spirit as well as in letter.

13. De Gaulle has let it be known that he hopes that among this elite will be a number who enjoy at least the tacit support of the F.L.N. He no doubt hopes that with this group he will be able to negotiate a settlement or at least a modus vivendi. Even he probably does not yet know the outlines of such a settlement. It is clear, however, that he will not aim at integration as demanded by the colons, but will nevertheless seek some form of continued close association.

14. By the very fact of establishing a "Government" in Cairo, and of rejecting on 25th October de Gaulle's offer of cease-fire talks in Paris, the F.L.N. "Government" leaders have probably placed themselves out of court insofar as negotiating an Algerian settlement is concerned. Their future prospects do not look bright.

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25/2/11

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

REW: BMW

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.16997

Sent: 30th October, 1958.
1450
Rec'd: 31st October, 1958.
1030

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
RANGOON.

196. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your AP57.

F.L.N. Algerian "Government".

I mentioned our position yesterday informally to Barrington, who said that the Burmese Government has given full consideration to the question of recognition of the "Provisional Free Algerian Government" and has decided not to accord recognition "for the time being". He emphasised that this decision may be subject to review in the light of further developments.

Loomes.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (167/2/2) 31st October, 1958.
P.M.'s

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL 25/2/11

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.18820

Sent: 23rd October, 1958.
Rec'd: 29th October, 1958.

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

Sav. Ex.799. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Australian Embassy, Paris.. Ex. 271, Australian Embassy, Washington Ex. 838.

Algeria.

You will have received from Paris (and also through United Kingdom High Commission) details of de Gaulle's directive to General Salanabout conduct of elections in Algeria. Comments made to us on 22nd October by Assistant Head, African Department, Foreign Office, and other information from United Kingdom reports we have seen, are summarised below.

2. Press has lately contained various stories to effect that French Government has entered into secret contact with F.L.N., perhaps through General Catroux in Cairo. Northern Department said that on this subject, as on Algeria in general, they knew nothing more than had appeared in the press: they seemed to think, however, that it was not unlikely that such contacts had taken plane. What was certain was that F.L.N. leaders, particularly through Ferhat Abbas's interview published in West Berlin paper, Der Tag, and in F.L.N.'s own paper, had been taking an unusually conciliatory line. Main points of Ferhat Abbas's interview were that F.L.N. were now "ready for any kind of discussions" with France; a French commitment to grant independence was not a necessary pre-condition for such discussions; the F.L.N. was ready to negotiate a cease-fire; and orders to cease F.L.N. terrorism in France might possibly be issued. Northern Department's opinion was that, whatever lay behind this new line,

a) recent F.L.N. military activity had certainly slackened;

b) military position of French had been considerably improved by completion of the "fence" along the Tunisian border, which was proving effective;

c) F.L.N. had certainly suffered a considerable blow from success with which French had been able to conduct referendum.

Elections

3. Northern Department thought that de Gaulle, who had been most skilful in handling Algerian situation, had greatly strengthened his prospects of Moslem support through his latest instructions to Salan. Asked their opinion of press suggestions that F.L.N., though formally disqualified from putting up candidates to contest elections, might in fact be preparing to fight the elections in disguise by using ostensibly independent

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INWARD SAVINGRAM.

Moslem candidates, Northern Department thought that such a development was not improbable. They agreed with our suggestion that prospective Moslem candidates might at least think it wise to reinsure themselves with the F.L.N. before running for election: certainly it was difficult to see where any large body of independent Moslem Nationalists could come from.

4. Report from United Kingdom Ambassador, Tunis, of conversation with Bourguiba, of 15th October, however, quotas Bourguiba (who saw Ferhat Abbas on 13th October) as believing that there would be no cease fire nor F.L.N. participation in the elections. "If I were in the Algerians' place", the President said, "that is certainly what I would do. But they cannot. You can take it from me. They have not enough control over the bands in Algeria to abandon the pre-condition of independence. Ferhat Abbas's talk of negotiation is simply meant to bring pressure on the Arab League to fork out the £12,000,000 they have promised". Bourguiba believed the Algerian war would continue, perhaps for another year and would get increasingly dangerous.

29th October, 1958.

MIN. & DEPT. D.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE

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G

TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

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c) F.L.N. had certainly suffered a considerable blow from success with which French had been able to conduct referendum.

Elections

3. Northern Department thought that de Gaulle, who had been most skilful in handling Algerian situation, had greatly strengthened his prospects of Moslem support through his latest instructions to Salan. Asked their opinion of press suggestions that F.L.N., though formally disqualified from putting up candidates to contest elections, might in fact be preparing to fight the elections in disguise by using ostensibly independent

CONFIDENTIAL.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

Moslem candidates, Northern Department thought that such a development was not improbable. They agreed with our suggestion that prospective Moslem candidates might at least think it wise to reinsure themselves with the F.L.N. before running for election: certainly it was difficult to see where any large body of independent Moslem Nationalists could come from.

4. Report from United Kingdom Ambassador, Tunis, of conversation with Bourguiba, of 15th October, however, quotas Bourguiba (who saw Ferhat Abbas on 13th October) as believing that there would be no cease fire nor F.L.N. participation in the elections. "If I were in the Algerians' place", the President said, "that is certainly what I would do. But they cannot. You can take it from me. They have not enough control over the bands in Algeria to abandon the pre-condition of independence. Ferhat Abbas's talk of negotiation is simply meant to bring pressure on the Arab League to fork out the £12,000,000 they have promised". Bourguiba believed the Algerian war would continue, perhaps for another year and would get increasingly dangerous.

29th October, 1958.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE COPY
27 OCT 1958

File No. ~~201/5/2~~ 201/2/5/1

17th October, 1958.

Memo No. 794

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ALGERIA.

Great interest is being taken here in the present attitude of Ferhat Abbas, as I reported in my telegram of 15th October.x to Ferhat Abbas

I referred in that telegram to a reported visit by General Catroux (former Ambassador and Grand Chancelier of the Légion d'Honneur) who, although well over 80, is sometimes used on delicate missions (e.g. the mission to Morocco which brought back the present King).

One report of General Catroux's visit to Cairo appeared in the "Economist's" supplement.

I met General Catroux two Sundays ago at a small lunch given by the Provincial of the Dominican Order in France. For what it is worth, General Catroux made no mention then of having been abroad recently.

The United Kingdom Ambassador was particularly interested in this report and endeavoured to get General Catroux to lunch.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.
PARIS

He also asked the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Joxe, about the visit; M. Joxe replied that there was "nothing in it atall".

AMBASSADOR.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper The Times File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 27. 10. 58.

FRENCH CEASE-FIRE HOPES FADE

REBELS REJECT OFFER FOR TALKS

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, OCT. 26

The news of the rejection by the F.L.N. (Algerian National Liberation Front) of his offer of cease-fire talks was given to General de Gaulle yesterday at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, where he had been spending the weekend. So far there has been little official comment, but the general reaction is undoubtedly one of disappointment after the high hopes aroused when the offer was made on Thursday, and after the recent conciliatory statement by Ferhat Abbas.

The stern wording of yesterday's declaration, and the threat to carry on the fight until independence has been won, suggests to most observers that the extremist wing of the F.L.N. has once again carried the day against the moderates, led by Ferhat Abbas. Whereas Ferhat Abbas only yesterday was referring to General de Gaulle as a patriotic and exceptional man, the F.L.N. now accuses his Government of blindness and incomprehension, and of carrying out a militarist, colonialist policy.

STALEMATE AGAIN

There is no mention any more of the unconditional cease-fire talks that Ferhat Abbas and others were proposing a few days ago. Instead, the only counter-proposal is for talks on neutral soil, to negotiate a solution for the Algerian problem as a whole. It is regarded as most unlikely that the French Government would even consider such an offer, especially when the F.L.N. denounces the forthcoming election as meaningless. So the crack in the door is closed again, and the political stalemate, so is seems, is resumed.

French officials are consoling themselves with the thought that the F.L.N. will further discredit itself in the eyes of world opinion by its intransigent rejection of an offer that has much increased General de Gaulle's international reputation for liberalism. M. Mollet said the F.L.N. had committed a tactical error. It is suggested that, just as the General's invitation was a mark of assurance and strength, so the F.L.N.'s reply shows weakness and confusion. But it is realized that immediate prospects for the kind of free elections that the General wanted have been darkened.

MUSLIMS DISAPPOINTED

According to reports from Algiers, officials there fear that Muslim nationalists who were waiting for the F.L.N.'s "green light" will not dare to present themselves as candidates now. There is said to be general disappointment among the Muslim community, many of whom were hoping for an early end to the fighting. The best hope now, it is felt, is that the rebel chiefs in the field will disobey their political leaders in Cairo, whom they often despise, and will agree to local cease-fire contacts.

Broadcasts on Algiers radio by the Algeria-Sahara public safety committee have been banned by the Government until further notice because, it is alleged, the committee was beginning to use them for electoral purposes.

The French Socialist Party decided in Paris to-day to present candidates in all constituencies in France next month. It was decided to leave the local federations with freedom of action for alliances in the second ballot, provided that there were no alliances under any conditions with the Communists and none, except in special cases, with the Independents. Alliances would be allowed with some Gaullists and with the centre and centre-left parties. Efforts would be made to avoid friction with the left wing breakaway Socialist Party led by M. Depreux. Second ballot alliances with this party would be permitted.

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

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25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
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Memorandum 779

15th October 1958

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE COPY
27 OCT 1958
CANBERRA

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Instructions concerning the Elections in Algeria

Yesterday's press carried the text of a letter from General de Gaulle to General Salan regarding the forthcoming elections in Algeria, together with a series of instructions which accompanied the letter. Translations of these documents are attached to the present memorandum.

The terms of the instructions are explicit and the letter itself is certainly blunt. The reactions, when the texts were published, were correspondingly lively. General Massu and the other officers on the Central Committee of Public Safety in Algiers informed the Committee on the morning of Tuesday, 14th October, that they were complying with the order and thereupon walked out. Officers on regional Committees of Public Safety followed suit. In the main the Army, especially the operational troops in the 'bled', seem satisfied with the instructions. They have for the most part never been anxious to get involved in politics: all they wanted was clear instructions and loyal support, and this de Gaulle is giving them. Some of the senior officers in Algiers are reported to object not so much to the substance of the instructions as to their being released to the press before they had been disseminated through normal army channels - "We would have preferred to learn that from the mouth of Salan." To assess the merit of this criticism it is necessary to look closely at the dates. The letter was written on Thursday 9th October and was received by Salan on Saturday, 11th. The texts were not released in Paris until the evening of Monday, 13th (and Salan was informed of the decision at that time) and published on 14th morning. Salan therefore had three days (admittedly including a week-end) in which to take action. Moreover as he was due to fly to Paris on 14th to attend the 'bazooka trial' it seems reasonable to assume that he would have taken the necessary action no later that Monday 13th. The publication of the texts may therefore be taken as a rap over the knuckles and a clear warning that de Gaulle expects prompt obedience to his orders.

The initial reaction of the civilians, Muslim as well as European,

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AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

especially in Algiers and in the Committees of Public Safety and similar organisations is said to be one of resentment and concern. This is understandably true so far as the C.P.S. are concerned: how far the general public share its feelings may be easier to estimate from the success of the demonstration which it is organising for tomorrow in the Forum at Algiers and of its strike call. Undoubtedly the success of de Gaulle's instructions will be watched closely by the Muslims and not least by the F.L.N. It is perhaps relevant that these instructions were given at a time when rumours are current of preliminery soundings by the French (cf. Economist Foreign Report of 9th October, 1958) and the F.L.N. is showing a willingness to negotiate.

The C.P.S. response to the news has been vigorous. Two Muslim members left Algiers for Paris the same day to seek an audience with de Gaulle, and the Committee went into permanent session. The Committee's views are summarised in a communiqué issued by Dr Lefèvre in which he made the following points:

a) the work of renaissance which the people and the Army have jointly undertaken in Algeria is far from complete and it is dangerous to break this alliance just when the discredited political parties are trying to re-establish themselves;

b) de Gaulle's decision was undoubtedly dictated by the political parties who knew that the C.P.S. had determined not to let the elections in Algeria be spoilt by politicians (ne pas laisser politiser les elections);

c) when the people of Algeria were looking for energetic action against the Communist Party and the terrorists they find, to their confusion, that measures are taken against the Army and the civil service as well as the terrorists.

In France the news has been well received except on the right and in the Returned Soldiers' organisations. De Gaulle's freedom from reliance on these elements of his supporters emerges more clearly as his policy for the elections and his programme for Algeria evolves.

A copy of this memorandum is being sent to the External Affairs Officer, London.

I. G. Bowden

I. G. Bowden,
Second Secretary.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

Letter from General de Gaulle to General Salan

Paris, 9th October, 1958

My dear General,

The Government has decided that Algeria, like the Metropole, will elect its representatives to the National Assembly on 23rd November next.

These elections will be carried out, so far as Algeria is concerned, by "scrutin de liste majoritaire à un tour."

The higher interests of the country requires that the elections take place in conditions of absolute freedom and sincerity and that lists representative of all tendencies - I say of all tendencies - be able to sollicit competitively and on an equal footing the votes of the electors.

In consequence, would you please conform with the attached directives.

Accept, my dear General, my cordial sentiments.

(SGD) Charles de Gaulle.

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Text of the General Instructions for the Preparation for the Leglislative Elections in Algeria

1. The elections must be honest. All opinions must be able to find expression and all candidates be able to present themselves and to conduct a campaign whatever their programmes, even as regards the status or the political future of Algeria.

The responsible authorities have the duty to secure the exercise of this right for the candidates of different parties. No measures restricting this liberty and imposed by the exigencies of public order can be taken without prior advice of the commission of control. Only those individuals who take part in terrorist action and in consequence fall under penal inculpation are excluded.

The seizure of local or metropolitan newspapers could only be ordered if the articles indicted are of a nature to lead to judicial prosecution.

2. I attach the utmost importance to there being genuine competition, that is to say that competitive lists must be able to exist.

The worst danger would be the constitution of single lists favoured by the official authorities.

The end to attain consists in achieving the free emergence of an Algerian political élite.

This is how the political vacuum, which has opened the way to the insurgents of the rebellion, can be filled.

3. The civil servants and Army personnel at present in Algeria or who have held such positions within the past year cannot be authorized to stand as candidates.

Furthermore, the moment has come for the military to stop taking part in any organisation which has a political character, whatever may be the reasons which, under the exceptional circumstances that have swept Algeria since the month of May, motivated their participation. Nothing should henceforward justify their membership of such organisations. I order them to withdraw without delay.

4. A report will be made to me of the measures taken for the execution of this instruction.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London

File No: 25/2/11 E.
Date: 25 - 10 - 58.

CARDINAL BACKS ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE

CASE OF THE LYONS PRIESTS

POLICE ACCUSED

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, OCT. 24

The case of the Lyons priests who have been charged with helping and sheltering members of the F.L.N. (Algerian National Liberation Front) has taken a dramatic turn. Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyons, who is in Rome for the Conclave, has publicly accused "certain members" of the Lyons police of having tortured Muslim suspects in order to provide support for allegations against the priests.

He has issued a statement saying that allegations of this kind have disturbed the conscience of many, and have caused it to be asked how such grave charges could be made without proof, or at least strong circumstantial evidence. It is now his duty "to dispel this painful state of doubt," and to speak out. He says that four things are certain in connexion with the case:—

(*i*) That Algerians in France organized a mutual aid service for Algerians in prison (*i.e.*, on charges of terrorism or connivance with the F.L.N.) and their families in need;

(*ii*) That an Algerian member of the relief service asked Father Carteron (one of the priests concerned) if he could find it accommodation;

(*iii*) That Father Carteron referred this man to Father Magnin, of the Prado seminary at Lyons, who agreed to put a room at the disposal of the organization on the understanding that it engaged in no political activity or acts of terrorism;

(*iv*) That, to the cardinal's best belief and knowledge, there is nothing to justify allegations that these conditions were not respected.

"LYING" STATEMENTS

The cardinal goes on to say that "certain members of the police" resorted to "violence and the most serious torture" in order to be able to ascribe to their Muslim suspects "statements, the lying nature of which is easy to see." He is careful to add that he is not criticizing the police as a whole.

This statement has apparently burst on Lyons like a bombshell, though it seems that something of the kind was already suspected, and that at the cardinal's request a number of priests, including Father Carteron, recently reported what they had found out about alleged police torture of Muslim suspects.

Father Carteron, who disappeared for 48 hours after the first arrests, chose, when he reappeared, to present himself to the examining magistrate rather than to the Lyons police, saying that he feared torture at the hands of the latter. On Tuesday four Algerians involved in the case laid a charge of torture against persons unknown with the public prosecutor. Three of them are in the St. Paul prison at Lyons and the fourth is on provisional liberty.

MINISTER'S REPLY

M. Pelletier, the Minister of the Interior, has issued a statement regretting that the cardinal should have made such allegations about a matter that is *sub judice*, and saying that members of the F.L.N. are under permanent orders to complain of torture by the police, and that their allegations consequently of no value. An accusation of such a

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ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No: 214/11 E.
Date: 24-10-58.

GEN. DE GAULLE OFFERS TO MEET ALGERIA REBELS

SAFE CONDUCT TO FRANCE FOR CEASE-FIRE TALKS

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, OCT. 23

Speaking this afternoon at the first Press conference he has given since his return to power in June, General de Gaulle revealed that he had already let it be known that if the representatives of the F.L.N. (Algerian National Liberation Front) were anxious to arrange for a cease-fire in Algeria, they had only to apply to the French embassies in Tunis or Rabat, who would ensure their onward transport to France. In France, their complete safety would be assured, and "I guarantee them the freedom to leave again."

This offer, while giving away nothing of importance on the French side—as General de Gaulle pointed out to-day, the political future of Algeria is a "question of evolution"—is the most precise reply yet given to the various offers and hints of a cease-fire emanating recently from F.L.N. sources in Cairo, Tunis, and elsewhere.

"BRAVE FIGHT"

Coupled with the General's references to-day to the "brave fight" put up by the rebels, and his reiteration that the future in Algeria will be based on the "courageous personality of Algeria and its close association with metropolitan France," his words are a token of a generous attitude and a general readiness to discuss a cease-fire in Algeria such as no other Government, in the four years of the war, would have dared publicly to adopt.

To-day's Press conference was very different in tone, as well as in content, from the many others which the General has held in Paris since he left power in 1946. Then he was a bitter critic of what he always referred to as "the System," his language flowery, his wit mordant, and his irony piercing. To-day, speaking as the head of the Government (all of whose members were present in the room), his face and gestures all expressed a new assurance and serenity, together with legitimate pride at what has been achieved in the past few months. The conference was held in the Hôtel Matignon, under the arc lamps of the television cameras, before at least 300 journalists, many of whom could not get into the main conference room. The whole performance was retransmitted on the French television programme this evening.

NO PART IN ELECTIONS

General de Gaulle began with a short introductory statement in which he compared the difference between to-day's atmosphere with that obtaining at the time of his last Press conference in May, a week before he came to power. After referring to the referendum results he remarked that the proof of "vigour and reason" which France had given could be seen the world over: "Yesterday very few people were betting openly on us, now everyone wants to get on France."

This brought him to the forthcoming elections, and here he made plain that he could not take any part in them. "The mission which the country has given me is of a kind which precludes my taking part." He therefore would not be backing anyone, not even those who had been faithful to him through all vicissitudes (a reference to the early and consistent Gaullists). While he could disapprove of groups or candidates of different tendencies who announced their "adhesion to the action of Charles de Gaulle," he could not allow his name, "even in the form of an adjective," to be used by any party or any candidate—*i.e.*, there is to be no such thing as a Gaullist or Gaullism under that name.

The General then recalled the changes that had been made in the Constitution, and the more limited powers of Parliament, and gave a warning that if, in the future, [illegible] the role which had been given to it, there would be with-

origin had been killed and 10,000 Muslims. In metropolitan France, 75 metropolitan Frenchmen had fallen victims to terrorist attacks, and 1,717 Muslims.

These figures led the General to exclaim: "What a slaughter this country [Algeria] would have experienced if we were stupid and cowardly enough to abandon it." He also gave the figures of French and rebel losses since the beginning of the war: 7,200 officers and other ranks dead, and 77,000 rebels killed fighting. Now the Army was continuing its mission, though as regards the forthcoming elections in Algeria the Army should remain "aloof and above . . . it has done it on my orders."

NO HUMILIATION

Then came the most important statement of the Press conference, about the F.L.N. peace offers. The General began by pointing out that it was the F.L.N. who had begun the fighting, but that, although ambushes, bombs, arms dumps and so on could go on, that was no longer the issue, any more than it was "the political dreams" of Algerian nationalists abroad. The real issue was the fact that the Army was gradually getting the upper hand and, above all, the "manifestation of civic values of September 28."

Nonetheless, "and I say it without embarrassment," it was true of most of the rebels that they had "fought courageously. May the peace of brave men come, and I am sure that hatred will die away." By this, the General explained, he meant quite simply that those who had begun the fighting should cease it and return to their families and work without humiliation. It only required the local rebel leaders to make contact with the French commander on the ground, by making use of the ancient procedure of the white flag of truce. He guaranteed that in that case "they would be received and treated honourably."

POLITICAL AWAKENING

After announcing the specific offer to the F.L.N. leaders to come to Paris by way of Tunis and Rabat, the General went on to consider what should be the political conditions which the French Government would accept for such a meeting. His answer was that "the political destiny of Algeria is in Algeria itself." The referendum had taken place, legislative elections were about to take place, and next spring there were municipal and senatorial elections. "I say that this is a question of evolution." In any case, an immense change had begun in Algeria, and political solutions would reveal themselves according to developments.

He believed "that future solutions would have as a basis, because it is in the nature of things, the brave personality of Algeria and its close association with Metropolitan France. This ensemble, completed by the Sahara, I believe some day will link up in the cause of common progress with the free States of Morocco and Tunisia." In answer to those who wanted to know who would be the final victor, "I reply with the utmost conviction that it will finally be fraternal civilization."

The General added, speaking with the greatest emphasis, that it was the basis of French Algerian policy that qualified and able Muslim candidates should be returned to the French Parliament, and that Algeria should undergo "a political awakening." This would take rather a long time and would be accomplished little by little. But "the road ahead is open; we must follow it, there is no other way."

ATOMIC POWER SOON

General de Gaulle neatly refused an invitation to define French foreign policy, but on the disarmament question, he expanded more fully. He was convinced that the West would disarm straight away if the East wanted to, but as things stood, the French position had not changed. He recalled the French, British, and American

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

return to power in June, General de Gaulle revealed that he had already let it be known that if the representatives of the F.L.N. (Algerian National Liberation Front) were anxious to arrange for a cease-fire in Algeria, they had only to apply to the French embassies in Tunis or Rabat, who would ensure their onward transport to France. In France, their complete safety would be assured, and "I guarantee them the freedom to leave again."

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The General then recalled the changes that had been made in the Constitution, and the more limited powers of Parliament, and gave a warning that if, in the future, Parliament did not accept the role which had been given to it, there would be without doubt a new crisis, the outcome of which was unforeseeable except in one respect—"parliamentary institutions would be swept away for a long time."

ARMY'S ROLE

If, on the other hand, Parliament fulfilled its functions properly, then there would be stability and efficiency and the nation would take an interest in the parliamentary debates. "In a word, it is by thoroughly reforming it that we have saved the chance for the representative regime."

The General then replied to questions, the first about the position of the Army in Algeria. He paid a glowing tribute to the work done by the Army in different fields, and considered that the greatest part of the military task had been accomplished, "though nothing is finally finished." He revealed that in the four years of war in Algeria, 1,500 Frenchmen of metropolitan attacks, and 1,717 Muslims.

These figures led the General to exclaim: "What a slaughter this country [Algeria] would have experienced if we were stupid and cowardly enough to abandon it." He also gave the figures of French and rebel losses since the beginning of the war: 7,200 officers and other ranks dead, and 77,000 rebels killed fighting. Now the Army was continuing its mission, though as regards the forthcoming elections in Algeria the Army should remain "aloof and above . . . it has done it on my orders."

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Nonetheless, "and I say it without embarrassment," it was true of most of the rebels that they had "fought courageously. May the peace of brave men come, and I am sure that hatred will die away." By this, the General explained, he meant quite simply that those who had begun the fighting should cease it and return to their families and work without humiliation. It only required the local rebel leaders to make contact with the French commander on the ground, by making use of the ancient procedure of the white flag of truce. He guaranteed that in that case "they would be received and treated honourably."

POLITICAL AWAKENING

After announcing the specific offer to the F.L.N. leaders to come to Paris by way of Tunis and Rabat, the General went on to consider what should be the political conditions which the French Government would accept for such a meeting. His answer was that "the political destiny of Algeria is in Algeria itself." The referendum had taken place, legislative elections were about to take place, and next spring there were municipal and senatorial elections. "I say that this is a question of evolution." In any case, an immense change had begun in Algeria, and political solutions would reveal themselves according to developments.

He believed "that future solutions would have as a basis, because it is in the nature of things, the brave personality of Algeria and its close association with Metropolitan France. This ensemble, completed by the Sahara, I believe some day will link up in the cause of common progress with the free States of Morocco and Tunisia." In answer to those who wanted to know who would be the final victor, "I reply with the utmost conviction that it will finally be fraternal civilization."

The General added, speaking with the greatest emphasis, that it was the basis of French Algerian policy that qualified and able Muslim candidates should be returned to the French Parliament, and that Algeria should undergo "a political awakening." This would take rather a long time and would be accomplished little by little. But "the road ahead is open; we must follow it, there is no other way."

ATOMIC POWER SOON

General de Gaulle neatly refused an invitation to define French foreign policy, but on the disarmament question, he expanded more fully. He was convinced that the West would disarm straight away if the East wanted to, but as things stood, the French position had not changed. He recalled the French, British, and American declaration earlier this year about limitation and control of armaments being the aim, rather than the "false objective" of the suspension of tests. "Our allies have found it necessary, and I think that this is a pity, to modify their position," but France saw no reason to do so.

This was because, apart from the question of what had been agreed between the western Powers, "we now have the means to nuclear arms and the day is approaching when in our turn we shall take part in tests." While the three other Powers (United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union) were armed to the teeth, "France cannot be satisfied with a chronic and enormous inferiority." Moreover, when she was an atomic Power, "which will not be long now," she would have all the more chance to make herself felt in questions which were close to everyone—world security and disarmament.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

24/10/58

ALGERIA: GENERAL de GAULLE'S PEACE PROPOSALS

Leaders of the Algerian rebels have expressed interest in the proposal of the French Premier, General de Gaulle, for peace negotiations in Algeria. General de Gaulle offered a safe conduct to Paris for any representatives of the rebels to discuss an end to the war which has been going on in Algeria for more than seven years. General de Gaulle appealed to the rebels to lay down their arms and said: "A rule of war permits the enemy who desire peace to raise a white flag. I declare that all those who have been fighting so courageously will be treated with honour if they come forward". A spokesman for the head of the rebel Algerian Government said last night that the General's statement was encouraging. He said the rebel leadership would give close study to the proposal.

MR. CASEY'S RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Casey, will arrive in Sydney to-morrow after three months abroad visiting Britain, Europe and the United States. His aircraft was due to reach Sydney this afternoon, but has been delayed in Honolulu.

NEW BRIDGE ACROSS THE BOSPORUS

Plans have been announced for the construction of a huge bridge across the Bosporus and the narrow waterways which divide the European and Asian parts of Turkey. The bridge will have a clearance for shipping of a hundred and sixty feet, will be seventy-five yards wide and would cost more than £20 million. Russian, American, French, German and Japanese contractors have submitted tenders for the construction work.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

A.B.C. NEWS SUMMARY- FRIDAY, 24th OCTOBER, 1958.

12.30 p.m.

FAR EAST: MR. DULLES ON U.S. STAND

The American Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, said last night that when the Communists launched attacks in the Far East, United States had to stand firm. If it did not, there would be a breach in the defence line and the whole position of the Free World running down to Australia and New Zealand would be lost. Mr. Dulles was speaking at a television interview broadcast in London last night. It was recorded in Washington before his trip to Formosa for talks with President Chiang Kai-Shek. Mr. Dulles said United States would not attack or tolerate attacks against Communist China. Asked why America did not recognise Communist China, Mr. Dulles said the question of recognition was largely a play on words. There was no doubt the United States recognised Communist China as a fact and ..... expected that the United States had had more continuous dealings with Peking than had any other Free World country over the past ten years. However, he said diplomatic recognition would carry great advantages for Peking, turning over to it assets throughout the world and putting it in a position of prestige as regards the Chinese overseas population. Mr. Dulles was asked if there was any chance of moving towards peaceful co-existence with Communist regimes. He replied - "We go to meetings with the United Nations Security Council and we are told that we will probably get no more than fifteen minutes warning before practically the entire country could be obliterated. When faced with that kind of threat we have to build counter threats and deterrents and so the thing goes on mounting." Mr. Dulles said he could not see the likelihood of a disarmament formula which would work unless the root of the trouble was reached. This was the fear of massive surprise attack. He placed his greatest hope on the possibility of developing what he called "zones of strategic importance throughout the world". In these areas the likelihood of surprise attack could be substantially diminished. United States hope to discuss these next month with Russia.

UNITED NATIONS: DR. WALKER'S STATEMENT IN DISARMAMENT DEBATE

At the United Nations yesterday, Australia's permanent delegate, Dr. Ronald Walker, said that any disarmament measures adopted by the United Nations would have to impose suitable obligations on Communist China. He said the threat of war in the Far East lay in the disproportionate strength of the Chinese Communist military forces. Any agreement which did not impose obligations on Peking would fall short of what was needed for security in the Pacific. Dr. Walker was speaking in the disarmament debate in the General Assembly's main political committee.

LEBANON: WITHDRAWAL OF LAST U.S. TROOPS

The last American combat troops were air-lifted out of Lebanon yesterday marking the end of American intervention in the Republic. The American commander, General Adams, announced that the last American units made up of support troops would leave Lebanon by the end of the month. A total of 14,000 American troops were in Lebanon at the height of intervention. There are now fewer than 1,000 in the country. The withdrawal of British troops from Jordan is due to be completed within the next few days.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No: 25/2/11 E.
Date: 23-10-58.

COST OF DE GAULLE'S 5-YEAR ALGERIAN PLAN

EVEN MORE FRENCH CAPITAL NEEDED

From Our Correspondent

PARIS, OCT. 22

Having decided to tackle the Algerian problem from the economic and social angle instead of the political General de Gaulle committed his country to an ambitious and costly five-year programme. This is expected to take the heart out of the rebellion and ensure that the nine and a half million Muslims no less than the million Europeans will be content to remain a part of France, or at least of the new French Community or commonwealth.

The General promised the building of homes for a million, an addition to the labour force of 400,000, a level of wages "comparable" with that in metropolitan France, the schooling of one and a half million more children, the distribution of half a million acres of land on which 80 per cent. of the Muslims depend for a scant living. In addition, he promised the development, with the aid of Sahara's oil and gas, of steel, chemical and other industries besides communications and sanitation.

BURDEN OF CAMPAIGN

There is perhaps a chance that the rebellion will peter out, which would mean for France a saving in budget expenditure of several hundred million francs besides eliminating heavy but scarcely calculable costs arising from diversion of civilian manpower and production at home, and from imports of foreign war material. But if the programme is to be carried out it would seem that the average annual burden for five years to come must be at least equal to the direct costs of the military operations at their maximum of the last four and may well exceed them, while after the end of the five years, even if the targets are attained, the burden is bound to continue.

It is, therefore, the financial aspect of General de Gaulle's solution for the Algerian problem that is attracting most criticism in France. The General has had nothing to say about this aspect of the problem which is understandable on political grounds. He cited no figures on costs. But some idea of them may be obtained by reference to plans prepared by experts in the past few years including the basic one known by the name of Maspetiol appearing in 1954 and the most recent one which began to come into operation some 12 months ago. All extended not over five but over 10 or more years and all set lower targets than those mentioned by General de Gaulle.

For instance, they proposed to provide elementary schooling for 850,000 children by 1965 as against the 300,000 out of 1,900,000 of school age in 1953, but a critical Senator pointed out some time ago that by the former date, owing to rapid growth of the number of such children, they should total some 2,450,000 so that there would be as many excluded from all schooling as 12 years earlier. If two-thirds of the boys and girls are to be attending school five years hence it means then that over a million and half must be at school by 1963, if the General's target is to be reached, at a total investment of some 200md. francs involving an annual expenditure of 36-40md. francs.

Similarly for the wage target. Previous plans were content with an annual rise of average earnings only a little less than that in France, or rather less than 4 per cent. But that would leave the disparity between the two unchanged, at some 25 per cent. Again in respect of housing the Maspetiol plan contemplated accommodation for 735,000 in 10 years instead of a million in five. That would have meant a construction rate seven or eight times the current one and the starting at any rate of 200,000 to 220,000 new homes in the first five years.

Finally as to the 400,000 jobs promised for Algerians, 100,000 of which are to be offered in France; previous targets have been vague, but it is to be noted that the wholly or partly unemployed have long been averaging close to a million. Agricultural reforms and Sahara oil exploitation can contribute little towards a remedy; and even if the Sahara fulfills its promises as a provider of energy, it cannot dispel Algeria's shortage of resources in raw materials or, except with time, of skilled and poor productivity of the unskilled native labour. In the energy-oil-mining sector, says the official commentator on last year's plan, only 2 per cent. of the labour employed in Algeria is represented.

In any case the outlays foreseen in the Maspetiol and the 1957 plans are considerable, not only compelling reliance on French public funds to bear the main burden of investment because most of it can be only indirectly reproductive, but also implying a heavy contribution from private French capital. The earlier plan, in fact, contained an estimated total of 4,700md. francs, and, in the last five years of the 10, estimated annual demands for current and capital expenditures of 200md. francs on the Treasury, and about the same total on private investors. The plan launched last year was content with a total of 2,800md. francs of which the State was to furnish 1,300md. in subsidies and loans, and private capital 1,500md. Both plans, of course, supposed a termination of the rebellion.

According to unofficial reports the new five-year plan will begin its first year with investment demands totalling 200md. francs, of which certainly the major portion must be furnished by metropolitan public funds, and they will rise in each succeeding year, while in the fifth the French Treasury will have to find over 100md. francs in grants and loans. Last year the Treasury provided Algeria (including the Sahara) with subsidies and advances to the tune of some 70md. for investment and 23md. for non-investment purposes. The Maspetiol plan foresaw the Treasury's share in the financing of investments rising by 15md. francs each year until it should become stabilized at 150md. in its sixth year. It is obvious, then, that to implement the new plan the restoration of France's external and internal financial equilibrium must be taken for granted.

INTERNATIONAL AID

Moreover the question also arises whether, in taking on the new task in Algeria, France may not find herself repeating the mistake of post-war years whose troubled course can be explained not solely by mismanagement of the national finances and economy arising from governmental instability but also by her assumption of the triple burden of colonial wars, social reforms, and reconstruction, the latter when accomplished to be followed by programmes of modernization and expansion. Thus a query seems justified—whether sooner or later she must not come to recognize that if in Algeria economic integration is really the road to political, it cannot be effected without international aid to which she was forced to resort so often in accomplishing her other tasks. But for that the same conditions must be fulfilled, pacification in Algeria, sound finance in France, and an ability and readiness on the part of her people for whom the retention of their last political hold on North Africa means sacrifices whether in peace or war.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Times — File No: 25/2/11 E

Published at: London — Date: 22-10-58

DECISION TO FREE 10 ALGERIANS

FRENCH RIGHT-WING DISQUIET

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, OCT. 21

General Salan announced in Algiers last night that he was about to set free 10 rebel prisoners captured under arms. The timing of the announcement has inevitably made it seem a response to the Algerian National Liberation Front's release of four French prisoners in Tunis a few hours previously.

This has disquieted right-wing circles in Algiers, who see the decision as an implicit recognition of the F.L.N., and as another step on the road to negotiations.

POLICY OF CLEMENCY

Colonel Lacheroy, General Salan's spokesman, pointed out to-day, however, that the decision to release the prisoners had been taken on General Salan's own initiative, without orders from Paris, and that it should not be construed as a move towards negotiations. It was simply another of the acts of clemency that were part of the Government's recent policy. Since May 13, 14,000 Muslim internees had been freed for reasons of clemency, and it was quite possible that a number of these had been captured under arms.

Colonel Lacheroy claimed that rebel activity was at a lower level than at any time for three years, and that the F.L.N. were daily showing new signs of latitude. There was fresh evidence, he claimed, of quarrels between their leaders. Last week no rebels had been detected crossing the frontier from Tunisia, but 643 rebels had been killed or captured elsewhere during this period.

This is not the first time that the military command in Algiers has made optimistic statements of this sort; often in the past they have simply been followed by a renewal of rebel pressure. This time there are more grounds than usual for sharing official optimism about the military situation. The results of the referendum and of General de Gaulle's new liberal policy are discouraging the rebels, according to certain independent reports.

COMMUNISTS CONVERTED

The Socialist Party to-day accepted the request to join their ranks made by two leading ex-Communists, M. Pierre Hervé and M. Auguste Lecoeur. The Socialists said: "We hope ardently that your decision will be justly appreciated by all the workers." Many observers think it possible that the lead given by M. Hervé and M. Lecoeur will induce at least some of their habitual Communist electors who voted "yes" at the referendum to follow this up by transferring their allegiance from the Communist Party to the Socialists at the elections.

For this type of lukewarm Communist, it is one thing to vote for General de Gaulle on a special occasion, but a much more difficult step to vote for the Socialists, whom in many ways they mistrust. They need a strong lead, which is perhaps what has now been offered. M. Hervé, an intellectual, has only a limited influence in working class circles, but M. Lecoeur was organizing secretary of the Communist Party for four years until his expulsion in 1954, and undoubtedly he still has a certain popular following.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London Date: 21-10-58

ALGERIA REBELS FREE CAPTIVES

4 FRENCH SOLDIERS HANDED OVER

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, OCT. 20

Four French prisoners released by the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) were to-day handed over to the French Ambassador in Tunis by a delegate of the "Algerian Red Cross." The exchange took place at the headquarters of the Tunisian Red Cross, under the supervision of International Red Cross officers from Geneva.

The four prisoners are all national service men captured in an ambush at Sakiet, near the Tunisian frontier, on January 11. They are said to be thin but in good health, and are being flown to Paris to-night in a French military aircraft. Their release is the first fulfilment of recent F.L.N. promises to give up French prisoners. It had been understood that 20 men would be released, but nothing was said to-day about the other 16.

READY FOR TALKS

A French Government spokesman was quoted in an American television interview during the weekend as saying that there was no question of political negotiations with the F.L.N., but the Government was ready at any moment to consider operational cease-fire talks. The F.L.N., he said, was only an element of the Algerian population and could not pretend to speak for Algeria. General de Gaulle had said several times that he would "do the rest" with the freely elected representatives of the entire Algerian people. If the rebels really wanted peace they had only to demand it directly, without propaganda or pre-conditions, in the form of cease-fire talks.

M. Mitterand, one of General de Gaulle's chief opponents during the referendum campaign, took up the same argument in a rather different form in an article published to-day. He said that according to information he had received, the F.L.N. would secretly allow candidates to present themselves at the elections, and if they were elected it would authorize them to negotiate in its name with the French Government.

M. Mitterand acknowledged General de Gaulle's "honest objectivity" and thought that his present Algerian policy faced up to the realities of the situation. He knew that this policy would displease those who had brought the General to power. Just as the right wing have long pretended that General de Gaulle's Algerian policy is the same as their own (*i.e.*, integration), so now M. Mitterand and M. Mendès-France are doing the same thing in reverse.

PRIESTS ACCUSED

The Abbé Carteron, the Roman Catholic priest wanted by the Lyons police on suspicion of having aided the F.L.N., and who had been missing since Thursday, gave himself up late last night. He and another priest, the Abbé Magnin, were charged with "seeking to damage the integrity of the territory" and then granted bail. The Archbishop of Lyons declared to-night that there was no evidence that the two men had done more than offer moral and spiritual aid to the Muslims in the mission where they were working.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 20 - 10 - 58

THE VANISHED PRIEST OF LYONS

ALLEGED AID TO F.L.N.

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, Oct 19

The dilemma of the worker-priests in France who became so identified with their working-class environment that some of them were in danger (so their critics said) of absorbing Marxist ideas is recalled, though in another way, by the arrests or questioning of priests who are now charged with or suspected of having given aid and comfort to members of the F.L.N. (Algerian National Liberation Front).

One of them was arrested at the Saclay atomic centre near Paris, where he has been employed as an engineer, and a warrant has been issued for the arrest of another. At Lyons two priests, members of a missionary community, have been questioned by the police, and a third is wanted.

CONSULTATION IN ROME

For a long time Church leaders in France have adopted a reserved and, so far as it has been decorous for them to express it, somewhat critical attitude towards the policy of "Pacification" in Algeria. They have been a good deal more outspoken on alleged tortures of Muslim suspects and other alleged irregularities in Algeria, though they have always been careful to include in their condemnation of such methods the acts of terrorism which might have provoked them.

In regard to the present series of arrests, the responsible authorities are clearly at pains, as they were when suspicions roused by a few worker-priests brought that remarkable movement under fire, to see that allegations shall not be taken as facts or that their priests as a whole shall not be condemned unfairly.

The Assistant Bishop of Lyons, who is the Superior-General of the Prado, the missionary foundation which is now under suspicion, has issued a statement claiming that the case has been presented in a false light by the Press. "In reality," he says, "the priests in question have always wished to remain on a basis of spiritual and moral mutual aid." The affair has apparently created a stir at Lyons, and on Friday the Vicar-General of the diocese left for Rome to consult Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyons.

It was Cardinal Gerlier who selected the Abbé Carteron, the priest whom the police wish to question but have failed to find, to carry out a special mission among Algerian workers in the Lyons area.

LEVIES IMPOSED

The Lyons arrests followed police inquiries which led to the Prado seminary, which for some time now has been a refuge for workless or homeless Algerians. The police claim that the Abbé Carteron, who speaks Arabic and knows North Africa well, not only served as a "post office" for F.L.N. correspondence, but distributed funds for F.L.N. "social services"—*i.e.*, for the families of F.L.N. agents on the run or in prison. The money did not come from diocesan funds but, according to the police, from levies imposed by the F.L.N. in France on as many Algerians as they could reach.

The Abbé Carteron on Friday celebrated Mass as usual at a Lyons church, but seems now to have vanished. Thirteen persons were arrested. Most of them are said to be members of the F.L.N., but they also included the father superior of the seminary and his assistant. Both these have been provisionally released, and no charge seems to have been made against them. The work of the Prado mission in working-class areas and among the young people of Lyons has for generations been highly regarded there.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 20-10-58.

ANGLO-U.S. ACTION SUGGESTED TO END ALGERIA WAR

FERHAT ABBAS CALLS FOR UNIFIED WESTERN POLICY

From Our Correspondent

CAIRO, Oct. 19

A plea for the adoption by the western Powers of a unified policy likely to stabilize their relations with the Arab States has been put forward in Cairo by Ferhat Abbas, Prime Minister of the "provisional Government of the Algerian Republic." He also reiterated his Government's readiness to negotiate with the French at any time and said that it had no intention of becoming involved in the dispute between Tunisia and the United Arab Republic.

In an interview with Correspondents yesterday at the Algerian Nationalists' (F.L.N.) headquarters, the 59-year-old leader, who has the reputation of being a "moderate Nationalist," indicated, in answering questions, his conviction that only on the basis of such an integrated policy, fully respecting Arab aspirations, could relations between the three main western Powers and the Arab countries become more satisfactory.

One of these aspirations, he made it clear, is Algerian independence. His argument implied that the United States and Britain ought to intercede with France in an attempt to secure an Algerian settlement.

SAME OBJECTIVES

He scoffed at recent assumptions that the declared readiness of the F.L.N. to talk with the French without insisting on prior recognition of Algerian independence represented a change in Nationalist policy. "The objectives for which we struggle have not altered," he said. "It is only that the time has come when I can meet any French Government without preconditions because now a government is holding legitimate sovereignty from the people."

Desiring an atmosphere more conducive to negotiations, the Nationalists had proclaimed an amnesty applying both to their French prisoners and to Algerians. This, he said, was not a sign of weakness.

Ferhat Abbas, who spoke throughout in French—his first language rather than Arabic—said that General de Gaulle's action in removing the military from the colonists' public safety committees in Algeria was "a start." General de Gaulle was showing courage but it was not enough. On the day when the French Prime Minister "is strong enough and has courage enough" to say that the Algerian people were not French it would be possible for them to contemplate some new form of association with France, embracing economic, social, and cultural ties.

RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE

They made no secret of the fact that they would welcome any actions by General de Gaulle which seemed to them to be steps in the right direction, but the present measures ignored a basic truth—that the Algerians were not French and had an indisputable right to independence.

"For more than a century," he said emotionally, "Algeria has been like a mouse in a French laboratory, fastened down while the French try experiments on it." The Algerians were not second-class citizens. This had lasted long enough.

The F.L.N. had regarded the recent French referendum as a secondary affair, not worth a battle. True, they had secretly ordered the Algerians not to vote, but they had said also that if by not voting they incurred any risk to life or property, then they should go to the polls. In any case the result was null and void so far as the Algerians were concerned; how could they still be conducting the struggle with the French Army if it was not with the help of the populace? "Do you think we have cooks among our forces?" he said. "Of course not. It is the women from the villages who bring the soldiers food at night."

PERSONAL QUARREL

The quarrel between Tunisia and the United Arab Republic would have no repercussions on the Algerian war. The Nationalists were friends of both parties and would continue to look to them for support. He regarded the affair largely as a personal matter between President Bourguiba and President Nasser. The Nationalists had no intention of mediating.

With regard to the Arab League decision yesterday that its members should pay £12m. annually to the free Algerian Government, Ferhat Abbas emphasized that this entailed a sacrifice, as the States concerned were poor. In the four years since the start of the fighting the F.L.N. had received a total of some £4m. from other Arab countries.

Ferhat Abbas discoursed freely on several points during the interview. He gave the impression of being a man who would go a long way in the hope of ending the killing in Algeria, whose problem he regards as "political and psychological, not military."

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

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25/2/11

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

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FRENCH AFFAIRS - No. 70 October 1958

PREMIER DE GAULLE ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN ALGERIA

Following is the full text of the letter sent by General Charles de Gaulle to General Raoul Salan, Delegate-General of the Government and Commander in Chief of the French Armed Forces in Algeria on October 9, 1958:

"My dear General:

"The Government has decided that Algeria, like Metropolitan France, should elect its representatives to the National Assembly on November 23 next.

"This election will be carried out in Algeria on the basis of majority vote by list with a single ballot.

"The higher interest of the country demands that the elections be held under conditions of absolute freedom and sincerity and that lists of representatives of all tendencies—I say of all tendencies—should be able to solicit, competitively and on an equal footing, the votes of the electorate.

"Consequently you will be good enough to conform to the attached directives.

"Cordially yours,

(Signed) "Charles de Gaulle."

General Instructions for Preparations for the Legislative Elections in Algeria

"(1) The elections must be fair. All opinions must have an opportunity for expression and all candidates must be allowed to present themselves and to campaign, whatever their platforms may be, including whatever concerns the status or the political destiny of Algeria.

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"It shall be up to the responsible authorities to ensure the candidates of the various parties the exercise of this right. No measure restrictive of this freedom and imposed by the requirements of law and order may be taken except after consultation with the Control Commission. Only those individuals who take part in terrorist activity and who, in consequence, have criminal charges brought against them will be excluded.

"Seizures of local or Metropolitan newspapers may not be ordered unless the incriminated articles are of such a nature as to entail judicial prosecution.

"(2) I consider it extremely important that there be real competition, in other words, that opposing lists of candidates be presented. The worst pitfall would be the establishing of single lists that were favored by the official authority.

"The goal to be reached consists in having an Algerian political elite freely come to the fore. Thus the political vacuum that has opened the way to the ringleaders of the rebellion can be filled.

"(3) Civil servants and soldiers presently in Algeria or whose period of service there terminated less than a year ago could not be authorized to become candidates.

"The time has come, moreover, when soldiers must stop taking part in any organization of a political nature, whatever the reasons that, under the circumstances prevailing in Algeria since last May, may have, on an exceptional basis, justified their participation. Henceforth nothing could any longer warrant their belonging to such groups. I order soldiers to resign from them without delay.

"(4) The measures taken in the execution of this instruction shall be reported to me."

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AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES October 1958
No. 117

PREMIER DE GAULLE OUTLINES HIS PROGRAM FOR ALGERIA

Following is the text of the speech delivered by General Charles de Gaulle at Constantine, Algeria on October 3, 1958.

Last Sunday, three and a half million men and women of Algeria, without distinction of community, in complete equality, gave France and myself their vote of confidence. They did this quite simply without any constraint and in spite of the threats that certain fanatics brought to bear against them, their families and their property. This is a fact, as clear as the bright light of day. And this fact is fundamental not only because it mutually and forever pledges, one to the other, Algeria and France, but also because it ties in with what happened that same day in Metropolitan France, in the Overseas Departments, in the Territories of the Community.

The least that can be said of this great demonstration is that the French people proved to themselves and to the entire world their determination for renovation, and that, at the same time, a hundred million men decided to build their future together in Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

With regard to Algeria, what is the future to which France is calling her? Women and men of Algeria, I have come here to tell you what it is.

What must be achieved is the basic transformation of this country, so brave, so alive, but also so full of difficulties and suffering. This means that it is necessary for the living conditions of each man and woman to improve from day to day. This means that, for the benefit of the inhabitants, the resources of the earth and the ability of the elites must be brought to light and developed. This means that children must be taught. This means that all Algeria must have her share in what modern civilization can and must bring to men in terms of well-being and dignity.

But the loftiest plans call for practical measures. Here are the measures that my Government intends to take in the near future covering the next five years by virtue of the full powers that the new Constitution has just conferred upon it.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

During these five years, of the young people in Metropolitan France--yes, I say in Metropolitan France--that enter the service of the State, in the Administration, in the Army, in education and in the public services, at least a tenth of these young people must be recruited from the Arab, the Kabyle and Mozabite communities, and that without prejudice to an increased proportion of Algerians serving in Algeria.

In the course of these five years, salaries and wages in Algeria will be raised to a level comparable to what they are in Metropolitan France.

Before the end of these five years, 250,000 hectares [617,500 acres] of new land will be allotted to Moslem farmers.

Before the end of these five years, the first phase of the plan for the agricultural and industrial development of Algeria will be brought to its conclusion. This phase includes, in particular, the delivery and the distribution of the oil and gas of the Sahara, the setting up, on this soil, of great metallurgical and chemical complexes, the construction of housing for a million people, the corresponding development of health services, of roads, ports, means of communication--in short, the regular employment of 400,000 new workers.

Gradually in the course of these five years, two thirds of the girls and boys will be enrolled in school and, during the three years after that, complete school enrollment of all Algerian youth will be achieved.

During these five years, the human contact that has been made especially by the French Army--by its career officers, its reserve officers, its fighting men, its young conscripts--will be continued and developed and, in Metropolitan France, the same must be true, in Paris and in our provinces.

What will be the political consequences of this evolution which calls for very extensive and prolonged efforts? I believe it is quite useless to freeze in advance, in words, that which, in any event, is going to take shape, little by little, as it is undertaken. But, in any case, two things are certain as of now: the first concerns the present.

In two months, Algeria will elect her representatives under the same conditions as will Metropolitan France. But at least two thirds of her representatives will have to be Moslem citizens.

The other refers to the future. The future of Algeria will in any event--because that is the nature of things--be built on a double foundation: her personality and her close solidarity with Metropolitan France.

In any case, it is absolutely essential that this fruitful transformation be accomplished. This is necessary for the good of the men of Algeria, for the good of the women, for the good of the children who live here; but it is also necessary for the honor of mankind. It is necessary for the peace of the world. For no one has any interest in the stagnation of a people, except the kind of people, who, to serve their ambitions, gamble on the spirit of revolt and the poverty of others.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

This transformation, this immense political, economic, social and cultural task--who could effect this transformation, if not France?

Now it happens that France has the will and the means to do so. It also happens that the vote of the Algerians has just proved that they desire this transformation and that it should be carried out with France.

Therefore, turning toward those who are prolonging a fratricidal conflict, who are organizing lamentable attacks in Metropolitan France, or who are spreading--through the chancelleries, through underground dens, by means of the radios and the newspapers of certain foreign capitals--vilifications of France, to those I say: Why kill? We must enable people to live. Why destroy? Our duty is to build. Why hate? We must cooperate.

Stop this absurd fighting and you will at once see a new blossoming of hope over all the land of Algeria. You will see the prisons emptying; you will see the opening up of a future big enough for everybody, and for you yourselves in particular. And then, speaking to those States which are throwing oil on the fire here while their unhappy peoples writhe under dictatorships, I say: Could you do what France is in a position to do here, what only France is capable of doing? Could you people do it? No. Then let France carry on, unless you deliberately decide to envenom the conflict in order to distract attention from your own difficulties. But in the present state of the world, where can these bitter incitements lead if not to a universal cataclysm? Only two paths lie open to the human race today: war or brotherhood. In Algeria as everywhere, France, for her part, has chosen brotherhood.

Long live the Republic! Long live Algeria and long live France!

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES October 1958
No. 117

PREMIER DE GAULLE OUTLINES HIS PROGRAM FOR ALGERIA

Following is the text of the speech delivered by General Charles de Gaulle at Constantine, Algeria on October 3, 1958.

Last Sunday, three and a half million men and women of Algeria, without distinction of community, in complete equality, gave France and myself their vote of confidence. They did this quite simply without any constraint and in spite of the threats that certain fanatics brought to bear against them, their families and their property. This is a fact, as clear as the bright light of day. And this fact is fundamental not only because it mutually and forever pledges, one to the other, Algeria and France, but also because it ties in with what happened that same day in Metropolitan France, in the Overseas Departments, in the Territories of the Community.

The least that can be said of this great demonstration is that the French people proved to themselves and to the entire world their determination for renovation, and that, at the same time, a hundred million men decided to build their future together in Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

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In two months, Algeria will elect her representatives under the same conditions as will Metropolitan France. But at least two thirds of her representatives will have to be Moslem citizens.

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Long live the Republic! Long live Algeria and long live France!

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Observer London File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at Date 19. 10. 58

ALGERIA

Light in the Darkness

TWO major events cast a little ray of hope on what until last week had seemed the unrelieved blackness in Algeria.

First was the news from the rebel side that they were ready to open negotiations with the French without insisting—as they had always done before—that the recognition of their right to independence was a necessary preliminary to talks with France.

In two consecutive interviews their leader, former French Deputy M. FERHAT ABBAS, declared they would be ready to talk to France on the limited question of cease-fire or on broader issues. He proposed that two representatives from either side should meet on neutral territory.

Firm Hand

Secondly, the long tradition in which the Army and local political machine in Algeria had effectively blocked a more liberal policy from Paris was peremptorily shattered by GENERAL DE GAULLE himself who, in a terse directive, dated October 9 and published on Monday, to the Commander-in-Chief, GENERAL SALAN, declared that the coming elections must be free.

His orders were:—

(a) That the candidates, whatever their views on "the political tendencies of Algeria," must be free to campaign and to run.

(b) That no newspapers must be suppressed unless they infringed the criminal code. (Up till then left-wing papers were regularly forbidden: *Le Monde* had just been seized in Algiers for publishing the Ferhat Abbas peace offer.)

(c) That members of the armed forces must keep out of politics and leave the Committees of Public Safety where, in harness with the French settlers, they have been running Algeria since the May 13 insurrection.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Observer — File No: 25/2/11E.

Published at: London — Date: 19 - 10 - 58.

COMM

FIVE months after the Algiers coup, General de Gaulle is well on his way to settling the rebellion of Frenchmen in Algeria which brought him to power. But no settlement of the Muslim rebellion is yet in sight. Civil war in France has been averted, but despite all improvements in the situation, the Algerian war goes on.

General de Gaulle's order to the French Army in Algeria to keep out of politics reflects his increased strength in France; but his ultimate intentions in Algeria remain mysterious. By re-establishing the authority of Paris over Algiers and splitting the army away from the settler politicians, the General has broken a dangerous combination: he is now in a position to pursue an Algerian settlement quite different from that envisaged by the men of the May 13 coup. But all his statements and plans so far leave the eventual political status of Algeria undetermined. It may be that at this stage of affairs, as in Cyprus, vagueness about the future is necessary in order to bring about a cooling down of communal fears and tempers.

It is in these terms, rather than as serious evidence of the wishes of the Algerian Muslims, that the recent referendum and the forthcoming elections must be seen. The F.L.N. leaders, now formed into a government in exile, have, on their side, recently moderated their negotiating position. They no longer insist on French recognition of Algerian independence as a condition for cease fire talks. But their condition for a cease fire itself would be recognition of Algerian sovereignty. Will General de Gaulle take the next step forward towards peace talks? It would be an historic act of great courage.

National Archives of Australia ... 1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Sun Herald
Published at: Sydney
File No: 2/1/2/11 E.
Date: 19.10.58

FRENCH MOVES OVER ALGERIA

de Gaulle wins in clash with Right

"Most Right-wingers believe de Gaulle intends to integrate Algeria into metropolitan France."

FACT'S London News Bureau

General Charles de Gaulle this week cleared another obstacle: He won in a clash with some of the fanatical Right-wing Algerian settlers who helped to bring him to power.

BUT the clash was more dramatic than decisive.

The General's plans for France and Algeria remain shrouded in mystery, and his authority will be fully tested only when he finally reveals where he is going.

For the moment he has confirmed that, wherever it is, he means to get there in a democratic fashion.

When he originally clashed with the settlers a fortnight after his installation he could assert his independence, but not his authority over them.

Fourth rebuff to the Right

This week, with 80 per cent of the French nation behind him, he clearly felt stronger and acted more firmly.

The issue was once more his refusal to become the instrument of a Right-wing authoritarian faction.

This is the fourth time the General has angered his Right-wing supporters.

The first time was when he included Socialists and the representatives of other political parties in his Cabinet.

The second was when he refused extremist demands to suppress political parties in France.

The third was when he insisted on an electoral arrangement that will favour moderates at the general election on November 23—five weeks from today.

This week he stepped in dramatically to ensure free elections in Algeria and promised to fly over to see that his orders were carried out.

De Gaulle ordered Army officers to get out of politics in Algeria.

More sensationally, he ordered that candidates of all political views should be allowed to stand, including those who favoured Algerian independence.

He also ordered the organisation of electoral lists in such a way that Moslem candidates are expected to take nearly all the 77 seats allocated to Algeria in the French National Assembly.

The Algiers Public Safety Committee promptly ordered a general protest strike and issued a proclamation which said: "The hour is grave. The fruits of our victory of May 13 are in danger. . . ."

But the Army stood firm and the strike collapsed before it started.

Most colonists are not alarmed

General Salan, General de Gaulle's Delegate-General in Algeria, banned the strike. And General Massu, the paratroop leader, obediently resigned his presidency of the All Algeria Public Safety Committee.

When its civilian members called out, "Stay . . . you must stay," he shrugged his shoulders and simply said, "It is no use going on about it."

However, only an extreme minority of the settlers was involved in this week's clash with de Gaulle.

The reason is that most of the colonists have seen nothing in de Gaulle's orders and statements to create alarm.

Although candidates of all views will be allowed to stand in Algeria, a ban remains on F.L.N. (Algerian National Liberation Front) and Communist candidates.

And there are unlikely to be any non-F.L.N. candidates available for any nationalist platform.

Meanwhile, de Gaulle is not only disguising his intentions, but also is remaining all things to all men.

After his referendum speech in Constantine on Algeria's future and his orders this week on free elections for Algeria, there remain millions of Frenchmen of violently opposed political views all believing equally firmly that the General intends to carry out the policies they want.

They cannot all be right!

Right-wing expects integration

Most Right-wingers believe he intends to integrate Algeria into metropolitan France and smash the F.L.N.

Socialists and moderates believe he means to accord Algeria some kind of semi-autonomous status in the French community and negotiate a settlement with the F.L.N.—which has twice offered talks without strings in the past fortnight.

Staggering cost of economic plan

One thing is sure: France cannot afford De Gaulles' grandiose five-year plan for raising the living standards of nine million Algerian Arabs so long as the Algerian war goes on—and possibly cannot afford it even if the war stops.

The plan's estimated cost is £7,000 million sterling, and one expert predicts that, if it is implemented, it will mean a fall of 20 to 30 per cent in French living standards—an almost impossible sacrifice to ask of any nation.

British observers this week doubted whether the plan would ever be implemented.

They also doubted whether it would wean the Algerian Arabs from their determination to be independent.

Most of all, they puzzled over de Gaulle's intentions. He has spent five months consolidating his power. What will he finally do with it?

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times — File No: 25/2/11E.

Published at: London — Date: 17-10-58

GEN. DE GAULLE'S BLOODLESS VICTORY IN ALGIERS

EUROPEAN DIEHARDS CALL OFF STRIKE

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, Oct. 16

To-day's trial of strength between General de Gaulle's Government and the European extremists in Algiers has ended in a bloodless victory for the General—the first time for many years that the word of Paris has prevailed in such a matter over that of Algiers. Shortly before the general strike called by the extremists of the committee of public safety was due to begin this afternoon, the inner committee voted by a narrow majority to call off the strike. The afternoon and evening in Algiers were undisturbed by any incidents, and in shops, cinemas, public services, and elsewhere work went on normally.

In the 24 hours preceding their formal retreat, the diehards of the committee of public safety saw their methods—if not their cause—increasingly condemned. General Salan, the Government's representative in Algiers, returned late last night from his talks in Paris with General de Gaulle, and promptly forbade the strike. General Massu, the parachute commander and acting prefect in Algiers broadcast a warning that the Army would oppose any public demonstrations. During the night, 18 members of the committee dissociated themselves from the strike order; so did Dr. Sid Cara, the Muslim president; and M. de Sérigny, editor of the *Echo d'Alger*, resigned from the committee.

APPEALS TO PUBLIC

This morning, the remaining members of the committee of public safety were stoutly maintaining their stand and issuing appeals for a public meeting on the Forum this afternoon. "We have been betrayed," said a tract, referring to General de Gaulle's orders to the Army to keep out of politics and to arrange for candidates of all tendencies (terrorists excepted) to stand at the forthcoming elections in Algeria; the tract also announced that General Massu was being transferred to Madagascar, a rumour which was later officially denied.

Towards midday a delegation of the diehards was received by General Salan, and soon afterwards the inner committee, now calling itself the public safety committee of May 13, instead of the much larger Algeria-Sahara committee, voted by 13 to 10 to cancel the strike order.

Nothing was said about calling off the demonstration in the Forum, but the afternoon passed off without any sign of it. The committee's decision was announced in a statement which referred to "information furnished by General Salan" and to the desire to avoid any hindrance to the Army, "which has our total confidence." In spite of the cancellation, the authorities were running no risks, and discreet precautions against disorders were taken, with Army broadcasting vehicles relaying appeals for calm by General Salan and General Massu.

DOUBTS PERSIST

If the prestige and authority of the de Gaulle Government over the Army and most of the civilian population in Algiers has thus been convincingly demonstrated, and the extreme diehards isolated and neutralized, there are still wide differences in the interpretation of General de Gaulle's Algerian policy. M. Mendès-France and many other Liberals have welcomed with enthusiasm the General's instructions to the Army, and the arrangements to secure truly free elections in Algeria. But this welcome makes the new policy—if such it be—doubly suspicious in the eyes of the right wing in France and Algiers; and it is clear that even some of those who dissociated themselves from the original strike order are restive and anxious.

Thus the 18 members of the public safety committee, among them M. de Sérigny and some of the Muslims, who came out yesterday against the strike, said in a statement issued at the time that while they disapproved of "the immediate means envisaged," they would continue to fight with their colleagues for the total integration of Algeria and the Sahara with metropolitan France, and for the disappearance of the "system" from French politics. The statement implored General de Gaulle "to make his position clear, so as to dissipate the dramatic ambiguity resulting from his instructions to General Salan."

ELECTION PROCEDURE

General de Gaulle's detailed instructions for the elections in Algeria, addressed to the head of the electoral commission, require the commission to see that no pressure is put on anyone to stop him being a candidate. The commission must ensure that "each candidate is free to campaign on the same conditions and in the same way as in metropolitan France," and that, if needs be, adequate protection is provided for this purpose. There must be no discrimination against any candidate of whatever political shade, provided he conforms to the requirements of the law (i.e., no member of the Algerian National Liberation Front or the Communist Party, both of them proscribed, can be enrolled as a candidate).

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

CONFIDENTIAL

POL.443/10/1

20/2/11

TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 15.15 Hours 16th October, 1958.
Received: 08.30 Hours 17th October, 1958.

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR W. NO. 889. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed United Kingdom High Commissioners Colombo, Accra, Kuala Lumpur No. W889, repeated others.

My telegram circular W. No. 435 Saving.

WEEKLY SUMMARY 37.

Following is first part. Begins.

ALGERIA. In Press interview on October 10th Ferhat Abbas, FLN Prime Minister of "Provisional Algerian Government", is reported to have offered to negotiate cease fire with French. No mention was made of independence as pre-condition. At same time FLN announced release of some French prisoners. In some French quarters offer has been interpretted as a sign of weakness on part of FLN who notably failed to prevent massive Muslem participation in French referendum. General de Gaulle's reaction to offer is not yet known. But his instructions to Army in Algeria to withdraw from politics and indications of his readiness to see candidates of all shades of opinion standing at forthcoming elections, suggests that he may be prepared to consider negotiating cease fire and permit members of FLN to stand as candidates.

TUNISIA. After accusing United Arab Republic (U.A.R) at Arab League meeting on October 11th, of attempting to dominate League, Tunisian delegate announced at Press conference that Tunisia was withdrawing from current

CONFIDENTIAL /League

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

League session because of lack of faith between Tunisia and U.A.R. Tunisian Government made it clear that they resent continued presence and activities in Cairo of Salah Ben Youssef, President Bourguiba's exiled opponent.

League Council meeting on October 13th. In absence of Tunisian and U.A.R., delegations unanimously denounced Tunisian accusations and invited U.A.R. Delegation to resume participation in League meetings.

U.A.R. Government reacted strongly to Tunisian challenge and Cairo radio vigorously attacked President Bourguiba describing him as Imperialist agent and enemy of Arab Nationalism. President Bourguiba's reputation in Tunisia (as Nationalist leader) stands high and Tunisia radio is putting out strong counter campaign.

League Council subsequently invited Tunisian Delegation to return to current session but on October 15th it was announced that Tunisia had decided to break of Diplomatic relations with United Arab Republic. Ends.

2. (To all except Colombo, Accra and Kuala Lumpur). Above has for most part appeared in Press. You may nonetheless wish to make use of it with Commonwealth authorities.

SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Age File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: Melbourne Date: ~~29~~ 17-10-58.

ALGERIA COMMITTEE CALLS OFF STRIKE PLAN

"Remain Calm" Plea by General Salan

From A.A.P.-Reuters

ALGIERS, October 16—The Algiers Public Safety Committee, weakened by sudden resignations, today postponed indefinitely the general strike it had called for this afternoon to protest against General de Gaulle's Algerian policy.

The committee announced its decision after a delegation had called on the Government Delegate-General (General Raoul Salan) who had said he would not tolerate the stoppage.

The vote to call off the strike was 13 to 10. The communique issued by the committee, which said it spoke in agreement with all other committees in the region, declared that the strike was being postponed "in the higher interests of the nation, to preserve the unity of the public safety organisation and in the desire to avoid embarrassing the army, which has its entire confidence."

As the committee met, army loudspeaker vans toured the streets appealing to the population to remain calm and not to respond to the civilian committee's call for a strike and demonstration in the forum at 3 p.m.

As the zero hour for the strike approached the committee sent a delegation to meet General Salan who had said he would not tolerate the stoppage.

The committee's supporters distributed tracts repeating their strike call and alleging that General Jacques Massu, former president of the committee, was to be transferred to Madagascar.

The committee, which was sitting in permanent session this morning, was widely divided over the demonstration.

By mid-morning today five prominent members of Public Safety Committees were known to have resigned, including M. Alain de Serigny, Right - wing editor of "L'Echo D'Alger," a newspaper which usually expressed the viewpoint of the European settlers.

The demonstration had also been condemned by both Moslem co-presidents of the committee, M. Sid Cara and M. Azem Ouali.

Two Moslem emissaries of the Public Safety Committee sent in haste to Paris yesterday to see General de Gaulle ended by repudiating their own committee.

After talking to one of the general's officials, they announced that they dissociated themselves from the strike call.

The All-Algerian Public Safety Committee, now a purely civilian body after the withdrawal from it on Tuesday of army officers on General de Gaulle's orders, called the strike yesterday.

Its purpose was to protest against General de Gaulle's order withdrawing military members from the Public Safety Movement set up on May 13 in the anti-Government revolt which led to the General's return to power.

Another purpose was to protest against the French Premier's instructions aimed at ensuring completely free elections in Algeria next month, under which candidates advocating independence for Algeria are given full facilities.

General Salan's office later denied that General Massu was being transferred to Madagascar.

French Bank Rate Reduced

PARIS, Oct. 16.

The French bank rate was today reduced from five per cent. to four and a half per cent.

The five per cent. rate — the highest since the war — had been in force since August 12, 1957.

Today's cut was seen as the first move to ease France's credit squeeze, which has been effective for 18 months.

The cut in the bank rate announced by the Bank of France has not been followed by reductions in other interest rates.

The bank announced that the Government bill rate would remain unchanged at 3 per cent. and that the rate for advances against securities would be unchanged at 7 per cent. — A.A.P.-Reuters.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

20/2/11

:FPG

I.18030

Dated: 16th October, 1958
1020

Rec'd: 17th October, 1958
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

460 SECRET

Repeated Savingram London 83.

Algeria.

1. General de Gaulle's speech of the 3rd October at Constantine in effect inaugurated policy of practical "integration" at any rate on a substantial scale and on the lines planned by Soustelle (my memorandum 647) to which de Gaulle has come around.

2. On the other hand de Gaulle has now got Soustelle into line with regard to his own personal policy regarding Algerian elections and in particular the admission of candidates "of all tendencies". The Prime Minister's blunt letter and instructions to Salan created a marked impression here. They have evidently been well received by the Army in Algeria as coming from de Gaulle who is also Minister of Defence. General Massu took them readily and has set the example by immediate resignation from Algiers" Committee of Public Safety.

3. General Salan is in Paris and de Gaulle saw him yesterday. Publication of the letter must have been galling for Salan but de Gaulle seems to have given him a private assurance that he would never negotiate with the Rebel Algerian "Government".

4. On the other hand it is now likely that among some 45 Moslem Deputies to be elected next month there will be several Nationalists leaders committed to independence.

5. General Catrou was recently in Cairo (before the referendum) and seems to have had talks with Ferhat Abbas (on which I hope to advise shortly).

6. Ferhat Abbas has (ø) had Bourguiba as one of his main people. He may be in a quandary if relations between Tunis and Egypt completely deteriorate and he may even have to leave Cairo.

7. There have been some significant alignments in internal party politics. Pleven's breach with Mitterand splits their small but important party and it could be Mitterand may now move further towards the Left while the African leader Houphouet - Bogny remains with Pleven.

Stirling.

(ø Corrupt group)

17th October, 1958.

A/ MIN & DEPT E.A.(25/2)
P.M.'S.
SEC A/Ss L. UN AM&SP CASE SP E.A/P&ME EC A/P&ME INF
DL P.C&.M

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DIGEST OF DESPATCH No. 47 of 16 Oct 1958

RESTRICTED

file 25/2/11

ALGERIA

There have recently been two important developments bearing upon Algeria. The first has been a deliberate F.L.N. terrorist campaign in France itself, beginning about 25th August with attacks on oil installations and climaxed so far with the attempt last week to assassinate M. Soustella, the Minister for Information, near the Arc de Triomphe. The second was the proclamation in Cairo on 19th September of a "provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria" by Ferhat Abbas and the announcement of the members of the "Government".

The Terrorist Campaign

Since the attacks on the oil installations, the terrorist campaign has, with the exception of the attempt on M. Soustelle's life, taken the familiar form of cold-blooded murder of policemen and soldiers. The campaign has had considerable success in terms of lives taken, but otherwise it is hard to see what the F.L.N. have gained or hope to gain from it.

The objectives of the F.L.N. appear to include the following: -

(a) To create a state of tension in metropolitan France in the hope that the French people will press for the end of the conflict in Algeria:

(b) To bring about the return to France from Algeria of some of the security forces there:

(c) To add to the economic burden of the Algerian conflict:

(d) To discredit General de Gaulle on the eve of the referendum:

(e) To draw world attention to the Algerian problem on the eve of the General Assembly's latest attempt to seek a solution with the hope of influencing the outcome in the Assembly:

(f) To disorganise French production. There are between 320,000 and 400,000 Algerian workers in metropolitan France, mostly industrial workers. Terrorism could lead to loss of their services as the security forces may have to police their activities closely.

It is doubtful whether the F.L.N. can mount terrorist attacks of such a scale as could lead to any considerable satisfaction of the first five objectives, and there is also the distinct possibility that terrorism may harden such French opinion as there is in favour of a negotiated settlement in Algeria without a prior military victory.

The "Provisional Government of Algeria"

The reason why the F.L.N. have chosen at this particular time to set up their long-threatened government in exile can, it seems, be boiled down to two only:

(a) To influence the Algerian vote in the referendum:

(b) To influence the discussion of Algeria in the General Assembly.

It is difficult to see how either objective can be gained. The combination of "the colonels and the colons" in Algeria should be able to ensure that Algeria votes "oui" in the referendum while the lines are already drawn so tightly in the United Nations that one cannot see them being changed very much, if at all, by this new development.

/ The French Government

RESTRICTED

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

The French Government has so far taken the establishment of the "provisional government" with restraint. Immediately after the announcement in Cairo, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that France would regard recognition of the government as a hostile gesture; recognition would also put in doubt the stability and normality of any recognising government. Apart from this statement, there has been silence on the part of official French sources.

According to the press here, recognition of the F.L.N. regime has so far been accorded by the U.A.R., Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Morocco. The press has also reported that Washington, London, Rome, The Hague, Brussels and Athens do not intend to extend recognition, while New Delhi and Djakarta are troubled by the fact that the regime does not have control over the territory of Algeria. The local press says also that recognition by Moscow is imminent and one newspaper has reported that Communist China has already recognised the F.L.N. regime.

The establishment of the regime puts Tunisia and Morocco in a difficult position. It is not yet clear just how the French Government will react to their recognition of the regime, although clearly the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments had no alternative but to recognise, and perhaps General de Gaulle will await the outcome of the referendum before deciding this question. A severe reaction could inflate the significance of the F.L.N's move. However, it seems very doubtful that Tunisia and Morocco can expect French aid to continue to flow without at least some interruption. It is likely also that General de Gaulle is counting on the outcome of the referendum in Algeria to be a considerable riposte to the F.L.N. His hopes in this respect should be fulfilled.

A spokesman for the Arab League is to-day reported as saying that, although the League's Charter only permits the admission of independent states, the F.L.N. regime can be considered as such. The same spokesman is reported as adding that the Political Committee of the League has approved an annual grant of £ Egyptian 12,000,000 to the F.L.N. and the U.A.R. and Iraq have promised to pay their shares of the grant. The entry of the F.L.N. regime will no doubt be considered at the next session of the League Council which meets on 1st October.

On the general plane, the most disturbing aspect of the establishment of the F.L.N. regime for Algeria appears to be the hardening it represents of the attitude of the rebels at a time when, with the referendum in France just about out of the way, General de Gaulle may be on the point of getting down to thinking about ways of resolving the Algerian problem. The move may turn the General away from any inclinations he may have had towards a negotiated settlement without prior pacification; it certainly strengthens the hand of the principal opponents of such a move, the colonels-colons combination in Algeria.

Another worrying aspect of the F.L.N. move is that the declaration of Abbas was made in Cairo and his "government" will meet there at least until it decides upon its headquarters. M. Bourguiba may privately welcome a decision on its part not to come to Tunisia, while Colonel Nasser would no doubt be glad to have it continue in Cairo. The tie between the F.L.N. and Nasser, whatever the decision as to the headquarters of the F.L.N. regime, has been made stronger; it will be even stronger still if the regime is admitted to the Arab League and seats itself in Cairo. The boundaries of the empire Nasser dreams of may be in the process of extending northward.

PARIS MEMORANDUM NO. 713

22nd September, 1958

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper The Times
Published at London

File No 25/2/11 E.
Date 16. 10 - 58.

GEN. DE GAULLE DENOUNCED IN ALGIERS

OPPOSITION TO ELECTION PLAN

EXTREMIST STAND

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, Oct. 15

While in Paris to-day General de Gaulle discussed with General Salan his instructions for the Algerian elections which will permit candidates who desire to do so to campaign for independence, the opposition of the European extremists in Algiers began to assume a more active form.

The Algeria-Sahara committee of public safety, indignant at the withdrawal of its Army members, called for a general strike and a mass rally to-morrow afternoon (*i*) to demonstrate against political parties "which wish to liquidate Algeria"; (*ii*) to demand the return of the military to the public safety committees; and (*iii*) to prevent the Army's being deprived of the civil powers now in its hands.

'SHAMELESS INGRATITUDE'

The committee distributed leaflets in the streets of Algiers which said:—

The hour is grave. The fruits of our victory of May 13 are in danger of being lost. The political parties, more insolent than ever, are once more inspiring Government policy. The Prime Minister's incredible decision to permit Communist and F.L.N. propaganda in the election contest has no other aim than that of politicizing the elections in Algeria as much as possible, by preventing the election of men free from political blemish.

The pamphlets complain that the Army, having saved Algeria from surrender, was now being treated by General de Gaulle with shameless ingratitude.

The committee to-day sent telegrams to right-wing leaders in Paris urging them to act, and two Muslim delegates from the committee arrived in Paris this evening to plead their case with General de Gaulle and were received at the Hotel Matignon. What happens in Algiers to-morrow will show whether or not the committee still has the support of the European population.

CHANGED SITUATION

Reports from Algiers suggest that most Europeans are not greatly worried by General de Gaulle's measures. The situation has changed since May 13. The extremists no longer have the Army behind them, and Algiers now faces not the weak Pflimlin Government but a man of unique prestige with the mandate of 80 per cent. of French voters behind him.

Many officers are said to be glad to be rid of their political duties, and some are quoted as saying that their efforts to win Muslim cooperation are likely to be aided. In Paris most comment continues to be favourable. Even the right-wing *l'Aurore* praises a move which it describes as loyal to the most republican tradition[illegible]

M. Delbecque, the [illegible] of the May 13 committee, a notorious enemy of the Fourth Republic system, to-day repudiated the public safety committee's attitude on the present issue and announced his approval of General de Gaulle's measures; he thought that the public safety committees had survived their usefulness.

OUTLAWED PARTIES

General de Gaulle to-day also saw M. Debré, the Minister of Justice

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M. Delbecque, the prime organizer of the May 13 plot, "a solonious enemy of the Fourth Republic system," to-day reproached the public safety committee's attitude during the present crisis and announced his approval of General de Gaulle's measures; he thought that the public safety committees had outlived their usefulness.

OUTLAWED PARTIES

General de Gaulle to-day also saw M. Debré, the Minister of Justice, M. Brouillet, the Secretary-General for Algeria, and General Ely, the Army Chief of Staff. M. Brouillet said afterwards that candidates would be allowed to express all manner of views about the future of Algeria, provided they did so in a peaceable manner and did not encourage the rebellion.

He added that the Communist Party and the F.L.N. would remain outlawed, and candidates from these organizations would not be permitted.

This remark has caused some speculation. It is wondered where General de Gaulle expects nationalist candidates to come from if not from the F.L.N.; for the "moderate" nationalists, if such there be, are lying very low, and it will be hard to persuade them to put forward candidates if the F.L.N. are excluded and threaten reprisals.

Messali Hadj, the leader of the F.L.N.'s moderate rival, the Algerian National Movement, issued a statement to-day from the island off the west coast of France in which he is exiled.

POSSIBLE SOLUTION

He said that General de Gaulle's meaures might lead to a solution of the Algerian problem, provided that cease-fire negotiations were first held between the French and the nationalists. He criticized the F.L.N. as well as the social and economic reforms announced by General de Gaulle at Constantine. He said that these tended towards integration, a solution rejected by the Algerian people.

These reforms were discussed by General de Gaulle and his advisers to-day. It was decided to increase to 90 per cent. in some places the percentage of local posts in the public services in Algeria reserved for Muslims.

Security police have arrested the Abbé Boudouresques for having allegedly given help and shelter to Algerian terrorists, in particular men involved in the recent attempted murder of M. Soustelle.

AT ATOMIC CENTRE

The arrest was carried out at the French atomic centre at Saclay, where the priest, a former pupil of the École Polytechnique, worked as an engineer. He took orders after the war, and was a member of the Mission de France, the organization which included many worker priests until they were banned.

The police claim that Boudouresques was the organizer of a whole network for sheltering members of F.L.N. special groups, and of an escape route for terrorists on the run. Another priest and his brother and sister, who are alleged to have sheltered terrorists, have also been arrested.

ALGIERS, Oct. 15.—After returning from Paris this evening General Salan banned the strike called for to-morrow by the all-Algeria committee of public safety.—*Reuter.*

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 2/1 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Age
Published at: Melbourne.
File No. 25/2/11 E.
Date 16.10.58.

ALGERIA COMMITTEE CHALLENGES FRENCH P.M.

From "The Age" Correspondent and A.A.P.

PARIS, October 15—The Algerian Public Safety Committee today called for a general strike and demonstration tomorrow to protest against General de Gaulle's orders for free elections in Algeria next month.

This follows the French Premier's order yesterday to French officers in Algeria to quit politics and the public safety committees.

The 12 officers on the Algiers Public Safety Committee walked out of yesterday's meeting, led by the president (General Massu).

When the civilian members tried to restrain them, General Massu retorted: "We have received our orders.

Today a communique issued after a meeting of the civilian members of the committee said: "The hour is grave. All the fruits of our victory of May 13 (when the public safety movement started) are being put in question.

"Political parties, more insolent than ever, are again inspiring Government policy."

"Incredible"

The statement continued: —

"The incredible decision of the head of the Government to open electoral competition in Algeria to Communists and progressionists, as well as to National Liberation front (Algerian insurgents) propaganda, has the sole aim of making Algerian elections as political as possible, while preventing men without political taint from being elected.

"The only orders of exclusion made by the Government are against the soldiers who, not being able to present themselves for election, become second-class citizens.

"What is more, the most unpardonable and the most gratuitous disavowal has been made of those who have saved Algeria from abandon, despair and fear by obliging them to leave the Public Safety Committee, of which they were the binding force."

GENERAL MASSU.

It was an alarmed Algiers that today took the news of General de Gaulle's instructions to General Salan, separating the army from politics, and insisting on the right of all opinions to be represented among electoral candidates.

French Nationalists in Algeria had presumed that the lack of expression of opposition would be allowed to continue, and that Algeria would contribute to the National Assembly 70 hand-picked deputies elected on unopposed lists.

It is now considered in some quarters that General de Gaulle's move may hasten the end of the Algerian war.

Rebel Offer

The Prime Minister of the Algerian Rebel Government (Mr. Ferhat Abbas) yesterday repeated in much more emphatic terms the proposal to negotiate that he originally made in his Government's own organ.

In an interview with the correspondent of a West Berlin newspaper, he said his Government made no preliminary conditions for opening negotiation on any subject that the French Government might choose.

The impression in Paris, therefore, is that for the first time on both sides a serious effort is being made to manoeuvre into a position from which attempts to terminate the war could be made.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

RWS:ABK O.13024.

Sent: 16th October, 1958.
1145.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO.

Australian Embassy,
RANGOON.

Australian High Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

REPEATED SAVING FOR INFORMATION TO ALL OTHER POSTS

SAVINGRAM AP56 CONFIDENTIAL

F.L.N. Algerian "Government".

We have been approached by French about the possibility that certain Asian and Ghana Governments may recognise the so-called Provisional Free Algerian Government established by F.L.N. in Cairo on 19th September.

2. We understand that similar approach was made by French to Canadians who were asked to urge non-recognition on Pakistan and Ghana. We are informed that Canadians felt unable to do this but that they promised to make known to all Commonwealth Governments their view that recognition should not be extended.

3. We have told the French that we doubt wisdom of formal approach but would ask you to take any suitable opportunity that might arise to make our views known informally. The French agree that an informal raising of the subject would be preferable.

4. In answering Parliamentary question on 23rd September, Acting Minister for External Affairs stated that we do not recognise Algerian "Government" in Cairo but recognise France as being responsible in Algeria.

5. In our view F.L.N. "Government" was established largely for purpose of dissuading Algerians from voting in recent Constitutional referendum. Results of the referendum show that a large proportion of Algerians disobeyed F.L.N. ban on elections, and this casts doubt on claim of F.L.N. to represent wishes of Algerians. Approximately two-thirds of the Algerians eligible for the franchise voted. The basis of voting was universal adult franchise.

6. F.L.N. "Government" does not fulfil normal requirements for recognition particularly since it does not exercise and has never exercised sovereignty in Algeria. (This point is important in relation to Australian recognition of the Government of the Republic of China and of the Western

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM. 2. 0.1302.

European Governments which were established in London during World War II. In the latter case the lawful governments were dispossessed by armed invasion assisted by internal subversion, and in the former (China) the legal Government which is still recognised by a majority of countries, has been in part displaced by the Communists).

7. Further arguments against recognition are that rebel "Government" -

(a) was not established through consultation with or agreement by Algerians; and

(b) cannot carry out normal international obligations in respect of Algeria.

8. The F.L.N. "Government" has not provided any cogent reasons for ignoring above considerations. In Australian eyes it will be an obstacle to the working out of a solution by the French which will satisfy genuine Algerian demands for greater autonomy. Further, recognition of F.L.N. "Government" by those countries which concede United Nations competence (which we do not) implies commitment to a particular solution for Algeria, and this would seem to be inconsistent. According to the information presently available, the F.L.N. "Government" has so far been recognised only by Arab League States excluding Lebanon, Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and Indonesia. Russia and European satellites so far show no signs of recognising.

New Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur.

9. If opportunity arises please speak informally to Government to which you are accredited and acquaint them with our views. You should not of course reveal that your approach results from French request. Please report any reactions.

Other Posts

10. You may draw on above information in informal discussion.

A/MIN. & DEPT. D.A. (167/2/2) 16th October, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AN EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P.

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times — File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London — Date: 15-10-58.

"NO CONDITIONS" FOR ALGERIA TALKS

FERHAT ABBAS AND NEED TO END WAR

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BERLIN, OCT. 14

Ferhat Abbas, the Prime Minister of the "provisional Government of the Algerian Republic," said in an interview published to-day, by the west Berlin newspaper *Der Tag*, that his Government would agree to any kind of negotiation with France. The interview was given in Tunis to the newspaper's Paris correspondent. Kerim Belkacem, Ferhat Abbas's War Minister, was present.

Asked whether negotiations between his Government and France would have to mean French recognition of Algerian independence, Ferhat Abbas said: "We have asked for no conditions and not for the recognition of independence. I will repeat that again to-day. We have also not linked any propaganda intentions with our proposal. It was made only to put an end to the unspeakable suffering that this war has already brought. The Algerian war is a terrible tragedy."

He said he knew General de Gaulle was a great patriot and a man of good will. "We are no enemies of France but want cooperation with the French on the basis of new bonds as soon as we have reached independence. We must make concessions to win our people for cooperation with France after all they have gone through."

RESTRICTED TOPICS

Asked whether it would not be easier for a French Government to negotiate on restricted topics such as the exchange of prisoners of war, he said: "We agree to any kind of negotiation. The negotiated topics can be drawn closer or wider. In practice, we think that one or two from each side should meet at a neutral place to talk about a programme."

Ferhat Abbas said the release of prisoners by the Algerian side was done solely for humanitarian reasons. "We have put no conditions to it, nor have we asked for anything in return. We shall continue to liberate the prisoners no matter what the reactions on the French side are." He said the prisoners were still in French territory. They would be handed over to the Red Cross in Tunisia and Morocco.

Asked how these humanitarian intentions compared with the order to increase terrorist acts in France, Ferhat Abbas said one newspaper had wrongly put such an order into his mouth. In reality the F.L.N. (Algerian nationalist) organization in France had asked for more than a year for such an increase of terrorist activity. "We have long refused it before we gave our agreement a few weeks ago—but with the restriction that the attacks are to be limited to military targets and economic aims of military importance. The civilian population should be spared, also the police."

Asked whether the placing of a bomb on the Eiffel Tower (a time-bomb was found there on September 23) could serve the fight against the French Army, he said: "You know that orders are broken everywhere in the bitterness of fighting." Asked whether this meant that theattacks were not to be continued, Kerim Belkacem answered: "Our Government has discussed this. We have not yet taken a decision."

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 752

6th October 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

Attached are copies of General de Gaulle's speech which he made at Constantine, Algeria, on 3rd October, 1958. The speech is notable in two respects, one positive and one negative.

As regards the positive aspect, General de Gaulle mapped out a generous programme for improving the political and social status of the Muslim population of Algeria, which the General described would mean the "profound transformation of Algeria." The specific points in the programme enumerated by General de Gaulle were :

(a) At least one-sixth of those taken to metropolitan France in the next five years to join the French Public Service will come from the Arab, Kabyle and Mozabite communities;

(b) In the next five years pay-levels in Algeria will be brought up to the same level as those in metropolitan France;

(c) In the same period, 625,000 acres of new land will be distributed to Muslim labourers;

(d) Again in the same period, the first phase of the "agricultural and industrial development of Algeria" will be completed. This phase will include the production and distribution of the oil and natural gas of Algeria, the establishment in Algeria of large metallurgical and chemical plants, the building of housing for one million people and regular employment for an additional 400,000 workers;

(e) Again in the same period, education facilities will be provided for two-thirds of the children of Algeria. Within eight years such facilities will be available for all Algerian children.

As regards the political part of the positive aspect of the speech, General de Gaulle pledged that at elections in two months' time, Algerians would elect representatives under the same conditions as the people of metropolitan France elected their representatives, subject to the proviso that at least two-thirds of the Algerian representatives would be Muslims.

The negative aspect of the speech concerns the future political status

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

of Algeria. As regards this, the General ~~has~~ said that the referendum "mutually engaged forever both Algeria and France." However, later in the speech he said that: "As to the political status of Algeria, I think it is completely pointless to set forth in advance through words what, in any case, will little by little make itself evident." He later added that the future of Algeria would "in any case be built on a double basis: her personality and her tight solidarity with metropolitan France." These remarks about the political future of Algeria have been generally interpreted as meaning that General de Gaulle has declined - wisely - to commit himself for the time being to a solution, one way or another, of this fundamental problem.

The other point in the Constantine speech was an appeal to the Algerian rebels and to countries helping them (it is clear from the text that the General had in mind particularly the United Arab Republic) to stop the strife in Algeria and work with France for Algeria's development and prosperity.

While General de Gaulle was in Algeria, it was rumoured in the Paris press that General Salan, head of the Algerian Public Safety Committees, was about to be moved back to France to assume a high position in the French defence establishment. This rumour was proved false by General de Gaulle when, just before leaving Algeria, he wrote General Salan a letter telling him of the satisfaction the Government felt with the way the Army in Algeria had contributed to the success of the referendum. General de Gaulle also said in his letter that it was necessary to achieve, as soon as possible, the complete pacification of Algeria and he had confidence in General Salan to carry out this great task. Apart from saying that General Salan is to remain in Algeria, this letter makes it clear that the political, economic and social pledges which General de Gaulle announced at Constantine did not mean any relaxation in the military effort in Algeria; if anything, General de Gaulle wants this effort stepped up.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

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N. Y. H. T. 4/5 October 1958

De Gaulle Speech Text

By United Press International

CONSTANTINE, Algeria, Oct. 3.—*Following is the text of Premier Charles de Gaulle's statement here today:*

Last Sunday, three million and a half men and women of Algeria, without distinction of community and in total equality, gave France and myself a vote of confidence.

This is a fact as clear as the brilliant light of the skies. And this is a capital fact, for, first of all, it mutually engaged forever both Algeria and France. And, on the other hand, it occurred simultaneously in metropolitan France, in the overseas departments and the territories of the community.

In addition, the French people proved to itself and to the whole world unity in its rebirth. And, on the other hand, 100 million men decided to build together their future in liberty, equality and fraternity.

For Algeria, what is the future to which France calls her? Women and men of Algeria, I have come here to announce it to you: It is the profound transformation of this country—which is so courageous, so alive, but also so difficult and suffering—that must be accomplished.

This means that it is necessary that the conditions of life of every woman and man be improved every day. It means that the resources of the soil must be found and developed, it means that children must be educated. It means that all of Algeria must have a part of what modern civilization can and must give to men in welfare and dignity. . .

Moslem Proportion

In the course of five years, the young men who will go to metropolitan France—I repeat, metropolitan France—who will join the cadres of state, the administration, justice, army, education and public services, will have to be chosen to the proportion of at least one-sixth among the Arab, Kabyle and Mozabite communities, and this, regardless of a larger proportion of Algerians serving in Algeria.

In the course of these five years, the remunerations and salaries in Algeria will be brought to a level comparable with that of metropolitan France. Before the completion of these five years 250,000 hectares (625,000 acres) of new land will be given to Moslem laborers.

Before the end of those five years, the first phase of the agricultural and industrial development of Algeria will have been completed. This phase will especially include the production and distribution of the oil and natural gas of Algeria, the creation on her soil of large metallurgical and chemical plants, the construction of houses for one million persons, the corresponding development of sanitary equipment, roads, harbors, transmissions, and, finally, regular employment for 400,000 new workers.

Education Increase

In the course of those five years, two-thirds of the boys and girls will be provided with schooling, and three years after that will see the completion of the total education of all the Algerian youth.

In the course of those five years the human contacts, established especially by the French Army, its career officers, its reserve cadres, by its volunteers and young men of the contingent, will be pursued and built up and, in metropolitan France, it must be the same—both in Paris and in the provinces.

This profound evolution, where can it lead? As to the political status of Algeria, I think it is completely pointless to set forth in advance through words what in any case will little by little make itself evident. But, nevertheless, two things are certain right now: the first concerns the present.

In two months' time Algeria will elect her representatives in the same conditions as metropolitan France. But at least two-thirds of her representatives will have to be Moslem citizens.

The other thing concerns the future: the future of Algeria—and this is the nature of things—will in any case be built on a double basis: her personality and her tight solidarity with metropolitan France.

Necessary Transformation

In any case, it is absolutely necessary that this transformation should be carried out; it is necessary for the good of men from Algeria, for the good of women, for the good of children who live here.

But also it is necessary for the honor of mankind. It is necessary for peace in the world, since nobody can be interested in the stagnation of a people except that sort of men who in order to serve their ambitions count on the revolt and misery of others.

This transformation, this immense work—political, economic, social and cultural—who then can do it if not France? Yet it so happens that she wants to do it, and she has the means. And it so happened that the ballots of the Algerians proved that they want it to be done, and that it be done with France.

Therefore, turning to those who prolong a fratricidal struggle, who organize in France lamentable attacks, who disseminate through chanceries, offices, radios, publications from certain foreign capitals—to these I say: Why kill? We should live instead. Why destroy? The duty is to build. Why hate? One should instead co-operate. Stop these absurd combats and soon we will see hope flower everywhere in the land of Algeria.

Prisons Will Be Empty

We will see the prisons empty, and a future big enough for everybody—particularly for you yourselves—will open up.

Talking to those nations which are throwing oil on the fire while their peoples live painfully under dictatorships, I declare to them: what France is able to accomplish here, what France alone can realize, can you do? No. So, let France do it. Unless your calculations prompt you to further poison the wounds to cover up your own difficulties. But where can vicious incitements lead in the present world situation if not to a world-wide disaster?

Two roads only are opened before the human race today: war or fraternity. In Algeria, like everywhere else, France herself has chosen fraternity.

Long live the Republic, long live Algeria and France.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

U.N.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

25/2/11

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 754

7th October 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE COPY
15 OCT 1958
CANBERRA

Algeria

Reference is made to Embassy memorandum 752 of 6th October, 1958.

There has been little published so far in Paris about the reactions of the Algerians (that is Algerians in Algeria) to General de Gaulle's speech at Constantine on 3rd October. About the only report worth forwarding to the Department which has appeared up to date is the attached column from the New York Herald Tribune of today's date.

The column says that the Muslim population of Algeria is displaying little enthusiasm for the economic and social programme mapped out by General de Gaulle, some thinking that the war in Algeria will prevent its execution and others doubtful that France intends to execute the programme. Still other Muslims are reported as feeling that the programme is "politically empty."

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

UN to Canberra
E to retain.
HLO.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/1
Memorandum 764

9th October 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
15 OCT 1958
COPY

Terrorism in France

Reference is made to the Embassy's memorandum 739 of 2nd October.

On 7th October, 1958, General de Gaulle's Government announced that, acting under its emergency powers, the Government had sent back 300 Algerians from France to Algeria. Presumably these Algerians are suspected of terrorist activities and will now be tried in Algeria by military tribunals or put under detention in Algeria.

Terrorist activities in metropolitan France since the referendum seem to have subsided although incidents continue to be reported.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times
Published at London
File No 22/2/11 E.
Date 15. 10. 58.

ALGERIA ORDERS CARRIED OUT

PROMPT RESPONSE BY ARMY

DE GAULLE BOMBSHELL

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, OCT. 14

General de Gaulle's message to General Salan, instructing him that the forthcoming Algerian elections are to be organized in such a way that candidates of all tendencies are to be allowed to stand, and ordering members of the armed forces to withdraw from all political organizations in Algeria, has caused a sensation both here and in Algeria.

This morning, the military members of the Algeria-Sahara public safety committee in Algiers, led by General Massu, withdrew from the committee, in spite of the reluctance of the civilian members to see them go. Reports from Algiers speak of bitterness and anxiety among some Europeans there, while one report says it was the Muslim members of the public safety committee who were most upset at the departure of the soldiers.

The powerful ex-service men's committee in Algiers has issued an angrily worded statement expressing "profound anxiety" at what it considers to be the renascence of the political parties. An extremist European member of the public safety committee, who is president of the so-called "popular movement of May 13," appeals to "patriots of metropolitan France and Algeria" to fight against the "forces of the system which have not yet been eliminated."

END OF RÉGIME

In France those connected directly or indirectly with the "men of Algiers" are plainly subdued or disturbed by the General's bombshell, which not only opens up whole new fields of possibility for the future of Algeria but also puts an end in the most peremptory manner to the régime existing in Algeria since the rising of May 13—a régime in which the distinction between military and civil responsibilities had virtually disappeared. Generals may still be carrying out the functions of civilian prefects, but the Army as a whole has been told to get out of politics and stay out. In many other circles in France, ranging from genuine Gaullists to "liberals," there is undisguised pleasure and admiration at the General's latest move.

Thus M. Mendès-France, who campaigned against the new constitution, sees in the new directive for Algeria a "possible opening towards *détente* and peace." *Le Populaire*, the Socialist party newspaper, thinks that, coming after the Constantine speech, the General's instructions "mark a new stage towards the return of Republican legality in Algeria." Many people are asking themselves whether the General's attitude, combined with the seemingly conciliatory views now being expressed by Ferhat Abbas, head of the so-called provisional Algerian government, have not opened new vistas for the approach of peace in Algeria.

In practice, the activity of the public safety committees in Algeria has for some months now been much reduced, and some of the celebrated "Algiers colonels," who played such a leading part in the uprising of May 13, and later in Corsica, have gradually been transferred to operational areas, away from the delights of politics, or promoted and re-posted. None the less, Army officers [illegible] on the public safety com-

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3



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In practice, the activity of the public safety committees in Algeria has for some months now been much reduced, and some of the celebrated "Algiers colonels," who played such a leading part in the uprising of May 13, and later in Corsica, have gradually been transferred to operational areas, away from the delights of politics, or promoted and re-posted. None the less, Army officers remained on the public safety committees—there were 11, including General Massu, on the main Algeria-Sahara committee—and many people in France who supported General de Gaulle for other reasons regretted that he had never exerted his authority in a wholly convincing manner against the military enthusiasts for a new order.

FRIGID TONE

Now he has done so, and judging from reports from Algiers there is no question about his being obeyed. "It is no good going on about it," said General Massu this morning, when the civilian members of the committee tried to restrain him from going. However much they may dislike the substance and frigid tone of the General's letter, the soldiers will obey him where they refused to obey the leaders of the Fourth Republic.

Then there is the prospect opened up of a "new Algerian élite" emerging from the elections—an élite with which the General would, if his previous speeches be taken into account, be ready to consider the future of the territory. He has expressly ruled out terrorists as electoral candidates, but this does not seem to preclude Algerian nationalists who have been fighting as soldiers against the French, still less non-belligerent nationalist sympathizers.

Up to yesterday, it had been generally assumed that the 66 Algerian deputies in the new Assembly would all be "integrationists," of a faithfully pro-French disposition, who would vote on all issues with the right-wing block in the new Chamber. Now General de Gaulle has shown that he does not want this; and still more, that he expects the Army to guarantee conditions in which, if need be, critics and perhaps opponents of France can make their voice heard in the election campaign.

DELEGATES FOR PARIS

The Algeria-Sahara public safety committee, after meeting intermittently throughout the day, this evening elected Dr. Sid Cara, a Muslim member, its president; previously he shared the post with General Massu. It decided also to send two or more of its Muslim members to Paris to seek audience with General de Gaulle.

A statement announced that the places left vacant by the departing soldiers would be filled, and the committee would continue its struggle for the objectives of May 13: namely, complete integration of Algeria and the Sahara with metropolitan France as well as "national rebirth." The statement added that this work, which the people and the Army had sworn to carry through, "is far from being achieved."

According to the latest reports from Algiers, hostile reactions there are confined largely to the public safety committees and other "activist" European elements. The bulk of the European population is said to be calm and outwardly unconcerned. There is none of the atmosphere of popular disquiet that characterized the eve of the May 13 revolt.

Negotiation offer by Ferhat Abbas, page 10.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 26/1/1/1 PART 3

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 766

9th October 1958

25/2/11

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
ORIGINATE
9 OCT 1958
COPY

Algeria

It has been reported here that the Public Safety Committee for Algeria and the Sahara met in Algiers on 7th October to study the speech which General de Gaulle made in Constantine on 3rd October. The Committee is said to have issued a communiqué at the end of this meeting which makes the following points:

a) The most important point in General de Gaulle's speech was the promise of representation for Algeria in the National Assembly under the same conditions as those for metropolitan France. This pledge made Algeria a French departement indissolubly attached to metropolitan France;

b) The reference to an Algerian "personality" did not imply that the principle of "indissoluble attachment" would be questioned. This "personality" concerned only certain particular matters, notably the status of Algeria which merited special administrative and social measures similar to those which the people of Alsace/Lorraine enjoyed.

It will be seen from this announcement that the Public Safety Committee has interpreted General de Gaulle's speech as endorsing the integration of Algeria with France. The speech was, of course, open to this interpretation just as it could be equally well interpreted as endorsing the eventual independence of Algeria. ~~etc~~ .

E - retain .

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

LStL

O.13012

Dated: 15th October, 1958
1540

TO:

2/1/2/11

Australian High Commission,
ACCRA. 90

Repeated:-

Australian Embassy,
PARIS. Cypher SAV.48 (For information.)

CONFIDENTIAL

F.L.N. "Government" in Cairo has been recognised by Arab League States, Indonesia and Communist China, but not by Russia and European satellites. Acting Minister has stated in Parliament we do not recognise F.L.N. "Government" but recognise France as responsible in Algeria.

2. If suitable opportunity arises, please informally acquaint authorities in Accra with our view that not only does F.L.N. "Government" not fulfil normal requirements for recognition since it:

(a) does not exercise and has never exercised sovereignty (in contrast to Republic of China Government and Allied Governments in London during World War II, which were dispossessed by force);

(b) cannot carry out normal international obligations in respect of Algeria.

but also F.L.N.'s claim to represent wishes of Algerians is disproved by extent to which Algerians ignored its ban on participation in recent referendum.

A/- MIN. & D EPT. E.A. (167/2/2) Cost £5.4.2
P.M.'s 16th October, 1958

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E AF&ME INF C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

25/2/11

::HP

I.17892

Dated: 7th October, 1958.

FROM:

Rec'd: 15th October, 1958.

External Affairs Office,
L O N D O N.

Saving EX755. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Paris EX261, Washington EX795.

Algeria.

You will no doubt have seen reports of de Gaulle's speech at Constantine during his latest visit to Algeria, in which he announced a programme of action to raise industrial and agricultural wages in Algeria to the level of that in France, and other social and economic measures to benefit Algeria - without, however, indicating what political measures he had in mind.

2. The United Kingdom Consul-General in Algiers has reported to the effect that the General's speech and his five year plan for Algeria were received with consternation and sharp dissatisfaction by the local members of the Committee of Public Safety who commented "we have not acted only to see Algeria give independence in five years' time". Their first reaction was to try unsuccessfully to telephone General Massu.

3. The Consul-General thought there was good reason to believe that General Massu and the bulk of the Army were solidly behind the General and that the dissatisfaction of the Right-Wing elements would lead to no repercussions.

4. The Moslems seemed sceptical and the effect of the speech on the general situation would only become apparent slowly. Before the speech, the General was received in Algiers with emotional enthusiasm; but the Right-Wing press was now explaining that his plan was in fact integration.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
" " " Defence.

15th October, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAP&ME E
AF&ME INF DL MT C&P MR.EASTMAN
G
TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London Date: 14-10-58.

ITALY TURNS AWAY FERHAT ABBAS

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

ROME, Oct. 13

Ferhat Abbas, the leader of the "provisional Algerian Government" in exile, was refused permission to remain in Italy after arriving during the night at Ciampino airport from Tunis. He apparently intended to spend a few days in Rome. He was put on the next aircraft for Cairo, which left in the early hours. A spokesman of the Italian Foreign Ministry said that his passport was not in order.

On his arrival Ferhat Abbas was taken to a waiting-room and a guard was placed at the door. He was later joined by officials of the Tunisian, Moroccan, and of the United Arab Republic embassies. The Press were not permitted to meet him, but in reply to a written question he confirmed that the Italian authorities had denied him permission to stay.

He stated that he was in any case on his way to Cairo, where his "government" has its headquarters so that he was not unduly disturbed by the action of the Italian authorities. He had earlier told them that his reason for coming to Rome was to be present at the burial of Pius XII. His wife was allowed to remain, but she left this afternoon for Geneva.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No 29/1/4/2 E

Published at London Date 14 - 10 - 58.

DR. ADENAUER TO SEE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

BONN, Oct. 13

Dr. Adenauer is to receive Mr. Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassador, for discussions to-morrow. He is expected to protest against conditions in east Germany and the restrictions on inter-zonal travel, though Mr. Smirnov's official attitude is that this has nothing to do with Russia.

The Chancellor will also seek to discover whether there is room for a compromise between the east German proposal (supported by Russia) for a four-Power commission to discuss a German peace, and the west German proposal (supported by the western Powers) for a commission to discuss the German question. Dr. Adenauer will also sound Russian reaction to the idea of west German diplomatic relations with the satellite countries.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 14 - 10 - 58

GEN. DE GAULLE'S ORDERS FOR FREE POLL IN ALGERIA

STRICT BAN ON MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS

PARIS, OCT. 13

General de Gaulle to-day ordered complete political freedom in the campaign for the November 23 parliamentary elections in Algeria for all shades of opinion, including candidates who might demand independence for Algeria.

In a bluntly worded directive to General Salan, the Commander-in-Chief in Algeria, he said: "The target to reach is to enable an Algerian political *élite* freely to show itself."

NO NEWSPAPER SEIZURES

He forbade soldiers and Civil servants to stand for election and ordered members of the armed forces to withdraw from any political organization to which they belonged. He also forbade the seizure of newspapers printed locally or in France, unless they contained matter of a nature such as would result in a prosecution.

No restrictive measures were to be taken against the liberty of candidates, except with the consent of the electoral comission on the ground of public order, and the only persons to be excluded from standing as candidates, apart from soldiers and Civil servants, were "individuals who take part in terrorist action and as a result come under a penal charge."

General de Gaulle said: "I attach extreme importance to there being real competition, that is to say, that rival lists can exist. The worst danger would be the constitution of single lists favoured by the official authority. The target to reach is to enable an Algerian political *élite* freely to show itself. It is thus that we could fill the political void which opened the way to the leaders of the rebellion."

ORDERED TO REPORT

The directive ended with the words: "A report will be made to me of the measures taken for the execution of this instruction."

The trend of the directive was emphasized in a brief covering letter to General Salan in which General de Gaulle said: "The higher interests of the country demand that the elections shall take place in conditions of absolute liberty and sincerity and that lists representative of all trends—I say of all trends—can equally and at the same time seek the votes of the electors."

These are the firmest words sent to Algiers from Paris since the events there on May 13, which threw France into a turmoil and ended in General de Gaulle being called to power.—*Reuter.*

principal accused, who has failed to surrender to his bail and is not in court, the aim of the plot was to get rid of General Salan, considered too "soft," and replace him with General Cogny. Kovacs described how he had met General Cogny in Algiers to arrange this.

To-day, General Cogny denied the allegations. The first time he had seen Kovacs had been at the office of the examining magistrate; that was after Kovacs had been arrested following the death of General Salan's staff officer, and the discovery of the plot. Asked by the prosecution about a member of his staff who had been implicated in the preliminary evidence given by Kovacs, General Cogny said that it was possible that this man had discussed matters with M. Lacoste, then Resident Minister in Algiers, but that these discussions were fruitless and in no way had entered into any future undertaking.

OFFICER'S CRITICISM

At this point, the defence asked that what it considered to be an important deposition made by M. Lacoste, should be read to the court. In that document M. Lacoste told how he met General Cogny's staff officer in December, 1956, and how that officer began to use severe arguments and language about the régime and the Government. He said that only subversive activity would allow Algeria to be saved.

M. Lacoste said, according to his deposition, that there was nothing to be gained by activity of this sort. Later, he received the officer again, who asked him to see General Cogny, which he did. General Cogny confirmed his wish to replace General Salan as Commander in Chief in Algeria.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No: 25/2/11 E
Date: 13-10-58

ENDING ALGERIA DEADLOCK

HOPES RAISED BY CEASE-FIRE APPEAL

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, OCT. 12

The latest appeal by Ferhat Abbas for cease-fire talks in Algeria is regarded in official French circles as something more than a mere propaganda move. Coming so soon after the release of French prisoners, it is taken as a further sign that the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) is ready to make concessions and wants to end the present deadlock. The word "independence," it is noted, is still being used by the F.L.N., but it is no longer made a pre-condition of negotiations.

In an interview published in Tunis by the F.L.N. newspaper *El Moudjahid*, Ferhat Abbas said that the "free Algerian government," of which he is leader, was ready to put an end to the trial of strength which had lasted for four years in Algeria. It was ready to send delegates to discuss with the French the political and military conditions for a cease-fire. The newspaper's leading article referred to the Algerian people's unshakable resolve to secure independence, and to their desire to maintain friendly and constructive links with France.

GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

French officials, openly optimistic, claim that the F.L.N. has reached the end of its resources and is in disarray before the Muslim population's welcome for General de Gaulle's speech at Constantine. Even so, it is difficult for the French Government to reply to Ferhat Abbas's advances without appearing to recognize his "government." Thus on the French side extreme prudence is likely to be the watchword. Yet an increasing number of officials are of the opinion that a chance of discussing a cease-fire should not be missed, especially as genuine democratic elections in Algeria next month would be well nigh impossible without the cooperation of the F.L.N. If the F.L.N. were to accept a cease-fire, it is thought quite likely that General de Gaulle would allow Ferhat Abbas and other Nationalists to stand as candidates.

Le Monde was again confiscated in Algeria to-day, this time for printing an article analysing some of the implications of Ferhat Abbas's cease-fire call.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper Foreign Report- File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 9.10.58.

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL 591

RTMENT OF
IBRARY
RNAL AFFAIRS

Published by The Economist Newspaper Limited,
22, Ryder Street,
St. James's, London, S.W.1.

October 9th, 1958.

Foreign Report

CONTENTS

Way Ahead in Algeria
Chou says No to Dag
Free Trade in Limbo
Unemployment—Soviet style

Way Ahead in Algeria

General de Gaulle's policy in Algeria is becoming clearer, with news of conciliatory moves toward the Moslem rebels' National Liberation Front (FLN) seeming to indicate a more positive political approach than he put forward in his Constantine speech on October 3rd.

Earlier reports that the presence of General Catroux, a Gaullist liberal, in Cairo was connected with direct negotiations between the FLN and the French (see FOREIGN REPORT of September 25th) have now been confirmed by our special correspondent in Bonn, where the FLN maintains an office. The talks have been going on in Cairo for the past three weeks.

This suggests that the impulse to negotiate, felt on both sides, had brought about a meeting before either (*a*) the FLN announcement that a government-in-exile was being appointed, or (*b*) the General's 97 per cent triumph in the Algerian referendum. If the FLN sought to strengthen its hand by forming an administration which has since received formal recognition from the Arab states, General de Gaulle has countered with a demonstration of evident, and genuine, support among a section of the Moslem community in Algeria itself.

The General's policy speech at Constantine, like all his Algerian pronouncements so far, was not free from equivocation. Although expectations had been raised by the referendum result and by the choice of Constantine, a city which played only a minor part in the movement of May 13th, General de Gaulle clearly prefers a gradual unfolding ("what . . . will little by little make itself evident") to unsettling major changes at this time.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

But in the light of events outside Algeria, certain key phrases in the Constantine speech can be emphasised as evidence of what the gradual Gaullist evolution of Algerian affairs is intended to achieve, thus:

(i) *November elections:* General de Gaulle said Algeria would elect its representatives "in the same conditions" as metropolitan France, but that "at least two-thirds" of its representatives "will have to be Moslem citizens." The new electoral law, however, does *not* give Algeria the system of single-member constituencies that France will have. It is thought likely that, given the proportion of Moslems to Europeans on the electoral lists in the referendum, the Europeans would have found difficulty in reaching even their allotted one-third of representatives if the fight in each constituency had been reduced, on the second ballot, to one European against one Moslem. Under the list system the Europeans should do better.

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

(ii) *Algerian "personality":* The General used the same phrase as M. Mollet to signify the special status of the Moslem community and its desire to attain an identity of its own. But besides this, he said, its future would be built on "tight solidarity" with metropolitan France. The General's proposals for advances in Moslem education and experience in administration in the next five years must inevitably develop the Algerian "personality," while his industrial programme can only serve to increase Algeria's existing, and essential, ties to the French economy.

(iii) *Moslem moderates:* It is clear that the success of the General's measures must depend on the character of the representatives produced by the November vote. He is pledged, in his first Algerian speech, to seek the Moslem representatives with whom he will, in his own words, "do the rest." But his emphasis on the "profound evolution" which he expects in Algeria in the next five years suggests that he is not putting too much faith in this first batch of elected members alone. If he seriously intends to do business with the FLN at a later stage (and he spoke of "the prisons empty and a future big enough for everybody") this wariness is fully justified. A big question is whether, in fact, the FLN can admit the existence of any Moslem opinion other than its own.

The General did not go far enough in his Constantine speech to satisfy the hopes of the French liberals, like the Socialist leader in Marseilles, M. Defferre, who had urged him to take a more clear-cut stand. It is now thought unlikely that M. Defferre will contemplate accepting a post in the government (he had been strongly tipped for responsibility for colonial affairs) until or unless an Algerian solution is brought nearer. General de Gaulle is, however, understood to have insisted that his present policy is the only one which can work in Algeria.

In effect, it now rests on the basis that:

1. Integration, as a concept of one nation stretching "from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset" is impossible. (He said this privately to local dignatories at Rennes during the referendum campaign.)
2. Economic integration, however, is necessary in Algeria's own interests. It is also part of France's duty to the Moslem people to ensure that they receive its benefits. (The thesis of Mlle. Germaine Tillion in this sense is now widely quoted in Gaullist circles.)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL
OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.
Report-
File No. 25/2/11 E.
Date 9.10.58.

3. The first thing to do is to build a modern state in Algeria. Once this is seen to be under way existing political attitudes among the extremists on both sides may undergo important changes, making a compromise solution possible.

CONVERSION OF M. SOUSTELLE ?

M. Soustelle, once the brain behind the settlers' movement in Algiers, is now reliably reported to be an influential convert to the General's ideas. M. Soustelle is understood (*a*) to have been saying privately that total integration is unworkable, and (*b*) even to have envisaged the eventual participation of the more moderate leaders of the FLN in an Algerian administration. These reports are given credibility from the fact that M. Soustelle has always had certain ties with the Algerian Moslems, in contrast to the isolation of his successor, M. Lacoste.

The development of M. Soustelle's thought would be of particular importance if he were, as has been suggested, the General's choice for the first prime minister of the Fifth Republic. But opinion in Paris is now moving to the conclusion that General de Gaulle will not pick his prime minister, in the first stage, from among candidates like M. Soustelle (a considerable political figure in his own right) or M. Mollet (who also has ideas of his own). He is thought more likely to settle for a loyal Gaullist who would not have political importance but for General de Gaulle's own support, like the present Minister of Justice, M. Debré. The General's desire to make policy himself, if confirmed by the event, will have far-reaching repercussions in Algeria and, of course, throughout France.

General Salan's Future: Despite strong rumours that it was about to take place, General Salan's departure from Algeria has not yet resulted from General de Gaulle's last visit across the Mediterranean.

Two explanations have been given. One (officially) is that General de Gaulle refused to confirm the change because he strongly disapproved of the original leakage about it to the press, in which General Salan played a leading part. The other is that General de Gaulle talked generously of the new responsibilities he was putting on General Salan's shoulders, and dropped the name of de Lattre. General Salan interpreted this to mean that he would be made a Marshal of France. General de Gaulle was only thinking of the inspectorate-general of the forces. Time may now be needed to heal the wound.

Chou Says No to Dag

Backstage at the United Nations the air has been heavy with rumours that the Secretary-General might soon be setting off for Peking to try to sort out the conflicting interests of China, the United States and President Chiang Kai-shek. It is now reported from New York that although Mr. Dulles supports this proposal, Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, has turned it down flat. Since Mr. Hammarskjöld had already made it known privately that he would only take on the job of mediator if requested to do so by both the United States and China, the flying visit is off—at least for the present.

The Norwegians head the small group of UN delegates trying to damp down the flames of Quemoy. This is not an unfamiliar role for them. Mr. Hans Engen, Norway's

National Archives of Australia

permanent representative at the UN, was an active member of the fire brigade that tried to find a way out of the Middle Eastern deadlock during the emergency session in August. He has now been joined by his foreign minister, Mr. Halvard Lange, and the two have been busily manoeuvring between Mr. Hammarskjöld, Mr. Dulles and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko. Their hand was strengthened when Mr. Dulles finally agreed to drop his plan of introducing a resolution condemning Chinese actions, and decided instead to support the mediation idea either through (*a*) the Secretary-General; or (*b*) a small group of nations acceptable to both sides.

But the Chinese are not co-operating. The proposal was sent to them by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Mr. Einar Gerhardsen, through the Chinese embassy in Oslo. They were asked whether they would be willing to receive Mr. Hammarskjöld and discuss with him possible solutions to the crisis in the Formosan straits. Mr. Chou En-lai's answer pointed out that since his government was not represented at the United Nations "and its place wrongfully occupied by Chiang Kai-shek" he could not agree to the Secretary-General visiting Peking.

The uncompromising tone of this refusal surprised the Norwegians, especially as Mr. Gromyko had apparently promised Mr. Lange that he would put in a good word with Peking for the Norwegian proposal. They are wondering whether: (*a*) Mr. Gromyko really fulfilled his promise to ask Mr. Chou En-lai to give the suggestion fair consideration; or (*b*) Peking decided to brush aside the Soviet advice; or (*c*) the advice was offered in such a tongue-in-cheek way that Peking could ignore it with equanimity.

The Norwegians still have a second card to play. In the General Assembly Mr. Lange suggested that a small group of neutral countries should use its good offices to bring about a settlement. The weakness of this suggestion is that it may prove almost impossible to compose a group on which Washington and Peking would both agree.

PEKING'S WAITING GAME

The background to the Chinese refusal to meet Mr. Hammarskjöld may be that Peking is playing for higher stakes than could be obtained through the Secretary-General's mediation, thus:

(i) Although the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw make no progress, the Chinese believe it important to carry on with them. Their main reason for this is the assumption that at some stage the talks will be raised to Foreign Ministerial level. This would be a considerable prestige booster for China.

(ii) The Chinese feel that time is on their side. The US position has already softened considerably. But so far Mr. Dulles has only indicated that after a permanent cease-fire he would urge the Nationalists to thin-out their troops on the off-shore islands. He has stopped well short even of the Belgian Foreign Minister's suggestion that the coastal islands should be temporarily put under UN custody. The Chinese are standing out for more.

Over and above these strategic arguments for holding back, Peking may have decided that on personal grounds Mr. Hammarskjöld is not altogether acceptable as a mediator. Their reluctance to welcome him may be based on the following:

1. As a West European Mr. Hammarskjöld is automatically suspect politically.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 3022/1 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

25/2/11

H. Helmuth - retain AID 1760

TO: OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
PRETORIA (ACTING H.C.)
SALISBURY

RPTD: DELHI
KARACHI
COLOMBO
ACCRA (ACTING H.C.)
KUALA LUMPUR (ACTING H.C.)

(Dated 8th October 1958)

W. No.432 SAVING CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated to Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Accra and Kuala Lumpur.

My immediately preceding Savingram.

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S ALGERIAN POLICY

Little attention seems to have been given by press to problems arising from de Gaulle's speech viz:-

(i) The General skates around continuation of Algerian war. There seems no reason to suppose that rebel leaders will accept his appeal to stop fighting or that it will be possible for France to diminish existing military effort.

(ii) Despite vagueness of its outline, five year plan will obviously cost vast amount of money. "Less Echos" estimates that new investment in Algeria will require additional budgetary expenditure of over Frs. 200 milliard per year. In a leading article this paper describes Plan as "generous and ambitious", but points out that in addition to this commitment to Algeria, France has to construct and finance new African Community, to brace herself to meet competition of Common Market and finally to carry out her own Metropolitan investment programme. It is, therefore, essential for an overall financial and economic policy to be drawn up in Paris designed to achieve these objectives. At same time, Government will have to establish exact extent of sacrifices to be requested of tax payers and likely effect of plan on Metropolitan investment policy.

2. Immense financial effort that will be needed by France is recognised. It is more than doubtful whether bulk of French people are really prepared to accept this burden and France would probably require further outside assistance which might be forthcoming only if de Gaulle can stop the fighting.

3. It is fair to say that de Gaulle himself is convinced by his thesis and encouraged by spectacular success of referendum. If enough initial impetus is given to scheme in Algeria to make genuine impact on Muslim opinion there is perhaps hope that rebels, at least inside Algeria, will lose heart and "pacification" make more progress.

/(To Ottawa)

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

(To Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Pretoria, Salisbury)

4. Please inform Commonwealth authorities. High Commissioners in London informed.

(To Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Accra, Kuala Lumpur)

5. Above is for your own information only.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No 25/2/11E

Published at London Date 8. 10. 58.

TIMING OF ATTACK ON GEN. SALAN

WOUNDED GENERAL'S EVIDENCE

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, OCT. 7

When the "bazooka case" trial was resumed here to-day, an officer in General Salan's Cabinet produced evidence to counter the claim of the accused that they had planned their attack on General Salan for a time when his office would be empty and there would be little risk of other casualties.

Colonel Basset told the court he was present when the attack was made, and had been wounded by the bomb, which killed the officer standing next to him, Commandant Rodier. He alleged that the declaration of the accused was false, because the attack was made in the evening at a time when General Salan was surrounded by people, especially by his subordinate generals.

The five accused present thereupon told the court that this was not true. They had intended to attack General Salan at a time when his office was empty. The sixth and principal accused, René Kovacs, was again absent to-day. General Salan is expected to give evidence on Tuesday.

PARIS, Oct. 7.—As to-day's hearing was coming to an end, the prosecutor, Colonel Cornu, protested vigorously to the tribunal against action by a small aircraft which, he said, was flying over the barracks where the case is being heard and writing "Down with Cornu" with a smoke trail in the sky. The court was adjourned and all eyes turned skywards where the remnants of an advertising sign in skywriting were drifting away.—*Reuter.*

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

:FPG I.17438

Dated: 1st October, 1958.

Rec'd: 8th October, 1958

25/2 /11

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAV.EX.732 CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Paris Ex.254; Washington Ex.771
Austunat New York Ex210.

Algerian "government in exile".

Following are points from recent Foreign Office telegrams:-

(i) Morocco: French Ambassador called on Moroccan Prime Minister on 23rd September to tell him that French Government would be unable to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Morocco if all or part of the F.L.N. Government were established on Moroccan soil. He was given assurances that Moroccan Government did not intend to permit this; nor was the establishment of an Algerian Embassy at present in prospect.

(ii) Iraq: United Kingdom Embassy in report dated 22nd September pointed out that Iraq was first government to regonise F.L.N. regime and had pledged full support to it: this line was reflected in Iraqi press, and Algerian representative in Baghdad broadcast over Baghdad Radio on 22nd September.

(iii) Kuwait: United Kingdom representative reported on 28th September that reports published in Arab press and radio that Ruler of Kuwait had sent a congratulatory message of recognition to the F.L.N. regime were entirely untrue: the Ruler did no such thing. Unfortunately, however, an article had just appeared in the Kuwait Official Gazette welcoming the formation of the regime, and repeating the story of the Ruler's contratulatory message: this article appeared to come from a member of the ruling family.

(iv) Liberia: United Kingdom Minister reported on 24th September that Liberians had told him they were giving consideration to question of recognition: his impression was that they were unlikely to extend it and certainly not immediately.

(v) Indonesia: You will no doubt know that Indonesian Government decided on 27th September to recognise F.L.N. government, while at the same time professing its intention of maintaining cordial relations with France.

(vi) Sweden: According to a report from United Kingdom Embassy Stockholm, Swedish Government have been approached in Cairo and by Egyptian Ambassador with a request for recognition, which they have flatly refused.

8th October, 1958.

A/ MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

..JD. **INWARD SAVINGRAM.** 47443.

Sent: 29th October, 1958.

FROM: Recd: 8th October, 1958.

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

S.V. LX729. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington EX767, Paris EX252, Australian Mission New York EX207.

North Africa: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.

1. On 29th September we had a conversation with Assistant Head, African Department, Foreign Office, from which the following points emerged:

Algeria.

2. In connection with our savingram 719, the Foreign Office understood that the F.L.N. "government in exile" had now been recognised by all Arab States, and also by Communist China, though not by U.S.S.R. or European satellites. Foreign Office had predicted that, if F.L.N. "government" should be established, Russians might be slow to grant recognition: not only was claim of F.L.N. regime unusually weak in international law, to which Russians customarily pay a good deal of heed in these matters, but also Russians might well want to avoid complicating their relations with France and their popularity among French people - recognition would certainly increase problems of French Communist Party. According to Press, de Gaulle had now sent a strong note informing Russians that recognition by them of F.L.N. regime would result in withdrawal of French representation from Moscow, and request that Russians withdraw their Embassy from Paris. Foreign Office does not as yet know exact terms of note which we have not seen reported but of which you will no doubt learn from Paris.

3. The press also carried story about a week ago that Pakistan had recognised new "government", but this was apparently inaccurate and arose from fact that Pakistan Charge d'Affaires in Cairo, presumably acting without proper instructions, offered congratulations to F.L.N. on formation of their regime.

4. Foreign Office thought that F.L.N. had not made any great effect by their announcement, and that heavy affirmative vote in Algeria on constitutional referendum, reported in today's press, should be a fairly effective counter to it. In this connection, they had not yet received direct reports from Algeria, but believed there was no reason to suppose that there had been any interference with result of ballot, or that poll was not fairly conducted. Certainly, circumstances of referendum, with army conducting it and lorries being provided to bring people to the polls, were likely to have a certain influence with voters, but nevertheless results so far reported seemed as satisfactory as French could have wished, and F.L.N. boycott to have been fairly ineffective. We suggested that boycott might have been a mistaken tactic from F.L.N. point of view, in that, since it should be fairly easy for French to discover who had voted and who had not, non-voters might feel exposed to reprisals; it might perhaps have been better to try to muster a 'No' vote instead. Our informant,

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.17443.

however, thought that the argument cut both ways, in that F.L.N. themselves would probably find it easier to threaten voters than to allow people to vote, since it would have no control over the way they cast their ballots.

5. There was still no indication of de Gaulle's intentions about future policy; we should have to wait and see. We suggested that one effect of a heavy affirmative vote might be to strengthen the hand of Soustelle and the integrationists, who could represent it as a vote for integration. Our informant conceded this point, but thought that, since result of the referendum as a whole was in effect a massive vote of confidence in de Gaulle, he would find that his hands were freer than before: he should now be able to impose whatever policy he wanted, with less regard to the wishes of pressure groups.

6. The Foreign Office still had no indication of when Algeria was likely to be debated at the U.N., or of French preferences in the matter; but did not expect that Algeria would be one of the first items on the First Committee's agenda. As you know, the French have said that they will not participate in the debate. On 17th September the Foreign Office told the United Kingdom delegation in New York that the question whether the United Kingdom should take part in any debate should be considered nearer the time; and our informant was not able to add anything useful to this.

Tunisia.

7. The Foreign Office thinks it probably that the head of the Algerian "government", Ferhat Abbas, may spend most of his time in Tunisia, where he is at the moment, though the headquarters of the regime are expected to remain in Cairo.

8. In the case of both Tunisia and Morocco, the French have not withdrawn their Ambassadors, threatened to cut off economic aid (of which there is actually not a great deal), or otherwise attempted to retaliate for recognition of the F.L.N. regime. Both the Tunisians and Moroccans have explained to the French the necessities of their domestic political situation which the French seem prepared to recognise; and both sides have been trying to minimise any damage to their relations.

9. The internal situation in Tunisia remains as previously reported (see our savingram 634, and the Foreign Office note prepared for Mr Casey of 2nd September, of which you have copies). Bourguiba, however, continues to be nervous about the possibility that the F.L.N. (whose forces in Tunisia outnumber his own army) may join with the Opposition elements supporting Saleb ben Youssef to overthrow him.

10. Arms for Tunisia: This question is still under discussion in Washington and London: the scheme reported in our savingram 691, whereby the United States would supply arms through off-shore purchase from France, has foundered on Bourguiba's refusal to accept any arms manufactured in France; he thinks that public reaction to Tunisia's acceptance of French-made arms would be more than he could face. The French remain unwilling to see the Americans supply arms direct.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.17443.

Morocco

11. Istiqlal Party. Our informant explained internal political situation on lines similar to analysis in paragraph 9 of Washington's savingram 616, saying that the King, Prime Minister, and the moderate elements in the Istiqlal party were being driven to make some extreme statements in order to outflank the left-wing of the party, and that the King might shortly have to reshuffle the government to admit some left-wing figures. The chief importance of the struggle lay in a possible threat to the American bases: the Americans were now talking with the Moroccans to try to work out some concessions. If by any chance the American bases were ever removed, American aid to Morocco might also be expected to end, and this would have serious economic effects there.

A/G MIN.& DEPT. E.A.
MIN.& DEPT. DEFENCE

9th October, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER CR PACAM ANZUS SATO S. E.FAME
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Observer — File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London — Date: 5 - 10 - 58

De Gaulle Halts the Rot in Algeria

From JOSEPH KRAFT

ALGIERS, October 4

GENERAL DE GAULLE left Algeria yesterday a different place from what he had found it on his arrival the day before.

The brakes have been applied to a movement that for two years has been racing with steadily gathering speed down the road to disaster. Whether a settlement of the war with the Nationalist rebels will also result is uncertain—even highly doubtful. But the worst has been averted.

For the rest, as General de Gaulle likes to say, he has gained room for manoeuvre. The political reins thrown over by the Socialist Premier, Guy Mollet, to the European settlers when they pelted him with tomatoes in February, 1956, are now back in the grip of Paris. For the first time in more than two years the Algerian problem is on a new footing.

No Equivocation

Before the General's arrival last week the settlers, organised in regional Committees of Public Safety, were riding high.

They had made the May 13 "revolution" against Paris which thrust de Gaulle into the saddle. Integration—the slogan that under the guise of keeping Algeria French would continue the settlers' administrative domination over the Muslims—was the order of the day.

A section, at least, of the more active Army colonels seemed allied with the settlers. The massive "yes" vote in last week's referendum was being cited as evidence that the great majority of Muslims had no objections to integration.

That General de Gaulle himself would pronounce the word was too much to hope for. But for the settlers' purpose it sufficed that he should stick to glorious equivocation. Under the mandate of, say, a paean to the future, the settlers in the next few weeks could have welded their local control so firmly as to make eventually inevitable some kind of cataclysmic reaction by the Muslims.

In fact, the General was anything but equivocal. In two informal speeches at Tiaret and Orléansville he sounded the note of "Algeria with France"—an unmistakable balancing of two discreet parts.

'Fake' and 'Cretin'

In the formal address in Constantine the framework was a five-year plan—postponing until 1963 at least any final decision on integration. Then, toward the end, he pronounced the word used by M. Guy Mollet before February, 1956, and which means nothing if it does not mean Algeria is not part of France. He spoke of the Algerians' "personality," [illegible] battle cry of his [illegible] Constantine headquarters of the Committee of Public Safety.

De Gaulle was "a fake, a cretin and a whore." "No man in history" had "done so much harm to France." "If he had spoken those words in Algiers he would not have lasted five minutes." "He can afford to waste five years, because then he will be dead, but what will we do?"

Even as an Arab interpreter was laboriously repeating de Gaulle's speech for the benefit of the Muslim audience outside, the Constantine Committee of Public Safety moved to telephone the paratroops' commander heading the Algiers organisation, General Jacques Massu.

"We have to move now or not at all," one said. But they did not get Massu, and as de Gaulle left the rostrum they were cajoling, in not exactly pristine fashion, a telephone operator named Odette.

Revolutions are not made by men who ask generals for orders, and it is now most unlikely that the settlers can make serious trouble for de Gaulle. But if they are now asking "by your leave," the reason is that they have been cut off from the Army.

The bond of mutual bitterness that once linked both groups has been sadly frayed by the referendum: for the Army, the great victory last Sunday has drawn a surprisingly large amount of the sting out of the record of defeat absorbed since 1940.

Mutual Bitterness

In addition, and in contrast to his rebuff to settler interests, General de Gaulle, at Constantine, endorsed and promised to enlarge the main Army stake in Algeria—the intimate personal contacts set up between officers in the field and the Muslim population. Most of all though, de Gaulle had broken up the knot of Army activists by a brilliant campaign of military politics.

Two of the colonels have been, not altogether privately, rebuked. Another has been taken in tow by sweet reason: "De Gaulle," he said the other day, "is the boss." A fourth colonel is to be promoted—out of Algiers.

The efficacy of this latter remedy (a dose, in effect, of the proposition that the Army prefers honours to Algeria) has been dramatically demonstrated in the case of the chief military commander here, General Raoul Salan. He is to become Inspector of Military Forces, a highly honorific post without specific duties or powers.

Normally General Salan is a taut and taciturn man. But when General de Gaulle told him of the promotion last Thursday, he could barely contain his joy. Before the morning was out he had spilled the beans to the Press.

More solid benefits may be in store for the Muslim population here. At Constantine, General de Gaulle pledged a New Deal when he announced his Five-year Plan.

Because in this troubled land the mass bears no witness, it is difficult to know what the Muslims think of the proffered bonanza. "Wait and see" is one fairly educated guess on Muslims have heard a great many promises in the past, and on most they have yet to see the results.

While there is no reason to doubt General de Gaulle's pledged word, there is room for doubt—much room—about the willingness of France, or indeed any other country, to sustain the enormous burden entailed in de Gaulle's programme.

Moreover, there remains the fact of the rebel National Liberation Front. General de Gaulle had bait for the F.L.N. also—a sketchy promise to let captured rankers out of gaol, coupled with a hazy offer to find for the leadership important posts in the new Algeria.

F.L.N. Difficulties

But there is little reason to think the F.L.N. is ready to throw in the towel. It is true that over the past six months the military effectiveness of the rebel forces has diminished considerably. Apparently the electrified barbed wire fence along the Tunisian border has resulted in new troops coming across only in small-sized packages, while weapons already in the interior lie useless for want of spare parts and ammunition.

Difficulties have evidently fostered dissension in the ranks. Two weeks ago the French discovered a mass grave of at least a hundred F.L.N. soldiers, killed, it is claimed, by order of the chief F.L.N. officer in the Kabyle district, Colonel Amirouche.

Still, Amirouche's headquarters were found to be a modern installation, well stocked with medical equipment and supplies of all kinds. An American Methodist missionary "released" by Amirouche after more than a month of "captivity" reported that the F.L.N. troops were armed with rifles, machine guns and mortars, that their morale was good, and that they enjoyed the support of the local Muslim population.

Furthermore, last week's referendum was not an unmitigated defeat for the F.L.N., not in the Department of Setif, anyhow. There the total of "No" votes and abstentions was slightly above 50 per cent.

Troops Thinly Spread

No doubt a part of the explanation is that Setif is the home of the Premier of the [illegible] rebel Government, Ferhat Abbas. But what makes Setif special—interesting is that it is a wholly pacified region, where rebels hardly exist at all, and French troops are very thinly spread.

According to one theory the Muslim population in the presence of war goes for protection to the strongest—the French Army. Once the tide of battle has swept by, they return to a position of support for independence. But the effect of pacification is to prepare the ground for the F.L.N., and each rebel loss becomes in the long run, a victory.

With such straws to grasp at and with the increased possibility of continued backing from Cairo and, if necessary, Moscow, the probability is that the F.L.N. will stick by its original demands for direct negotiations with France. Unless General de Gaulle is willing to meet these terms and so far there is no sign that he is, the prospect is for con-

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25/2/11

3rd October, 1958.

167/2/2

ALGERIAN VOTE IN REFERENDUM

MR. KEVIN:

COPIES FOR E.
U.N.

Despite the efforts of the F.L.N., through intimidation and the establishment of a rebel "Government", to dissuade Algerians from voting in the Referendum, polling was exceptionally high. According to the latest figures I have seen (Sydney Morning Herald of 1st October), 3,474,784 voted out of a total population of about 9 millions. Even after deducting the votes of the half-million odd French troops, a balance of 3 millions, or one-third of the total population remains.

2. It has already been claimed by the F.L.N. that the Algerians were bludgeoned into voting. This story will probably be believed throughout Africa and Asia. Certainly the Army has shown itself in previous elections as being expert at manipulation. However, no credible reports of manipulation in the referendum have yet emerged. It is true that in the present referendum the Army did actively campaign to secure a massive poll, was responsible for maintaining security, and, for security reasons, provided transport for outlying areas to protected polling stations. This, however, does not amount to coercion. In fact, if coercion had been attempted in this particular referendum, it would probably have failed.

3. Voting was overwhelmingly in favour of de Gaulle's constitution. 3,356,169 or 97 per cent of the voters said "yes".

4. The poll was probably composed as follows:

(a) French Army - slightly less than 500,000.

(b) Colons - say 500,000.

(c) Moslems - say 2,500,000.

As regards (c) probably half of the voters were women.

5. Although the new Constitution is not specific on this point, in my view it did not make any provision for Algeria. It provided for the Overseas Territories - but Algeria is part of Metropolitan France. It is therefore rather surprising to find such a large vote so overwhelmingly in favour of the Constitution.

6. We do not yet have sufficient information to enable us to analyse fully the significance of the "yes" vote. However, it is probably valid to say that while all affirmative voters felt that a "yes" vote might enable de Gaulle to achieve a settlement, the following groups would have voted "yes" for the additional reasons indicated:

(a) The Army and colons would have pretended or believed that such a vote would provide a mandate for integration with France. (De Gaulle, however, has never said publicly that he favours integration; on the contrary, he has said privately that integration is impossible.) The Army would in

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in addition have seen in a large "yes" vote the means of destroying the inefficient system in France.

(b) The 1,250,000 odd Moslem women voters would have been influenced by feelings of appreciation at their emancipation and of hope that an affirmative vote would bring peace.

(c) The 350,000 odd Moslem ex-serviceman would probably have felt admiration for de Gaulle as a soldier and affinity with the France they had serviced.

Thus diverse interests prompted these groups to vote in the same way.

7. As regards the 900,000 odd remaining male Moslem voters similar divergences probably existed.

8. In these circumstances one cannot help wondering whether voters in Algeria knew what they were voting for. Did many realize that by voting "yes" they were supporting a new Constitution for Metropolitan France, of which they formed an integral part, and expressing confidence in de Gaulle? No doubt some did realize this. The majority, however, probably believed that their affirmative votes represented support for anything from integration to independence.

9. One query which emerges is the extent to which the F.L.N. represents the feelings of Moslem Algerians. They were clearly unable to dissuade Moslems from voting. Does this mean merely that their tactics were less effective than those of the Army and colons? Or does it mean that they do not enjoy the support of Moslem Algerians to the extent they have previously claimed? Are Moslem Algerians tired of the violence and brutality of the F.L.N., of the reprisals which it provokes, and of the extent to which it prevents implementation of the bright economic future promised by France? Could it even be that Algerians like being part of Metropolitan France? I think that to say this is probably going too far.

10. De Gaulle is now visiting Algeria. Perhaps the picture will be clearer after his visit. Nevertheless he himself is baffled by the problem. After his initial statements immediately after he became Premier, which seemed to give hope for a solution, he has become increasingly reticent and vague on Algeria. Early in September he even told the Canadian Ambassador in Paris that there was no solution, or at least no immediate solution, for Algeria. He was convinced that Algeria would not be ready for independence for a long time (particularly in view of the danger posed to a weak new state by Nasser and the U.S.S.R.), that integration with France was impossible and that there could therefore only be a modus vivendi for the present.

11. It is clear that unless de Gaulle modifies his opposition to integration (which seems unlikely), the Army leaders in Algeria must either modify their demand for it or face recall. They may feel that they cannot accept any watering-down of their demands. In this case de Gaulle may find their removal a difficult task. Of course, he has

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behind him a very large vote by the Algerian electors, and this will assist him. It is ironical that to secure this vote he was obliged to rely on the administrative assistance of those same Army leaders with whom he may now find himself in conflict!

(T. C. [illegible])
Africa & Middle East Sections

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION.
SAIGON.

29th September, 1958.

File No. 221/5
Memo No. 825

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE
- 3 OCT 1958
COPY

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Recognition of New Algerian "Government"

On 23rd September "Times of Viet Nam" published the attached editorial urging the Vietnamese Government to recognize the new "Government" without delay. The editorial ends:

> " National conviction calls for the recognition of the Algerian Government by our Government. When it comes to keeping to our ideals and convictions, to respecting morality, let us be prepared to run any risk even the risk of having our diplomatic relations with France broken off."

2. Foreign Minister Mau assured me on 26th September that this editorial "certainly does not represent" the policy of the Vietnamese Government(see also my memorandum 818 of 27th September).

3. As the editorial points out, a policy of recognition would have the popular appeal of opposition to what it describes as "colonialism" and "imperial domination". There are, however, reasons, at least equally strong, for the Vietnamese Government to see the parallel to its own experience, not in Viet Nam's recent fight for independence from France, but in the current campaign of open subversion and terrorism inspired by North Viet Nam.

(F.J.Blakeney)
Minister.

1. CEA
2. E

(orig on 16/2/11)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

25/2/11

TO: OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
CAPE TOWN
SALISBURY

RPTD: DELHI
KARACHI
COLOMBO
ACCRA (ACTING H.C.)
KUALA LUMPUR (ACTING H.C.)

(Dated 2nd October, 1958)

W. No. 420 SAVING CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated to Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Accra and Kuala Lumpur.

ALGERIA - REFERENDUM

United Kingdom Consul-General in Algiers reports that Referendum passed off quietly in Algeria under heaviest military guard ever seen in Algeria. All cars were stopped and searched and drivers' identities checked at approaches to voting polls. But voters seemed to have suffered no interference.

2. Exceptionally heavy and fair poll followed intense Army propaganda making it clear that abstention or adverse vote was hostile to Army and France. Many Muslims undoubtedly voted under psychological constraint since they did not trust secrecy of vote; but equally many seem to have voted genuinely, hoping that support for de Gaulle might permit return to peace and end of present intolerable situation.

3. Where Army control was weak and F.L.N. strong abstentions were numerous.

4. Historic feature was keen Muslim female participation for first time in Algeria but many had little idea of what they were doing. This seems to have met no opposition from men.

(To Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Cape Town, Salisbury)

5. Please inform Commonwealth authorities. High Commissioners in London informed.

(To Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Accra, Kuala Lumpur)

6. You may at your discretion inform Commonwealth authorities.

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1. E to see
2. UN to return.
AHD 1/10.

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

:ABK

I.17058.

Dated: 25th September, 1958.

FROM:

Rec'd: 2nd October, 1958.

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAVINGRAM EX719 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Paris EX250, Washington EX761, New York EX205.

Algeria: Announcement of formation of an F.L.N. "government" with headquarters in Cairo.

1. You will be aware that the formation of an Algerian "government in exile", with headquarters in Cairo, was announced on 19th September. The following paragraphs summarise information contained in relevant Foreign Office telegrams we have seen, and may supplement other reports.

(i) French Reaction: The text of the Quai d'Orsay statement made on 19th September was as follows:

"There is no precedent for a Government of this nature in peace time. This "Government" does not in any case exercise any Algerian sovereignty whatsoever. Such a Government has no "effective strength" ("effectivite") nor any territorial foundation ("assiette territoriale"). Its only means of action are assassination and terrorism. France, while making allowance for the rhetoric and verbal enthusiasm which may accompany any possible recognition of such an artificial organisation, would consider such recognition as an unfriendly gesture to her. Moreover, she would feel justified in casting doubt upon the normal and balanced character of governments which allowed themselves to indulge in such demonstrations".

(ii) United Kingdom-United States Reaction: The Foreign Office has made no official statement, as yet, beyond the comment that the United Kingdom has "not received any approach" from the alleged government, and background guidance to the press leaving no doubt that the United Kingdom has no intention of recognising it. A guidance telegram to a number of Asian posts, however, asked them to put the arguments against recognition to the governments to which they were accredited, and also to report on probable attitudes of the latter. The State Department was similarly reported on 20th September as proposing to withhold all comment for the present, but we gather it may since have confirmed that the United States has no intention of according recognition.

(iii) Tunisia, Morocco and Libya: All three governments have announced recognition. Mr. Ladgham (in charge of the Tunisian Government) told the United Kingdom Ambassador on 19th September that the matter was a little awkward for the Tunisians; they still hoped they might be able to persuade the Algerians to refrain from asking for recognition. The Ambassador commented, however, that they obviously had little hope of avoiding it.

The Moroccan Government told the French Ambassador on

CONFIDENTIAL ..2..

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

19th September that they could not avoid recognition, but this implied no hostility to France, and they hoped that French reaction would be moderate. They were prepared to withhold the announcement of recognition for three days, in order to help the French. The French Embassy told the United Kingdom Ambassador that the French were likely to recall their Ambassador, but they hoped that he would not be recalled for good. The Moroccan Prime Minister asked the American Ambassador if Washington could help to calm the French.

Libyan recognition was announced on 20th September: the Libyan Prime Minister told the United Kingdom Ambassador that the Libyan Government had no alternative in view of the pressure of public opinion. He believed that the F.L.N. government might later move to Morocco and gave an assurance that, for the present, the Libyan Government would not allow its establishment in their territory. The Libyan press reported on 24th September that Karim bil Qasim, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Armed Forces in the new Algerian "government" would arrive in Benghazi that day: a dinner in his honour was being given by the Prime Minister.

(iv) Sudan: The French Ambassador was told by senior Sudanese official that on 22nd September the Sudan Government had decided to recognise, and some sort of public statement to this effect was apparently made. The Acting Foreign Minister, however, told the United Kingdom Ambassador the same day that he was opposed to recognition: how could anyone know whether the alleged government really represented the Algerian people? The Sudanese Cabinet would be considering the problem that night. (No outcome has yet been reported).

(v) Iraq: The Iraq Government granted recognition on 20th September.

(vi) Jordan: The Prime Minister sent telegram of congratulation to Farhat Abbas on 22nd September, addressing him as "Prime Minister of the Free Algerian Government". The United Kingdom Ambassador commented that the Jordanis could scarcely miss such a good opportunity of demonstrating their patriotism in a way which would cost Jordan nothing.

(vii) Lebanon: The United Kingdom Ambassador thought, on 20th September, that the new government would be inclined to recognise, although General Chehab himself, would probably not wish to do so: a strong vote in favour of de Gaulle in the referendum in Algeria might enable the Lebanese to postpone decision.

(viii) Turkey: A Turkish official said privately on 20th September that they would seek to avoid comment or definite action for as long as possible.

(ix) Ethiopia: The United Kingdom Ambassador thought it unlikely on 20th September that the Ethiopian Government would recognise.

(x) Afghanistan: The United Kingdom Embassy thought on 23rd September that the Afghan Government was considering recognition, but might delay their decision until they could judge the attitude of other Asian countries.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

3. I.17058

(xi) Thailand: The United Kingdom Embassy thought the Thais were unlikely to recognise, both because of their alliance with France through S.E.A.T.O., and of their inclination to avoid involvement in contentious issues unconnected with Thai interests.

(xii) Indonesia and Burma: The United Kingdom Embassies concerned thought that recognition was probable, though it might not be granted immediately.

(xiii) Vietnam and Laos. The United Kingdom Ambassadors concerned thought it unlikely that either country would grant recognition: neither had received any request to do so, and neither would wish to risk a rupture with France.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 2nd October, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR P.C&M AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P.

G.

TEL AVIV WELLINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT. MCT:AC. 58/6011.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
West Block,
CANBERRA.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
2 OCT 1958
25/2/11
CANBERRA

Referred for information in connection with your 25/2/11 of 25th September, 1958.

-1 OCT 1958

(Allen Brown)
Secretary.

SECRET

Dear Ian

I refer to your letter (your reference POL.52/1) of 23rd September, 1958 concerning the question of recognition of the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) as an Algerian Government in exile.

The Australian authorities are in general agreement with the legal arguments in your letter concerning the question of recognition of the so-called "Provisional Free Algerian Government" established by the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.).

The Australian Government's attitude to this question was expressed by the Acting Minister for External Affairs in reply to a question in the House of Representatives on 23rd September, 1958. A copy of this reply is attached for your information.

...

Yours Sincerely
(Sgd) M. C. Timbs

(M. C. Timbs)

I. W. Bell, Esq.,
Official Secretary,
Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
CANBERRA.

SECRET

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CANBERRA.

-1 OCT 1958

In reply quote No.

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I. W. Bell, Esq.,
Official Secretary,
Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
CANBERRA.

SECRET

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

201/2/5/1
Memorandum 713

22nd September, 1958

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE COPY

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Algeria

1. There have recently been two important developments bearing upon Algeria. The first has been a deliberate F.L.N. terrorist campaign in France itself, beginning about 25th August with attacks on oil installations and climaxed so far with the attempt last week to assassinate M. Soustelle near the Arc de Triomphe. The second was the proclamation in Cairo on 19th September of a "provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria" by Ferhat Abbas and the announcement of the members of the "Government".

The Terrorist Campaign

2. Since the attacks on the oil installations, the terrorist campaign has, with the exception of the attampt on M. Soustelle's life, taken the familiar form of cold-blooded murder of policemen and soldiers. The campaign has had considerable success in terms of lives taken but otherwise it is hard to see what the F.L.N. have gained or hope to gain from it.

3. The objectives of the F.L.N. appear to include the following:

(a) To create a state of tension in metropolitan France in the hope that the French people will press for the end of the conflict in Algeria;

(b) To bring about the return to France from Algeria of some of the security forces there;

(c) To add to the economic burden of the Algerian conflict;

(d) To discredit General de Gaulle on the eve of the referendum;

(e) To draw world attention to the Algerian problem on the eve of the General Assembly's latest attempt to seek a solution with the hope of influencing the outcome in the Assembly;

(f) To disorganize French production. There are between 329,000 to 400,000 Algerian workers in metropolitan France, mostly industrial

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AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

workers. Terrorism could lead to loss of their services as the security forces may have to police their activities closely.

4. It is doubtful whether the F.L.N. can mount terrorist attacks of such a scale as could lead to any considerable satisfaction of the first five objectives, and there is also the distinct possibility that terrorism may harden such French opinion as there is in favour of a negotiated settlement in Algeria without a prior military victory.

The "Provisional Government of Algeria"

5. The reason why the F.L.N. have chosen at this particular time to set up their long-threatened government in exile can, it seems, be boiled down to two only:

(a) To influence the Algerian vote in the referendum;

(b) To influence the discussion of Algeria in the General Assembly.

It is difficult to see how either objective can be gained. The combination of "the colonels and the colons" in Algeria should be able to ensure that Algeria votes "oui" in the referendum while the lines are already drawn so tightly in the United Nations that one cannot see them being changed very much, if at all, by this new development.

6. The French Government has so far taken the establishment of the "provisional government" with restraint. Immediately after the announcement in Cairo, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that France would regard recognition of the government as a hostile gesture; recognition would also put in doubt the stability and normality of any recognizing government. Apart from this statement, there has been silence on the part of official French sources.

7. According to the press here, recognition of the F.L.N. regime has so far been accorded by the U.A.R., Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Morocco. The press has also reported that Washington, London, Rome, the Hague, Brussels and Athens do not intend to extend recognition, while New Delhi and Djakarta are troubled by the fact that the regime does not have control over the territory of Algeria. The local press says also that recognition by Moscow is imminent and one newspaper has reported that Communist China has already recognized the F.L.N. regime.

8. The establishment of the regime puts Tunisia and Morocco in a difficult

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

position. It is not yet clear just how the French Government will react to their recognition of the regime although clearly the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments had no alternative but to recognize, and perhaps General de Gaulle will await the outcome of the referendum, before deciding this question. A severe reaction could inflate the significance of the F.L.N.'s move. However, it seems very doubtful that Tunisia and Morocco can expect French aid to continue to flow without at least some interruption. It is likely also that General de Gaulle is counting on the outcome of the referendum in Algeria to be a considerable riposte to the F.L.N. His hopes in this respect should be fulfilled.

9. A spokesman for the Arab League is today reported as saying that although the League's Charter only permits the admission of independent states, the F.L.N. regime can be considered as such. The same spokesman is reported as adding that the Political Committee of the League has approved an annual grant of £ Egyptian 12,000,000 to the F.L.N. and the U.A.R. and Iraq have promised to pay their shares of the grant. The entry of the F.L.N. regime will no doubt be considered at the next session of the League Council which meets on 1st October.

10. On the general plane, the most disturbing aspect of the establishment of the F.L.N. regime for Algeria appears to be the hardening it represents of the attitude of the rebels at a time when, with the referendum in France just about out of the way, General de Gaulle may be on the point of getting down to thinking about ways of resolving the Algerian problem. The move may turn the General away from any inclinations he may have had towards a negotiated settlement without prior pacification; it certainly strengthens the hand of the principal opponents of such a move, the colonels-colons combination in Algeria.

11. Another worrying aspect of the F.L.N. move is that the declaration of Abbas was made in Cairo and his "government" will meet there at least until it decides upon its headquarters. M. Bourguiba may privately welcome a decision on its part not to come to Tunisia while Colonel Nasser would no doubt be glad to have it continue in Cairo. The tie between the F.L.N. and Nasser, whatever the decision as to the headquarters of the F.L.N. regime, has been made stronger; it will be even stronger still if the regime is admitted to the Arab League and seats itself in Cairo. The boundaries of the empire Nasser dreams of may be in the process of extending westward.

Copies of this memorandum are being sent to London, Washington and New York.

Alan Renouf,
Counsellor.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York Date 28-9-58.

Algerians Ask Talk With France As Voting on Constitution Begins

Abbas Makes Appeal

By FOSTER HAILEY

Special to The New York Times.

CAIRO, Sept. 26—An offer to stop the killing and terror and negotiate a peaceful settlement with France was made today by the Provisional Government of Algeria.

A declaration of principles made public at the temporary headquarters here said, however, that "Algeria is not France" and that Algerians never would submit to integration. The negotiations, therefore, would be for independence.

The declaration was read by Premier Ferhat Abbas at a press conference in the ballroom of the Continental Hotel. He was flanked by ten of the eighteen ministers named with him as the Cabinet when the Provisional Government was proclaimed Sept. 19. These included Belkacem Krim, Vice Premier and Minister of War, who has been the active head of the rebel troops. Five others of the Cabinet are in French custody and three are in Algeria.

No mention was made at the conference of the selection of a

Continued on Page 2, Column 2

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

more permanent headquarters than that already established here nor of intent to apply for membership in the League of Arab States or the United Nations.

There had been predictions that decisions would be announced on all those points today. Mohammed Yazid, Minister of Information, declined to comment on the failure to do so.

It is believed the new Government does not wish to link its own future too closely with that of the United Arab Republic and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The declaration spoke of a North African Federation of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. That is believed to be the most active hope. Both protectorates have recognized the Provisional Government, which would prefer either Rabat or Tunis to Cairo as a temporary seat, it is believed.

Mr. Yazid said a decision on where the Government would settle would be made later.

U. N. Principles Endorsed

The declaration pledged its framers to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Bandung Conference in 1955 of Asian and African states and said it "will make its own" universal declaration of the rights of man.

"In this domain, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic will accept with the greatest favor all international initiatives tending toward application to the Algerian war of the humanitarian disposition of the Convention of Geneva [covering the treatment of prisoners of war]," the declaration said.

When Mr. Yazid was asked by a French correspondent whether the rebels would apply the Geneva Convention to the terror campaign in Metropolitan France, he said: "That depends on reciprocity, but as of now no civilian has been attacked as such."

On the question of negotiation, the declaration said this: "We have always affirmed our desire to bring to the Algerian problem a peaceful and negotiated solution. Only the obstinate refusal of French governments to accept negotiation is at the base of the prolongation of the war. The Provisional Government is, for its part, ready to negotiate. To do so, it is prepared at any moment to meet with representatives of the French Government."

"The independence of Algeria is in no way an obstacle to the establishment of new relations between France and Algeria," the statement said. "These relations will be the more fruitful since they will be founded on respect for the sovereignty of each of the two countries."

Communist China is the only non-Arab state that has formally recognized the new regime and notice was taken of that recognition in the declaration. It will be followed, the declaration predicted, by recognition from other Asian and African states.

The Provisional Government intends to press its campaign for recognition particularly among neutralist states such as Indonesia and India in Asia and the Scandinavian countries in Europe. It has gone through the formality of seeking recognition from Western powers, including the United States, but it has little hope now of any success in those quarters.

Mr. Yazid, who has been the Algerian rebels' spokesman at the last three sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is returning to New York in a few days to continue his campaign for a hearing of the Algerian case.

New Terms for Talks Set

CAIRO, Sept. 28 (UPI)—A statement read today by Premier Abbas indicated the Algerian Nationalists wanted to confer with the French without the conditions attached previously. The rebels have insisted that France recognize Algerian independence as a condition for any settlement.

Paris Silent on Offer

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Sept. 26—Premier de Gaulle and his Government were silent tonight on the subject of the Cairo statement by Premier Abbas of the Provisional Algerian Government. Mr. Abbas said the rebel Government would carry on the fight against French rule until France indicated willingness to negotiate on the basis of recognition of the Algerians' "right to independence."

Informally, some Government sources said the Abbas statement offered nothing notable or new. The influential Paris newspaper Le Monde, however, suggested that use of the term "right to independence" rather than "independence" might indicate a slight softening of the rebel position, at least tactically.

That the Government chose to ignore the Abbas statement was not surprising. The Government does not recognize the legitimacy of a rebel government in what is regarded technically as an integral part of France.

Also any statement on the Abbas offer, either a rejection or a slight indication of interest in negotiation, would alienate one or the other of the major currents of opinion—those favoring negotiation or those demanding war without quarter—at a time when the votes of both are needed to assure a big majority for the Constitution.

Tunisia Offers to Mediate

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Sept. 26—Tunisia offered today to make a new attempt at mediation of the long-drawn-out fighting between France and Algeria.

Sadok Mokkadem, Foreign Minister of Tunisia, made the suggestion in his principal policy address this morning before the General Assembly.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No: 25/3/47 E.

Published at: New York Date: 26.9.58.

ALGERIANS WAGE TERROR IN FRANCE

Refineries and Shops Fired —7 Dead, 21 Injured

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Aug. 25—Large-scale and coordinated terrorism leaped from Algeria to Metropolitan France today, taking seven lives and leaving at least twenty-one persons injured.

About 2:30 o'clock this morning saboteurs struck simultaneously in Paris and at about twenty places between the English Channel and the Mediterranean. Their targets were gasoline storage facilities, a munitions factory, a railroad signal post and a plant producing military trucks.

Fourth Policeman Slain

The saboteurs killed three policemen and wounded one by machine gun fire when they tried to shoot their way into a police garage on Paris' Left Bank. They threw flaming gasoline torches into the garage in a futile attempt to set it afire.

A fourth policeman was killed a few moments later when the police, alerted by the attack on the garage, foiled an incendiary raid on a munitions factory in

Continued on Page 2, Column 4

Algeria Saboteurs Wage Terror In French Refineries and Shops

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

the Bois de Vincennes on Paris' east side.

At the same time saboteurs set fire to storage tanks in a big refinery in Mourepiane near Marseilles. Fire-fighting units sought all day to control the blaze, which tonight, sixteen hours after the attack, led to an explosion wounding seventeen firemen, three seriously. Late tonight the blaze still was out of control.

Incendiary raids also were directed against gasoline storage facilities near Le Havre, at Carcasonne and Narbonne in the Pyrenees, in Provence, in several cities west of Marseilles, at Salbris in Central France and in several suburbs of Paris.

All attacks were the work of Algerian nationalists, according to the French Government.

Two Algerians were killed and three wounded in the attack on the Paris police garage. Another was burned to death when he set off a plastic bomb in the Esso refinery at Notre-Dame-de-Gravinchon, near Le Havre, the police reported. The bomb caused no damage.

Scores of Algerians exchanged fire with the police at the scenes of various incidents, official reports say. More than fifty Algerians were arrested during the day.

The violence was said to be the worst of its type in Metropolitan France since the nationalist rebellion began more than four and a half years ago.

The French police had known for a long time that the Algerian National Liberation Front, which controls the Nationalist rebellion in Algeria, has an effective, tightly knit organization also in Metropolitan France.

This organization is understood to consist of two command zones: one for the Paris area and the north of France, the other for the eastern and southern part of country with an extension for Toulouse. The zones are subdivided into smaller regions, sectors, sections and, finally, cells. A cell consists of three or four men.

The strength of the organization is not known. There are said to be about 400,000 Algerians in France. Most of them are believed to have been touched in one way or another by the nationalist organizations and are paying dues—often to save their lives.

Past terrorist activity in Metropolitan France was largely confined to the slayings of Moslems. This was the way extremists extorted dues from their victims, French police officials say. But an important role was being played also by the rivalry between the Nationalist Liberation Front and the older Algerian Nationalist Movement led by Hadj Messali, which has a considerable following among Algerians in France but is weak in Algeria.

Between forty and seventy Algerians in Metropolitan France have been killed by their countrymen every month since the beginning of the year, according to a reliable private estimate. Official figures, which

to strike simultaneously in virtually all parts of the country has caused obvious concern. But French officials, speaking for the record, have an optimistic explanation for the turn of events.

They say the leadership of nationalist rebellion has given an order for all-out terrorism in Metropolitan France as part of its desperate and futile campaign against Premier Charles de Gaulle's referendum Sept. 28 on conatitutional reform. These officials say the nationalists are under pressure to demonstrate their military and political power in a dramatic way now, but find it increasingly difficult to do so in Algeria proper.

The Ministry of the Interior, after a day-long session of its top officials, announced that a special police service had been set up to coordinate all countermeasures against nationalist terrorism in Metropolitan France.

Rebels in Tunis Proud

By MICHAEL JAMES
Special to The New York Times.

TUNIS, Aug. 25—Headquarters of the rebel Algeria National Liberation Front here had nothing official to say concerning the wave of sabotage by its members in France. Unofficially it had plenty.

Rebel circles made it clear that the French could expect further attacks against key industries.

Rebel leaders here were obviously proud of last night's work. They asserted that, although there had been some failures, the batting average was excellent. At first try the results have surpassed all expectations, they feel.

A spokesman here for the front said official comment would be forthcoming within a few days. He frankly conceded that the group would first analyze public reaction in foreign nations, especially in Atlantic pact countries and most particularly in the United States.

Rebels Point to Objective

Just as the rebel army in Algeria has no hope of beating the French Army there in open war, the front does not pretend to hope to bring France to her knees by sabotage against French industry. Front members here, however, hope that sabotage in France will bring some lessons home to the French and other peoples.

The operation was planned well ahead and many Algerians in France were aware of targets, rebel sources here said. If as much as one man taken prisoner by the police had talked, the raids would have failed.

The rebels hope that the sabotage will result in Atlantic Pact, especially United States, pressure to end the hostility of the group. The only way to do that, is to ask France to grant Algeria independence, according to the rebels here.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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TERROR IN FRANCE

Refineries and Shops Fired —7 Dead, 21 Injured

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times.

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Continued on Page 2, Column 4

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

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All attacks were the work of Algerian nationalists, according to the French Government.

Two Algerians were killed and three wounded in the attack on the Paris police garage. Another was burned to death when he set off a plastic bomb in the Esso refinery at Notre-Dame-de-Gravinchon, near Le Havre, the police reported. The bomb caused no damage.

Scores of Algerians exchanged fire with the police at the scenes of various incidents, official reports say. More than fifty Algerians were arrested during the day.

The violence was said to be the worst of its type in Metropolitan France since the nationalist rebellion began more than four and a half years ago.

The French police had known for a long time that the Algerian National Liberation Front, which controls the Nationalist rebellion in Algeria, has an effective, tightly knit organization also in Metropolitan France.

This organization is understood to consist of two command zones: one for the Paris area and the north of France, the other for the eastern and southern part of country with an extension for Toulouse. The zones are subdivided into smaller regions, sectors, sections and, finally, cells. A cell consists of three or four men.

The strength of the organization is not known. There are said to be about 400,000 Algerians in France. Most of them are believed to have been touched in one way or another by the nationalist organizations and are paying dues—often to save their lives.

Past terrorist activity in Metropolitan France was largely confined to the slayings of Moslems. This was the way extremists extorted dues from their victims, French police officials say. But an important role was being played also by the rivalry between the Nationalist Liberation Front and the older Algerian Nationalist Movement led by Hadj Messali, which has a considerable following among Algerians in France but is weak in Algeria.

Between forty and seventy Algerians in Metropolitan France have been killed by their countrymen every month since the beginning of the year, according to a reliable private estimate. Official figures, which have never ben announced, are believed to be even higher.

Now for the first time the nationalist terrorists have turned from attacks on their countrymen to concerted, well-planned large-scale action against Frenchmen and French institutions.

The fact that they were able to strike simultaneously in virtually all parts of the country has caused obvious concern. But French officials, speaking for the record, have an optimistic explanation for the turn of events.

They say the leadership of nationalist rebellion has given an order for all-out terrorism in Metropolitan France as part of its desperate and futile campaign against Premier Charles de Gaulle's referendum Sept. 28 on constitutional reform. These officials say the nationalists are under pressure to demonstrate their military and political power in a dramatic way now, but find it increasingly difficult to do so in Algeria proper.

The Ministry of the Interior, after a day-long session of its top officials, announced that a special police service had been set up to coordinate all countermeasures against nationalist terrorism in Metropolitan France.

Rebels in Tunis Proud

By MICHAEL JAMES
Special to The New York Times

TUNIS, Aug. 25—Headquarters of the rebel Algeria National Liberation Front here had nothing official to say concerning the wave of sabotage by its members in France. Unofficially it had plenty.

Rebel circles made it clear that the French could expect further attacks against key industries.

Rebel leaders here were obviously proud of last night's work. They asserted that, although there had been some failures, the batting average was excellent. At first try the results have surpassed all expectations, they feel.

A spokesman here for the front said official comment would be forthcoming within a few days. He frankly conceded that the group would first analyze public reaction in foreign nations, especially in Atlantic pact countries and most particularly in the United States.

Rebels Point to Objective

Just as the rebel army in Algeria has no hope of beating the French Army there in open war, the front does not pretend to hope to bring France to her knees by sabotage against French industry. Front members here, however, hope that sabotage in France will bring some lessons home to the French and other peoples.

The operation was planned well ahead and many Algerians in France were aware of targets, rebel sources here said. If as much as one man taken prisoner by the police had talked, the raids would have failed.

The rebels hope that the sabotage will result in Atlantic Pact, especially United States, pressure to end the hostility of the group. The only way to do that, is to ask France to grant Algeria independence, according to the rebels here.

Two Algerians Guillotined

ALGIERS, Aug. 25 (AP)—Two rebels were guillotined today at Algiers' civil prison. They had been condemned to death for having slain five Moslems. It was the first time a death sentence had been carried out since mid-May.

National Archives of Australia : NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

25/2/11

25/2/11

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA.

25th September, 1958.

ALGERIA

I refer to the letter of 23rd September, 1958, from Mr. Bell of the United Kingdom High Commission to Mr. Timbs, a copy of which Mr. Bell forwarded to me.

2. We are in general agreement with the legal arguments in Mr. Bell's letter concerning the question of recognition of the so-called "Provisional Free Algerian Government" established by the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.).

3. The Australian Government's attitude to this question was expressed by the Acting Minister for External Affairs in reply to a question in the House of Representatives on 23rd September, 1958, the text of which is attached.

J.C.G.K.
(J.C.G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

Dr Wynes + Mr Body (LRT Division) agree with above wording. 29/9/58

Copy has been given to M.E. section

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Age File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: Melbourne Date: 25-9-58.

DEFIANCE FROM AFRICA

"FREE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT" A WORRY TO FRANCE

A 59-YEAR-OLD pharmacist who once campaigned fervently for the complete integration of Algeria into France emerged at the week end as the official leader of the Algerian rebels now fighting to prevent the French carrying out this very policy.

He is Ferhat Abbas, the husband of a Frenchwoman, a holder of the French Legion of Honor, a former opponent of Algerian nationalism — and now the Prime Minister and chief spokesman of the "Free Algerian" Government which he proclaimed in Cairo last Friday.

THE ALGERIAN rebel leader, Ferhat Abbas (left) announcing the formation of an Algerian "Government in exile" in Cairo last Friday. On the right is another prominent Algerian leader, Twafik El Medani.

From "The Age" Correspondent in Algeria

To add to the general irony, Abbas made his dramatic proclamation in French, the reason being that he is considerably more fluent in French than in Arabic.

Although he has been the chief political and military strategist of the F.L.N. for two years, Abbas is still regarded as a comparative moderate, with whom it might be possible to negotiate.

His political outlook has undergone a gradual transformation since the days, 20 years ago, when he advocated the complete assimilation of Algeria into France.

At that time he wrote that he had searched everywhere for the soul of an Algerian nation, but had been unable to find it—a remark that is now often quoted against him by Frenchmen, who claim that Algeria cannot have independence because she has no national identity.

Abbas changed his mind and began to demand independence in 1943. But when the Algerian war broke out in 1954, he at first tried to stop it from spreading.

He appealed for calm, and urged the French to put forward a rapid programme of reforms.

Throughout 1955 he was a member of a group of Moslem deputies in Algiers known as "the sixty-one," who tried to bring pressure on the French from a moderate Nationalist point of view, without openly siding with the rebels.

★

HE threw in his hand with the F.L.N. only in 1956, when he was gaoled by the French but escaped to Cairo, and it is a tribute to the innate ability of this craggy-faced Nationalist that he was able to assume the direction of a vast movement almost from the moment that he joined it.

According to the "Times" correspondent in Paris, some 30 Governments are expected to recognise the "Free Algerian" Government in spite of the French warning that recognition would be considered a "hostile act."

All the Arab States, most Communist countries, some members of the Afro-Asian bloc, three South American republics and "two or three non-Communist European States" were expected to accord recognition.

But no clue was given to the identity of the European Governments said to be contemplating this step.

Britain is certainly not considering recognition. A Foreign Office spokesman pointed out that under established principles of international law, a Government must have effective control before recognition can be accorded.

The United States is understood to be taking the same line as Britain.

AS long ago as April the Mahgreb conference in Tangiers authorised the formation of an Algerian emigre Government.

However, the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments used strong pressure to delay the actual formation of an F.L.N. Government.

Both countries wished to settle outstanding disputes with France before being called on to recognise an Algerian Government in exile—a step which will now almost certainly rupture their relations with Paris.

In its task of continuing the war the new emigre Government has ample funds.

Earlier this month, the revived Arab League voted the Algerians £12 million sterling a year.

There are also the substantial sums raised by the F.L.N. in Algeria, and the contributions of more than 300,000 Algerians in metropolitan France.

Paradoxically, the Algerian immigrants are invaluable to the French war effort as they fill the major labor gaps in heavy industry and construction produced by the absence of half a million young Frenchmen in Algeria.

At the same time, the comparatively high wages they earn in France are an inestimable help to the rebel war effort.

★

THE formation of a Government was the strongest way the F.L.N. could show their dissociation from the French referendum due next Monday.

Even the most enthusiastic members of the National Liberation Front expect nothing but a decisive victory for General de Gaulle in an Algeria occupied by French troops.

Although the general French reaction to the Algerian move was said to be "anger and dismay," a dissenting view came from M. Gaston Deferre, the young Socialist leader.

He claimed that General de Gaulle intends to start secret negotiations with the F.L.N. after the referendum, and that his task will be made easier by the existence of an established body with which to negotiate.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No: 25/2/11 E.
Date: 24.9.58.

Burning their Boats

China has become the first non-Arab country to recognize the provisional Algerian Government proclaimed in Cairo on Friday. Other acts of recognition are certain to follow, and they will not come only from Communist States. Such acts conflict both with reality and with the rules for recognizing new States. FERHAT ABBAS and his colleagues have none of the attributes traditionally regarded as necessary before a breakaway movement of independence can be said to be "safely and permanently" established. Their so-called Government is an expression of hope, not of fact, and international law deals with facts. They cannot even meet the tests required if they are to be recognized as belligerents, since they are not established in Algeria and have been unable, even by ruthless methods, to make any sort of rebel writ run outside remote localities. Any country which tries to respect international legalities can have nothing to do with the Algerian Government in exile. In no sense is it a Government which international law gives any country, whatever may be its general political or racial sympathies, the right to recognize.

Those countries which recognize the Algerians are not bothered by the corpus of international law when it conflicts with their own beliefs. For them self-determination is always sacred and any form of colonialism always wicked. Does, for example, OPPENHEIM say that "an untimely and precipitate recognition as a new State is . . . an unlawful act, and it is frequently maintained that such untimely recognition amounts to intervention"? Very well, they are delighted to intervene. Recognition is regarded as a gesture of political warfare, designed to hurt France and to strengthen the Algerian nationalists. Other African "Governments" in exile, with even fewer qualifications than the Algerian, are to be expected, if recognition in this case proves a useful irritant.

It will, in fact, be much more than an irritant. The main effect of establishing a provisional Government is to make compromise still harder, if not impossible. The nationalists have all along insisted that the principle of Algerian independence must be conceded before negotiations for a cease-fire or anything else can be begun. They have been unsuccessfully advised, notably by the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments, to modify this demand, which no French Government can be expected for a moment to consider. But the nationalists fear that, if the momentum of the rebellion was once lost, it could never be recovered. Now, on the eve of the referendum, and with the possibility that after it may come some new and attractive proposals for Algeria, they have chosen to assert their intransigence in the most dramatic fashion open to them. It is a step which would have been serious and challenging even if it had been taken at an earlier stage. It is the more serious and challenging when it comes at a moment such as this. It will, among other things, make it the more difficult for GENERAL DE GAULLE to make any constructive plan acceptable to the extreme French nationalists in Algeria.

The immediate consequences will be most keenly felt by Morocco and Tunisia, which have had no option but to grant recognition to the provisional Government, while doing their best to avoid a total and disastrous breach with France. These two Governments will face their first great test when the United Nations debates Algeria. They, and other countries which hope for a peaceful solution, will have to try to find some way to prevent the problem from hardening into a cold war in which all nations are forced to take absolute sides.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times — File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London — Date: 23-9-58.

JORDAN SUPPORTS NEW ALGERIAN CABINET

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

AMMAN, SEPT. 22

The proclamation of the formation of an Algerian Government in Cairo was received with great satisfaction by all classes here. A Government spokesman said that Jordan had decided to recognize the "newly born Algerian Republic." In the meantime the Jordan Prime Minister, Samir Rifai, cabled to the Prime Minister, Farhat Abbas, expressing his congratulations for "having taken this blessed step in the course of their struggle for Algerian freedom and independence." Local newspapers supported the Algerian cause and congratulated the Arab nation in general and the Algerian people in particular on the formation of the "free Nationalist Government of Algeria."

The Sudanese Government has also recognized the new Algerian Government.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No.: 25/2/11 E
Date: 23-9-58

CHINESE RECOGNITION

HONGKONG, Sept. 22.—Communist China to-day recognized the "Provisional Free Algerian Government" which was set up in Cairo last Friday. The New China news agency reported that recognition was announced in messages of greeting sent to the new Government by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister.—*Reuter.*

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

25/2/11

RADIO PEKING
NEWS IN ENGLISH
7 p.m. Tuesday 23rd September 1957

NOTE: The tape from which this news has been transcribed will be kept for ten days. If there is any question which might be answered by replaying the tape, please phone The External Affairs Liaison Officer, FB.1466, before the time is up

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EUR. - para 2

1. China's trade unions, women's and youth federations have issued statements expressing their full support for Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi's statement refuting Dulles' speech at the UN General Assembly. The All China Federation of Trade Unions said China's workers would produce more steel, produce all the equipment the Liberation Army needs, and together with the Liberation Army completely wipe out the US pirates. The National Women's Federation said Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi's statement fully reflected the views of the Federation. National youth organizations said the Chinese youth would never yield to the war threats of the enemy. Meanwhile, people throughout China continue to express support for Ch'en Yi's statement, and their determination to struggle for the liberation of Taiwan. The Foreign Minister's statement has also won wide support from the national minorities all over the country.

2. The Chinese People's Republic yesterday announced recognition of the People's Republic of Algeria. Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Premier Chou En-lai, and Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi yesterday sent messages to Algeria. Earlier this month, the Premier of the provisional government had expressed the belief in a letter to Mao Tse-tung that China would be among the first to recognise the Republic.

3. A delegation of the Bulgarian National Assembly arrived in Peking yesterday afternoon to visit China at the invitation of Liu Shao-ch'i. The delegation is led by member of the Political Bureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Vice Chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. A delegation of the People's Council of Sofia also arrived in Peking yesterday afternoon, led by member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and First Secretary of the Sofia City Committee. The Bulgarian delegation leaders said they had come to China to see China's achievements in the cause of Socialist construction and to learn from China's experience.

4. In a speech welcoming the Albanian Military delegation at Peking airport yesterday, Vice Premier & Defence Minister ~~xxxx~~ Marshal P'en Teh-huai reaffirmed that the Chinese people's firm stand to liberate Taiwan and the coastal islands is unshakeable. The delegation is headed by General Baluku, First Vice Chairman of the Albanian Council of Ministers and concurrently Minister of Defence. General Balyku voiced the support of the Albanian people and the armed forces for the Chinese people in their struggle to liberate Taiwan and the off shore islands.

5. 6 US warships intruded into China's territorial waters yesterday and 10 US naval fighters, on 10 separate occasions, intruded into China's territorial air over the Fukien area; 1 US plane intruded over the Chinese mainland. A spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued China's 10th serious warning to the US.

6. The movement to support China in the Taiwan issue is gaining momentum in the Vietnam Democratic Republic. Mass rallies and demonstrations were held on Sunday.

The Central Council of Roumanian Trade Unions has cabled the All China Federation of Trade Unions expressing support for the Chinese against US aggression.

The Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Unions has issued a statement protesting against US provocations against China.

In Czechoslovakia, the 4th Congress of Peace Champions issued a statement on Sunday denouncing the provocative activities of US imperialism in the Taiwan Straits area.

In Damascus, Secretary of the Jordanian Peace Committee said on Sunday that China had the indisputable right to liberate Taiwan and other off shore islands as these islands constituted an integral part of China's territory.

7. In Warsaw, a further Sino/American ambassadorial talk was held yesterday. The meeting lasted 1hour and 45 minutes and both sides announced afterwards that the next meeting would be held at 3 p.m. on 25th September.

/2....

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8. China's metal workers have succeeded in further raising the output of iron and steel in their effort to fulfill the country's target of doubling steel production this year. From 11th to 20th September, the country's total iron and steel output surpassed that for the first 10 days of the month; the average daily output of iron increased by 32.4% as compared with early September, and steel output by 3.64%. According to the experience of Honan province, one of the effective ways to raise the output of pig iron is to set up traditional type small blast furnaces in large numbers. On 15th September, the province set an all time record of nearly 18,700 tons of pig iron from its small blast furnaces, 11 times the daily output in early September. The province has more than 50,000 traditional type small blast furnaces operating in full swing. The successful experience in Honan is now being swiftly popularised in other parts of China. A new nationwide upsurge in pig iron output is expected soon. Following Honan's lead, 6 other provinces are already aiming at turning out 10,000 tons of pig iron a day each. In other provinces, an ever increasing number of people are taking part in setting up these traditional type small blast furnaces.

9. In north east China, workers at the Dairen steel plant have set a new national record in electric furnace utilisation, turning out 56.39 tons of steel in 24 hours by using a million volt/ampere transformer in an electric furnace charged with cold material. This beats the previous national record set at the same plant several days ago. The new record doubles the plant's average electric furnace utilisation co-efficient during August. The Dairen steel plant is one of the largest in China and produces various kinds of highest grade steel for use in metallurgical equipment, automobiles, machine tools, and power generators.

10. Good harvests of early rice have been reported from coastal Fukien province. This year's early rice crop in the province comes to 2,199,000 tons, 9% more than that of last year. The average per acre yield is 5% greater than last year. Bumper harvests of early rice were gathered on the Fukien front despite the harrassing and destructive activities of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The increases in per acre yield in two regions are 32% and 8% respectively over last year's. Farmers of Fukien province are now delivering and selling their best rice to the State; at the same time they are strengthening field work for the late rice crop.

11. All cadres of the Liberation Army will spend a month every year in the ranks as ordinary soldiers. This decision is contained in a directive issued by the General Political Department of the Liberation Army. The purpose of this system is to enable cadres to establish closer xxx links with the rank and file and strengthen the fighting capacity of the armed forces. The directive emphasises that this sytem is a must for military cadres to enable them to become expert. Cadres working in the ranks must be under command of the particular squad or platoon leader and eat, live, work, train, and have their recreation along with the rank and file as soldiers. The directive notes that good results have been achieved in the army since its carrying out of the directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party requiring leading cadres to take part in physical labour and since a large number of army cadres were sent to the basic levels to work. The relationship between the leading organs and the rank and file has been greatly strengthened, the ideology and working style of the cadres has notably improved, and the revolutionary (idea) of the rank and file has been greatly heightened.

12. The Iraki's People's delegation of friendship to China, headed by the President of the Iraki ... Association, arrived in Peking yesterday afternoon. The 15 member delegation has come to China to attend China's National Day celebrations on the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

QUESTION WITHOUT NOTICE - 23RD SEPTEMBER, 1958.

MR. WILSON: Can the Minister acting for the Minister for External Affairs state the Government's attitude to the so-called "Provisional Free Algerian Government" formed in Cairo on the 19th September?

SIR PHILIP MCBRIDE: The so-called government referred to by the Honorable Member was established by the Algerian rebel National Liberation Front, which I believe is known as the F.L.N. The Australian Government will not recognise the Algerian rebel government because it does not satisfy the accepted international criteria for recognition. The Australian Government recognises France as being responsible in Algeria.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

SECRET

23rd September, 1958.

J. C. G. Kevin, Esq.
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

With the Compliments

of the

Official Secretary

Copy of a letter to Mr. Timbs, Prime Minister's Department: Recognition of the F.L.N. Government in exile.

Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Canberra, A.C.T.

BOL.52/1

SECRET

25/2/11

23rd September, 1958.

...ee,

...o you to have our views on the question ...an National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) ... exile.

...inciple that, so long as a civil war or ...recognition of the insurgents as a ...ry to international law. Thus the ...regard a de jure recognition of the ...Algeria while the rebellion was still ...ct of intervention by any State granting ...ervention would be increased by the ... F.L.N. Government in exile, at least ...h recogntion, either de facto or de jure, ...metances, would be missing: the control ...nt would have over the territory which ... be insufficient for it even to ...is position would be quite different ... in exile during the second world war: ...the continuance of recognition of ...eprived of control over their territory ...ded as a legal nullity.

...he French Government to make any ...ernments against according recognition ...sition seems to us quite clear in international law, that is that the so-called Government has, in our opinion, no valid claim to recognition. The purely tactical purpose of the formation of an Algerian Government in exile was revealed by a statement issued in Cairo on the 18th September that its establishment was designed to counteract the forthcoming French referendum.

I shall be grateful if you will let me know whether the Australian authorities are in agreement with the views given above.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Charles Kevin in the Department of External Affairs.

Yours ...

(Sgd.) L W. BELL

(I. W. Bell)

M. C. TIMBS, ESQ.
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT,
CANBERRA.

SECRET

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

SECRET

25/2/11

POL.52/1 23rd September, 1958.

Dear Maurice,

It may be of interest to you to have our views on the question of recognition of the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) as an Algerian Government in exile.

It is an established principle that, so long as a civil war or war of secession lasts, the recognition of the insurgents as a de jure Government is contrary to international law. Thus the French would be entitled to regard a de jure recognition of the F.L.N. as the Government of Algeria while the rebellion was still in progress as an unlawful act of intervention by any State granting it. The gravity of the intervention would be increased by the fact that, in the case of an F.L.N. Government in exile, at least one of the factors upon which recogntion, either de facto or de jure, depends even in normal circumstances, would be missing: the control which the so-called Government would have over the territory which it purported to govern would be insufficient for it even to establish itself there. This position would be quite different from that of the Governments in exile during the second world war; what was in issue there was the continuance of recognition of Governments which had been deprived of control over their territory by acts which could be regarded as a legal nullity.

It is, of course, for the French Government to make any representations to other Governments against according recognition but, apart from this, the position seems to us quite clear in international law, that is that the so-called Government has, in our opinion, no valid claim to recognition. The purely tactical purpose of the formation of an Algerian Government in exile was revealed by a statement issued in Cairo on the 18th September that its establishment was designed to counteract the forthcoming French referendum.

I shall be grateful if you will let me know whether the Australian authorities are in agreement with the views given above.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Charles Kevin in the Department of External Affairs.

Yours ever

(Sgd.) L. W. BELL

(I. W. Bell)

M. C. TIMBS, ESQ.
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT,
CANBERRA.

SECRET

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 21/2/11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Ambassador of France, M. Renaud Sivan

on 22nd September, 1958.

Officers Present The Secretary

B. C. Hill

MAIN SUBJECT(S): ALGERIA - RECOGNITION OF REBEL GOVERNMENT

The French Ambassador said he had called on instructions from his Government which was anxious to avoid recognition being accorded to the so-called "Provisional Free Algerian Government" recently set up in Cairo. M. Sivan said he had no doubt that the Australian Government, in the light of its record of support for France, had no intention of recognising the Rebel Government. Paris had sent him, in what was plainly a circular telegram, arguments against recognition which he felt no need to elaborate; however, he would leave a copy of this paper with the Secretary (attached).

...

2. The Secretary said he would bring the representations which the Ambassador had made on behalf of his Government to the attention of the Acting Minister and of Mr. Casey, and would inform them that he had told the Ambassador that Australia recognised France as being responsible in Algeria and had no intention of recognising the body set up in Cairo.

Mr B. Shelton 23/9

Mr Kelson

&

file

A23/9

United Nations Debate on Algeria

3. Mr. Tange said he felt the establishment of this new Rebel Government would mean a more sharply divided debate in the General Assembly. He feared that the recognition apparently already accorded by Tunisia and Morocco would be followed by a number of further recognitions among the Afro-Asian group. The Secretary regretted that prospects of assistance of a "good offices" character from Tunisia and Morocco now seemed very remote. The Ambassador said this was the more regrettable since relations had been improving recently and Tunisia in particular had been easier to deal with, for example in agreeing to have the Sahara pipe-line run through to a Tunisian port. Mr. Tange enquired whether the Ambassador had any news of New Delhi's intentions towards the Rebel Government. M. Sivan said he had none.

The French Constitutional Referendum and Algeria

4. Some general discussion followed on the effects of the new French Constitution (if adopted next Sunday) on French colonies and on Algeria. M. Sivan said that so far General de Gaulle had not been very explicit about what he had in mind for Algeria. No doubt he wished to have the referendum behind him first. The constitutional and institutional arrangements envisaged in the new Constitution for other French territories were much clearer, including the prospect of a measure of 'home rule' - perhaps the General was thinking on these lines for

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Legal Adviser A/S (7) Mr. McMillan Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S):

Paris, Hong Kong, UN New York

Report prepared by B. C. HILL

ACTION:

1858/56.

Gone to 24/9

Mr Shelton Pls do this telegram & return to Secret 23/9

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

Algeria, if the referendum was successful there. Meanwhile, the F.L.N. were doing all they could to beat the referendum; the "government" in Cairo was no doubt intended to provide the attraction of a new loyalty to keep Algerians from voting in the referendum.

Off-Shore Islands

5. The Secretary referred to the Prime Minister's recent statement and explained the reasons for the change from the policy adopted by the Australian Government in 1955. Mr. Tange stressed the dangers involved if the friends of the United States urged them to pull back, thereby encouraging Peking to keep up the pressure, and possibly creating the feeling in other countries in China's vicinity that it was not worth standing up to Peking since all-out American support could not be relied upon.

China

6. The Secretary referred to Mr. Stirling's report of the views of M. Mendes-France following his visit to China. The Secretary said there was a very active and bitter spirit abroad in China; the Peking Government seemed very firmly in control; it would be a fatal ignorance if Peking did not really understand the nature of nuclear war or were led to doubt United States determination to engage in it if need be.

French Trade Fair in Melbourne

7. The Secretary said he was looking forward to meeting Ambassador Riviere, the Special Commissioner coming out for the Fair, later this week.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

Canberra, le 22 Septembre 1958.

Un soi-disant "Gouvernement Provisoire Libre Algérien" a été récemment créé au Caire.

A cet égard, la position du Gouvernement Français est la suivante :

Ce prétendu Gouvernement est entièrement factice, car il ne possède aucun des attributs matériels ou juridiques d'un Gouvernement réel.

1°/ Sa constitution ne résulte ni d'une consultation populaire régulière, ni de l'assentiment, exprimé de façon non équivoque, des populations qu'il prétend représenter.

2°/ Il ne possède pas le pouvoir réel, au sens juridique, puisqu'il lui est impossible de s'établir en territoire algérien et de contrôler celui-ci.

3°/ Il n'est donc pas en mesure d'assurer l'ordre et la sécurité dans ce territoire: Au contraire, les bandes qui agissent en son nom, ne sont capables que d'actions sanglantes et destructives: pillages, incen-

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

dies, assassinats, massacres collectifs sans distinction de race ni d'origine.

4°/ Ne disposant point du pouvoir réel et ne représentant pas la population algérienne, il lui est impossible de garantir matériellement ou moralement l'exécution des engagements qu'il offrirait de contracter ou des obligations auxquelles il serait tenu.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 25/2/11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Ambassador of France, M. Renaud Sivan

on 22nd September, 1958.

Officers Present The Secretary

D. C. Hill

MAIN SUBJECT(S): ALGERIA - RECOGNITION OF REBEL GOVERNMENT

The French Ambassador said he had called on instructions from his Government which was anxious to avoid recognition being accorded to the so-called "Provisional Free Algerian Government" recently set up in Cairo. M. Sivan said he had no doubt that the Australian Government, in the light of its record of support for France, had no intention of recognising the Rebel Government. Paris had sent him, in what was plainly a circular telegram, arguments against recognition which he felt no need to elaborate; however, he would leave a copy of this paper with the Secretary (attached).

2. The Secretary said he would bring the representations which the Ambassador had made on behalf of his Government to the attention of the Acting Minister and of Mr. Casey, and would inform them that he had told the Ambassador that Australia recognised France as being responsible in Algeria and had no intention of recognising the body set up in Cairo.

United Nations Debate on Algeria

3. Mr. Tange said he felt the establishment of this new Rebel Government would mean a more sharply divided debate in the General Assembly. He feared that the recognition apparently already accorded by Tunisia and Morocco would be followed by a number of further recognitions among the Afro-Asian group. The Secretary regretted that prospects of assistance of a "good offices" character from Tunisia and Morocco now seemed very remote. The Ambassador said this was the more regrettable since relations had been improving recently and Tunisia in particular had been easier to deal with, for example in agreeing to have the Sahara pipe-line run through to a Tunisian port. Mr. Tange enquired whether the Ambassador had any news of New Delhi's intentions towards the Rebel Government. M. Sivan said he had none.

The French Constitutional Referendum and Algeria

4. Some general discussion followed on the effects of the new French Constitution (if adopted next Sunday) on French colonies and on Algeria. M. Sivan said that so far General de Gaulle had not been very explicit about what he had in mind for Algeria. No doubt he wished to have the referendum behind him first. The constitutional and institutional arrangements envisaged in the new Constitution for other French territories were much clearer, including the prospect of a measure of 'home rule' - perhaps the General was thinking on these lines for

DISTRIBUTION:

Act/ Minister. A/S.E.A. (2) Central Br. D.L. & P.I. Br. E. & T.A. Br. Admin. Branch.
Secretary. A/S.P.(Comm.) Pacific Br. U.N. Branch. C. & P. Br. Antarctic Div.
A/S.E.A. (1) L. & T. Div. Western Br. E.R. Branch. C'wealth. Rels. Melbourne Office.
Legal Adviser A/S (7) Mr. McMillan Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S): Paris, Hong Kong, UN New York

ACTION:

Report prepared by D. C. HILL

P.R. attn to Western Branch

1958/56.

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

Algeria, if the referendum was successful there. Meanwhile, the F.L.N. were doing all they could to beat the referendum; the "government" in Cairo was no doubt intended to provide the attraction of a new loyalty to keep Algerians from voting in the referendum.

Off-Shore Islands

5. The Secretary referred to the Prime Minister's recent statement and explained the reasons for the change from the policy adopted by the Australian Government in 1955. Mr. Tange stressed the dangers involved if the friends of the United States urged them to pull back, thereby encouraging Peking to keep up the pressure, and possibly creating the feeling in other countries in China's vicinity that it was not worth standing up to Peking since all-out American support could not be relied upon.

China

6. The Secretary referred to Mr. Stirling's report of the views of M. Mendes-France following his visit to China. The Secretary said there was a very active and bitter spirit abroad in China; the Peking Government seemed very firmly in control; it would be a fatal ignorance if Peking did not really understand the nature of nuclear war or were led to doubt United States determination to engage in it if need be.

French Trade Fair in Melbourne

7. The Secretary said he was looking forward to meeting Ambassador Riviere, the Special Commissioner coming out for the Fair, later this week.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

Canberra, le 22 Septembre 1958.

Un soi-disant "Gouvernement Provisoire Libre Algerien" a ete recemment cree au Caire.

A cet egard, la position du Gouvernement Francais est la suivante :

Ce pretendu Gouvernement est entierement factice, car il ne possede aucun des attributs materiels ou juridiques d'un Gouvernement reel.

1. Sa constitution ne resulte ni d'une consultation populaire reguliere, ni de l'assentiment, exprime de facon non equivoque, des populations qu'il pretend representer.

2. Il ne possede pas le pouvoir reel, au sens juridique, puisqu'il lui est impossible de s'etablir en territoire algerien et de controler celui-ci.

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4. Ne disposant point du pouvoir reel et ne representant pas la population algerienne, il lui est impossible de garantir materiellement ou moralement l'execution des engagements qu'il offrirait de contracter ou des obligations auxquelles il serait tenu.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times Weekly Review File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: New York Date: 21-4-58.

E

Algeria's Rebels

Two years ago Ferhat Abbas, a leader of the Algerian rebels who have been fighting since 1954 against French rule of their 847,-552-square-mile territory, said:

> I begged France to give us * * * just a little hope. But they gave us nothing and now my people have turned to the extremists.

Premier Charles de Gaulle has tried to turn the Algerian people away from the extremists. He has called on the Algerians—9,000,000 Moslems and 1,200,000 Europeans—to show they want to stay French by voting next Sunday in the referendum in which France will decide on de Gaulle's proposal for a Fifth French Republic. But the rebels have declared a boycott of the vote.

Last week the rebel Front de Libération Nationale (F. L. N.) led by Abbas took a strong position on two fronts. These were its moves:

On the *diplomatic* front, F. L. N. headquarters in Cairo proclaimed the establishment of an Algerian "government-in-exile" with Abbas as Premier. Previously the F. L. N. was ruled by a nine-member Committee of Coordination and Execution. The F. L. N. said the new Government "considers itself in a state of war with France under international law." It was promptly recognized by five Arab states—Tunisia, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Libya and Iraq.

On the *military* front, the F. L. N. climaxed a terrorist campaign in France with an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Jacques Soustelle, Minister of Information and leader of diehard opposition to Algerian independence. All over France, which has an Algerian population of 400,000, terrorists shot at policemen and tried to blow up such targets as oil refineries. "The attacks will continue," Abbas said.

Rebels' Motives

Proclamation of the government-in-exile was believed designed to underline the rebel demand for independence under F. L. N. rule no matter how the referendum turns out. The rebels, it was felt, are worried that many Moslems will vote, under French Army protection and pressure, despite the boycott. Another probable motive was to force the Arab states, particularly Tunisia and Morocco, to side wholeheartedly with the rebels. The terror in France also seemed intended to show de Gaulle that the rebels were set against any compromise.

The consequences of both moves were likely to be far reaching. Tunisia and Morocco's relations with France were bound to be strained, if not broken. Both nations have tried to stay on good terms with France, on which they are economically dependent; their governments tried to put off the F. L. N. proclamation. France warned that recognition would be an "unfriendly act." But the force of Arab opinion and the power of the F. L. N.—it has more troops in Tunisia than the Tunisian Government—forced the two nations to side with the rebels.

For France's Western allies, including the United States, the recognition issue seemed certain to [illegible] another point of conflict with the anti-colonial nations of [illegible]

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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For France's Western allies, including the United States, the recognition issue seemed certain to provide another point of conflict with the anti-colonial nations of Africa and Asia.

In France, the terror campaign infuriated even those who are sympathetic to the idea of Algerian independence. The moderate newspaper Le Monde pointed out that the rebels had strengthened the case of the French extremists who oppose any compromise. Thus the rebels had dealt a major blow to de Gaulle's chances of rallying moderates on both sides for a negotiated peace.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Economist File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 20.9.58.

FRANCE

The Terror Campaign

THE attempted assassination of M. Soustelle, General de Gaulle's Minister of Information and chief election agent, was evidently a deliberate act by the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN); and it should be roundly condemned by every friend of France—and of the Algerians. From Cairo, M. Ferhat Abbas has since announced that attacks against men like M. Soustelle and M. Lacoste are to continue. Another stage in the war has been ushered in: the progress of the nationalist revolution in Algeria obeys a familiar pattern. (Ironically enough, on the morning of the attempt on M. Soustelle the British press was carrying sedate reviews of a biography of Michael Collins.) M. Soustelle's luck has held ever since his escape from the Paris police in May carried him to leadership in Algiers. Now his escape from the assassins, and his bearing during and after the attack, make him a hero; new advancement may well await him after the elections are done.

Paris and other French cities have long grown accustomed to the internecine warfare carried on between rival Algerian nationalist groups. But it was understood to be FLN policy that a guerrilla campaign against Frenchmen in France would merely alienate the sympathy essential to a negotiated settlement recognising Algerian independence. The terrorist attacks on oil installations throughout France on August 25th showed a clear change in tactics. Since then policemen and soldiers in France, and particularly in Paris, have been shot down in cold blood. The FLN appears to believe that, since the surrender of republican authority in May, French opinion is powerless against the will and interest of the Algerian settlers. It may also have been prompted by the French diplomatic intervention in Tunisia which has now almost silenced President Bourguiba's public support for Algerian nationalism, and by French successes in the war in Algeria itself.

There are 400,000 Algerians in metropolitan France, chiefly workers in heavy industry. The economy needs them, and they need their wages to sustain their families at home. The FLN has its activists among them, and probably collects funds from most of them. The Paris police began to screen the Algerians in the poorer quarters earlier this month, but it is plainly impossible to account for them all, or even to hold very many in detention camps. If this new terror campaign continues, confidence between the two communities will be broken beyond repair.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

European Room 7 Ft

25/2/11

E DE FRANCE

SE ET D'INFORMATION

YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

September 1958

Avec les compliments
de l'Ambassade de France

CE COUVE DE MURVILLE

F FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

OF THE U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

H SESSION)

R 17, 1958

Rec'd am 24/9 JB

state very firmly, once again, that the
not empowered to deal with the Algerian
as in the preceding years, it is exceeding
s agenda.

too clear, to resume, in this connection, the demonstration that has already been given several times of the violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations.

I shall add, however, that in taking this attitude, the General Assembly is acting in contradiction, not only to the letter, but to the spirit of its mission. This mission is to endeavor to make tolerance and good will reign throughout the world, to put an end to difficulties and not to foster them, to calm passions and not to exacerbate them, in short to promote brotherhood between men and peoples. In other words, the United Nations should, in all domains, make every effort to facilitate the settlement of the world's problems and not, through inconsiderate actions, to complicate and delay this settlement.

I can only note that the action taken until now with regard to Algeria and which is apparently to be continued again this year has been, not only ineffective, but harmful, and I do not see that it can be of benefit to anyone. In any case, I do not see how it could be of benefit to the Algerian populations. It is enough to note that the opening of our session, with the prospects of sterile agitation that it may have to offer, is once more the occasion for a renewal of terrorist action which is the scourge of the Algerian populations and which, by a tragic application of the policy of making matters worse, tends to render vain the efforts made to work toward a reasonable solution.

(over)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

FRENCH AFFAIRS No. 68 September 1958

STATEMENT BY M. MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE

FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AND HEAD OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

BEFORE THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(THIRTEENTH SESSION)

ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1958

The French Delegation wants to state very firmly, once again, that the General Assembly of the United Nations is not empowered to deal with the Algerian problem and that, consequently, this year as in the preceding years, it is exceeding its rights in placing this question on its agenda.

There is no need, for it is all too clear, to resume, in this connection, the demonstration that has already been given several times of the violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations.

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(over)

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

During the last two sessions, the French Delegation agreed to explain, at considerable length, the particulars of the Algerian problem and the manner in which the French Government intended to give this problem a pacific, democratic and just solution. But, at the same time, our Delegation made it quite clear that it would not continue indefinitely to do so, and that it would not yield to the demand each year to resume the debate once more.

The reopening of a vain and harmful discussion is even more inopportune at a time when the French Government has shown, in the clearest possible manner, its determination to devote all its efforts to the indispensable solution, and when it is making ready to translate this determination into acts. That is why the French Delegation announces, here and now, that, during the present session, it will not take part, in any way and under any form, in the debate that some would like to open on Algeria in contradiction to the Charter and to the very interest of Algeria.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

MG:CM

I.16574

Dated: 24th September, 1958.
1655
Rec'd: 25th September, 1958.
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

437. RESTRICTED.

Algeria.

Bayle (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has told Renouf:

(a) The French took a grave view of establishment of the Abbas "government" in Cairo;

(b) All French missions abroad had been advised France would regard recognition of "government" as a "profoundly hostile act". The F.L.N. satisfied none of the conditions for recognition laid down by International Law. Recognition moreover would amount to condonation of F.L.N. terrorism;

(c) Pakistan had advised the French that action of Pakistan representative in Cairo in congratulating Abbas had not been authorized by Karachi.

Stirling.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S

25th September, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P G

RESTRICTED

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

L. tL

0.12021

Sent: 24th September, 1958
1130

TO: W (via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK. 562 ☆

Repeated.

External Affairs Office,
LONDON. 2130

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON . 1475 ☆

Australian Embassy
PARIS. 266

RESTRICTED

In answer to question hin Parliament yesterday, Acting Minister replied to effect that Australian Government:-

(a) Will not recognise the so-called "Provisional Free Algerian Government" formed in Cairo on 19th September; and

(b) Recognises France as being responsible in Algeria.

A/- MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

Cost £5.17.6

24th September, 1958

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL C&P

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 25/2/11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Dr. Spinks, Counsellor, American Embassy.

on 22nd September, 1958.

Officers Present J.C.G. Kevin

MAIN SUBJECT(S): ALGERIA.

Dr. Spinks told me when he was in the Department this afternoon that the American Embassy had received a telegram from Washington telling them that the F.L.N. had set up an Algerian "Government in Exile" in Cairo and that support for this was likely to be forthcoming from a number of countries of the Afro-Asian Group. The same telegram said that the United States did not propose to give any recognition to the "Government in Exile".

M. Kelso ✓
Please copy.
HLS
24/9

DISTRIBUTION:

Act. Minister. Secretary. A/S U.N. Mr. Hill

A/S G.R. A/S Admin. L. & T. Div. Dr. Cumes

Central Br. Pacific Br. Western Br. Mr. Quinn

D.L. & P.I. Br. U.N. Branch. E.R. Branch.

E. & T.A. Br. C. & P. Br. C'wealth. Rels.

Admin. Branch. Antarctic Div. Melbourne Office. Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S):

ACTION:

Report prepared by J.C.G. KEVIN

1838/58.

CONFIDENTIAL

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

25/2/11

SECRET

→ A - retain

22nd September, 1958.

NOTES FOR VISIT OF FRENCH AMBASSADOR : ALGERIA.

THE SECRETARY

Military Situation

Fighting continues unabated and the French Army still faces a very serious military situation. There is no prospect of a military solution in the near future. The longer the fighting continues, the more effective the F.L.N. (Front de Libération Nationale) forces become. By extending their attacks to France itself, the F.L.N. have demonstrated their determination, their efficiency, and the threat they pose even to France's own security.

Political Situation

2. There can thus be no immediate solution other than a negotiated political settlement. In his earlier speeches in Algeria, de Gaulle seemed to offer some hope that he would work for such a settlement. His subsequent speeches, however, have shown a vagueness on Algeria. Further, the new Constitution lacks any provision specifically for Algeria. All parties in Algeria are consequently firmly convinced that de Gaulle has accepted the policy of integration demanded by the Colons and the Army; his appointment of Soustelle as Minister for Information has only served to confirm this interpretation.

Referendum

3. The Army and colons are working hard to ensure the success of the referendum; they would interpret a "yes" vote as a mandate to proceed to integration. The F.L.N. are, with equal vigour through guevilla attacks and sabotage in France, attempting to dissuade Algerians from voting.

After the Referendum

4. It seems clear that de Gaulle has dropped any idea of formulating a policy for Algeria until after the referendum. He told the Canadian Ambassador in Paris that there was no solution, or at any rate no present solution, for Algeria: integration was impossible, and Algeria would not be ripe for independence for a long period ahead; consequently there could only be a modus vivendi for the present, combined with a programme of better food, housing and primary and secondary industry.

Dangers in Present Situation

5. The present situation is clearly damaging to France's economy and to the western position in general. However, de Gaulle told the Canadian Ambassador that, because the country was not ready for independence, if it were turned adrift now, "Nasser probably, and the U.S.S.R. certainly, would be the winners." On the other hand, it is apparent that the longer a solution is delayed, the greater is the likelihood of an independent Algeria becoming closely linked to the U.A.R. and perhaps the Communist bloc!

SECRET

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

SECRET

Formation of Rebel Government.

6. As an example of the latter, the F.L.N. on 19th September announced the establishment of a rebel provisional "Government" in Cairo. This "government" has been recognised of Morocco and Tunisia (any slight chance they had of assisting France in a settlement of the Algerian problem has therefore probably disappeared) and will no doubt be recognized by several Afro-Asian and Communist countries.

Australian Attitude

7. The French Ambassador may seek information on Australia's attitude to:-

(i) The new rebel "government"-

As this body does not fulfil any of the prerequisites for recognition, we can take no cognisance of it; in any case, we recognize France's title to Algeria.

(ii) any discussion on Algeria in the United Nations-

We would formally support a French argument that discussion would be contrary to Article 2 (7), vote against inscription, and vote against any provision of a "compromise" resolution which asserted the competence of the General Assembly.

Generally, it would seem pointless to offer advice on French policy: de Gaulle would not welcome nor follow such advice, and in any case the views of the Army are so emphatic that he does not have a free hand.

B.C. HILL
EA & ME

B.G. Dexter
AF & ME Sections.

SECRET

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 E

Published at New York Date 21-9-58.

The Algerian 'Government'

The Algerian National Liberation Front (F. L. N.) has chosen its moment to strike very shrewdly—perhaps too shrewdly. In setting up a "Provisional Government representing the Republic of Algeria" in Cairo, the rebels are putting a great future handicap on Premier de Gaulle.

A move of this nature blows up any bridges that might still have been used between the Algerians seeking freedom and France. The F. L. N., to be sure, has always taken the intransigent position of immediate independence. The compromises of autonomy, partial independence or a commonwealth status have been possible as future solutions. To outside observers the two extremes of independence or the integration of Moslem and French Algerians with France have seemed impractical.

Now a serious situation has to be faced by all powers as well as France. The United Arab Republic, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco have already recognized the new "government." Most or all of the other Arab states can be expected to follow suit. Indonesia, India, Pakistan and the Soviet bloc are going to be torn between a temptation to recognize the "government-in-exile" and the realization that France will consider such recognition an unfriendly act. The United States, Britain and the Western powers generally will certainly not grant recognition.

President Nasser has once again done a major act of mischief. He loaned his own seat of government to the Algerian rebels and did not wait a moment to recognize the exile regime.

The timing by the F. L. N. is related to the fact that the referendum on the French Constitution takes place Sept. 28 and the U. N. General Assembly has the Algerian problem on the agenda of the present session. France, incidentally, announced three days ago that she does not recognize the right of the Assembly to discuss Algeria and she will not attend any such debate.

Thus a new strain has been placed on international affairs, to add to Taiwan and the Middle East. The F. L. N. has taken a great gamble, and gamblers more often lose than win.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

RWS:HB

I.16329

Dated: 20st September, 1958.
2125
Rec'd: 21st September, 1958.
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

275. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed Canberra, repeated New York for Minister 3.

1. Noon sent this afternoon for my United Kingdom, Canadian, American colleagues and myself collectively and said he did so for two reasons.

2. First was to say the government had decided to issue ordinance banning political party guards such as the Muslim League National Guards (actually the only one in being) because the Awami and the Republicans have both announced intervention to organise their own guards. Recent Muslim League Guards have been very ostentatious and provocative at political meetings, demonstrations, marches and receptions. He said the government saw the serious threat to law and order and to the pre election (period?) in these developments. The Muslim Leaguers were threatening a civil disobedience campaign if the ordinance passed and he wanted us to know the background in case of trouble and that the government intended to stand firm. In West Pakistan, the guards strength is about 100,000, well organised and drilled, and armed with staves.

3. Second and "most important point" was to inform us of the already serious pressure on the government to recognise the Algerian F.L.N. government and of the bad effect of the report that the Pakistan Ambassador to Cairo had allegedly said Pakistan was recognising. He mentioned the probability of the Russian and Satellite recognition of the F.L.N. following on that by the U.A.R. - and other Middle East countries already reported as likely to increase pressure here. He asked us all to impress urgently on our governments the need for the French Governments to "do something practical immediately to meet the Algerian Nationalists demands". He said he anticipated rapid exploitation here of demands for recognition of the F.L.N., and unless "something was done" the Government's hand would be forced. We pointed out the imminence of the French referendum and urged him to defer any decision till the result and effects of that were known. He still pressed on us to report.

Algeria

4. He then admitted the government had not yet considered the question of recognition but said the decision to ban the Muslim League guards, vide paragraph two, had been precipitated by the fear that the League would work up anti-west and anti-present Pakistan Government feelings over

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.16329

Algeria and stage demonstrations in which the guards might clash with police.

5. In deference to Noon's request I report the above. I do not anticipate any serious reaction to the banning of the guards, which is a very belated, but necessary measure. I do anticipate considerable difficulty for the Government over the Algerian question and they may be forced, on the grounds of expediency, to recognize the F.L.N. It is quite clear Noon himself feels strongly on the question and blames the French for "continual procrastination and deceit". He told us that he fears the spread here of anti West feelings which the Muslim league is fostering, and I agree there is the danger of this at least in the cities.

Cawthorn

A/ MIN AND DEPT E.A. 21st September, 1958.
P.M's

SEC A/Ss L.A. UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA S.A. E.A.F&ME
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NEW YORK (UN) OTTAWA LONDON NEW DELHI WASHINGTON
WELLINGTON

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 PT 3

Published at: New York. Date: 20-9-58

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS, Sept. 18—Ultra-conservative Europeans here renewed their pressure on Premier Charles de Gaulle today to declare himself for "integration" as the only possible solution for Algeria.

Under a policy of integration, as it is understood here, Algeria would become a full department of France without any autonomy. Algerian nationalists are bitterly opposed to this course.

The new drive, which is part of the campaign for the pending referendum on a new French Constitution, was spearheaded this morning by Alain de Serigny, publisher of Echo d'Alger, Algeria's largest newspaper. In a signed front-page editorial, he called on the Premier to clarify the Government's position on Algeria.

He noted that a "malaise" had been created by printed reports that General de Gaulle might consider a policy of autonomy for Algeria and might even be willing to negotiate with the nationalists, who are in rebellion against the French.

M. de Serigny's editorial apparently was provoked primarily by the fact that at a recent party meetings the Socialists and Radicals came out strongly against the policies of the conservatives in Algiers while at the same time endorsing General de Gaulle's proposed Constitution.

The charter does not mention Algeria and General de Gaulle has carefully refrained from using the word "integration."

Nevertheless, conservatives here have asserted all along that a yes vote in the Sept. 28 referendum is a vote for integration. They are highly sensitive, therefore, to any suggestion made in Continental France that this theory might be wrong. They have been bringing in prominent reinforcements from France to enhance the impression that integration will prevail.

The All-Algeria Committee of Public Safety sought yesterday to commit Premier de Gaulle to a policy of integration by quoting from speeches he made here this summer. In a motion published by local newspapers, the committee implied that he promised integration when he was here.

"The voters will not doubt" the word of General de Gaulle, the motion said. "They will vote yes for integration," it added.

On a television program tonight a speaker for the committee urged his listeners to vote yes to bring about integration and to "bury permanently the system" of French political parties.

Paris Policeman Slain

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Sept. 18—Another policeman was shot to death today by Algerian terrorists who attacked him on a Paris street. Two of the three attackers were killed in the ensuing chase.

Another Algerian was killed in eastern Paris after he and two companions had opened fire on a police patrol car.

National Archives of Australia Item A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.
Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 25/2/11 E.
Published at New York. Date 20.9.58

ABBAS IS TO HEAD ALGERIAN REGIME

Rebels Are to Proclaim Exile Government Today

By FOSTER HAILEY
Special to The New York Times.

CAIRO, Sept. 18 — Al Shaab, a Cairo newspaper, reported today that Ferhat Abbas would be named Premier of Algeria in a rebel government in exile to be established tomorrow.

[A Reuters dispatch from Cairo Wednesday said a spokesman for the Algerian National Liberation Front had hinted that the new government would be proclaimed Thursday. A rebel spokesman in Tunis said, according to Reuters, that more than thirty countries were ready to extend recognition.]

The report in Al Shaab, a semi-official newspaper, said that in addition to Mr. Abbas, a member of the Coordination and Executive Committee of the Algerian National Liberation Front, twelve ministers would be appointed by the new government. Four of these, the paper said, are in the custody of France, from which the exile government would secede.

Mohammed Yazid, who has been the fronts unofficial observer and spokesman at United Nations headquarters in New York, was listed as Minister of

Continued on Page 3, Column 6

Ferhat Abbas Due to Be Head Of Algerian Rebel Government

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

Information. He flew to Cairo yesterday, and today called a news conference for tomorrow at which an "important" announcement is to be made. He said Mr. Abbas would make the announcement.

The new government's headquarters would be in Cairo.

Al Shaab said the announcement of the formation of the government would be made in all Arab capitals after noon prayers tomorrow. Friday is the Moslem sabbath.

Public confirmation of the newspaper's report could not be obtained either from the Liberation Front's Cairo headquarters or from Egyptian sources. But the report was generally accepted as correct.

Idea Was Discouraged

It has long been a dream of the front's leaders to establish a formal government, but it could not find a home. Both President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic discouraged the idea. Mr. Nasser finally agreed to establishment of the regime here, it is understood, because of the belief that it would encourage Algerians to boycott the referendum next week on the French Constitution presented by Premier Charles de Gaulle.

The Algerian rebel movement has been financed by voluntary contributions from Arab Governments and citizens. It is believed that with establishment of the government in exile these contributions will be placed on a more formal and continuing basis.

The Liberation Front appealed last week to the Council of the Arab League for a yearly fund of 12,000,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately $28,000,000 at the unofficial rate) to finance its activities. No action was taken but the matter will be on the agenda for the Council session starting Oct. 1.

Mr. Abbas, who has been the rebel spokesman here, said last week that the principal contributor to the treasury had been Kuwait, oil-rich shiekdom on the Persian Gulf, which is under British protection.

Cabinet Members Named

CAIRO, Sept. 18 (Reuters)—Al Shaab listed the following Cabinet designations today for the Algerian Government in exile:

Premier—Ferhat Abbas.
First Deputy Premier—Ben Bella (held by the French).
Second Deputy Premier and Minister of Defense—Kerim bel Kacem.
Economy and Finance—Ahmed Francis.
Social Affairs—Youssef ben Hira.
Information—Mohammed Yazid.
Communications—Abdelafiz Boussouf.

Portfolios are said to have been given to three other Algerians detained by the French.

Announcement in Tunis

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Sept. 18—Belkacem Krim, a member of the Committee of Coordination and Execu-

The New York Times
Ferhat Abbas

tion, will hold a news conference in Tunis tomorrow to announce the formation of the government in exile with Mr. Abbas at its head.

Moroccan Ruler Informed

Special to The New York Times.

RABAT, Morocco, Sept. 18—King Mohamed V received a four-man delegation of the Algerian National Liberation Front tonight. They informed him of the decision to constitute a provisional Algerian Government in exile.

Paris Minimizes Move

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Sept. 18—French officials sought today to minimize the importance of the projected formation of an Algerian rebel government in exile.

Jacques Soustelle, Minister of Information, told reporters after a Cabinet meeting that no great importance was attached to the move.

France is attempting to obtain the participation of Algerian Moslems in French political life by getting them to vote in the referendum on the proposed Constitution Sept. 28. The new nationalist step, as well as the rebels' widespread terrorist campaign in France, appears to many persons here as a reaffirmation of the rebels' rejection of the referendum and of their will to continue the fight whatever the referendum's results.

A government in exile would create diplomatic complications since it is expected to ask for recognition as well as a voice in the United Nations, where

the air forces in France named him Air Force Chief of Staff in Paris. He was a participant in the civil-military dissident movement that led an uprising against Paris in Algiers.

The second step was to permit additions to the list of parties and groups enabled to campaign on the referendum in Algeria. The list had been limited to sixteen groups, all in favor of the Constitution. The final decision still will be up to Gen Raoul Salan, French civil and military chief in Algeria.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper The Times File No 25/2/11E.

Published at London Date 20-9-58.

MOVE TO PREJUDICE FRENCH REFERENDUM

CAIRO, SEPT. 19

In a large apartment building in a Cairo garden city which is their headquarters, while the Friday prayers were being chanted in the mosques, a crowd of flushed, excited Algerians to-day heard Mr. Ferhat Abbas, the Algerian rebel leader, declare in a strong voice, speaking in French: "I proclaim a provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria, in the name of the Algerian people."

The rebel green-and-white flag with red crescent and star was then run up. Mr. Ferhat Abbas declared himself Prime Minister of a Government of 16. He said to reporters: "Our Government has been announced in Algeria, and we are repeating the proclamation here and in Tunis and Rabat."

PAKISTAN CONGRATULATIONS

The representative of Pakistan was one of the first to offer congratulations. The United Arab Republic, Iraq, and Libya promptly announced that they would recognize the new Government.

Mr. Yazid, the Minister of Information of the new Government said in reply to a question: "Naturally we are in a state of war with France. We are trying to make all Governments recognize the fact that we are fighting the French, because there are some countries who consider there is no war in Algeria." He said that policy statements would be issued in a week's time.

The Government list was given as:—

Prime Minister, Ferhat Abbas; deputy Prime Minister and Minister to the Armed Forces, Kerim Belkacem; deputy Prime Minister, Ahmed ben Bella.

Ministers of State, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Rabah Bitat, Mohamed Boudiaef, and Mohamed Khider; Foreign Minister, Mohamed Amine Debaghine; Arms Supply, Mahmoud Cherif; Interior, Lakhdar Bentobal; Communications, Abdel Hafif Boussouf.

North African Affairs, Abdel Hamid Mehri; Finance and Economy, Ahmed Francis; Information, Hamid Yazid; Social Affairs, Benghedda ben Youssef; Culture, Tewfik el Medani.

State Secretaries, Lamine Hane, Omar Oussedik, and Moustafa Stambouli.

Mr. Abbas explained that three of his Ministers were in French detention—Ben Bella, Rabah Bitat, and Mohamed Khider. The three State Secretaries were in Algeria leading military operations.—*Reuter.*

A Quai d'Orsay spokesman said to-day that any country's recognition of the F.L.N. Government would be regarded by France as a hostile gesture, and would cast doubt on the stability and normality of the Government of the country concerned. But, according to reports from Tunis, the new Government will be recognized by nearly 30 countries, including two or three non-Communist European States, three South American republics, all the Arab and Communist countries, and some members of the Afro-Asian block.

Mr. Ferhat Abbas, described as the new Government's Prime Minister, is the most prominent figure in the F.L.N., and is in many ways more moderate and less anti-French than his colleagues. His wife is French, and for many years before the war he advocated the complete assimilation of Algeria into France, an extreme form of the "integration" now proposed by his enemies.

CHANGE OF MIND

During those years he wrote that he had searched everywhere for the soul of an Algerian nation, but had been unable to find it—a remark that is now often quoted against him by Frenchmen who claim that Algeria cannot have independence because she has no national identity. He changed his mind and started demanding independence in 1943.

When the Algerian rebellion broke out on November 1, 1954, he at first tried to stop it from spreading. He appealed for calm, and urged the French to put forward a rapid programme of reforms. Throughout 1955 he was a member of a group of Muslim deputies in Algiers known as the "61," who tried to bring pressure on the French from a moderate nationalist point of view without openly siding with the rebels.

In April, 1956, he finally decided to throw in his lot with the F.L.N. and went to Cairo. He is said to be comparatively favourable to the idea of negotiations with France, without the usual F.L.N. stipulation that Paris must agree to independence first.

General Jouhaud, operational deputy to General Salan in Algeria, has been appointed chief of staff of the Air Force in succession to General Gelée. General Jouhaud played a prominent part in the May revolt.

M. Soustelle to-day arrived in Algiers, where he is to open new broadcasting premises.

APPREHENSION IN PARIS

FUTURE RELATIONS WITH TUNIS AND RABAT

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, SEPT. 19

The decision of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) to declare itself a "free Algerian Government" has been greeted in Paris with dismay. It is expected to have an adverse effect on the situation in Algeria, and may have a grave effect on French relations with other countries, notably Tunisia and Morocco.

The timing of the move is assumed to be intended to impress Algerian Muslims on the eve of the referendum. The F.L.N. has already threatened reprisals against any Muslims who fail to obey its boycott of the referendum, but it may have felt that further action was required, particularly if it was impressed by French claims that some 70 per cent. of the Muslim electorate were preparing [illegible]

APRIL PLEDGE

BRITISH RECOGNITION NOT SOUGHT

THE LEGAL POSITION

FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

The British Government have received no request for recognition from the so-called F.L.N. Government in Cairo, perhaps because their attitude was known in advance. The position of the Algerian extremists in Cairo is very different from that of a Government driven into exile.

In any event *de jure* recognition cannot in international law be given to an insurgent Government so long as a civil war is in progress, and the Algerian insurgents have not established themselves as an effective *de facto* Government in any part of Algeria.

The announcement is clearly aimed to prejudice voting in the forthcoming French referendum. It was being argued by French sources in London yesterday that it displayed lack of confidence in the outcome. If the F.L.N. had been confident that they would be supported, it would have been simple and easy to

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

of Algeria, in the name of the Algerian people."

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APRIL PLEDGE

It is in the international field, however, that the move is most serious. The Istiqlal in Morocco and the Neo-Destour in Tunisia pledged themselves in April to support the establishment of a "free" Algerian Government, but there is evidence that since then King Mohammed, President Bourguiba, and other moderate leaders have been using their influence to prevent its establishment because of the difficulties it would create in their relations with France. But the F.L.N. leaders, no doubt with the backing of the United Arab Republic, decided to wait no longer.

Mr. Amine Debaghine, described as the Foreign Minister of the new Government, discussed the question yesterday with Mr. Balafrej, the Moroccan Prime Minister, and in Tunis one of his colleagues, Kerim Belkacem, was received by President Bourguiba. Reports to-night suggest that Morocco and Tunisia will shortly recognize the new "Government."

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The announcement is clearly aimed to prejudice voting in the forthcoming French referendum. It was being argued by French sources in London yesterday that it displayed lack of confidence in the outcome. If the F.L.N. had been confident that they would be supported, it would have been simple and easy to appeal to the Muslim population in Algeria to vote "no," or to abstain, rather than to declare the formation of a Government in Cairo—a step which could have been taken at any time in the past four years.

TOULON ALARM FOR BATTLESHIP

TOULON, Sept. 19.—The French Navy reported to-day that two men had been seen last night swimming towards the escort ship Bouvet and the battleship Jean Bart in the harbour here. Navy frogmen were sent after them but they escaped under cover of darkness. The swimmers were believed to be frogmen of the Algerian National Liberation Front, a Navy spokesman said.

Later it was stated that a sentry had seen a trail of bubbles in the dock moving in the direction of the Jean Bart. The sentry threw a hand-grenade into the water and then summoned officers.—*Reuter.*

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times — File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London — Date: 17.9.58

The Fence

The attempted assassination of M. SOUSTELLE in Paris and the sporadic outbreaks of terrorism in other parts of France suggest that the F.L.N. have temporarily turned their attention to France because they are not making any headway in Algeria. The French Government certainly seems fairly confident about its hold in Algeria, for the forthcoming referendum there is not to be staggered over a week or two to enable troops to be sent to each area in turn as it votes. The majority will vote on September 28, and in certain areas where the prefects may vary the date according to local conditions the referendum must still be held on either September 26 or 27. This will not allow much scope for the movement of troops during the voting.

The most significant advance made this year by the French Army against the terrorists has been the erection of a wire barrier between Algeria and northern Tunisia. Before the fence existed the terrorists enlisted their recruits in Algeria and set them to find their own way in small groups to Tunisia. There they were equipped and trained without any interference such as they would have suffered in Algeria, and they returned as fully accredited terrorists. The fence runs parallel with the Tunisian border, but about thirty miles inside Algeria. This allows the French to attack the terrorists whichever side of the fence they are on when detected. The fence itself is like Hadrian's wall, in that it is not an impassable barrier, but is designed merely to impose enough delay on any party cutting their way through for them to be detected by radar beams directed along the fence. Motorized troops and helicopters are then sent to deal with them. In the early summer the terrorists suffered some severe reverses here when bands of several hundred men tried to break through and were caught by the French, whose perennial object is to compel the terrorists to concentrate in vulnerable numbers. The fence does not cover the whole border, but it has drastically cut down the number of F.L.N. recruits in the Tunisian training camps. It has also increased the terrorists' difficulties in getting supplies of munitions and medicine.

With the success of this measure, and the improvement in the Army's morale since GENERAL DE GAULLE came to power, the tide in Algeria is running more in France's favour. But there remain something like 20,000 hard-core terrorists, and pacification by military methods would take several years yet. The overriding problem for the Army is to free enough troops from static guard duties to take an active part in rooting out the terrorists. COLONEL BIGEARD, the outspoken parachute commander who was transferred back to France from Algeria last month, had been in open disagreement with the high command about the wisdom of tying down troops in this way, though the reluctance of the Army to replace them with local home guard units—who would have to be given arms—is understandable. If the Army is to keep the initiative it will probably have to take the risk; but an attempt to get a political settlement would surely be a wiser alternative.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No. 25/2/11E

Published at: London Date: 17-9-58

MOUNTING PRESSURE BY ALGERIAN TERRORISTS IN FRANCE

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, SEPT. 16

General de Gaulle to-day conferred with M. Soustelle, Minister of Information, and M. Papon, the prefect of police. It is believed that further measures to deal with the latest outbreaks of sabotage and terrorism were discussed after the attempt yesterday on the life of M. Soustelle.

The Algerian nationalists are continuing the offensive. This morning they blew up an armoured vehicle near Marseilles, killing a civilian and wounding five soldiers. Five police cars were machine-gunned in the Paris district yesterday, and attempts were made to sabotage a petrol station at Marseilles and a chemical factory at Le Havre.

In one or two places the campaign seems to have begun to achieve its object of provoking indiscriminate reprisals against Muslims, for there are reports of racial riots at several places in eastern France, with at least eight people injured; but it is not clear who began the trouble.

The attack on M. Soustelle has brought a general outcry from the non-Communist Press and from right-wing politicians. Many Liberals, indeed, fear that the present revulsion against the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) will be exploited by M. Soustelle and the right wing to strengthen public feelings against negotiations or any pro-Nationalist gesture over Algeria.

M. Soustelle commented yesterday after the attack: "This should help to open the eyes of those who still have illusions about the possibility of engaging in reasonable talks with people of this sort." M. Duchet, the right-wing leader, said that M. François Mauriac was "as dangerous as several battalions of rebels." "It is the same old story," observes *Le Monde*. "Justifiable condemnation of an act of terrorism becomes a pretext to lump all one's political opponents with the authors of the act, and make them share the public odium for it."

It has now become apparent that the political leaders of at least three territories in French Africa are determined to persuade their followers to vote "No" in the referendum. These territories, French Guinea, Niger, and Somaliland, are thus quite likely to secede and become sovereign States. In the 10 other territories and in Madagascar, a majority for the constitution and for the French Community remains likely.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

25/2/11

CM

I.15959

Dated: 9th September, 1958.

Rec'd: 15th September, 1958.

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAV.EX658. UNCLASSIFIED.

Repeated U.N.New York EX183, Washington EX711, Paris EX245.

Algeria.

Following is report of 2nd September from the United Kingdom Embassy at Tunis:-

"Permanent Secretariat of the Tangier Conference met in Tunis on August 30th and 31st and September 1st. Tunisia was represented by Ahmed Tlili (U.G.T.T.) and Abdelmejid Chaker (Neo Destour): Morocco by MM. M'hamed Boucetta (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) and Abdel Afid Kadiri (Under Secretary of State for Agriculture) for the Istiqlal; the F.L.N. by Ahmed Francis and Ahmed Boumendjel.

Two joint communiques were issued on September 1st. The first said the Secretariat had studied latest developments in Algerian situation and drawn up a plan of common action at the General Assembly of the United Nations. Secretariat further agreed on plans for a Consultative Assembly of the Arab Maghreb, for submission "to the Executives of the three countries". Secretariat also agreed on its own methods of work. Next meeting will be held at Rabat on October8th.

Second communique consisted of manifesto on the attitude of the "three countries" towards the French referendum in Algeria. Manifesto, citing de Gaulle's speech of August 29th in evidence, describes referendum as intended to show the world that the Algerian people are content to be integrated with the French nations. This is described as an attack upon the law of nations, and a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter. Manifesto asserts that the sole real problem is to restore sovereignty and independence to the Algerian people".

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 15th September, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER PAC&M AM&SP S&SEA SA E..F&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P G

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No. 25/2/11 E
Date 11. 9. 58.

FRANCE TO BOYCOTT U.N. DEBATES ON ALGERIA

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, SEPT. 10

The French Government to-day decided to boycott any debate on Algeria at the United Nations this winter.

During the previous two years France has attended United Nations debates on this subject and has patiently explained her point of view, so that the latest decision marks a return to the policy followed in 1955, when the French delegation withdrew in protest against attempts to have the matter discussed.

M. Soustelle, the Minister of Information, explained to-day that France had now given sufficient proof of her humane attitude to African problems, and that there were few other countries which would be prepared to carry out such a task. This was a reference to General de Gaulle's offer of independence to the African territories. The decision is also in line with the General's policy of solving France's problems single-handed without the mediation of the United Nations, an organization which in some ways he holds in low esteem.

220 MUSLIMS ARRESTED

French police in various parts of France to-day arrested 220 Muslims suspected of being leaders of nationalist terrorism. They will be transferred to Algiers for further interrogation.

The Government has announced a five-year plan for developing French cultural and technical activities abroad. It is felt that although France's cultural prestige is sufficiently high in other countries, her recent technical achievements are often minimized, and one object of the plan will be to show that in the scientific and industrial fields, as well as the cultural, modern France has few rivals.

The public opinion surveys are now prophesying a 70 per cent. favourable vote in the referendum. The latest liberal and uncommitted figure to rally to the "ayes" is M. Jean Monnet, author of the Monnet plan and one of the leading architects of European integration.

He told *Le Monde* to-day that he would vote for the constitution, but only with the greatest hesitation. The original text of the controversial Article 14, allowing the President of the Republic to assume dictatorial powers in an emergency, was enough to make him vote against, but this had now been modified. The constitutional text still contained risks and weaknesses and he did not like the proposed method of electing the President, but he felt that on the whole the new text offered more hope than a return to the errors of the Fourth Republic.

IMPOSED DECISION

M. Defferre, the left-wing Socialist who rallied to General de Gaulle last week, is also showing hesitation. To-day he urged the Prime Minister to try to allow conditions for a genuinely free campaign in Algeria. He felt that at present, with the Army in control and the Opposition muzzled, the referendum would be in the nature of an imposed decision, as in the countries behind the iron curtain.

On the eve of the Socialist congress, which opens to-morrow, more local Socialist federations have been expressing their views, and the pattern continues to be in the proportion of three to one in favour of the constitution. The main Socialist trade union, Force Ouvriere, has advised its members to vote according to the dictates of their own consciences and is not taking sides. It has decided that the text of the constitution does not in any way infringe the rights of trade unions.

The group of right-wing deputies who formerly supported M. Pouiade have decided to campaign for the referendum, and so has the dissident wing of the Radical Party, led by M. Morice.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SDP

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

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SECRET G

25/2/11

Dated: 10th September, 1958.
2137

Rec'd: 11th September, 1958.
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

415. SECRET.

Algeria.

1. The new Canadian Ambassador (Dupuy) told me of his first meeting with de Gaulle 9th September. De Gaulle said that there was no solution for Algeria, at any rate, no present solution.

2. He was convinced that Algeria would not be ripe for independence for a long period ahead.

3. Integration was impossible. The Algerians were too different from the French for integration.

4. There could, therefore, only be a modus vivendi for the present. He did not go into details but said that there must be an increased role in the Government for better trained Algerians. At present only ten per cent were educated. (Dupuy thought this a sorry reflection on France). He spoke of a programme of better food, housing and employment and development of agriculture and industry which exploration of the Sahara would make possible for Algeria.

5. If Algeria were turned adrift now they would certainly suffer. Nasser probably and U.S.S.R. certainly, would be the winners.

6. He was not optimistic about the future either of Morocco or Tunis although French relations with both had recently improved. Dupuy forebore to ask about their reported desire to join the Arab League.

7. He was not particularly worried about the Middle East and talked of it in a lofty and "historical" way. He agreed that Far East was much more important but evidently did not regard Quemoy situation as critical. (Dupuy himself thought present crisis was largely directed to opening of United Nations General Assembly).

8. Dupuy found De Gaulle "much aged but in full swing and he seemed to have achieved a certain serenity". Dupuy added that he understood Machiavelli had become De Gaulle's favourite reading.

Stirling.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 11th September, 1958.
P.M's.

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E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL

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SECRET

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No. 25/2/11E

Published at: London Date: 5-9-58

AN ALGERIAN "EXILE GOVERNMENT"

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

BONN, SEPT. 4

According to Dr. Ait Ahcene, chairman of the German delegation to the Algerian National Liberation Front, an Algerian "exile Government" has been formed and will announce itself at "a suitable time." Dr. Ahcene said at a Press conference in Hamburg that the Algerians would not lay down their arms until they had achieved independence.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

AMENDED COPY

:FPG I .15237

Dated: 28th August, 1958

FROM: Rec'd: 3rd September, 1958

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

= SAV.EX635 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Paris Ex.243 Washington Ex.694.

Algeria.

Reference our savingram No.634.

A report we have seen from the United Kingdom Embassy at Paris makes the following comments on the F.L.N.'s recent terrorist attacks in France:-

"The F.L.N.'s timing must of course be linked to the Referendum, and to the General's impending arrival in Algiers. They may well feel that their prestige has been shaken lately. The French Army have succeeded in creating the impressionn, at any rate in metropolitan France, that the F.L.N. have been doing badly in Algeria; and there has been the affair of Bourguiba's agreement with the French on the pipeline. In choosing this particular way to react, their motives may have been mixed.

(a) They probably wanted to administer a severe jolt to remind opinion in France and elsewhere that constitution making will not solve the Algerian problem, and that the key factor is still the ruthless determination of the F.L.N.

(b) By choosing petrol installations, they no doubt hoped to demonstrate to both Bourguiba and the French that agreements on pipelines are valueless if the F.L.N. decide to sabotage the installations.

(c) They may hope to isolate the 300,000 North Africans in France from the ordinary French population. All North Africans, innocent and guilty, are bound to be affected by the general atmosphere of distrust, the police operations and the supervisory measures.

(d) They may also hope that terrorism will lead to counter-repressive measures, which will alarm "liberal" opinion in France, and may lead to internal political difficulties".

= Amendment 3rd September, 1958

A/ MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AN AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME
INF DL C&P

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TELAVIV WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

:FPG

I .15237

Dated: 28th August, 1958

Rec'd: 3rd September, 1958

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAV.EX63 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Paris Ex.243 Washington Ex.694.

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Reference our savingram No.634.

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3rd September, 1958

A/ MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL C&P

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TELAVIV WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper The New York Times File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York. Date 31-8-58.

His Offer of Independence Leaves Politicians Without an Issue

By THOMAS F. BRADY

Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS, Aug. 29—French a proposition to 29,000,000 black Africans this week that was so generous it seemed to baffle some nationalist leaders. Fundamentally the proposition was this:

(1) You want your independence? You can have it by voting "no" Sept. 28 in the constitutional referendum.

(2) You want continued French military protection, economic aid, diplomatic and technical assistance? You can have it by voting "yes" in the referendum and joining a community which France will dominate at the Federal level, while you will have complete internal autonomy.

(3) If the community system does not work out to your satisfaction you can opt for complete independence any time you want to and go your own way later by a subsequent local referendum. Metropolitan France will not stand in your way.

(4) Remember, France has a right to independence and self-determination, too. She reserves the privilege of withdrawing from the community herself, or of throwing out any other member who becomes too difficult.

Leaders Confused

Colonial nationalist leaders were entirely unused to this kind of talk by the chief of a Government that has always been based on the philosophy of central authority.

Senegal, in West Africa, was the most striking example of the dilemma. Leopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia, chiefs of the Party of African Regrouping, avoided the issue by staying in Europe during de Gaulle's visit. Their followers yelled "independence" so noisily when de Gaulle spoke in the central square of Dakar that they could not hear him say: "To the bearers of banners, I say 'you want your independence? Take it Sept. 28.'"

Particularly in Senegal a Communist-dominated minority was active and succeeded through front organizations known as the Party of African Independence and the Dakar Committee for Defense of Democratic Liberties in treating de Gaulle to some insulting shouts and slogans like "go away" and "assassin." The consequence was that rational nationalist leaders found themselves in the unhappy position of having to apologize to de Gaulle.

The 67-year-old Premier, famous for his stiff eighteenth century dignity, took the insults in his stride. Standing before the howling crowd of some 30,000 Senegalese, he said dryly, "I observe with a certain satisfaction that the question interests you."

Despite the excitement the results of the trip made experts hopeful that most, if not all the African dependencies south of the Sahara would vote yes in the referendum. Fundamentally the nationalist leaders are too intelligent to reject the experiment of local autonomy combined with badly needed French help and friendship.

Territorial Conflict

The only real problem that remains is the conflict among the African territories themselves about whether they should enter the new community individually, as the Ivory Coast, Gabon and ethnically separate Mauretania want to or through a primary African federation, as Senegal and Guinea want to. De Gaulle and his young, liberal, and forthright Minister of Overseas France, Bernard Cornut-Gentille, have said that France will accept either method. Consequently the Africans must solve that problem themselves.

Political prediction in Africa is even chancier than in other areas, but expert opinion is agreed that the referendum prospects range from sure to a very doubtful yes, more or less in the following order of territories:

The surest yes is the Ivory Coast, with 2,500,000 inhabitants. In a descending order of certainty, the rest are: Mauretania, 614,000; Tchad, 2,550,000; Gabon, 400,000; Oubangi-Shari, 1,100,000; Madagascar, 4,500,000; French Sudan, 3,600,000; Upper Volta, 3,300,000; Dahome, 1,600,000; French Guinea, 2,400,000; Niger, 2,350,000; Senegal, 2,200,000.

Serious doubts do not begin, in the view of most observers, until Dahomey.

Few Europeans Affected

It should be noted that among this enormous African population there are fewer than 150,000 Europeans. The proportion greatly simplified de Gaulle's task in human terms. There is no real problem of abandoning Frenchmen.

The Premier's easiest way out of Africa after his stops in Madagascar, French Equatorial Africa (Brazzaville id the Middle Congo), Ivory Coast, Guinea and Senegal, would have been to fly directly from Dakar to Paris.

But he chose once more to face France's really difficult problem in Africa on his way home: Algeria. Here a million Europeans live with 9,900,000 North African Moslems. Algerian nationalism is more developed than nationalism south of the Sahara. The Algerian National Liberation Front has been in armed guerrilla warfare against France for more than three and a half years. The Europeans here are desperately opposed to a solution like that offered to the black Africans. A French army of half a million men is running Algeria and is also opposed to "abandonment."

Why did de Gaulle deliberately include Algiers in his 12,000-mile itinerary and thus link North Africa with Africa south of the Sahara? M. Cornut-Gentille said expressly after the de Gaulle Brazzaville speech last Sunday spelling out the ways the Africans could achieve independence that the formula did not apply to Algeria because "Algeria is part of metropolitan France."

General de Gaulle's only speech in Algiers did not answer the question.

Different Questions

What General de Gaulle said was that a yes vote in the referendum here would mean the voter "wants to behave like a Frenchman." But he did not say what a no vote would mean.

The Europeans of Algeria were not happy and General de Gaulle's welcome was notably unenthusiastic compared to that on his earlier visits to this territory. But no overt opposition to the man whom the Europeans of Algeria brought to power by their uprising last May had developed before he left here Friday night.

The situation at the end of the de Gaulle tour was that the constitutional referendum would pose different questions in different places. In Africa south of the Sahara it means, according to General de Gaulle, a choice between outright independence and participation in a new community. In France it means a choice between a new Constitution designed to stabilize the French Government and a return to pre-de Gaulle political chaos.

Here in Algeria it appears to be an expression of a desire to be or not to be a Frenchman, without an indication of what result either answer would produce.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No. 25/2/11 E
Date: 29. 8. 58

MASS ARRESTS OF MUSLIMS IN FRANCE

3,000 QUESTIONED ON TERRORISM

OIL DEPÔT SABOTAGE

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, AUG. 28

Algerian terrorists again sabotaged a petrol depôt in France last night. In the suburbs of Rouen, four tanks full of spirit were blown up and set on fire. The fire was under control this morning, but at least £50,000 worth of damage has been done. The security guards, although they were unable to prevent the outrage, were this time at least ready to hit back at the terrorists, one of whom was killed and another wounded.

Some 3,000 Muslims were rounded up in Paris last night, most of whom were released after questioning. Similar mass arrests have been taking place at Lille and other centres.

At Marseilles, where the fire at the Maurepiane oil depôt is still burning, the inquiry into the incident has been handed over to the Army under an article of the penal code which allows for the death penalty for those guilty of sabotaging installations of potential military value.

AMBASSADOR'S PROTEST

Of the 250,000 Algerian workers in France, it is estimated that about one-fifth belong to the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.), and perhaps 20,000 of these are actively engaged in terrorism. To sort out the suspects from the mass of innocent workers, some of whom are relatively pro-French, presents the police with an almost impossible task.

It is inevitable that in large-scale round-ups some innocent Muslims are going to be roughly handled. The Moroccan Ambassador yesterday went to the Quai d'Orsay to protest that many Moroccans living in France had been the victims of repression and even of torture at the hands of the French police. He complained that a number of business premises owned by Moroccans had been arbitrarily closed by the police.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No: 25/2/11 E

Published at: New York. Date: 27. 8. 58.

Algerian Terrorism in France

The Algerian nationalists struck with terrible effectiveness and a remarkable display of coordination in France on Monday. In the process four French policemen and at least five terrorists were killed and there was considerable property damage. The question to be answered is whether the Algerian National Liberation Front (the F. L. N.) and the cause of Algerian independence will gain or lose by such tactics.

One must first decide what objectives the nationalists had in mind. There is to be a referendum in Algeria on Sept. 28 that is intended to start Algeria on the road toward autonomy within the framework of a French community. The nationalists know they cannot prevent the referendum, but they want Algerians either to abstain or to vote negatively.

The F. L. N. has been losing ground in Algeria, both militarily and, what is much more important to them, politically. There has been evidence of a genuine popular desire to come to terms with France. General de Gaulle has promised Algerians individual equality, equal suffrage and economic rehabilitation, leading perhaps in time to autonomy. He and his program have had an appeal.

From the beginning, nearly four years ago, when the insurrection started in Algeria, the F. L. N. has demanded complete independence. The successive French Governments, the army and the French or European residents in Algeria will not willingly grant independence or abandon Algeria. This is the impasse. The F. L. N., therefore, can only reach its goal by a victory of conquest. Being a revolutionary movement, it uses the classic tactics of civic strife, sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

While waiting for the flames of Monday's wave of terrorism to die down there is one certainty, which is that American opinion, official and unofficial, can only condemn such acts. The probability is that most Algerians in North Africa and in France will also condemn the F. L. N. for what it did.

National Archives of A... 1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 27. 8. 58

CALM WELCOME IN ALGIERS FOR GENERAL DE GAULLE

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, Aug. 27

Algiers to-day greeted General de Gaulle for the third time in less than three months. There were some flags and crowds along the road, but the arrival had almost a routine air, and the city, usually so turbulent in its politics, must have seemed like a haven of peace to the Prime Minister after his stormy day at Dakar yesterday.

Politically the visit to Dakar was less of a failure than that to Conakry, the capital of French Guinea, the day before, but several thousand young African demonstrators followed the General wherever he went, with cries of "We want independence!" and "Down with de Gaulle!" At an open-air rally in the evening they made much of his speech inaudible, as well as those of local African leaders who were speaking in favour of independence.

General de Gaulle's reply to the demonstrators was: "If they want independence let them take it on September 28" (the day of the referendum). He added that, in spite of systematic agitation, and organized misunderstanding, he felt sure that Senegal and Africa as a whole would vote "yes." He spoke more vehemently than he has previously on this tour, and he was clearly annoyed by the demonstrations.

LEADER'S DISCLAIMER

These were organized, with Communist support, by one or two extreme nationalist parties and by the chief African trade union in Senegal. There is not much evidence that the Parti du Régroupement Africain, by far the strongest in Senegal, played any large part, in spite of its dissatisfaction with the proposed constitution and its desire for an independent West African federal State.

M. Guillabert, one of the leaders of the P.R.A. in Senegal, condemned the demonstrations as discourteous and disclaimed responsibility. He said that his party had wanted merely to hold one or two quiet and polite demonstrations to make clear to the General its desire for independence.

Nevertheless, the party's attitude towards the referendum remains equivocal. Some P.R.A. leaders in Senegal said yesterday that they were satisfied by the kind of Franco-African community proposed under the constitution, but others expressed the fear that the constitution laid too much emphasis on the autonomy of individual territories and did not offer sufficient scope for a West African federation based on Dakar. It is the ambition of Senegal to be the hub of a fully independent West African State.

The party will decide its attitude to the referendum when the central committee meets on September 19. Much will then depend on the views put forward by its two leaders, M. Senghor and M. Mamadou Dia, who were conspicuously absent from Dakar during General de Gaulle's visit yesterday.

After arriving in Algiers General de Gaulle received General Salan this afternoon. He will visit other parts of Algeria to-morrow and Friday.

DEPARTMENT OF FRANCE

Though Algeria is France's greatest problem, the referendum concerns Algeria much less directly than the oversea territories. The French oversea peoples will vote on the nature of their links with France, but the referendum is silent about the links between Algeria and France.

General de Gaulle intends to tackle the Algerian problem after the Algerians have expressed their views in a general election, and the referendum is meant to pave the way for this by providing, among other things, a strong central Government in Paris with whom the Algerians will be able to negotiate. For the purposes of the referendum Algeria will count as a department of France.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Times File No. 25/2/11 Pt. 1

Published at: London Date: 27-8-58

SABOTAGE

In the four years since the Algerian revolt started the nationalist F.L.N. has never tried a single operation as ambitious as Monday night's coordinated acts of sabotage in several French cities. There has, in the past, been plenty of sabotage in Algeria, and gang warfare in metropolitan France has brought its almost daily toll of sudden death. But this was a deliberately dramatic gesture, and even though most of the saboteurs were foiled, enough spectacular damage was done for the rebels to claim a success.

In war, which the F.L.N. says it is conducting, success is its own justification. But the nature and timing of this operation have their significance. It was executed on the eve of GENERAL DE GAULLE'S arrival in Algiers at the end of a journey which has taken him triumphantly through most of France's African possessions, and was no doubt meant to remind French and Muslims alike that the rebellion is still a fact and its leadership intact. Since the insurrection of May 13, and more still since GENERAL DE GAULLE'S return to power, the F.L.N. is thought to have lost influence. The GENERAL'S personal prestige, the prospect of strong government, the exciting if vague idea of integration, have all helped to turn Muslim Algerian thoughts away from violence. Particularly in the towns and coastal regions cooperation and trust between Muslims and French have revived. This is, of course, unwelcome to the F.L.N. leaders, and no doubt one consequence of the sabotage operation will be to increase racial suspicions and antagonisms. The fact that the target of the saboteurs was oil and that Marseilles, where sabotage was most effective, is the port for Algerian oil was probably intended to show that the exploitation of Saharan oil cannot be safely undertaken without the nationalists' good will. Even in metropolitan France the oil is not safe.

But the main purpose of the F.L.N. is undoubtedly to influence the coming referendum on the new constitution. In next month's vote Algerians of all races will be asked to express approval or disapproval of the constitutional proposals, but they will vote as part of France. The vote will, therefore, not have for Algerians the immediate importance it has for the inhabitants of the other territories GENERAL DE GAULLE has been visiting. In these the elected assemblies will be preparing to decide their own future political status. In Algeria the moment of decision is farther off and the form of choice still obscure. That there will be a choice eventually the GENERAL has promised, without indicating its scope. At Constantine in June he said that the votes of all Algerians would have the same weight in the referendum, and that subsequently "we must gather together, here as elsewhere, the representatives belonging to the public bodies of to-morrow. After that we shall have to see, with the representatives, what remains to be done."

What remains to be done may be integration or some still undefined form of association with France. But the F.L.N. stands out for independence. It has called for a boycott of the referendum. The French Army has the task of ensuring that Muslim electors vote if they [illegible]. The F.L.N. has

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

of sabotage in several French cities. There has, in the past, been plenty of sabotage in Algeria, and gang warfare in metropolitan France has brought its almost daily toll of sudden death. But this was a deliberately dramatic gesture, and even though most of the saboteurs were foiled, enough spectacular damage was done for the rebels to claim a success.

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What remains to be done may be integration or some still undefined form of association with France. But the F.L.N. stands out for independence. It has called for a boycott of the referendum. The French Army has the task of ensuring that Muslim electors vote if they want to. The F.L.N. has fallen back on terrorism to make certain that they stay away. The old struggle between the French Army and the rebels is thus being fought in a new political setting, but in France as everywhere else violence will be stamped out only with the help of political solutions.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

JD. I.14632

FROM: Sent: 19th August, 1958.
Recd: 25th August, 1958.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON. (via air mail)

SAV 616. CONFIDENTIAL.

Information copies to London (for External) and Ottawa.

North Africa.

The following from Allen (Tunisia) on 19th August:

Franco-Tunisian Negotiations:

1. It was likely that withdrawal of French troops (except those in Bizerta) would be complete by end of this month. Negotiations on the future status of the Bizerta Base had not yet begun but other issues in Franco-Tunisian negotiations were being resolved. The main questions involved in the transfer of the Bank of issue to Tunisian hands had been settled and only technical details remained to be worked out. The International Airport at Tunis had been handed over to the Tunisians. Some difficulties had arisen because, of the 100 French technicians employed at the airport and weather stations in various parts of Tunisia, only a small number had agreed to remain. As a result some of the weather stations had been closed temporarily. Negotiations regarding French Consular establishments appeared to be proceeding smoothly although the Tunisians might insist that some of the small French Consular posts away from the main cities on the coast should be permanently closed. The Tunisians maintained that there was no need for some of the smaller Consular posts and that the French only used them as information gathering points. The Tunisians were allowing French settlers with small farms to return but were seeking to buy out those with large holdings. The French were unhappy about this because they felt that the Tunisians were conducting the land reform programme at their expense.

Tunisian-FLN Relations:

3. Earlier this month the F.L.N. had objected strenuously to the Tunisian Agreement with a French company for building of pipeline from Edjele Oil Field in Algeria to a point near Gabes on the Tunisian coast. The Tunisians had argued that it would take three years to build the pipeline and that Algeria would be independent by the time the pipeline was operating. The F.L.N. bi-weekly/(El Moujahid) had been critical of the Tunisian action and its printing plates were seized when it began to launch into a more general criticism of the Tunisian Government and Borguiba. The F.L.N. had attempted to call Maghreb (Moroccan-Tunisian-F.L.N.) meeting to deal with the matter, but the Tunisians had successfully blocked this move. (subsequently members of the F.L.N.'s executive body (committee forCo-ordination and Execution) had come to Tunis to patch up differences and amicable relations now appeared to have been restored between Borguiba and the F.L.N.)

4. Apart from the pipeline issue, Borguiba's pro-Western stand on the United States intervention in Lebanon and his public statements suggesting that the F.L.N. should take what concessions they could get now to provide a basis for further demands later, had added a further strain to F.L.N.-Tunisian relations.

5. The F.L.N. maintained that if they went back on their demands for full independence, the morale of their forces would be

CONFIDENTIAL 2

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seriously weakened and they would lose popular support. Allen thought the F.L.N. leader would be willing to negotiate with the French if the latter would concede the F.L.N.'s political dominance in Algeria. However, the French would probably be willing to concede anything but this.

ALGERIA.

6. Fighting between the F.L.N. and the French was continuing and there was a noticeable increase in F.L.N. terrorist activities in the main cities. Allen believed the incidence of terrorism would continue to increase as the vote on the French Constitution came nearer.

7. The F.L.N. had been late in calling for a boycott of the registration for the poll and the French claim that a large proportion of the population had registered was probably true. As the vote would be a simple yes or no for the new French Constitution (which did not include any specific reference to Algeria), the affirmative vote would be regarded as a vote of confidence for De Gaulle. Arrangements provided for the Algerians to cast either a green or white ballot paper as affirmative or negative votes respectively. Allen doubted whether the vote would be free and believed that the French would ensure substantial affirmative vote. However, F.L.N. would do its best to stop Muslim voters from voting.

8. Allen was pessimistic about long term prospects in Algeria and thought recent developments, if anything, had forced the F.L.N. further towards extremism.

Morocco:

9. There was an intensive struggle taking place in Istiqlal between the Moderates and Extremists. The position of foreign forces, including United States bases, was the central issue in this struggle and moderates, including the King and Prime Minister Balafrej, gave the impression in their public statements of being more extreme than extremists. The latter, with the support of Major Labour Union (U.M.T.) under the guise of assisting their "Arab Brothers" were attempting to disrupt the flow of supplies to the United States bases by refusing to unload United States supply ships.

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TEL AVIV WELLINGTON.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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AUSTRALIAN - EMBASSY
PARIS

20/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DUPLICATE COPY
21 AUG 1958

201/1/4
Memorandum 599

13th August, 1958

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

The New French Constitution

1. The Consultative Committee has accelerated its work and now plans to report to the Government on 14th August, a week ahead of schedule. This decision may reflect a feeling by the Committee that its recommendations are unlikely anyway to carry weight with the Government now that General de Gaulle has come out unequivocally against any important changes in the draft.

2. The Public Safety Committee of Algeria has drawn up its plans for the referendum campaign there. These indicate that the Army is to go all out to get the Muslims to vote and to vote "yes". Public Safety Committees are to be established in eanh Algerian town to win the support of the populace for the Constitution. General Salan has yet to approve these plans.

3. This step has an ominous note - the network of Public Safety Committees will increase the hold of the Army on Algeria and will leave it sitting pretty to take over the country if Algeria votes "no" or if the metropolis should reject the Constitution.

Alan Renouf,
Chargé d'Affaires.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Manchester Guardian File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: Manchester Date: 14. 8. 58.

REBUFF FOR EXTREMISTS IN ALGERIA

by our Correspondent

PARIS, AUGUST 12.

Following two long meetings yesterday evening and to-day, the Algiers Public Safety Committee is reported to have decided on a reorganisation of the whole system of Public Safety Committees in Algeria. They are to be reformed on a hierarchial plan, to enable them to direct more effectively the referendum campaign and "gather the adhesion of the population."

Public Safety Committees at communal level will elect representatives to departmental committees, which will in turn send representatives to regional committees. These last will be represented on the Public Safety Committee for All-Algeria, which will also be re-organised. Membership of the All-Algeria Committee will be cut from 80 to 76, and the seats allotted to the "Committee of May 13" (settlers responsible for sparking the May insurrection in Algiers) will be cut from 45 to five. There will be increased Moslem representation.

All this seems to mark another triumph for the Army, and a rebuff for the extreme elements among the settlers. The settlers will also be displeased by the Algiers Public Safety Committee's rejection of a proposal to endorse General de Gaulle's new Constitution only if it specifically mentions the integration of Algeria with France. Instead, the committee decided that this would be a suitable matter to discuss with Algerian representatives after the election.

"Le Monde" to-day publishes a directive circulated by the headquarters of the South Algerian military region, which throws an interesting light on the rôle which the Army has allocated itself in the referendum campaign. Recipients of this directive are told that their first task is to "prepare the population" in Algeria.

"There is no need," it says, "to insist on the vital interest which the success of the referendum has for France." Consequently the Army, as "representative of civil and military power in Algeria," must undertake "a vast propaganda campaign" in order to obtain a really impressive vote in the referendum and "a very large favourable majority."

To this end, a psychological warfare campaign must be launched right away. This should include the development of the "de Gaulle myth," a wholesale distribution of the General's photograph, and placarding of walls indelibly (in paint or tar) with the V for Victory symbol, interlaced with the Cross of Lorraine, "even in the most out of way places."

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

SECRET

25/2/11

CM

I.13889

Dated: 31st July, 1958.

Rec'd: 14th August, 1958.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

SAV.3. SECRET.

Repeated London 51, Washington 30, New York 8.

The Policy of General de Gaulle.

1. The following gives the main lines of Gaullist policy as it has emerged since May. There has been nothing to suggest that the present Government is anything but a one-man show; hence the term "Gaullist policy".

2. The New Constitution. General de Gaulle's purpose is to have approved by referendum on 5th October a Constitution which will put an end to the chronic French political instability. He has therefore proposed a new Constitution which would establish a presidential rather then a parliamentary democracy. Under this Constitution the President would be the central figure of the Government and the role of Parliament would be severely curtailed.

3. There are rumblings of discontent in the press and among the politicians over de Gaulle's plans for the Constitution. But the people, who will decide the issue, show no signs of bucking. They may (it is only a possibility) once the holidays are off their minds, but at present all the auguries for the referendum on 5th October point to a triumph for de Gaulle.

4. Economic. General de Gaulle got himself over his immediate economic problem by literally cashing in on his return to power, that is, by successfully floating an internal loan. This should tide him over until the New Year.

5. In other respects, he seems to be having trouble working up an economic and fiscal policy which is likely to be effective. Apparently, he plans to lower prices, but each proposed reduction is resisted by those whose pockets are to be pinched. The same resistance is encountered to proposals to increase particular taxes. One wonders whether the same fate will not great the rumoured appeal not to ask for wage boosts.

6. Algeria. How much control de Gaulle has over the officers who run Algeria is difficult to say from Paris; this is most likely an undetermined question. General de Gaulle's prestige probably awes Salan and his colonels, at least to the extent that they make a public show of marching with him provided that he gives them a pretty free hand in Algeria. Behind this uneasy arrangement the colonels in Algeria are waiting and watching what the General is doing with the ball.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SECRET

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.13889

7. So far as regards Algeria, de Gaulle has made no play; he has and is merely temporizing. There is no knowing how long he can or will do so but it is known that he gives priority to the enactment of the new Constitution. Meanwhile, he has shown his awareness of the Algerian problem by two personal visits. By these visits he has also reconnoitred the position of the colonels, tried to swing the lower ranks behind him rather than behind them, and played for the support of the Moslems by announcing measures of social and economic alleviation. Military action against the rebels seems, moreover, to have been stepped up since the last visit.

8. General de Gaulle has on the other hand sought to placate the colonels by decorating General Salan, promoting the other leading generals of the Algerian revolt and making Soustelle, the darling of the colonels and the colons, Minister for Information (perhaps Soustelle was also taken into the General's inner circle the better to control him). It is a significant illustration of de Gaulle's authority that the press and the politicians took these measures almost without a murmur.

9. Clearly, while he gropes towards an Algerian policy, de Gaulle is in these ways seeking to establish the widest possible basis of support for the policy he eventually plumbs for, support which he hopes will be forthcoming if not for the policy itself because it is the policy which de Gaulle thinks right. As a temporizing measure this is excellent, but a policy has still to be found. One element of policy seems to have de Gaulle's approval at present - the assent of the Moslems to any settlement. But this is of little help for whatever may appeal to the Moslems is hardly likely to appeal to the colonels and the colons.

10. Foreign Affairs. Under de Gaulle, there is a new flavour, a new style, rather than a new foreign policy. Earlier fears that de Gaulle would make a deal with the Soviet Union and pull out of the Western Alliance have proved quite groundless. But while France's policy as a member of the Western Alliance remains the same, there has emerged a tendency to act more independently. General de Gaulle seems to be trying to pull France out of the position to which she had fallen - the position of junior partner in a firm of three - and to restore her as one of the three equal Western great powers.

11. Hence the following:-

(a) the determination to become a nuclear power no matter what the economic cost and no matter what the United Kingdom and the United States think of such a course (I wonder if this determination would not disappear if the United States and the United Kingdom were to offer France a voice in the use of their strategic weapons?);

(b) the stubborn distinctiveness of de Gaulle's approach to the proposed Summit Conference on the Middle East (this stubbornness and distinctiveness probably also reflects hurt pride - not being consulted about

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intervention in the Lebanon and Jordan - and distaste of meeting where France's voice would be only one of a number);

(c) General de Gaulle's desire to see established in N.A.T.O. a political directorate of the Big Three and to have more command posts in N.A.T.O. occupied by Frenchmen.

12. Another aspect of the new flavour of French foreign policy is the implication contained in de Gaulle's letter to Khrushchev of 26th July that at a Summit Meeting on the Middle East France would seek to speak for Europe as a whole (Couve de Murville immediately afterwards raced off to Rome and Bonn). To be able to do so would help to achieve the aim mentioned in paragraph 10. But this new note raises also the question whether de Gaulle, contrary to expectations, has not been sold on the idea of concerted European action on major international problems.

13. General de Gaulle is so far doing well and nothing at the moment seems beyond his capacity except a solution of the very problem which swept him back to power - Algeria. He will need rare capacity and good fortune to solve this, but he is at least approaching the problem with a proper caution.

Renouf.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 14th August, 1958.

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times
Published at: London
File No. 25/2/11 E.
Date 12-8-58.

RENEWED VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA

TERRORISTS FIRE ON CARS AND BUSES

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, AUGUST 11

In Algeria over the weekend there was a sharp recrudescence of terrorism, leading to the death of 19 people, of whom 15 were Europeans, and injuries to about 50 more. The most dramatic incident was that in which Algerian terrorists fired with machine guns on cars passing along a village road some 18 miles from Algiers; the cars contained young Frenchmen and girls going to a dance. Three of them were killed and three injured. South of Oran, the Algerian nationalists opened fire on a bus making towards Sidi Bel Abbes and five passengers were killed, of whom two were Europeans.

This morning, the Algiers-Oran passenger train struck a mine which had been planted on the permanent way, and three soldiers were killed and several civilians injured. The inference is that the F.L.N. (Algerian National Liberation Front) are resorting to these acts of terrorism in readiness for the referendum at the end of September, their aim presumably being to show that they are present over large sections of Algerian territory, or can make life very unpleasant there, and that those Muslims who go to the polling booths should realize what their action may cost them.

INDEPENDENCE CLAIM

The M.N.A. (the nationalist organization which is a rival to the F.L.N. and which, when General de Gaulle came to power, adopted a reserved but not completely hostile attitude towards him) has now issued a statement claiming independence for the Algerian people, and encouraging Algerians to work for the failure of any efforts by the Government for a policy of integration.

The M.N.A. say that the de Gaulle Government has paid attention only to the interests of the French minority in Algeria and that it is ignoring completely the aspirations of the Algerian people. "All its efforts, they claim, have been concentrated on strengthening the "war of repression in Algeria and the triumph of the policy of so-called integration."

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 7-8-58.

E

SECRETS OF THE PLOTTERS IN ALGIERS

M. LACOSTE "BACKED OUT"

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, JULY 7

Both M. Delbecque and M. de Sérigny have during the past few days thrown fresh light on the important roles which they played in the preparation of the Algiers insurrection of May 13.

Speaking at Lille yesterday M. Delbecque admitted that he had organized the movement. He said that as principal private secretary to the Minister of Defence he had known about the various plots which were being prepared against the Republic, and which the police were powerless to suppress. He took it upon himself to see that the inevitable insurrection, when it came, should be directed towards General de Gaulle.

M. Delbecque admitted that some elements in the insurrection were Fascist, but denied that this had been true of himself or the other principal conspirators. As for the future, he thought that the smaller political parties in France should disappear in favour of the three or four main currents, of which the Social Republican (ex-Gaullist) party was one. General de Gaulle should remain the "national arbiter" and not head any one political movement.

MORAL SUPPORT

M. de Sérigny, in a book just published, has given his own account of how he and M. Delbecque flew from Paris to Algiers on May 9 to persuade M. Lacoste to join the insurrection, after they had received assurances from M. Soustelle that General de Gaulle would lend his moral support. M. de Sérigny called on M. Lacoste and asked him to declare publicly that he would stay in Algiers until the political parties in Paris had made a truce and decided on a "Government of national unity" pledged to hold on to Algeria. M. de Sérigny hoped that M. Pflimlin would thereupon fail to get his vote and that M. Coty would be obliged to call on General de Gaulle.

According to M. de Sérigny, M. Lacoste had first agreed, but later backed out, after consulting his staff and several members of his party. It can be regarded as fairly certain that M. Lacoste was in favour of a large-scale demonstration on May 13—including, according to M. de Sérigny, an assault on the town hall—in order to secure his own retention as Minister Resident and to oblige M. Pflimlin to change his policy; but he was not prepared to break decisively with his own party by siding openly with the plotters.

KNEW FOR MONTHS

Speaking at a Socialist Party meeting yesterday, M. Lacoste denied that he sought to violate the constitution or act against the Republic. He said that he had known for months that the insurrection was being prepared, and had several times tried to secure the transfer to France of Colonel Trinquier, the parachute officer who played a leading role in it. It was Colonel Trinquier more than anyone else who persuaded the parachute division to side with the civilian demonstrators.

The book gives some hint of the rivalry and mutual suspicion that has always existed between M. de Sérigny and M. Delbecque.

DANGER AVERTED

M. Moch, who was Minister of the Interior in M. Pflimlin's ill-fated Government, told the Socialist Party meeting yesterday that during the crisis four of the nine generals commanding the various regions of France had not hidden their sympathy for the insurrection, and that the police and the gendarmerie were corrupted. In Corsica, only one prefect or sub-prefect out of 17 had remained loyal. This was why it had not been possible to defend the Republic by force. On May 27 M. Moch had received a secret report that the parachute troops were to invade France the next day. M. Moch believed that General de Gaulle had received a similar report and that was why on May 27, in order to avert imminent civil war, the General had published his strangely premature declaration that he had already begun the process of forming a Government. M. Moch thought that a great danger had thus been averted and that the administration must now be given again the conviction that its first duty was to defend the Republic.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Observer
Published at: London
File No. 25/4/11 E.
Date 3.8.58.

French Raid Rebel Fund Headquarters

From William Millinship

PARIS, August 2

THE French D.S.T. (*Direction de Surveillance du Territoire*), counter-espionage police, claimed to-day to have smashed the Algerian rebel fund collecting organisation in north-eastern France and arrested 19 National Liberal Front agents.

Four of the accused are women, three French, and one an Algerian Muslim student of philosophy at Paris University.

Investigations [illegible] to a flat in the 16th *arrondissement* in Paris. D.S.T. officers, disguised as house painters, watched the building for several days, while cameras hidden in a painter's van photographed all persons entering and leaving the flat. Other policemen followed suspects to hide-outs in Lille and other towns in the north of France, where the F.L.N. organisation known as Willaya No. 3 collected subscriptions to rebel funds from Algerian workmen.

Documents Found

The police claim that when they raided the Paris headquarters they found hundreds of documents containing full information on the F.L.N. wing in France. They also discovered forged identity cards hidden under the floor-boards. Among those arrested is Ben Aissi Mohammed, a street hawker, believed to be head of Willaya No. 3.

In Algeria, a strong F.L.N. force has ambushed a French Army convoy and killed 10 soldiers, unconfirmed reports said to-day. Two other soldiers were said to be missing. About 200 rebels armed with automatic weapons made the attack near Bou Saada, 100 miles south of Algiers, on Thursday. The French casualties were the highest suffered in a single engagement for several months.

French Army headquarters announced to-day that 30 rebels had been killed in a battle 50 miles south-west of Algiers. They were said to be followers of France's former ally "General" Bellounis, who was killed by French paratroops three weeks ago.—*Copyright.*

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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25/2/11

FPC:ABX.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

A.6059.

Dated: 31st July, 1958.
1742.
Rec'd: 1st August, 1958.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2176 CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Savingram Washington EX612, and Paris S.221.

From External.

Middle East.

1. Following points from Levant and African Departments, Foreign Office, will supplement information in Commonwealth Relations Office savingram 607 and in portions of J.I.C. Review 29th July already cabled to defence.

(A) Iraq.

Foreign Office are again in direct cypher communication with Baghdad Embassy but only limited traffic possible. They have received nothing to confirm reports that some Khurds, Shias and the Marsh tribes of Tigris were opposing the new Government. They thought anti-Republican broadcasts by the "Voice of Iraq" might be a work of the Jordanians or conceivably of Royalist Military Group.

(B) Jordan.

Morale of Hussein and the Government had now improved. Danger was less from wholesale defections of military groups than from plots by small numbers of officers subverted by U.A.R.

(C) Libya

Nasser could set off attempt at coup at any time he wanted. Success of attempt was however open to question. The King certainly appreciated reasons for, and was heartened by, United Kingdom and United States action. He had perhaps unnecessarily weakened his internal position by the forthright message of condolence to Hussein on Feisal's death.

(D) Tunisia

Bourguiba probably appreciated the reasons for United Kingdom and United States action. Tunisian relations with F.L.N. had worsened, (mainly because of France/Tunisian agreement on oil pipeline through Tunisia from Sahara oil wells) and Bourguyba would now find it more difficult to control well armed F.L.N. elements in Tunisia especially as Tunisian forces were poorly armed. The Iraq coup had undoubtedly raised Nasser's prestige in Tunisia (as in Libya). As a result Nasser would find it easier to make trouble in Tunisia by using F.L.N. and Youssefist elements.

(E) Morocco

The King and perhaps Balafrej appreciated reasons for United Kingdom and United States action, although the press had been extremely hostile. The Foreign Office were concerned about the internal situation but the danger was not so much from outside interference as from Government incapacity. Additional strain was imposed on the Government by difficulties in negotiations for the withdrawal of French forces. Moroccans were saying that they wanted all foreign troops (including United States) to leave

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

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and that after the troops had left they would consider conditions on which they might agree to have the United States back.

(F) Algeria.

Draft French Constitution did not provide for possibility of independence for French territories overseas. If the Algerians were required in the referendum to vote on the whole Constitution while other French territories overseas were required to vote only on parts dealing with status of overseas territories it appeared unlikely that Muslim Algerians would vote in any numbers. With Soustelle's appointment etc. no one now believed that de Gaulle was in fact going to propose a liberal solution in Algeria. If indeed there had been a breach in F.L.N. between those who now wished to negotiate with the French and those who did not, it had probably been closed by recent events.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S. 1st August, 1958.

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INF DL C&P.

G.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times — File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London — Date: 24. 7. 58.

OPEN SPLIT IN ALGERIA

EXTREMISTS' DEMAND FOR REFORMS

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, JULY 23

An open split has appeared in the Algeria public safety committee between those, such as its president, General Massu, whose main objective was confined to securing the return of General de Gaulle, and the extremist minority who consider that the work is not yet done and want to push ahead and reform the French State on "corporative" lines.

Fourteen members of this minority, most of them Poujadists or of the extreme right-wing, yesterday published a declaration calling for a corporative French State—a sinister word with echoes of Vichy and Mussolini. It means a nation without political parties where the power is held in theory by the people in their various groupings and in practice by a State hierarchy.

The committee held a meeting at which angry words were exchanged, and later General Salan and General Massu disclaimed responsibility for the declaration. The committee decided to allow its members more political liberty of action, provided that they acted in their own name and not that of the committee. This is a reversal of the decision made six weeks ago that the committee's members should be non-political and not belong to political parties.

SAHARA PIPELINE

The new decision is likely to increase the divergences already apparent within the committee's ranks. The best that could happen would be for the extremist wing to break openly with the rest and drop off, for most of the other members are far from being the Fascists that they are sometimes accused of being, and they are probably prepared to back General de Gaulle all the way.

In Tunis, the leaders of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) are very angry with President Bourguiba at a result of his agreement with France to allow a pipeline from the Sahara across southern Tunisia to the coast. The F.L.N. regard this as a breach of the agreements reached whereby the Tunisians admitted the right of Algerian Nationalists to the Sahara. In general, the F.L.N. are now worried that President Bourguiba may be beginning to let them down and may be more interested in seeking general agreement with France.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

Place on file copy 25/2

I.12489/90

Sent: 22nd July, 1958
1714
Rec'd: 23rd July, 1958
2007

25/1/4/20

25/1/4/21

GJW/BD

FROM: Transmitted via leased channel

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

Tunisia

1266. CONFIDENTIAL.

P.I.R.

(Information copy to London and Ottawa)

France - North Africa.

The following from Looram (Franco-Iberian Affairs) on 21st July.

Tunisia.

1. The Franco-Tunisian negotiations were proceeding in a satisfactory manner. There would no doubt be difficulties in the negotiations for the French use of the Bizerta base but a serious start had not yet been made on this aspect of the negotiations.

2. All French troops in southern Tunisia (including Remada) had now been evacuated. Arrangements for the evacuation of French forces from other points were proceeding smoothly and the Tunisian agreement had been secured for French technical assistance for the maintenance of airfields. The French had also made a number of gestures including the handing over of all military hospitals and some other facilities to the Tunisian authorities. Negotiations regarding the position of French settlers, consular establishments and other such problems were also progressing well. French assistance in Tunisian monetary reform had helped the progress of the negotiations

3. The Tunisians were very pleased with the way things were going. It was indicative of the new atmosphere in Franco-Tunisian relations that the bad border incident a few days ago had been played down by both sides.

Morocco.

4. French negotiations with the Moroccans for the withdrawal of French troops were not going so well. The Moroccans had been upset because Borguiba had been able to get concessions from the French before them. They felt that while Borguiba had been shouting from the housetops they had been quiet and therefore deserved better treatment from French. However, the French had now undertaken to withdraw their troops and to leave only training bases in Morocco.

5. As a result of events in the Middle East the Moroccans were adopting a tough line about foreign bases on their territory and the position of United States bases might be affected.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

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Algeria.

6. It was hard to tell whether General de Gaulle had any clear idea as to the form of the settlement he might seek in Algeria or whether he was hoping to improvise as he went along. His first problem had been to restore authority over the Army and to detach the latter from French settlers. General de Gaulle had made some progress in this direction but still had a long way to go. When he had first come to office he had spoken of a federal solution for Algeria including a large measure of autonomy. However, he was now less categorical about this.

7. Apart from the problem of restoring discipline over the Army, much would depend on the success of the constitutional changes and elections which de Gaulle had promised for Algeria. If a substantial number of Muslims voted in the elections, this would provide General de Gaulle with an opportunity to negotiate. However, if F.L.N. Boycotted the elections and persuaded the majority of the Muslim population to stay away from the polls, the elections would be a failure.

8. The F.L.N. were believed to be divided on what to do next. Some F.L.N. leaders were understood to be in favour of negotiations with General de Gaulle. Others, however, were uneasy about the negotiations which the Moroccans and the Tunisians were holding with the French and feared they might be left out in the cold unless they maintained a firm and militant position. The F.L.N. claimed to be quite happy about their military position vis-a-vis French, but it was indicative of the quandary they were in that they were again resorting to terrorism in the major cities to maintain their hold on the Muslim population. There were no new indications that the F.L.N. intended to form a provisional Government, but this possibility could not be ruled out with approach of the United Nations General Assembly Debate.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'S.

24th July, 1958

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AN&SP S&SEA SA [illegible] E
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G.

WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: New York Date: 20.7.58.

OVERSEAS FRENCH TO CHOOSE STATUS

Charter Offers Continuance as Territories, Federation Role or Integration

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, July 19—France will offer three choices of future status to her overseas territories under the new constitution—continuance as territories, integration with France or membership in a federation.

This was announced today as a ministerial committee put the finishing touches on the draft Constitution for the Fifth Republic that will be considered by the full Cabinet next week.

At the end of the month the draft will be submitted to a consultative committee of legislators and jurists for advisory opinions.

Finally, after what promises to be a sharp electoral campaign, with the Communists leading the opposition, it will be submitted to the voters at a referendum, probably Sept. 28, instead of Oct. 5 as previously believed.

To the provisions setting up a strong executive Presidency cut to the measure of Gen. Charles de Gaulle, the current Premier, and to the modifications of the legislative system, the committee today added a section defining the relationship of France with her overseas territories.

There are twenty-one of these, most of them in the two big African dependencies of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, but also including Madagascar and other island possessions. All are now regulated by a framework law giving them a measure of home rule under French-appointed governors.

Even before the committee's decisions were announced a group of African leaders entered a demand that the options to be presented to the territories include that of full independence. The Government has not commented upon it but the constitutional draft made it clear that full independence is excluded for the present.

Following the meeting, presided over by Premier de Gaulle, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Minister of State, himself an African leader, and Bernard Cornut-Gentille, Minister for Overseas France, outlined the terms of the triple choice to be presented to the territories.

The decisions did not apply directly to Algeria, but Premier de Gaulle in a recent speech clearly indicated that Algeria, too, would have the option of federal relationship with Metropolitan France instead of its present status as an integral part of it.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

CM

I.12135

Dated: 17th July, 1958.
1430
Rec'd: 18th July, 1958.
2159
(Transmitted via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

560. UNCLASSIFIED.

Algeria.

Our 526.

Secretariat has circulated letter signed by 24 Afro-Asian Delegations requesting inscription of item on 13th Assembly Agenda.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S

19th July, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
E.AF&ME E STHN AF&ME INF DL MT C&P
G

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM CONFIDENTIAL

25/2/11

I. 11795.

Dated: 8th July, 1958.
:MP Rec'd: 15th July, 1958.

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAVING EX 526 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Australian Embassy, Paris EX 199, Australian Embassy, Washington EX 558, Australian Mission to United Nations, New York EX 144.

From External.

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO ALGERIA

1. Set out below is the text of a report of 5th July from the United Kingdom Consulate-General at Algiers:-

"General de Gaulle's visit has once more reinforced his authority with the army here while at the same time strengthening position of the army itself. In a private address to 300 officers he expressed his confidence in them, and stressed the necessity of intensifying the war against F.L.N. during the week preceding the referendum.

On several occasions General de Gaulle showed his impatience with the Committee of Public Safety which was trying to give him their views on the situation, and in Algiers he was "too busy" to see a delegation which wished to present a motion on "integration". The delegation was eventually received by M. Mollet. Following this rebuff the committee is meeting on July 8th to consider a further motion on integration.

A sub-committee is now engaged in interpreting various declarations made by General de Gaulle during his visit. General de Gaulle never used the word integration, and in Kabylie, replying to fulsome speeches demanding integration by local tame Moslem mayors, he merely spoke of Algeria "fraternally associated" with France. In the same way his final broadcast did not in any way bind him to a policy of integration in the sense in which this is understood by right wing led opinion here, although attempts are being made to prove that it did. The economic and social development of which General de Gaulle spoke could quite well be carried out in an Algeria enjoying a wide measure of local autonomy, linked to France by federal or other ties."

MIN.&DEPT. E.A. 15th July, 1958.
MIN.&DEPT. DEFENCE

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CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM. CONFIDENTIAL

I. 11795.

Dated: 8th July, 1958.

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Wagner Hall over, but note para 2.

15th July, 1958.

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.
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CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: London Date: 14-7-58

ALGERIANS GO TO PARIS FOR FÊTE DAY

"FRATERNIZATION BY COMMAND"

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, JULY 13

The usual summer crowd of tourists in Paris has been augmented this week-end by a more unusual sight—thousands of dark-skinned, white robed Muslims from remote Algerian villages, who have been taking trips on the Seine and rubbing shoulders with incredulous Texans or Swedish students at the Eiffel Tower and other centres of attraction.

To-morrow's Bastille Day is officially placed under the sign of Franco-Muslim fraternity, of the unity of the French Army and unity between France and Algeria. For this purpose the Government has brought to Paris 3,600 Muslim ex-service men and 2,000 Muslims of between 17 and 20, nearly all on their first visit to this country. Besides taking part in to-morrow's great military parade on the Champs Elysées, they are spending a few days being shown the sights, historical and modern, of what they may or may not wish to regard as their own capital city. *L'Humanité* calls it "fraternization by command."

The Muslims will be encouraged to take part in the great open air balls that are being organized on a lavish scale all over Paris, and extra armed police are being posted in the Algerian quarters to protect them from F.L.N. terrorist attacks.

POLICY REVERSED

The Bastille days of 1956 and 1957 were reduced to austerity scale, on Government orders, because of the war in Algeria. To-day, with that war still raging, the policy is reversed, and public money is again authorized for the traditional balls and firework displays. It will be the most majestic and nationalistic Fourteenth of July since the liberation, and with perhaps few parallels since 1789. The accent is not only on links with Algeria but on the new revival of France under General de Gaulle.

Some 15,000 troops, 5,000 ex-service men and the 2,000 young Muslims will be reviewed by President Coty and General de Gaulle on the Champs Elysées in a march past lasting two hours.

General Salan and General Massu have arrived in Paris and will be at the parade. The Government has chosen this moment to issue them with what looks curiously like rewards. General Salan receives the Military Medal, the highest army decoration, and General Massu is promoted from brigade to divisional rank. General Jouhaud, who also played a large part in the Algiers revolt, is promoted to a higher rank in the Air Force and so is General Challe, whom the Pflimlin Government banished from Paris on May 16 for his suspected part in aiding the Algiers revolt. Most curious of all, General Jacques Faure, who spent two weeks in prison early last year for plotting a military *coup d'etat* in Algiers, is now to return to Algeria with an important command in Kabylia. He has recently held a command in Germany.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York. Date 14-7-58

Aides Before Premier's Talk —Delbecque Back From Paris, Is Optimistic

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS, June 13 — A spokesman for the Algiers Committee of Public Safety praised Premier Charles de Gaulle's address today before he had heard it or seen a text.

"We know General de Gaulle," he said. "We are certain he will express the feelings of the entire nation."

The spokesman added that the committee itself, at an early evening session, had pledged its loyalty to the Premier and assured him of "its fullest confidence" and "respectful cooperation."

Léon Delbecque, the committee's vice president, who returned from Paris yesterday, had given an optimistic report to the group on his conversations in the capital. He, too, appealed for a united effort behind the Premier.

In other words, the Algiers junta, which only Tuesday drew a rebuke from the Premier by demanding that political parties be eliminated, was on its best behavior. However, to the expressions of goodwill a jarringly dissonant note was added.

A folder of propaganda pamphlets handed to reporters by a member of the military-civilian committee included a letter from a private citizen accusing General de Gaulle of "entering the system" — the junta's term for the parliamentary regime—while the "army continues to be stabbed in the back by the newspapers." A mimeographed copy of the letter bore the seal of the "Office of the Minister for Algeria, Information Service."

Confusing Duality

Lucien Neuwirth, the spokesman, himself represents both the committee and Gen. Raoul Salan, Premier de Gaulle's deputy here.

This deliberate and confusing duality of official and private functions is typical of the Committees of Public Safety. Since the dissident movement's violent beginning a month ago today, the committees have acted both as a simple lobby and, in practice though not in law, as a local government.

The organization of the committees closely follows the administrative set-up in the territory.

At the top is the all-Algeria committee, which has between seventy-five and seventy-eight members, according to conflicting official lists.

Forty-six of these belong to the inner circle, namely to the Committee of May 13, the parent group, which was formed on the evening of the uprising.

The all-Algeria committee also includes representatives sent to Algiers by four regional committees.

The chain of command runs from the central committee to the regional bodies, from there to the committees of smaller administrative districts and, finally, to local committees. There are more than 800 local committees scattered throughout the territory, according to committee members.

The line that should separate

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

Salan, Premier de Gaulle's dep-

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The chain of command runs from the central committee to the regional bodies, from there to the committees of smaller administrative districts and, finally, to local committees. There are more than 800 local committees scattered throughout the territory, according to committee members.

The line that should separate committee activities from those of the army is equally blurred.

Army officers take part in committee activities as fully integrated members. In the All-Algeria committee fifteen members are officers, three of them generals.

The committee has set up special commissions in virtually every field. Their purpose is to speed the process of "integration" in all walks of life.

Integration, in the committee definition, means "absorption of every individual, Moslem and European, in the French nation."

Nine out of ten of the local committees have their headquarters in official administration buildings, city halls or prefectures. In a majority of cases the president of the local committee is the Mayor or the army officer responsible for both civilian and military administration.

Complete Control Held

Officially or legally, the committees have no governmental functions. Unofficially and practically, local government officials double as committee leaders. Committee control over local administrations is thus complete.

Committee members here are quite frank about this and obviously proud of it. Even at the top it often is impossible to make a distinction between governmental action and committee policy, between General Salan's decisions and the committee members' demands.

In cooperation with the army the committees run a paramilitary organization for young people, with special blue uniforms tailored after the famous camouflage attire of the paratroopers. The youngsters are being taught a craft and then go on to receive basic military training, according to a committee official.

Similar commissions have been set up for labor organizations, information, economic affairs, foreign affairs and internal relations.

The committees also are organizing what are called "friendship chains" between Moslems and Europeans.

The committee's secretariat boasts that through these activities it touches "every individual in the population."

A more realistic appraisal heard here is that the committees, with the help of the military and civilian authorities, are trying to reach into all important phases of social, political and business life and are doing their best to create a state within the state.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

RESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

HB

I.11621

Dated: 10th July, 1958.
1730
Rec'd: 11th July, 1958.
1517

FROM: (via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

NY.526. RESTRICTED

Algeria.

Afro Asian Group today decided to request inscription of item on Algeria in Agenda of Thirteenth General Assembly. Members of the Group are reported to have instructions to support inscription. In the expectation that other members of the group will be instructed to support inscription, formal request will not be lodged with the Secretariat until 16th July.

MIN. DEPT. E...
P.M's.

11th July, 1958.

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RESTRICTED

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The New York Times Weekly Review File No: 25/2/11 E.

Published at: New York Date: 6.7.58

De Gaulle to Algeria

"The Algerians cry 'Vive de Gaulle' as Frenchmen instinctively do," General Charles de Gaulle said when he offered to take control of France after the May 13 uprising against the Republic. On June 4, four days after he took office, Premier de Gaulle flew to Algiers. He received an enthusiastic welcome. Hundreds of thousands of Algerians, both European and Moslem, cheered "Vive de Gaulle" as the General rode through gaily decorated streets.

Last week de Gaulle journeyed once more to Algeria. He found a far different climate. The crowds were sparse, and few of them shouted "Vive de Gaulle."

The cool reception of de Gaulle reflected his failure so far to give any of the embattled forces in Algeria much to cheer about. He has stated no definite policy. On the Moslem side, the mass of people appear unconvinced by de Gaulle's promises of equality, while the armed rebel minority is intransigent in its demand for independence. On the European side, the civilian extremists are increasingly hostile because de Gaulle refuses to endorse their scheme of "integration" of Algeria into France. Under integration, the Moslems would in effect be swallowed up in the French majority. The Army officers who took part in the uprising, and who now are the effective rulers of Algeria, still maintain close relations with the civilian dissidents.

Two Appeals

Last week de Gaulle made an effort to gain support among the Moslems and the younger Army officers outside Algiers.

To the Moslems de Gaulle offered promises of equality and economic benefits. He invited the Moslems, including women for the first time, to vote on equal terms in the referendum he plans to hold in October on a new French constitution. He offered a "vast plan" of public works to relieve unemployment and build schools for all Moslem children.

To the Army officers de Gaulle gave lectures on obedience, praised their "role of pacification" and asked pointed questions about their relations with the Moslems. When he left, de Gaulle's aides were convinced that he had the assured loyalty of the Army outside Algiers. In Algiers the problem centers on Gen. Raoul Salan, supreme military and civil commander. Salan and many of his associates participated in the May uprising and are still equivocal in their allegiance to de Gaulle. De Gaulle was reported bitter at Salan's lack of loyalty. With de Gaulle's new strength, his aides said, the Premier will move soon to undercut Salan.

De Gaulle's ultimate line in Algeria, it appeared, will hinge on the Moslem response to his invitation to vote in the October referendum. The rebels will try to enforce a boycott of the vote; the Army will try to get the Moslems to the polls. Thus the turnout will serve as a measure of the comparative influence of the Army and the rebels over the Moslem people.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Economist File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at London Date 5-7-58.

ALGERIA

Military Reconnaissance

MILITARY matters were General de Gaulle's first preoccupation when he returned to Algeria on Tuesday, and on his flying visits to Constantine, Oran and Kabylia he was weighing up the strength and thoughts of two armies. French military sources now claim to see a deterioration in the Moslem rebels' fighting efficiency. Desertions from the FLN forces have gone up markedly since the events of May 13th ; in June, 260 are said to have given themselves up, half of them with their arms. The sealing-off of the frontiers with Tunis and Morocco seems to have become effective, and the FLN, although keeping up their attacks, appear to be fighting as guerrilla bands rather than as the regular military force they lately aspired to be. General Salan is believed to have asked for massive reinforcements to exploit the advantage he now sees opening up.

If General de Gaulle has decided to fall in with the army's wishes to secure a demonstrable military success, he must nevertheless be aware that the psychological initiative—in implementing the promises of equality for the Moslem population in Algeria—must equally be pressed forward. His plans have still to be made concrete. The general is reported to be impressed with the evidence of the army's personal loyalty to him, and he has gone out of his way to learn the opinions of the younger commanders. It is evident that General de Gaulle will rest heavily on the army's support in any dispute with the extremists within the Committee of Public Safety in Algiers. News of the weeding out of certain generals who seem to have been lukewarm toward some of the ideals of the movement of May 13th is, however, disconcerting to those who would prefer to see General de Gaulle given room for manœuvre in the search for an ultimate political settlement. In personal terms, the general has succeeded in taking M. Mollet and other civilian ministers to Algeria without exposing them to insult, but his own reception from the settler population who hopefully await the proclamation of one France "from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset" has this time been less than overwhelming.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper: The Herald — File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: Melbourne — Date: 5-7-58

From ROLAND PULLEN

PARIS, Fri. — "General de Gaulle's three-day visit to Algeria has lowered the fever there from 110 deg. to 100 deg." a member of de Gaulle's staff said today.

Since the May 13 revolution, the French Army in Algeria has only partly obeyed Paris orders. But the great majority of generals and officers have now promised complete obedience to de Gaulle.

But there is still fever in Algiers, where extremists of the Committee of Public Safety still insist on the creation in France of a national safety committee aimed at suppressing old political parties.

The extremists now detest Leon Delbecque and Lieut. Neuwith, their former leaders, who organised the May 13 revolution. These two have now pledged their loyalty to de Gaulle.

The new leader of the extremists is Dr. Felix Martin, a notorious 63-year-old right-winger.

Before the Second World War he was a leading member of "Cagoule," which organised an armed conspiracy aimed at seizing power and preparing the fall of the French Republic.

They plan mischief

When the plot was discovered Martin fled from France.

After the war he was sentenced to a long term of hard labor — but the sentence has never been served.

The Algerian extremists demanded to be received by General de Gaulle in Algiers yesterday, but de Gaulle refused.

They are now angrily determined to reinforce their mischievous activities. In this, they may have the backing of a handful of high army officers.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Age — File No. 25/2/11 E.

Published at: Melbourne — Date: 4-7-58.

De Gaulle Faces Fire From "Men of Algiers"

ALGIERS, July 3.—General de Gaulle is expected to come under fire today from the men whose takeover in Algeria, in May, helped his return to power.

Some observers believe that things are moving rapidly towards a test of strength between the de Gaulle Government and the Algiers Committee of Public Safety on the future of Algeria.

The committee is reported to have drawn up a showdown resolution asking the Premier to define his views on integration for Algeria.

There are fears that he does not intend to follow the demand of the Algiers Public Safety movement for complete integration of Algeria with Metropolitan France.

Voting Rights

Europeans in Algeria believe this is the only way to balance their representation in the electorate if the nine million Moslems of Algeria are made full citizens with the same voting rights as the million Europeans.

Impatience over this issue was reflected by the cool reception accorded the General and his Minister of State (M. Guy Mollet), when they arrived in Algiers last night after touring military installations.

There were boos from a group of youths as the general drove slowly past, standing in the back of an open car.

There were also a few cries of "Guy Mollet to the gallows" as the rest of the party drove behind the Premier in closed cars.

On the last day of his three-day military inspection tour, General de Gaulle will today fly by helicopter from Algiers to Fort National, in Central Algeria.

Later he will hold consultations at the summer palace in Algiers before returning to Paris in the evening.—A.A.P.

National Archives of Australia — A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times — File No: 25/2/11 Pt 3
Published at: London — Date: 4-7-58

"NEW DEAL" PLAN FOR ALGERIA

REFORMS ANNOUNCED BY GEN. DE GAULLE

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, JULY 3

Before leaving Algiers for Paris tonight after his three-day military tour of inspection, General de Gaulle announced an important series of economic and social reforms in Algeria which are to come into effect forthwith.

He again refrained from giving any real hint about the country's political future—it is becoming clearer daily that he does not intend this to be pre-judged before the referendum—but he did refer repeatedly to the great role which France had still to play in Algeria.

Full voting rights for Muslim women, £12m. extra credits this year for industry and agriculture, enough schools for all Muslim children within ten years, the same postage stamp as for France—these are the main elements in the new reforms. General de Gaulle said that his visit this week had been a moving experience, and it had brought him to the heart of the problem.

RECLAIMING WILDERNESS

France, he said, intended to carry out a vast plan of renovation in Algeria so that "the 10 million Frenchmen" there would all have the same rights and duties. He promised that before the end of the year he would give details of the great new industrial centres that were to be built there, making use of local sources of energy (oil and gas). Agriculture would be modernized, restoring land that had gone to wilderness, and giving protection to labour; the housing programme would be doubled from this year.

This afternoon the Prime Minister declined to receive a delegation from the committee of public safety, led by General Massu and including some of its leading "Gaullists": he said that he was too busy and received General Massu alone. The official spokesman, evidently in some embarrassment at this turn of events, said afterwards that he was unable to say in what precise capacity General Massu—who is acting prefect of Algiers, military commander of the city, and chairman of the public safety committee—had been received.

General Massu handed to the Prime Minister the text of a resolution, approved unanimously by the committee of public safety, developing the idea of Algerian integration with France.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York Date 4. 7. 58.

De Gaulle Defines His Plan For Rehabilitating Algeria

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS, July 3—Premier Charles de Gaulle proclaimed today a "vast plan" intended to give Algeria its "rightful share" in the progress of France. This plan provides for economic expansion, social improvement and political reform.

The Premier drafted the program at the end of a three-day fact-finding tour of the Algerian countryside and announced it in a radio broadcast here tonight.

Tomorrow, the Premier said, the Government will publish three decrees defining the conditions under which a referendum will be held in Algeria next fall.

There will be a single electoral college and all communities of the territory will participate, he said. Moslem women will have the right to vote for the first time.

New Industry Envisaged

General de Gaulle promised that before the end of the year he would announce specific projects for "great new industries" and power plants.

Algerian agriculture, he said, will be modernized and arid zones irrigated. The rights of rural workers will be protected by adequate legislation. The number of dwellings will be doubled.

New public works will be started immediately. Fifteen billion francs, or $36,000,000, will be added for this purpose to the current French budget. The budget now provides 62,000,000,000 francs for the development of Algeria in 1958.

Algeria's education system will be built up and expanded

Continued on Page 4, Column 6

DE GAULLE GIVES PLAN FOR ALGERIA

Continued From Page 1

so that in ten years at the latest every child will go to school.

The Premier said these improvements required military security. He added that security "is about to be established."

The general repeated his appeal to the nationalists to participate in French plans for social and human betterment in Algeria. Could any man, he asked, dare to refuse his support to all that France wants to do for the welfare of the Algerian people?

In spite of continued pressure by extreme conservatives here, the Premier again avoided the word "integration," meaning the incorporation of Algeria into France as a province.

The All-Algerian Committee of Public Safety adopted yesterday a motion requesting a "solemn proclamation of the total integration of Algeria and the Sahara as a province in France."

When a delegation of nine committee members wanted to present the motion to General de Gaulle today they were told that the Premier was behind schedule and had canceled all appointments.

Premier de Gaulle, however, received Gen. Jacques Massu, who is president of the Public Safety Committee. General Massu is understood to have transmitted the committee motion to the Premier.

Premier de Gaulle's refusal to come out for integration, his aides explained, reflects his desire to keep a free hand and to avoid promises he might be forced to break.

Beyond the conviction that Algeria must remain French, they added, General de Gaulle has not yet defined in his own mind what the formal relationship between France and Algeria will be.

The first reaction of conservative Europeans to Premier de Gaulle's speech tonight was halfhearted praise. A typical comment was: "This is the first time he has made a concrete step toward integration; we wish he had gone a step, or several steps, further."

Early this morning General de Gaulle flew by helicopter to Fort National, a fortress city on a mountaintop in Kabylia, about fifty miles from Algiers.

Kabylia is one of the poorest, most densely populated regions of Algeria. Its steep, arid mountain ranges are refuges for strong rebel forces.

A battle took place yesterday only three miles from Fort National.

General de Gaulle mingled with a Moslem crowd as he had done on preceding days. He exchanged greetings with notables, shook hands with others and in a short address gave them his word of honor that they would soon have full equality with the European populace of Algeria.

Early Rebel Talks Unlikely

By THOMAS F. BRADY
Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS, July 3—General de Gaulle's three-day visit to Algeria has convinced responsible members of his entourage of four things:

1. There will be no negotiation with the insurgent Algerian National Liberation Front in the next few months.
2. The degree of Moslem participation in the constitutional referendum in October will serve as a barometer to guide General de Gaulle in his future Algerian policy.
3. The army and European civilians throughout the Algerian hinterland are loyal to Premier de Gaulle and will accept his decision.
4. A problem still exists in the capital, where an extreme European Right Wing known as "The Ultras," may cause difficulties. For this reason a change may be expected in the top-level army command.

The first two points are closely related, according to observers who traveled with Premier de Gaulle. The General, they say, is a pragmatist who is making an experiment in the conciliation of the Moslems of Algeria. He is offering political equality and economic improvement within a French context, while seeking by continued military effort to render nationalist insurgents powerless to interfere with elections.

General de Gaulle made a special point in his three-day trip to Algerian military posts to talk with Moslems, shake their hands and tell them of his reform program. By contrast he saw almost no European civilians.

Questions he asked repeatedly of army officers were: Will the people of your region vote in the referendum? Can you provide security? How many people are unemployed here? What are your contacts with the Moslems? Do agricultural employers pay the legal minimum wage? How many children are in school?

The replies have apparently decided him to gamble on Moslem participation in the referendum, against which the National Liberation Front is virtually certain to declare a boycott. Whether the Moslems vote yes or no on a referendum, which will concern French constitutional reform, will have far less importance than their participation or non-participation.

General de Gaulle's advisers believe reform will be adopted by a heavy majority in France. The most important information to be gained here is whether the Moslems are interested in the question.

The test will be in effect: Does the French Army or the nationalist guerrilla army have more effective powers of persuasion and compulsion? If the Moslems should abstain from voting in impressive numbers, General de Gaulle's advisers say, being a realist, he may be expected to adapt his policy to a new situation.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

25/2/11

A.B.C. NESS SUMMARY FRIDAY 4th JULY, 1958

ALLEGED THREAT OF U.S. AIRCREW TO DEFECT TO SOVIET "POOR PROPAGANDA"

An American military spokesman has dismissed as "Poor propaganda" a Soviet claim to have received a letter from an American bomber crew offering to defect to Russia. The Soviet Embassy in London released details of the anonym letter last night. The letter said the bomber crew intended to drop the nuclear weapon carried in their plane somewhere over the North Sea and then to fly on to Russia where they would reveal all the secret information they had. The letter said bomb would be dropped not very far from the British coast but far enough so that not too many people would be killed. It said the bomb would be dropped sometime after July 1st. The letter was posted at Ipswich in Sussex an area in England where there are several American air bases. However, a spokesman for the United States Air Force said the letter did not appear valid. All American air fields in the Ipswich area were fighter bases and although some fighters were capable of carrying atomic bombs they were manned by only one person and it would be impossible for an individual to deliver an atomic weapon. The spokesman added that all precautions were designed to prevent any one person doing such a thing. A photostat copy of the letter was handed to the British Foreign Office, which will make an investigation.

NUCLEAR TEST TALKS IN GENEVA

Western delegates to the nuclear talks in Geneva have prepared a detailed plan for policing nuclear test explosions. Scientists from the United States, Britain, France and Canada met for nearly four hours yesterday to complete the plan which is believed will be submitted to the Russians to-day. The Conference is trying to work out an inspection system for nuclear test explosions.

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S INTERVENTION CLAIMS DISPUTED

The Lebanese Government has disputed a statement by the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Hammarskjoeld, that there was no evidence of massive intervention from Syria in the Lebanese revolt. A Government spokesman said the rebels were supported by about 3,000 Egyptians and Syrians. He said these were armed with 36,000 fire arms, machine guns and heavy mortars. At a news conference in New York, Mr. Hammarskjoel said that they had no evidence to support the Lebanese claims of intervention from across the border. Under these conditions he saw no reason to send any more United Nations observers to the spot. Asked about radio propaganda in the Middle East, Mr. Hammarskjoeld said that he hopes some formula could be found for only, what he called, this sort of indiscipline. Meanwhile, Government forces in Lebanon are claiming a big victory over the rebels in the port section of Tripoli. The Government claims victories, also, against rebellious tribesmen in the mountains only a few miles from Beirut, the capital.

BIG DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR ALGERIA

The French Premier, General de Gaulle, has outlined a vast development programme for Algeria. In a broadcast before leaving for Paris, after his three day visit to Algeria, General de Gaulle said the programme would include the erection of new factories to give work to all, modernisation of agriculture, a doubling of the house-building programme and the erection of more schools. Extra facilities would be provided to train more Algerians for Government posts. For an immediate start on these projects France would add £15,000,000 to the £62,000,000 already allotted for work in Algeria. General de Gaulle announced that decrees would be issued to-day providing equal rights for Moslems and Europeans in the forthcoming elections both as candidates and voters. Moslem woman would have the vote for the first time.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

WAYS SOUGHT TO OVERCOME POLITICAL IMPASSE IN NEW CALEDONIA

In Noumea to-day two special Commissioners from General de Gaulle are seeking ways to overcome the political impasse that dominates life in New Caledonia and several other French possessions. The A.B.C.'s correspondent in Noumea said by radio-telephone this morning that one was an Inspector of the French Overseas Ministry and the other an expert in French-Pacific affairs. The French Overseas Ministry Inspector, M. Corry reached Noumea before the Right-wing demonstrations of June 18th and induced the Governor to declare the Council of Minister suspended. His original task was to examine the work of French working of French law in Pacific territories. The French Pacific affairs expert M. Angammare. arrived from Paris on Wednesday. Both carry special instructions to investigate current issues and seek solutions. The situation generally in New Caledonia remains calm. Bars are still closed. Armed guards continue their duty in strategic places and for the month of July, the Governor has prohibited by decgree the carrying of knives, firearms and all weapons described as offensive.

JAPANES INTEREST IN COKING COAL

The Japanese steel industry will send a technical mission to Australia to find out if it is possible to import large quantities of coking coal from Australia. Two of Japan's biggest steel makers will be represented on the mission. The Chairman of the joint Coal Board, Mr. Cochran, said in Sydney to-day that it might be possible for Australia to ship out up to 1,000,000 tons of coking coal a year to Japan. At present Japan imports about 3,000,000 tons of coking coal a year practically all of it from America. United Press International says that the Japanese steel industry hopes it will be able to ship coal from Australia at about £2.5.0 per ton compared with the American price of £3.10.0 per ton.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM. CONFIDENTIAL

DB:HP

I.11172

FROM:

Dated: 2nd July, 1958.
0225
Rec'd: 3rd July, 1958.
0830

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

25/2/11

303. CONFIDENTIAL.

Algeria.

My telegram 305 paragraph 10.

I had a long talk at lunch with Soustelle 2nd July. He said de Gaulle had told him three weeks ago that he had decided on a number of practical measures of integration. Soustelle mentioned stamps and coins, integration of Algerian budget with the French, amalgamation of banks of Algeria with the banks of France, military rates of pay and others. None of these has yet been announced.

2. Asked if he were collaborating in the Committee on the constitution he said that he was "not collaborating in anything' at the present time (I think with some bitterness). The press had appointed him Ambassador at Washington and elsewhere and he believed many people would want him appointed to (America Ø) "or beyond", to remove him as far as possible from France.

....Stirling.

Ø Corrupt group.

Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
" " " Trade(C.)
Treasurer & Treasury.
P.M.'s.

3rd July, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL C&P
G

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Times File No: 25/1/11 E

Published at: London Date: 2-7-58

GEN. DE GAULLE WITH HIS ARMY

BRIDGING THE GULF IN ALGERIA

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, JULY 1

General de Gaulle flew by Caravelle from Paris this morning to Telergma airport, near Constantine, and spent the day visiting Army units in eastern Algeria. From Telergma he flew to Ain Arnat, near Sétif, and then to Batna, a garrison town in the Aurès mountains. Here there was a military parade, and the crowd produced the usual banners and slogans and sang the "Africans' Song," the signature tune of the Algiers insurrection.

Something of the atmosphere of General de Gaulle's triumphant Algerian tour four weeks ago was revived at Batna, but this is a very different occasion. This time he came as a general to inspect his troops in the battle zone; there will be no speeches, few journalists, and few crowds.

ARMY LOYALTY

He wishes to make personal contact with the fighting forces in Algeria: (*i*) to establish the extent to which the rebel armies might represent a threat to the holding of a referendum and elections in the autumn; (*ii*) to see what justification there is for General Salan's reported request for reinforcements; and (*iii*) above all, perhaps, to bridge the gulf which still exists between the Army in Algeria and the Government in Paris.

It is essential for General de Gaulle to assure himself of the loyalty of the Army in Algeria at all levels, and he must therefore talk to others besides senior staff officers in Algiers.

General de Gaulle was greeted at Telergma by General Salan. He was accompanied from Paris by M. Mollet; M. Michelet, Minister for Ex-Servicemen; M. Guillaumat, Minister for the Army; and General Ely, the Chief of Staff. Opposition in Algiers to M. Mollet's inclusion in the party has died down. To-night the Prime Minister leaves for Oran. To-morrow he will visit Tlemcen and Sidi-Bel-Abbès, and in Algiers on Thursday he is expected to announce details of economic and social reforms for Algeria.

In Algiers this morning 11 Europeans and 11 Muslims were injured when a grenade exploded in a crowded market near the Casbah.

TUNISIAN ARRESTS

TUNIS, July 1.—Ten former Ministers who served in governments in office when Tunisia was a French protectorate were arrested here to-day. A law published last November made it an offence for any Tunisian to have given aid to the Protectorate authorities.—*Reuter.*

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No 25/2/11 E

Published at New York Date 2-7-58

DE GAULLE HAILS ALGERIANS' FEAT

At Site of Revolt's Outbreak He Voices Confidence in a Cooperative Future

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times.

BATNA, Algeria, July 1—Premier Charles de Gaulle came to the town where the first shots of the Algerian rebellion were fired and told a cheering crowd today: "The work we have done together is immense. From what I have seen here, I know that the future is ours."

Earlier in the day, at the helicopter base of Ain Arnat, near Setif, General de Gaulle had heard a request for more troops from Gen. Paul-Louis Gandoet, commanding that sector.

French commanders throughout Algeria are known to feel that the present French strength of more than 400,000 men is not enough. It may be enough to drive the rebel forces out of any given sector, but it is not enough to keep them from establishing new centers of resistance in areas that have been "pacified."

Celebration Is Organized

Although the Premier had come to Batna on military business, the Committee of Public Safety here had decided at the last moment — yesterday — to stage a public celebration.

A crowd of about 2,000 gathered in the main square to greet the Premier with songs, cheers, flag-waving and shouted demands for the integration of Algeria in France.

But the cheers of the European demonstrators were not enough to dispel the grim impression that the city was simply on a two-hour holiday from the state of siege that is its normal way of life.

Security forces, made up of tough paratroopers in camouflage uniforms and red berets, equaled or outnumbered the celebrating civilians.

There was no evidence that General de Gaulle's great hope, fraternization between Moslems and Europeans, had taken hold in Batna.

The Europeans, including a cheering section consisting mostly of teen-agers, were ranged on one side of the square. Some Moslems were scattered among them.

On the other side of the square was a compact group of Moslems, who had no cheering section and remained silent and apparently indifferent in spite of exhortations from a loudspeaker and the cheering and flag-waving on the other side of the square.

Greets Moslems First

General de Gaulle left his car at the entrance to the square. Ignoring the cheering Europeans on the left, he walked quickly to the Moslem side and advanced deeply into the crowd, shaking outstretched hands. Then he turned to the European side and repeated the gesture.

As soon as he had entered the prefecture building, the Moslems went back to army trucks that had brought them to the square. The trucks were waiting in a back street. They whisked the Moslems off in

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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As soon as he had entered the prefecture building, the Moslems went back to army trucks that had brought them to the square. The trucks were waiting in a back street. They whisked the Moslems off immediately, while other spectators waited for General de Gaulle to reappear after his conference with the military commanders.

Premier de Gaulle's speech had not been scheduled. It was his response to a request from the crowd, which chanted: "De Gaulle to the microphone."

Premier de Gaulle flew to Algeria this morning. His first stop was Telergma, a big military air base south of Constantine and about forty miles from the Tunisian border. There he reviewed a regiment of Algerian riflemen.

Afterward he boarded a DC-3 for the flight to Ain Arnat, where General Gandoet briefed him on problems of civil administration as well as military issues.

From Ain Arnat General de Gaule flew here for a similar briefing. Later in the evening he returned to Telergma for a third briefing session. From there he was flown by Caravelle to Oran, where he is spending the night.

Blast Kills One in Algiers

Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS, July 1—A grenade thrown by a terrorist in a crowded market place here today killed one person and wounded twenty-one, four of them seriously. The terrorist escaped.

The victims were about equally Moslem and European. The man killed was a Moslem. Among the wounded were a child and five women, two of them European. It was the first act of terrorism in Algiers since the end of May.

National Archives of Australia NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No 25/2/11 E.

Published at New York Date 1-7-58

CHANGED ALGIERS TO GREET PREMIER

Élan of the First de Gaulle Visit Is Absent—Moslem Women Demonstrate

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times.

ALGIERS, June 30—A muffled but astounding cry, "Long live independence!" was heard in downtown Algiers this morning. It came from a group of about 200 veiled Moslem women in long white robes massed in front of the Prefecture, headquarters of the regional administration.

The women belonged to a committee of the mothers, wives and sisters of political prisoners. They cried: "Tell us the truth about our men. Set them free!"

They smashed windows and headlights of parked cars. The police rushed in, arrested fifteen of them and dispersed the others.

5,000 Under Arrest

About 5,000 Moslems are believed to be under arrest in the Algiers area. The figure for all Algeria is set at about 100,000, not counting rebel prisoners taken in combat. Inquiries by relatives about the men's fate and whereabouts have been in vain in many cases.

The Moslem women's committee sent a letter to Premier Charles de Gaulle, reminding him of his last visit to Algiers and his offer of conciliation to the nationalist rebels. The Premier is scheduled to make a second visit to Algeria starting tomorrow.

"Your appeal has given life to the flickering flame of hope in our hearts," the committee told General de Gaulle. "The head of Free France, we hope, will know how to assert his authority over those who are responsible [and will tell them] to let us know what the fate is of dear ones who have disappeared."

Contrasts Cited

This morning's incident was one of many striking contrasts between Algiers today and Algiers on the eve of Premier de Gaulle's first visit June 4.

A month ago Algiers was delirious with joy, triumphant over its newly won victory and arrogant in the belief that it could impose its will on Metropolitan France.

None of that excitement has remained. The city is sober now. The surface calm is coating an ever-present hidden tension. There is much, almost general, indifference. Only the extremists on both sides seem to care.

Some of today's lack of enthusiasm may be due to fact that some extremist groups have let it be known they would like to see General de Gaulle get the silent treatment—no flags, no photographs, no shouts and small crowds.

But a far more important reason for the apparent indifference is seasonal. Summer and heat have set in. The schools are closed. Boats and planes have been filled to capacity for the last ten days, as they are every summer, as well-to-do families are taking off for their annual summer vacation in the cooler climate of Metropolitan France.

Beneath this placid atmosphere, resembling the midsummer mood of any other provincial city in France, tensions have remained acute.

Armed military patrols still

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

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Beneath this placid atmosphere, resembling the midsummer mood of any other provincial city in France, tensions have remained acute.

Armed military patrols still mingle with shoppers in the streets and paratroopers stand guard on roofs. When Gen. Raoul Salan, military commander and chief civilian administrator in Algeria moves through Algiers, he is preceded and followed by jeeps with mounted machine guns. The curfew ends the modest night life at midnight.

The Moslem crowds that were brought out in force by the army for the last de Gaulle visit have not been in evidence so far.

The Moslems are more hopeful, it seems, than they were before General de Gaulle's return to power. But they have not yet been won over. They are curious. They are waiting for a follow-up to the Premier's offer of conciliation.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: The Herald File No: 25/2/11 E

Published at: Melbourne Date: 1-7-58.

From ROLAND PULLEN

PARIS, Mon. — There is so much unrest in Algeria that details of Gen. de Gaulle's movements there on his three-day visit, beginning tomorrow, are being kept secret.

The French Premier is going there primarily to study the worsening military situation, but he will also face extremist settlers who are growing more critical of his liberal views.

A few weeks ago the French commander there, Gen. Salan, announced that the fighting there in the four-year-old rebellion had stopped.

Now Frenchmen are dismayed to learn that in the first week of that so-called calm, 447 Moslem rebels were killed and 1047 wounded. Since then the war has hotted up and the French Air Force is making 300 sorties a day.

Army leaders in Algeria are expected to ask de Gaulle for 100,000 to 150,000 more troops to wage the war more effectively. Already there are 450,000 men fighting in the French Army in Algeria.

The problem of the Algerian war is, therefore, as acute as ever.

The Army leaders, plus the settlers, are also angry because de Gaulle has given no post to Jacques Soustelle, his former right-hand man and a key figure in Algeria.

He'll show who is master

So de Gaulle, to show who is master, is taking Mr Guy Mollet, a former Socialist Premier, and now a Minister in his Government, to Algeria with him. The last time Mollet went to Algeria, as Premier, he was pelted with rotten fruit.

Army opinion on the visit was summed up by one captain who said today: "We don't know whether he is coming to give us medals or knocks."

While in Algeria, Gen. de Gaulle is also expected to give details of the new deal, under which Moslems will get equal opportunities with Frenchmen.

These are expected to include:

- Use of the same banknotes, currency and postage stamps in Algeria as in metropolitan France;
- Abolition of Customs control between Algeria and France;
- Equality of ex-service pensions for Moslems and Frenchmen (at present a Moslem ex-soldier when wounded gets only two-thirds the sum paid to a wounded Frenchman).

Mission leaves for Noumea

An inquiry mission headed by Mr Raoul Angamarre, a high official of the Overseas Ministry, has left Paris for Noumea, capital of France's Pacific territory of New Caledonia, to investigate political troubles there.

Recent reports from Noumea said that the Governor had taken supreme power there because of political unrest.

National Archives of Australia A1838, 25/2/11 PART 3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.11017

Sent: 25th June, 1958

Rec'd: 1st July, 1958

25/2/11

25/1/1/20

BD

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

Sav Ex 490. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Savingram Australian Embassy, Washington Ex 514. Australian Embassy, Paris Ex 184, Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York Ex 131.

North Africa.

According to a report we have seen from the United Kingdom Embassy at Tunis, the following communique was issued there on 20th June at the conclusion of the conference of Tunisian, Moroccan and F.L.N. representatives:-

The delegations of the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments and that of the Committee of Co-ordination and Execution (C.C.E.) met in conference at Tunis on June 17th, 18th 19th and 20th.

The Conference carefully studied the so-called integration policy adopted by the new French Government following the events of May 13th last.

It considers that the adoption of such a policy represents a definite regression even by comparison with the policy already announced by previous French Governments.

The Conference noted that the only result of this policy could be the intensification of a murderous war against a people resolved to resist and struggle in order to have no nationality but Algerian, and no existence but that of free and peaceful people.

In consequence, it (the conference) rejects any system of integration which has frequently been rejected by the peoples of North Africa.

Faithful to the principles and resolutions adopted at Tangiers, the conference solemnly proclaims the indefensible right of the Algerian people to sovereignty and independence which is the sole condition on which the Franco-Algerian conflict can be solved.

"It (the conference) takes note of the good intentions of the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments in searching for means capable of putting an end to the Algerian war.

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The Conference incidentally expresses its satisfaction at the agreements reached on evacuation of French forces from Tunisia as well as its solidarity with the Moroccan people and Government in their action aimed at evacuation of foreign troops from Moroccan territory".

2. The United Kingdom Ambassador at Tunis, commenting to the Foreign Office on the absence of any mention in the communique of a "provisional Algerian Government", said that it was common gossip in Tunis that the Tunisian and Moroccan delegations had again had a tough fight to make the Algerians postpone it. The Ambassador suspected that one reason why the Tunisians would not agree to starting discussions with the French on Bizerta until after the evacuation of the rest of Tunisia was complete was in order to furnish themselves with another excuse for urging postponement from 1st October onwards, of the formation of a provisional Algerian Government. According to a report from the United Kingdom representative at Tripoli the press there announced on 21st June that F.L.N. representatives had arrived in Tripoli "to hold important discussions about setting up the Algerian Government on Libyan soil".

The Foreign Office have instructed the United Kingdom Ambassador at Benghazi to seek confirmation that the Libyan Government do not contemplate the establishment of an "Algerian Government in exile"on Libyan soil. The Ambassador is to point out the establishment of such a government will wreck the possibilities that a solution may now be found in Algeria to meet the wishes and needs of its inhabitants. He is also to say that it would be a pity for Libya to permit her territory to be used for purposes which the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments consider imprudent in their own cases.

3. Following is report from the United Kingdom Embassy at Tunis on a broadcast made by President Bourguiba on 19th June at Mahdia in the presence of the Moroccan Prime Minister and leaders of the F.L.N.

"Bourguiba laid special emphasis on importance of achieving spontaneous union of great Arab Maghreb. They had no desire to declare war on any one nor to unify the African continent 'under the ferrule of the Arab Maghreb'. Great obstacle was situation in Algeria. 'We must concert our efforts to help France and help our brothers find a solution, and a solution can only be durable, fruitful and constructive to the extent to which it is founded on respect of the Algerian people's independence and of their chosen policy'. At another point the President said cooperation between France and Algeria had no chance, save on basis of Algerian people's liberty of self-determination.

President regarded Franco-Tunisian agreement on evacuation as a help to both Algeria and Morocco. He expected troops to have left everywhere but Bizerta by October 1, i.e. 3½ months. History would record Sakiet as a great turning point. The President then rehearsed events of the last four months from a strongly Tunisian standpoint. He emphasised that evacuation agreement was 'governed by no condition derived from requirements of any common defence or of any statute that would ensure the continuance of France at Bizerta. Given the understanding

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shown by the new French Government, he hoped no further struggle wouldbe necessary.

Fact that de Gaulle had now done all and more than what right wing opinion would not let previous government do, was distinctly hopeful and the President appealed to France to pursue this new course. But if two or three months hence, France was still making bitter war in order to integrate Algeria and Algerians with France 'It could only lead us to the worst of catastrophies'.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 2nd July, 1958

SEC A/Ss L.A. UN PACMN AM&SP SCSLA S. AJF&ML E AF&ME INF DL C&P G.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

25/2/11

:ABK. I.11014.

Sent: 25th June, 1958.

FROM: Rec'd: 1st July, 1958.

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAVINGRAM EX487 CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Paris EX181, Washington EX511, Austunat New York EX128.

Tunisia and Algeria

1. You will have seen from Commonwealth Relations Office telegram W No. 440 of 18th June that the Franco-Tunisian agreement concluded on 17th June provided for:

(a) Withdrawal of French troops outside Bizerta by the end of September;

(b) Lifting of blockade of French troops as soon as withdrawal started.

(c) Negotiations on Bizerta as soon as possible; negotiations to conclude at the latest by the end of the period of withdrawal (i.e. September);

(d) The object of negotiations to be establishment of provisional regime for maintaining strategic base at Bizerta pending definite agreement;

(e) Withdrawal of French radar technicians on condition that material in the various radar stations would be adequately maintained by the Tunisians.

2. The African Department of the Foreign Office told us on 20th June that they welcomed this agreement not only for its effects in Tunisia but also for the good prospects it held out for a settlement in North Africa generally. It would now be easier for the Tunisians and the Moroccans to exert a moderating influence on the F.L.N. De Gaulle had shown himself prepared to make concessions which would have brought down previous governments in France. (He had not insisted on the stationing of neutral observers on airfields in Tunisia; nor on the maintenance of French technicians at various radar stations in Tunisia). Our informant in African Department thought that the present conciliatory attitude of the French reflected their growing military success in sealing of the border between Tunisia and Algeria.

3. On the prospects of a settlement in Algeria, our informant said that the Foreign Office had received more optimistic reports from the United Kingdom Consul General at Algiers than from the United Kingdom Embassy at Paris. The view of the Consul-General was no doubt over much affected by the fact that for the first time in recent years it was conceivable that a settlement in Algeria might be achieved, where previously it had been apparent that no solution was possible. The Consul-General considered that "genuine" integration would be accepted by the Muslim population of Algeria and that the French settlers, provided they had no support from the army, would be powerless to prevent

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The United Kingdom Embassy at Paris had estimated that full integration would cost 1000 milliards of francs a year for the next ten years in social services etc., which, apart from political factors, would make it an impossible policy to pursue. Our informant in African Department thought that anything less than full integration would not be accepted by the Algerian Muslims.

4. In our savingram No. 465 we advised you of an interview which the Minister at the Moroccan Embassy at London had had at the Foreign Office on 9th June. Si Abdelali called again at the Foreign Office who have made the following report on his visit:

"The Moroccan Minister has given us an account of a conversation which he went to Paris on June 16th to hold with Yusfi Abderrahman, whom he described as Secretary-General of the Moroccan Resistance Movement and a Legal Adviser to Ben Bella.

Yusfi, who had been visiting Ben Bella in prison, made three main points:-

(a) Ben Bella and his companions in prison are afraid that French extremists, believing that they may be released and allowed to go to non-French territory, intend to kidnap or kill them. The prison guard has been increased but their fears remain.

(b) In Yusfi's opinion, Ben Bella is the incontestable leader of the F.L.N. Despite his long absence from their councils he still wields a major influence and would take over the leadership if he was released.

(c) Ben Bella has convinced Yusfi that he does not want to align himself with Nasser. His present policy is to avoid commitment to either the East or the West.

Si Abdelali's purpose in giving us this information was clearly to reinforce his argument that the first move in bringing the F.L.N. to a more moderate position should be the release of Ben Bella. He expressed the view that, thereafter it should not be impossible to get the F.L.N. to agree to negotiate direct with the French without any prior conditions. To avoid the appearance of capitulation the F.L.N. would want this presented publicly as being the outcome of a Moroccan and Tunisian initiative.

It seems likely to us that Abdelali was speaking on instruct although he said that this was not so".

5. Our informant in the African Department of the Foreign Office said that while the Pflimlin government was in office the United Kingdom authorities had considered suggesting to the French that a gesture on their part, such as the release of Ben Bella, might help to improve the chances of a settlement in Algeria. The United Kingdom authorities have now decided not to make any approach to the French, as General de Gaulle seemed to be in no need of advice from outside.

6. Our informant considered that General de Gaulle's next major task in Algeria was to ensure that the various elections there which seemed to be foreshadowed (see paragraph 3 of our savingram 456) were genuinely free and appeared so. Our informant thought that genuinely free elections were to take place in Algeria, a cease-fire with the F.L.N. would have first to be arranged. He had no confirmation of rumours that General Catroux (the former Governor-General of Algeria to whom the Muslims are well disposed) had gone to Cairo to get in touch with the F.L.N.

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JR 1015/116

Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

ALGERIA
June 16, 1958
Section 1

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO ALGERIA

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 16)

(No. 29. Confidential) *Algiers, June 11, 1958.*

Sir,

When General de Gaulle paid his three-day visit to Algeria from the 4th to the 6th of June his staff defined his objectives to a journalist in Paris as being threefold: to restore the normal relations between Algeria and France; to hold the European population of Algeria to the consequences of their slogans of fraternity and equality with the Moslem population; and to make a gesture of reconciliation to the Moslem community including those in rebellion.

2. The General gave a masterly performance. He felt his way carefully, and seems to have made some concessions to the temper of local feeling, but when he left from Oran on the evening of the 6th of June he seemed to have achieved all his immediate objectives.

3. From the moment of his arrival in Algiers he took care to emphasise his solidarity with the army in the person of General Salan, who was also the impersonation in Algiers, by however strained a fiction, of legal and constitutional continuity. At the same time in deference to Republican legality he ordered the immediate release and repatriation to France of three Prefects interned by the army for resisting the establishment of Committees of Public Safety.

4. Then with admirable timing he successively brought General Massu down to earth, deflated M. Delbecque after his flamboyant speech reported in my telegram No. 65 and finally, in a scathing address to the Oran Committee of Public Safety most of whom had been ardent Vichy men, he confined the duties of the Committees in general to fostering the "integration of souls."

5. The army in Algiers seem well pleased with the affirmation of their own authority and the reassertion of the authority of the Central Government. M. Soustelle also seems to have decided that his road to power now lies through succession rather than rivalry to the General and therefore gave him full support. M. Delbecque, for his part, seems to accept the role tacitly offered him of party campaign manager, for which his reputed organisational flair should suit him well.

6. There remain a number of civil and military extremists to be disposed of, and they may yet make some noise. But the civilian "ultras" of Algiers are powerless without military support and the help of their lobby in Paris. Their allies or tools, the Spanish and Jewish mob of Bab-el-Oued, already showed, in September last, that they knuckle under very quickly to a display of firmness. As to the Colonels and Captains of parachute regiments, transfers are likely to take place unobtrusively and in due course. Colonel Bigeard's successor in command of the *2nd Régiment Parachutiste Colonial*, Colonel Trinquier, who was deeply involved in the events of the 13th of May, is already due to move out of Algiers with his regiment.

7. The first objective has thus been reached and is being consolidated; the second was achieved by the series of brief and carefully constructed speeches at Algiers, Constantine, Bône, Oran and Mostaganem, of which I enclose the texts.(1) He took due note in the name of the Republic of the popular desire for the grant to all, in equality and fraternity, of the full rights of French citizenship. Having thus accepted the surrender of the "ultras," he made his appeal to the Moslems.

8. General de Gaulle has not been able at one stroke, and this could hardly be expected, to win over the Moslems entirely. His recognition that the rebels had acted

(1) Not printed.

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from despair, and his tribute to their courage were greatly appreciated by the Moslems, as was also a point less noticed by the Europeans, that in appealing to Moslems to vote he referred to "*your* towns, *your* villages, *your* plains and *your* hills." Above all, his definition of full citizenship as the recognition of the dignity of those whose dignity had been called in question has touched a responsive chord among the Moslems. As one Moslem said to me, "For once we were not insulted."

9. It is General de Gaulle's greatest strength in dealing with the Algerian problem that he is trusted and respected by the Moslems. The Algerian quarrel has always had a triangular character with the Moslems distinguishing sharply between the Metropolitan French whom they like, and the Algerian French whom they hate and distrust. Between Metropolitan and Algerian French there has never been much love lost. It was in this context that the abject capitulation of M. Mollet before the Algiers mob on the 6th of February, 1956, was so disastrous to French interests in Algeria. By demonstrating his subservience to the Algerian French he destroyed all hope of Moslem confidence or respect for him or indeed his colleagues. There is now a fresh start and fresh hope.

10. It is early yet to see how the administrative problems of the Referendum and projected elections can be dealt with, but one thing is certain. It will be known with that speed which is an extraordinary phenomenon of the Moslems here whether the voting has been free and fair. General de Gaulle is reputed to be determined to stop the war as soon as possible. If he ensures a free vote he may succeed. If he allows his authorities to tamper, it will be known at once throughout the Moslems of North Africa and his chance of conciliation will be destroyed.

11. In discussing the General's speeches and possible policies with a highly educated Moslem who is a contemporary of the F.L.N. leaders and knows them all, I derived the impression that in the idea of an autonomous Algeria within a French federation, which is believed to be the General's plan, there lies good hope of a solution. The continued presence of French officials, particularly the more senior ones would present no problem. Many of them have earned respect among the Moslems and their continued presence as administrative technicians would be welcomed.

12. Questions of pride, self-respect and face-saving will present difficult problems. The Algerian Nationalists will want to represent the solution as Independence within a Federation, whereas the army will insist on any new Algerian entity being at least under the French flag. If the differences can be narrowed down to such a point an opportunity may then occur for the friends of both parties to help forward a reconciliation.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Washington, Tunis and Rabat and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at Malta, without enclosures.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

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Algeria : Economic Reports Distribution
ECONOMIC REPORT

Period January - March 1958
From Algiers to Foreign Office

(Enclosure to despatch No. 26 of May 24, 1958)

I. GENERAL

Trade returns for 1957, published during the quarter, show that Algeria's adverse trade balance rose to 211,150 million francs last year against 122,578 million in 1956. The increase is due essentially to a continued rise in imports to meet the needs of the armed forces, and to substantially larger imports of machinery and equipment for the oil companies operating in the Sahara. At 382,895 million francs (against 272,692 million in 1956) import figures moreover take no account of some of the heavy equipment imported under bond for use in the Sahara. The deficit would have been larger but for an increase in the value of exports of over 20,000 million francs, due to the high prices obtained this year for wine - a product which accounts for 50 percent of Algerian exports. Total exports were valued at 171,745 million francs against 150,114 million in 1956.

2. The publication in February of the first details of the measures which the authorities propose to take to encourage the establishment of local industries was followed by a series of officially sponsored visits from representatives of French industry and commerce. A ten-year plan for the development of the country has been in preparation for some time, the details of which have yet to be released. The emphasis is to be on industrial development, hinging on the oil and natural gas resources of the Sahara. It is hoped in this way to find work for the steadily growing number of unemployed and underemployed who are at the heart of many of Algeria's problems.

3. Prices continued to rise. On February 1 basic salary scales were increased by 4.85 percent, while the cost-of-living index on which the scales are based rose from 105.8 in December to 110.15 in March making another increase inevitable. The retail price indices naturally reflect this trend, but in February for the first time the wholesale price index dropped slightly as a result of a seasonal fall in the price of certain items of food.

4. Boom conditions continue, heightened by a serious shortage of trained and specialist labour as well as an acute scarcity of living accommodation.

II. FINANCE.

5. At 178,047 million francs in January and 179,054 million in February note circulation remained at the level reached by the end of 1957 and showed an increase of more than 10 percent over the figure for January, 1957.

6. Bank and savings deposits remained very high. One reason for this is that Moslem traders are keeping an absolute minimum of cash at home and on their business premises in order to keep down as much as possible the amount of the contributions which are exacted from them by the rebels from time to time. Banks are finding it difficult to put these deposits to good use and fresh capital is said to be readily available to sound applicants.

7. Electricité et Gaz d'Algérie 6 percent 1958 loan. Subscriptions for this issue, which opened on February 17, closed at the end of March at 5,463 million francs. Of this amount private investors took 4,376 million and Insurance and Banks

1,040 million.

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1,040 million. The issue was an attractive one as capital and interest are pegged to turnover. The public also reacted favourably to the news that plans were being considered for the production of electricity, possibly also for export to Europe, by using natural gas from the Sahara, a project which if realised would cause turnover to soar.

8. Scant information only is available regarding the financing of Saharan development. At Paris, in February, Mr. Max Lejeune the Minister for the Sahara said that by 1960, when an output of 10 million tons of oil per annum was expected, 150,000 million francs would have been spent on prospection and development work and a further 70,000 million francs for the laying of pipe lines.

9. Supplementary estimates published in January increased the Algerian budget for 1957/58 by 10,600 million francs, ordinary expenditure rising from 148,200 million to 157,300 million francs and extraordinary expenditure from 82,600 million to 84,100 million francs. Since the closing of the Algerian Assembly concern is being constantly expressed at the fact that the budget is now settled by the authorities acting alone, and it has been frequently suggested, without avail, that until elections are possible the Chambers of Commerce and similar bodies should be invited to participate in a consultative capacity.

III. INDUSTRY

10. Although details of the Government's ten-year plan for Algeria have yet to be released, the pattern has begun to emerge following the publication, in February, of the measures with which it is proposed to encourage the development of industry in the country. The measures consist in financial grants (of up to 40 percent of the capital required) and in a reduction in interest rates on loans (the rate being brought down to about 3 percent) which are to be financed in approved cases from the French Fonds d'Investissements. In addition Algeria is to offer substantial tax concessions to the new industries and may also underwrite capital loans. Development corporations are also to be set up to assist the country's industrial expansion. The first of these, the Société pour l'Etude et le Développement de l'Industrie en Algérie (S.E.D.I.A.) was formed on December 18. Its shares are held jointly by the Algerian administration itself, Electricité et Gaz d'Algérie and certain French industrial groups.

11. It is hoped that Algeria's industrial development will go a long way towards solving the unemployment problem by providing work for an additional 900,000 of whom 500,000 would be absorbed in the new industries and 400,000 by an expansion of ancillary trades and services, such as transport, etc. Official calculations also claim that the national revenue during the ten-year period should rise by 7.5 percent per year, and it is calculated that while a part of the increase will be absorbed by the rise in population, there will still be room for an average increase in individual income of about 5 percent per year, weighted slightly in favour of the unskilled worker, who will thus gradually see his lot improve. The success of the plan will depend of course on the necessary financial support coming from private investors and industry, as well as from official sources, and this in turn will depend on the course of events.

12. Contacts between representatives of French industry and local officials and businessmen have been taking place frequently

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since February to discuss the matter. Thus M. Peugeot headed a delegation which visited Algeria in February, and in March representatives of the Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français were at Algiers. So far few concrete results have been achieved. Local firms are somewhat worried by the competition which the new industries may offer while, not unnaturally, French interests are weighing up the future before committing themselves.

13. Nonetheless, many plans are in the air, including one for the establishment of iron and steel works at Bône, to make use of the Ouenza iron ore and the natural gas from Hassi R'Mel. As a first step the Société Algérienne d'Etudes Sidérurgiques (SERISAL), which is backed by the Fonds d'Equipements de l'Algérie and the Banque Lambert, has opened offices at Bône. There is also talk of petrochemical works and an ambitious scheme for the installation in an indeterminate future of two 400 MW electricity generating stations which would supply France and Italy through under water cables. News about the last scheme coincided with the floating of E.C.A's latest loan, but there is no doubt that serious thought is being given to these and similar proposals.

14. Petroleum. The first shipment of oil to France took place on March 3 when the tanker "President Merny" loaded 15,000 tons of crude oil at Philippeville. Two more sailings have since taken place (the third early in April) bringing the amount shipped to France to 41,000 tons since the small 6-inch pipeline from Hassi Messaoud to Touggourt was put into service in January. Capacity on the railway link between Touggourt and Philippeville is being increased to 1,500 tons per day and the addition of a night train is expected to raise it to 1,800 tons. Meanwhile preliminary work on the projected 24-inch pipeline from Hassi-Messaoud to Bougie is to begin shortly. At Bougie work on the harbour installations and the first storage tanks is to begin in October. The pipeline and the first installations at the port are scheduled to be ready by the end of 1959. Initial capacity will be 4 million tons a year, to be increased to 7 million tons in 1960 and 10 million tons in 1962. Maximum capacity will eventually reach 14 million tons.

15. By the end of March nine wells had reached the oil bearing strata at Hassi Messaoud, two more being scheduled for completion early in April. A potential output of 700 tons per day per well is claimed. In the Edjélé area, near the Libyan frontier, prospection has continued to progress and several new strikes have been reported. Meanwhile, no progress has been made on plans for evacuation of any exploitable product.

16. Mining. Six prospection teams of the Algerian Bureau des Recherches Minières have been working in the Hoggar mountains of the Sahara where they claim to have found evidence of platinum, diamonds, nickel and copper traces.

IV. AGRICULTURE.

18. General. Disastrous floods occurred late in 1957 and again early this year. Damage to crops was extensive. In the Constantine region local needs had to be met by shipments from Algiers, Oran and France.

19. The balance sheet for Algerian agriculture in 1957 shows an increase : 256,000 million francs gross income against 230,000 million in 1956. The increase is due entirely to the high prices obtained by wine growers whose total income rose from 70,000 million francs in 1956 to about 100,000 million in 1957, despite a

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fall in the yield of about 17 percent. Wheat and other cereal growers on the other hand suffered a loss, their gross income falling to 48,000 million francs against 65,000 million in 1956, a bumper year. Although income from livestock shows a slight increase - 56,000 million against 52,000 million francs - the picture is in fact gloomy with farmers getting rid of their animals in many cases because of losses due to the present insecurity.

20. Cereals. Local wheat farmers were disappointed at the prices set for hard wheat for 1958, 39,750 francs per ton against 33,000 francs for soft wheat. A higher differential had been expected. The prospects of the Common Market are said to be good for durum wheat with France, as the main exporter, in a strong position. The situation for soft wheat on the other hand is less happy and it is argued in Algeria that with soft wheat prices expected to drop in 1961 the local grower will require support if he is not to turn over entirely to durum. This would mean that local soft wheat needs would have to be met entirely by imports. It is stated in official circles that assistance, in the shape of tax concessions, will be the official choice.

21. Livestock. The growing shortage of animals led the authorities to forbid exports of cattle while encouraging the importation of animals and meat to satisfy local needs. In 1957 exports of sheep to France fell from 363,000 head in 1956 to 100,000.

22. Crops. Cereals. Wheat, barley and oat sowings were delayed by bad weather but it is estimated that the area under cultivation will be equal to last year's, when 3,182,000 hectares were seeded. Adverse climatic conditions also seriously affected rice, maize and sorgho plantings, and last year's yields of about 15,000 tons for the three crops may not be equalled. Dried Vegetables. Plantings are equal to last year's. Tobacco. Plantings are roughly those of the previous year despite the floods which it was at one time feared would affect sowings. Fresh Vegetables. The early potato crop is expected to be small as plantings were cut by 40 percent due both to the weather and to the poor return obtained last year. Spring plantings, although larger than in 1957, may not give a good yield because of the poor seed used (imports of seed potatoes were reduced by 4,000 tons to 14,000 tons this year), and their high price which led many growers to use ware potatoes instead. Early carrot yields were also affected by the weather which reduced the quantity available for export. Citrus fruit. Despite heavy damage, exports had reached 201,760 tons by the end of February against 189,600 tons at the same time last year. The demand for fruit by the fruit juice factories has been good and prices have risen in consequence.

V. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS.

23. Car registrations in 1957 were 31,095 vehicles of all types, compared to 23,311 in the previous year. Of these 21,623 were private cars, 9,387 commercial vehicles and 75 motor coaches and buses.

24. 6,973 motorcycles were registered in 1957 against 6,906 in the previous year.

25. A telephone cable linking Algiers with Marseilles and providing for 60 simultaneous communications was opened in January.

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The existing radio telephone link, which carries 24 simultaneous communications, had become markedly insufficient.

VI. PRICES AND WAGES.

26. Prices continued to rise throughout the quarter. The retail price index, which stood at 109.2 in December (July 1, 1957 = 100), rose successively to 111.2 in January, 112.7 in February and 115.4 in March. Wholesale prices (December 3151) began to steady in February as a result of a seasonal fall in the price of certain foods, the index standing at 3195 against 3208 in January. The index figure for March has not yet been published.

27. On February 1, the minimum basic salary (S.M.I.G.) was increased by 4.85 percent, the mean of the cost-of-living index in November and December (104.4 and 105.8). The index continued to rise reaching 108.19 in February and 110.15 in March making another adjustment of basic salaries inevitable. (Base 100 - September, 1957).

28. A series of measures were taken during the quarter relating to prices. Broadly these restored freedom of price to a wide range of products including foodstuffs (semolina, macaronis, confectionery, spirits, etc.) and manufactured products (cutlery, carpets, publications, leather, etc.). As a result many price increases were recorded, among them 10 percent on the price of bread, 11 percent on bricks, 8 percent on cement, etc. At the same time steps were taken to overcome a serious shortage of meat by prohibiting the export of animals on the hoof, carcasses and fish, and by encouraging imports by the granting of a subsidy of 50 francs per kilogramme for beef and the suspension of customs duties on a wide range of fresh and frozen fish. Measures were also taken to curb the fantastic increase in the price of fruit and vegetables, but they were perhaps not so effective in holding prices as a seasonal improvement in supplies in March.

29. The shortage of ordinary wine and its high price was more effectively tackled, as might be expected. A maximum price of 90 francs per litre was set for ordinary red wine and to ensure supplies at that price for the civil population and the armed forces a levy of 2.5 percent of the season's yield was instituted on harvests of over 200 hectolitres while an additional levy of 3 percent was made on stocks held on December 24.

VII. LABOUR.

30. The scarcity of trained labour has continued to be increasingly felt, competition for clerical workers and trained technicians being very fierce. The oil companies and the many new firms setting up in business offering salaries as much as 50 percent above established local rates.

VIII. TRADE AND COMMERCE.

31. Imports in 1957 were valued at 382.395 million francs against 272,692 million in 1956, an increase of 40.4 percent. An increase of 14.4 percent was recorded in exports which rose from 150,114 million in 1956 to 171,745 million francs in 1957. The result is a deficit of 211,150 million francs compared to 122,578 million in 1956. The increase in imports is due essentially to two factors : the heavy requirements of the large armed forces in

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the country and the considerable needs, both for consumer and for capital goods, of the oil exploration companies operating in the Sahara. No account is taken in the above figures of the substantial imports under bond of special equipment for use in the Sahara.

IMPORTS (In francs)	1957	1956
France	278,772,268,000	199,964,453,000
Petroleum products (Usines exercées)	23,247,245,000	15,658,369,000
Franc area	23,104,023,000	18,404,634,000
Foreign sources	56,772,459,000	38,664,667,000
	382,895,995,000	272,692,133,000

32. Imports of food products rose by 15.5 percent (81,457 million francs against 70,532 million in 1956). Manufactured goods showed an increase of 47.9 percent (196,601 million francs against 132,946) which was made up as follows: agricultural machinery 1,940 million, industrial equipment 28,130 million and consumer goods 33,585 million. Imports of fuels rose from 19,400 million francs in 1956 to 30,280 million francs, 53 percent of the increase being accounted for by petroleum products.

EXPORTS (In francs)	1957	1956
France	137,190,812,000	114,282,840,000
Franc area	9,625,926,000	10,522,930,000
Foreign destinations	24,928,587,000	25,308,286,000
	171,745,325,000	150,114,056,000

33. The gain in exports is mainly due to the fact that wine exports were greater in volume (16 million hectolitres against 13,200 million the previous year) and with higher prices (5,172 francs per hectolitre on average against 4,270) exports showed an increase in value of 26,750 million francs. Citrus fruit, iron ore and cereals were among the exports which also showed a gain. on the other hand, vegetables, cork and esparto grass exports declined.

34. A table is attached showing imports and exports by principal countries of origin and destination.

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